Domestic drivers of transgovernmental regulatory cooperation

Transgovernmental cooperation among domestic regulators has generated considerable interest among scholars and policymakers. While previous research has focused on describing such regulatory networks, we know very little about what drives individual jurisdictions to join them. The question of membership is important because it determines the reach of rules and standards promulgated by a given network, and because it is logically prior to understanding the rulemaking dynamic within a network. We develop a set of hypotheses that highlight the role of domestic political factors in shaping network membership. Our empirical analysis, using an original data set for transgovernmental cooperation in securities and insurance regulation, finds that the institutional form of domestic market regulation, as well as the relative domestic weight of the industry, are closely correlated with membership. All else equal, jurisdictions with independent regulatory agencies and those where the industry in question represents a large share of gross domestic product are much more likely to join the respective network than jurisdictions without these characteristics. The paper underscores the important interactions between domestic and international factors for informal cooperation, an issue that has become increasingly central to global governance.     

The theory of economic regulation and public choice and the determinants of public sector bargaining legislation

In this study we used the theory of economic regulation and public choice to derive a model to explain the pattern of public sector bargaining laws among the states. We find this type of legislation is influenced by the following demand factors: (1) the extent of public sector union membership, which represents the interest group hypothesis, has a positive influence on pro-union legislation; (2) the extent of employer opposition to unions, as measured by unfair labor practice charges against employers in representation elections, has a negative effect on bargaining laws; (3) two taste variables — the salaries of public employees and the percent of nonwhite employment in the state — have a positive influence on these laws. A result which will be surprising to many people is that the extent of private sector union membership has no significant influence on the passage of public sector bargaining legislation.Our empirical analysis indicates that supply factors are also important in explaining the pattern of public employee bargaining laws across the state. We find that states are more likely to enact pro-union legislation under the following conditions: (1) constituents appear to hold pro-labor views as represented by their Congressmen's voting record; (2) neighboring states have passed mandatory bargaining laws; and (3) when competition is greater among the political parties.     

An organizational analysis of political action committees

As the number and putative importance of political action committees have grown, so too has scholarly attention to this new breed of political organization. Yet this attention has been uneven. Although much is now known about the aggregate spending patterns of PACs, much less is known about their internal lives. The present study attempts to open the PAC black box to empirical inquiry. Drawing on interviews with the managers of 70 Washington-based political action committees, we suggest how theoretical perspectives about formal voluntary associations may be usefully applied in explaining the behavior of PACs. After examining the relationships among several variables — organizational goals, constituency relations and decision making, strategy, and interorganizational relations — we show how these forces affect the behavior of corporate, trade/membership, labor, and nonconnected PACS.     

The distribution of honoraria income in the U.S. Congress: Who gets rents in legislatures and why?

The major conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that low-cost suppliers of political favors receive the highest honoraria incomes. There is no evidence that being a lawyer, acquiring a large number of committee assignments, receiving high ratings by labor unions, representing a safe district, or introducing numerous legislative bills, increases one's honoraria income in any significant way. The wider dispersal of power reduces the effects of seniority, and membership on the Finance Committee, in determining institutional power in the Senate; hence, these variables are only significantly related to honoraria income in the House. The smaller the number of suppliers in the Senate, relative to the House, means that senators obtain higher prices for their services. As a result, business groups are more willing to pay extra — a price premium — to assure that no shirking occurs.While the distribution of honoraria has caused considerable concern and given rise to cynical explanations as to who gets them and why (see, for example, McChesney, 1987), this analysis suggests a less pejorative but empirically valid conclusion: business, and therefore honoraria, gravitate to those who can supply political favors at a lower cost than other legislators, just as low-cost suppliers gain a greater proportion of the sales in the market than those who supply the same service but at a higher price.     

