Direct Discrimination, Indirect Discrimination and Autonomy

Western liberal democracies tend to impose duties on publicand private bodies that are often formulated as an obligationnot to discriminate. For instance, the European Union prohibitsdirect and indirect discrimination on certain grounds in certaincontexts. Under this model, indirect discrimination involvesa measure that, although it does not directly (i.e. explicitly)discriminate on the basis of a proscribed ground, produces adisparate impact that correlates with such a proscribed ground.Indirect discrimination is generally viewed, both conceptuallyand politically, as subordinate to direct discrimination. ProfessorJohn Gardner has argued that anti-discrimination law is justifiedon the basis of duties to respect other people's autonomy. Onthe base of this analysis, he argues that indirect discriminationis a secondary concept to the paradigm wrong of direct discrimination.I contend in this article that, if one adopts Gardner's autonomy-basedanalysis of anti-discrimination law, indirect discriminationis not a secondary concept to direct discrimination. Further,I argue that autonomy does not provide a convincing justificationfor the prohibition of either direct or indirect discrimination.I tentatively suggest, however, that the widespread impact ofcertain types of discrimination (alluded to by Gardner) maysupport an equality-based justification for the prohibitionof both direct and indirect discrimination.     

言论自由、出版自由、新闻自由的主体及其法律保护

言论自由的主体是自然人 ,出版自由的主体是自然人和法人 ,新闻自由的主体是法人。法律应当对言论区别不同类型给以相应的保护 ;对出版自由 ,法律既要保护 ,又要限制 ,但二者的界限尚有待明确 ;法律对新闻自由在保护的同时 ,要注意它与公民个人权利、与国家权力、与公众人物的利益发生冲突时应采取不同的调整手段。     

Freedom and Futures: Personal Priorities, Institutional Demands and Freedom of Religion

How should one define the legitimate reach of individuals' institutional obligations in the light of their right to freedom of religion? The most divisive settings for this question involve exclusions from certain jobs and schools. At the same time, some fundamental issues of ethics and law lie in the background. One of the most central concerns choice. On one approach, if there are other sources of work or education that do not make the same demands on the objector then she should choose between conforming and taking up that alternative. On another approach, even if there are such alternatives, people should not be confronted with such a dilemma: they should be entitled to stay in their preferred institution, which must make its best effort to accommodate them. The conflict between these two views arises from underlying differences concerning the nature of free choice itself; about the obligations borne by institutions in civil society; and about basic rights. The connections between these notions are investigated, and a way through the disagreement is suggested.     

自由、宪政及其关系——解读中国宪政运动的自由之结

自由是近现代西方社会的基本价值,是其政治、经济、文化的基石和源泉。宪政是在自由基础上建立起来的政治体制,自由乃宪政之根。对近现代中国而言,宪政的困境有两个一是社会价值系统的缺失,传统中国很难发掘出用来构筑宪政制度的思想资源;二是历史语境的错位,在严酷的二十世纪里,中国的宪政建设并不具备适宜和充分的条件。中国宪政制度的生机寄托于这两大困境的消除。     

Kant, Copyright and Communicative Freedom

The rapid recent expansion of copyright law worldwide has sparked efforts to defend the ‘public domain’ of non-propertized information, often on the ground that an expansive public domain is a condition of a ‘free culture’. Yet questions remain about why the public domain is worth defending, what exactly a free culture is, and what role (if any) authors’ rights might play in relation to it. From the standard liberal perspective shared by many critics of copyright expansionism, the protection of individual expression by means of marketable property rights in authors’ works serves as an engine of progress towards a fully competitive ‘marketplace of ideas’ – though only if balanced by an extensive public domain from which users may draw in the exercise of their own expressivity. This article shows that a significantly different, and arguably richer, conception of what a free culture is and how authors’ rights underpin it emerges from a direct engagement with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. For Kant, progress towards a fully emancipated (i.e. a ‘mature’ or ‘enlightened’) culture can only be achieved through the critical intellectual activity that public communication demands: individual expressive freedom is only a condition, not constitutive, of this ‘freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters’. The main thesis defended in this article is that when Kant’s writings on publicity (critical public debate) are read in relation to his writings on the legal organization of publishing, a necessary connection emerges between authors’ rights – as distinct from copyrights – and what Jürgen Habermas and others have named the public sphere. I conclude that it is the public sphere, and not the public domain as such, that should serve as the key reference point in any evaluation of copyright law’s role in relation to the possibility of a free culture.     

Freedom, Law, and the Colonial Project

In this essay I develop a Marxist-informed anticolonialist position, and from this position I assess the role of law in the early Canadian settler-state. I claim that the flexibility of law is a measure of its restitutive and exploitative facets, such facets that operate dialectically as a means of moderating between the settler-state’s liberal democratic ideals (e.g. individual freedom and enfranchisement) and its capitalist imperatives (e.g. privatization of land, expansion, and profit). Law plays an integral role in this context because, by performing this moderating function, it stabilizes the socio-economic order of the emergent settler-state. In the second half of this essay, I enrich my theoretical analysis by examining the variable legal subjectivity of early Ukrainian immigrants to Canada. This historical perspective allows me to illuminate the intricacies of the logic that informs law’s flexibility, and to show how the liberal democratic principle of freedom was—and continues to be—both extolled and compromised by the law’s moderating function.     

