What price access to the open seas? The geopolitics of oil and gas transmission from the Trans-Caspian republics

In the late 1980s, the Soviet Union was the world's largest hydrocarbon producer. The landmass over which these resources are distributed is vast and the reserves mostly landlocked. To convey these hydrocarbons to refineries and to market, the Soviets constructed the largest integrated pipeline networks in the world. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, new competing national interests have produced tensions over these energy resources and transmission corridors, with economically detrimental and often irrational consequences. In Central Asia, the post-Soviet Republics of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan produce significant amounts of hydrocarbons and export their oil and gas to or through Russian Federation territory. Russian government policy aims to continue exercising political control over these resources and to maximize Moscow's share of profits from their export. This paper examines oil and gas transmission issues in Central Asia, against a backdrop of emerging new relationships between the Russian Federation and the three post-Soviet republics, the resurgent strategic competition between Russia and the United States, China's developing power base in the region and Iran's potentially key geographic position for channelling Caspian energy supplies towards the Persian Gulf.     

Persistence and change in Soviet and Russian relations with Afghanistan

This paper examines persistence and change in the Soviet Union's and then Russia's relations with Afghanistan with respect to development and security. First, a detailed analysis of the promise and reality of Soviet development assistance reveals conceptual shortcomings in their attempt to induce economic development in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union's heritage is then revealed in order to understand Russia's current perception of post-Taliban Afghanistan as well as Russia's emerging interests and commitment to Afghanistan's economic development. This paper argues that Russia will most likely replicate standard industrialization development approaches in contributing to Afghanistan's development. Therefore, Russia will probably run into problems similar to those that led to the failure of the Soviet modernization project, which consisted of large-scale development projects that were inappropriate to the country's institutions and the lives of most Afghans. It is questionable whether such reiteration will induce economic development now, in the complex setting of a fragmented and fragile state with a multitude of external players looking out for their own interests.     

South Korea’s policy toward Russia: A Korean view

The article focuses on delineating South Korea’s policy toward Russia. First, it gives a cursory review, from a historical perspective, of how South Korea came to normalize diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and has continued to maintain its diplomatic relations with Russia in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in an attitude of increased pragmatism. Second, it examines the salient features of South Korea’s diplomatic milieu, especially in terms of its strategic security and economic interests, in a bilateral and regional context in the post-cold war era, in light of its newly established diplomatic relationship with Russia. Finally, South Korea’s policy agenda vis-à-vis Russia is identified in various arenas, including diplomacy and security; bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation; and regional multilateral secruity regime-building.     

Russia,the death penalty,and Europe: the ambiguities of influence

Studies of capital punishment worldwide investigate how international influence affects the death penalty. We analyze European influence on the death penalty in Russia over the imperial, Soviet, and post-Soviet periods, using two parameters: the changing mechanisms of influence in each period and the death penalty's significance in the broader spectrum of punitive violence. On the first parameter, in the tsarist period, European influence on Russian policy was “productive” – exercised through prestige, moral suasion, and “diffusion.” In the Soviet period, European influence was blocked. In the post-Soviet period, European influence is coercive, as the Council of Europe has unsuccessfully sought to compel Russia to abolish its death penalty. On the second parameter, the death penalty in Russia has always been only one of many forms of state-sanctioned punitive killing. In consequence, the Council's involvement in Russia's death penalty has produced an incoherent policy outcome and has entangled the Council in Russia's authoritarian politics. Russia thus exemplifies the hazards of external involvement in death penalty abolition.     

Stalinism and Russian Nationalism: A Reconceptualization

A sologist analyzes the idea of Russian nationalism as it evolved under Lenin and Stalin. Based on a reconsideration of Soviet history and of Stalin's and others' published statements, the article reexamines the relationship between Soviet and Russian identity and nationalism. The article concludes with discussion of the implications of this historical legacy for Putin's Russia.     

Happiness and Toska: An Essay in the History of Emotions in Pre-war Soviet Russia

This article examines the question of what can be gained from an investigation of people's emotions in Stalin's Russia. Such an investigation is inevitably limited by the type of sources available. However, the available sources on Soviet subjectivity provide some evidence of both "official" Soviet emotions (such as enthusiasm and righteous anger against enemies) and less officially prescribed, but widespread, emotions, such as fear, melancholy ( toska ), malice ( zlost' ) and personal happiness. This article focusses on accounts of happiness ( schast'e) and the yearning sadness known as toska , a frequently encountered counterpart of the former. The civic obligation to express public, collective happiness impinged on the capacity to express private happiness: grief and melancholy could be expressed, as long as they were not connected to complaints about the régime.     