The Quality of Representation and Satisfaction with Democracy: The Consequences of Citizen-Elite Policy and Process Congruence

Citizen-elite congruence has long been considered an important yardstick for the quality of democracy. The literature on citizen satisfaction with democracy, however, has reduced congruence almost exclusively to one of its components, policy congruence. Just as citizens are considered to have positions on policy issues, there is growing scholarly interest in the preferences they have about the process of representation. Yet studies inquiring into the impact of the divergent preferences that citizens and elites have regarding the representational process thus far have been few and their results inconclusive. Combining new, unique data from the 2014 Belgian Election and Candidate Studies, we seek to address this lacuna. Our findings indicate that we cannot understand citizen satisfaction without also taking process into account—even as the policy gap has the greater effect. They should be of interest to scholars of democracy, those concerned about citizen disengagement from politics, and political practitioners.     

Election Campaigns,Social Communication,and the Accessibility of Perceived Discussant Preference

This paper examines the communication of political preferences between citizens during the course of an election campaign. We are particularly concerned with the ability of individuals to make judgments regarding the likely votes of others within their networks of relationships. To this end, we employ the concept of accessibility and its measurement device—response latency or response time—in the context of a computer-assisted telephone interview. We argue that the accessibility of respondent perceptions regarding the voting preferences of their associates depends on a range of individual and contextual factors, and the analysis focuses on variation across individuals, across relationships, and across the temporal contexts of election campaigns.     

Institutional features of congressional decisions: The fight to prohibit smoking on airlines

A pervasive theme of the congressional politics literature is that the committee system is fundamental in determining the policy status quo. Such an assertion hinges crucially upon committees controlling their jurisdictions; congressional delegation is undermined if a committee can assert authority over any issue domain at any time. Yet, representatives may possess an incentive to support a policy proposal that would change the status quo, even if it entails disregarding procedures. Indeed, standard conceptualizations of how members of Congress make their voting choices assume that only the benefits and costs associated with a policy matter, and they do not consider institutional factors such as whether a bill emerged from the correct committee.This analysis examines whether representatives will sacrifice policy interests to preserve institutional features of the legislature. The effort in 1987 to curb smoking on airplanes — which became embroiled in a difficult-to-resolve jurisdictional dispute — serves as a vehicle to analyze how sensitive members are to such features. The results demonstrate that a sizable number put aside their [generally moderate] policy preferences and voted against limits on smoking for institutional reasons. These findings have important implications both for specifying the determinants of policy change and for understanding institutional stability.     

A retrospective on retrospective voting

This paper critically reviews the extensive literature on retrospective voting in response to economic conditions. Each of the major types of analyses which have been performed — time-series analyses of national vote totals, presidential popularity, and cross-sectional analyses of individual survey responses — has raised several interesting and important questions. The answers that have been obtained, however, are only partial and limited, as each of these approaches entails serious problems of estimation and interpretation. Further progress in this area, we argue, requires explicit treatment of conceptual and statistical issues that have hindered previous research: the dynamic formulation of expectations and preferences, the incidence of policy (and nonpolicy) effects across the population, and notions of incumbency and political responsibility.     

What’s in a poll? Incentives for truthful reporting in pre-election opinion surveys

We examine the ability of pre-election polls to aggregate information about voter preferences. We show that if the electorate is small and voting costs are negligible, then an equilibrium exists in which citizens report their true political preferences. If the electorate is large or voting costs are significant, however, then no such equilibrium exists because poll respondents possess incentives to influence the voting behavior of others by misreporting their true preferences. We find that when a truthful equilibrium does exist, a poll can raise expected welfare by discouraging turnout among members of the minority.     

Public preferences about government spending: Partisan,social, and attitudinal sources of policy differences

Although the causes and consequences of the growth of government have become the focus of increasing scholarly attention, relatively little empirical research has been done about the nature and determinants of individual fiscal preferences. The present study analyzes patterns of partisan, socioeconomic, and attitudinal differentiation in public spending preferences for a variety of government functions. Two important findings emerge from our analysis. First, attitudes about the adequacy of government spending for each of the functions considered are shown to have two dimensions—a support for spending dimension and a support for change dimension. Second, the patterns of partisan and socioeconomic cleavages about government spending are shown to vary significantly across policy domains. This fracturing of demand structures, it is argued, may be one of the root causes of the performance crisis of political institutions.     