Freedom of Expression,Autonomy, and Defamation

Law and Philosophy -     

Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion

Although laws against discrimination have conventionally been justified and articulated according to various conceptions of equality, tensions between different notions of equality undermine the coherence of these explanations. The aim of social inclusion is proposed as part of an alternative justification for discrimination laws. As well as exploring the meaning and implications of the policy of social inclusion for discrimination laws, the extent to which the law already embodies this idea is assessed with particular reference to the scope of anti-discrimination laws, proof of discrimination, justification defences, and positive discrimination. It is concluded that the goal of social inclusion has the potential to provide a vital ingredient in a more coherent, though not uncritical, account of the aims of anti-discrimination legislation.     

无隐私即无自由——现代情景下的个人隐私保护

隐私权是现代文明的奢侈品.隐私权从无到有,隐私权话语的背后到底蕴藏着现代人的生存困境.科学技术、大众传媒、公共权力、消费主义文化使现代社会的个人隐私濒于死亡.隐私权旨在合理划分公共领域与私人生活,保障私生活自由.隐私权的实质是私生活的自由权.     

Intentions and Moral Permissibility: The Case of Acting Permissibly with Bad Intentions

Many people believe in the intention principle, according to which an agent??s intention in performing an act can sometimes make an act that would otherwise have been permissible impermissible, other things being equal. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Frances Kamm and Thomas Scanlon have offered cases that seem to show that it can be permissible for an agent to act even when the agent has bad intentions. If valid, these cases would seem to cast doubt on the intention principle. In this paper, I point out that these cases have confounding factors that have received little attention in the literature. I argue that these confounding factors undermine the putative force of these cases against the intention principle. Indeed, when cases without these confounding factors are considered, it becomes clear, so I argue, that intentions can be relevant for the permissibility of an act.     

Choice,Discrimination, and the Motherhood Penalty

Recent studies have documented substantial penalties associated with motherhood and suggest that discrimination plays an important role in producing them. In this article, I argue that the degree to which motherhood is conceptualized as a choice affects the penalties associated with making this choice. Two methods are employed to evaluate this argument. The first method is an analysis of state differences in the wage penalties for motherhood, in which hierarchical linear modeling is used with data from the 1988–2004 Current Population Survey. The second method is a hiring experiment in a highly controlled setting. The wage analysis shows that, net of the usual individual and state‐level factors that affect wages, mothers are penalized more in states where motherhood is perceived to be a woman's choice. The hiring experiment distinguishes between productivity‐based and discrimination‐based explanations for the penalty and provides strong evidence for a causal relationship between perceptions of choice and discrimination against mothers.     

行政自由裁量的“自由”与“不自由”

尽管行政自由裁量权的不断扩张为有识之士所担忧,但迅速发展的社会要求赋予行政机关更多的自由裁量权当然,这种裁量的自由是法律控制下的自由,超出法律界限的自由将不复自由因此,为保证法律赋予行政自由裁量权行使的初衷,自由权力的行使应受到权力和权利的制约.     

Sex Discrimination,Personal Denial,and Collateral Damage

Many social scientists, especially those interested in social justice, have bemoaned the election of Donald Trump as president of the USA and have decried similar right-wing victories around the globe. We wish our research would have more of an impact. I argue that if we want our conclusions to have more application outside academia, we must first put our own house in order. As illustrated by a personal narrative, we are guilty of the sexism that we decry in others, although we can see that with clarity only in hindsight. Connected to our sexism are some epistemological shortcomings: our false insistence on the primacy of basic research and our false claim to conduct “value-free” research.     

有关法律与自由的问题

就人类活动而言,法律主要表现为规范、引导和限制人的行为;自由则是满足人行为的自主与自为。两者之间似乎是一对矛盾,我们怎样认识和理解这对矛盾呢? 讨论这个问题之前,先让我们来认识自由行为的主体——人和自由行为的环境——社会之间的关系。马克思把人的本质看成是“真正的社会联系”,是“社会关系的总和”,是“人的真正共同体”。同时,全体的人又总是从属于一定的社会群体、阶层和阶级,生活在特定的历史时段。因此,那种用超社会、超阶级、超时代的观点来界定人的自由概念是不可取的。     

Legitimating Racial Discrimination: Emotions, Not Beliefs, Best Predict Discrimination in a Meta-Analysis

Investigations of racial bias have emphasized stereotypes and other beliefs as central explanatory mechanisms and as legitimating discrimination. In recent theory and research, emotional prejudices have emerged as another, more direct predictor of discrimination. A new comprehensive meta-analysis of 57 racial attitude-discrimination studies finds a moderate relationship between overall attitudes and discrimination. Emotional prejudices are twices as closely related to racial discrimination as stereotypes and beliefs are. Moreover, emotional prejudices are closely related to both observed and self-reported discrimination, whereas stereotypes and beliefs are related only to self-reported discrimination. Implications for justifying discrimination are discussed.