The Problem of Soviet Colonialism in the Baltics

This essay works through some of the necessary preliminary questions in thinking about Soviet colonialism in the Baltics. It opens by tracing the prehistory of critical thinking about Soviet colonialism in the 1960s and considers why the topic of Soviet colonialism has not (or not yet) become a dominant way to understand Soviet history. The central question posed by the article is whether one can speak about the Soviet invasions of the Baltic States as ‘colonization’. It proposes that, initially, communist Russia did not in fact seek to colonize the Baltic States and instead ‘occupied’ them; however, this initial period of occupation later developed into a period of a colonial rule.     

Culture and Symbols as Tools of Resistance

In 1918, when Estonia was proclaimed an independent republic, nearly one-sixth of all Estonians were living beyond its eastern border. The possibility of returning to Estonia was offered to these tens of thousands of people with the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of Tartu between Estonia and Soviet Russia in February 1920. The Republic of Estonia, which had just emerged from a war and was only beginning to rebuild its public sector, had to arrange this vast re-emigration. This article illustrates the problems that arose for Estonian state authorities in connection with offering citizenship to Estonians living in Soviet Russia and arranging their re-emigration in 1920–1923.     

Australia and the Struggle for Soviet Jewry: 1961–1972

The plight of Soviet Jewry emerged as a major issue for World Jewry after the Second World War. Both Israel and Jewish Diaspora communities campaigned to give Soviet Jews either freedom of religion or the right to emigrate. The 1960s saw the promotion of the latter, with the slogan “Let My People Go”. Whilst geographically isolated and only being a medium power, the Australian government played a key role, with Australian politicians at times acting against the advice of the public service. The politicians were swayed by idealism, whereas department officials pursued a pragmatic, realist approach, being only concerned with what they saw as Australia's core foreign policy interests.     

NATO–Russia security challenges in the aftermath of Ukraine conflict: managing Black Sea security and beyond

NATO’s relationship with the Soviet Union and then Russia has been central to defining the European regional and global security configuration for decades. This article explores the potential consequences of the Ukrainian conflict for the current and future NATO–Russia relationship. The analysis focuses on defining specific challenges and risks for NATO and Russia in managing the evolving security environment of the Black Sea region. The author offers an assessment of the potential for future NATO–Russia clashes or cooperation in the Black Sea, and for broader regional and global security. Some recommendations are suggested for managing the future NATO–Russia relationship during this period of heightened uncertainty and risk.     

Endorsing Annexation? The Whitlam Government's De Jure Recognition of the Soviet Baltic States

In August 1974, the Australian Labor Party Government under Prime Minister Gough Whitlam announced it had recognised the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union de jure. Historical writing around this diplomatic recognition is scarce and sheds little light on why the policy was enacted. Using previously unavailable archival evidence, as well as other sources including testimony from Government and public service workers, this article demonstrates that the recognition was induced primarily by Whitlam, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and Sir James Plimsoll, Australia's ambassador to the Soviet Union. These actors were motivated by varying considerations. These included an adherence to realist foreign policy principles, concerns regarding Australian–Soviet bi-lateral relations, convictions around the legitimacy of Baltic self-determination, and ethnic prejudice against Australians of Baltic descent.     

Ahmad Amin and nationalism

With the breakup of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, three republics in the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) achieved independence for the second time during the twentieth century. Their first experience was contentious and short-lived, had little or no support from the Western powers and was brought to end by the newly formed Soviet Union with the tacit approval of Turkey. While Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani national aspirations were quashed in the early post-First World War era, Zionism was given encouragement with the establishment of the Palestine Mandate. When Israel was established it was given immediate recognition by the Soviet Union, but most Jews from Georgia and Azerbaijan – Armenia's population was very small in comparison – only made their way to Israel during the last years of the Cold War. On the other hand, following the Second World War, some members of the Armenian Diaspora, including those in the Arab world, immigrated to the Soviet Union. While Soviet-Israeli relations had been strained since the Six-Day War, the end of the Cold War not only brought better ties between Russia and Israel, but it allowed Israel to establish relations with the other successor states of the former Soviet Union. Many of those countries sought ties with Israel (and the other Western states) to insure their continued independence from Russia, while, at the same time, Arab-Israeli relations improved and Turkey and Israel drew closer together. Iran was regarded with suspicion by Azerbaijan and along with Georgia, which wanted to enhance its ties with the West, drew closer to Turkey. Both countries have benefited from the transport of oil. Jews from Georgia and Azerbaijan have kept close connections with their former countries, where anti-Semitism was never the problem it was in Russia. Armenia has remained the closest to Russia with its conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh and its distrust of Georgia. However, Armenians experienced genocide at the hands of the Ottomans and have sought support from Israel over that issue.     