How Affordable Is HUD Affordable Housing?

This article assesses the affordability of U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) rental assistance properties from the perspective of transportation costs. HUD housing is, by definition, affordable from the standpoint of housing costs due to limits on the amounts renters are required to pay. However, there are no such limitations on transportation costs, and common sense suggests that renters in remote locations may be forced to pay more than 15% of income, a nominal affordability standard, for transportation costs. Using household travel models estimated with data from 15 diverse regions around the United States, we estimated and summed automobile capital costs, automobile operating costs, and transit fare costs for households at 8,857 HUD rental assistance properties. The mean percentage of income expended on transportation is 15% for households at the high end of the eligible income scale. However, in highly sprawling metropolitan areas, and in suburban areas of more compact metropolitan areas, much higher percentages of households exceed the 15% ceiling. This suggests that locational characteristics of properties should be considered for renewal when HUD contracts expire for these properties, based on location and hence on transportation affordability.     

Being Certain Versus Being Right: Citizen Certainty and Accuracy of House Candidates' Ideological Orientations

Research on voting behavior has been reinvigorated by focusing on citizens' certainty of candidates' issue positions and ideological orientations. According to this perspective, citizens are inclined to support candidates whom they are confident possess attributes they deem important. Analysis of citizens' perceptual certainty and perceptual accuracy of 1994, 1996, and 1998 House candidates' ideological orientations reveals that many candidate characteristics (incumbency, fiscal resources) that enhance certainty fail to improve perceptual accuracy. The electoral consequence of this fact is that candidates endowed with these resources benefit from the importance of certainty to citizens without paying the electoral costs of clarifying their issue positions and ideological orientations. Similarly, several characteristics of citizens that lead to certainty reduction—gender and caring about the outcome of the election, for example—fail to improve perceptual accuracy. The implications of the empirical findings for the role of citizens' assessments of certainty in the voting decision for producing an informed electorate are considered here.     

Lumpy preference structures

A widely held and durable normative position has been that policy analysts should attempt to estimate the evaluative reaction of those who will be most directly affected by a government sponsored or regulated technology. The premise of applied welfare economics is that citizens would divide, substitute and additively recombine their assessments of the project's impacts in the same manner. This paper outlines an alternative theory by arguing that citizen preferences will often be contingent upon, rather than divisible from, the substantive and procedural characteristics of the context in which a choice takes place. Moreover, one can predict that the manner in which these evaluations are substituted and recombined will vary with the internal structure of one's value and belief system. By representing that system in terms of a hierarchical model composed of four factors — common orientation, procedural judgment, desire for personal control and substantive evaluation — it is argued that the evaluations of a project will be combined by way of interactive, indirect and non-recursive relationships as well as the common additive expectations. Some of the implications of this alternative theory for policy analysis are explored.     

Shaping Local Councillor Preferences: Party Politics,Committee Structure and Social Background1

The preferences of politicians are crucial in a representative democracy. In order to change policy, voters must elect politicians who prefer to do so. Party affiliation may signal preferences to voters, but preferences are also shaped by institutional factors, such as committee membership and social background. This article assesses whether political, institutional or social background explanations best explain spending preferences, based on a survey of 1,200 Danish municipal councillors. Simulations of the relative effect of such variables show that party membership is the most important explanation of spending preferences. Social background, including age, gender, occupation and education, has limited impact, but female, young and better-educated politicians are likely to prefer higher spending. The committee structure is more important. Standing committee membership and seniority have a substantial positive effect on preferences. Although spending advocacy does exist, guardians are harder to find. Even though the members of the economic committee are responsible for the overall economic situation, spending preferences among these politicians are not systematically different.     

Iceland's Economic Crash and Integration Takeoff: An End to European Union Scepticism?

Iceland's application for European Union (EU) membership in summer 2009 suggests that the country's political parties had reconsidered their longstanding scepticism towards European integration and opted for closer engagement with the EU after the financial crisis. Applying Moravcsik's liberal theory of preference formation, this article investigates the European policies of Iceland's political parties from 2007 to 2010, focusing on four related European issues which have been prominent in the Icelandic EU debate: an application to join the EU with no reservations; the unilateral adoption of the euro; the inclusion of a clause in the constitution allowing a transfer of sovereignty; and the holding of a referendum on an EU application. It analyses whether the economic crash actually led to a change in the political parties' economic preferences and to a subsequent reformulation and adaptation of their long‐term European policy goals and, if not, then how Iceland's decision to apply for EU membership is to be understood. The article concludes that the parties' European policies have remained remarkably stable despite the EU application. This indicates that Iceland's EU membership application can only be understood through a thorough examination of domestic politics, to which liberal intergovernmentalism pays insufficient attention.     

Estimating voter migration in Canada using generalized maximum entropy

As voters switch political preferences from election to election, understanding the magnitude of voter flows among parties and transitions between voters and non-voters is an essential element of political analysis. As exit polls are uncommon in Canada, voter migration can also be estimated using suitable statistical techniques. Backing out micro-level voter migration probabilities from macro-level election data is a problem of ‘ecological inference.’ This paper uses the method of generalized maximum entropy (GME) to estimate voter migration patterns for the two most recent Canadian federal elections (2004 and 2006) and two most recent provincial elections in British Columbia (2001 and 2005). The estimation results answer important questions about voter behaviour in Canada. These results will be of interest to political scientists, historians, and politicians, as well as econometric practitioners who wish to estimate voter migration.     

Ladies against women: Explaining the political participation of traditional- and modern-role females

Data from the 1980 National Election Study are used to examine how well participation theory variables and group consciousness variables account for the nonvoting political activity of traditional-role women. Of the little variance in this activity that is explained by a regression analysis among these women (.070 after adjustments for number of respondents and variables, compared to .240 among modern-role women), most is due to two participation theory variables: party identification and efficacy. However, a discriminant function analysis emphasizes two group consciousness variables (gender consciousness and religious consciousness) and only one participation theory variable (political ideology) as the main forces that distinguish active traditional-role from active modern-role women. These findings indicate the need to make clear which comparison group — other traditional-role women or politically active modern-role women — is being used in efforts to understand traditional-role women's political conduct. The findings also call for new theoretical directions about traditional-role women's nonvoting participation, because of the weak explanatory ability exhibited by all fourteen variables together.     

External dimensions of European environmental policy: An analysis of environmental treaty ratification by third states

The European Union has become an important leader in international environmental affairs – particularly through the negotiation of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) with favourable terms. In this article, EU environmental leadership is studied from a new perspective, focusing on the ratification stage of environmental regime formation. Specifically, it investigates whether the EU is also capable of motivating third states to join its preferred MEAs. It is argued that third states join the EU's preferred MEAs to signal their compliance with EU environmental standards in an effort to become eligible for various rewards that the EU could potentially offer, including a credible membership perspective, access to its lucrative markets, and aid and assistance. The argument is tested by examining the ratification behaviour of 25 non‐EU Member States with regard to all 21 MEAs negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). The results provide robust support for the theory that EU rewards motivate third states to ratify these treaties. The results withstand a number of statistical tests, even when alternative explanatory factors such as trade intensities, transnational communication and geographic proximity are controlled for. The study is the first large‐scale demonstration of the EU's external influence at the ratification stage of environmental regime formation. By identifying three different channels of EU influence, the research permits a more refined understanding of the EU's role as a promoter of environmental protection standards.     

Professional associations and the free rider problem: The case of optometry

Political influence by a professional association, like the influence of any special interest group, is a collective good for the members of the profession. This paper investigates the variables affecting the ability of state optometric associations to overcome the free rider problem and induce optometrists to join the association. Although the empirical results show little evidence that organization costs are reduced by concentration in urban areas, the results do strongly support the hypothesis that there will be less free riding in smaller groups. The results also support the hypothesis that selective incentives enable latent groups to overcome the free rider problem. By providing continuing education at reduced fees to members of the association, optometric associations have increased the percentage of optometrists who are association members in those states with statutory continuing education requirements.