Disarmament,with special reference to Asia

On February 20 M. V. dc Korostovetz read a paper on Soviet Russia and her Southern Neighbours. The subject was divided into four parts: (a) The general trend of Russia's foreign policy, which, whether Imperial or Bolshevik, has differed in method rather than aim; (b) the States from Turkey to China, lying to the south of the Soviet block, with special attention to Chinese Turkestan; (c) the Ukrainian attitude to Communism; and (d) an outline of the new canals planned to make the Volga the chief waterway of Russia at the expense of the Don, and, with the refortification of the Straits, to turn the Black Sea into a mare clausum.     

The Politics of Citizenship Policy in Post-Soviet Russia

Russian citizenship policy has evolved in puzzling ways from the 1990s, when all former Soviet citizens were entitled to simplified access to Russian citizenship, to the 2002 citizenship law, which put an abrupt end to this policy, giving few but those born on the territory of Russia the right to citizenship. Since 2002, the right to Russian citizenship has been extended to some additional categories of former Soviet citizens, but without a return to the expansive policy of the 1990s. Drawing on legal and governmental sources and the scholarly literature, this article looks at elite debates over citizenship rules to analyze Russian citizenship politics and policies, focusing on citizenship rules affecting former Soviet citizens. These are examined to uncover the causes of legislative zigzags and ascertain the applicability of existing citizenship theories to Russian realities.     

SIDESTEPPING A QUAGMIRE: RUSSIA,SYRIA, AND THE LESSONS OF THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR

Russia's military intervention in Syria (2015-present) has ensured the Assad regime's survival to date. Why though has Russia succeeded in achieving its objective? This article provides an analysis of Russia's involvement in the Syrian civil war in comparison to the Soviet Union's military debacle in Afghanistan (1979-89). Accordingly, by avoiding the USSR's mistakes in Afghanistan, this article posits that Russia has not become entangled in a protracted conflict in Syria. In Syria, Russia has militarily intervened to buttress the Assad regime, not to reorganize the host government's leadership and assume control over the war effort. Meanwhile, Syrian opposition forces lack concerted international support and Russia has allies that are assisting the embattled Syrian government. Lastly, Russia intends to ‘freeze’ the Syrian civil war in place by (i) pressuring opposition forces to submit and other countries to re-embrace Damascus in a diplomatic forum, (ii) endorsing Syria's claim to sovereignty, and (iii) relying upon a small military presence to deter others from destabilizing Assad's rule.     

Russian Studies Without Russia

A distinguished American specialist on Soviet and Russian politics addresses the lessons of the seven years leading to Russia's crash of 1998 for how US scholars, journalists, and politicians have analyzed Russia under Yeltsin. Citing a wide range of academic and journalistic sources, including materials published from October 1998 to January 1999, the article surveys and criticizes the mainstream concepts employed for comprehending social, political, and economic life in that country. It proposes both an alternative vocabulary and different comparative references for explaining and predicting developmental trends in Russia.     

Russian politics in a time of uncertainty∗

It is not only the vitality of the incumbent political regime but the very basis of the democratic system in Russia that has been tested by the recent economic crisis, argues Sergei Smolnikov, Visiting Professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo. So far, the regime has reacted to the situation by recruiting the old nomenklatura to manage the country. Since it is forced to maneuver in a political and economic environment that is qualitatively different from the Soviet era, the nomenklatura might eventually attempt to reconstruct this environment. Smolnikov highlights a growing disparity between the major structural elements of the regime's foreign policy. If exacerbated, this trend could lead to a deterioration of Russia's relations with the West, and might eventually make Russia an international outcast. Strategically, this situation is dangerous not only for the future of democracy in Russia but also for international security. To ensure democracy in Russia remains vibrant, the West should not reduce its commitment to engage Russia by economic and political means.     

帝国研究视角下的苏联解体研究

苏联的建立与演进,似乎都与"帝国"有复杂的关联性。其前身——俄罗斯帝国是典型的陆上帝国。苏联成立后坚持反帝立场,但之后逐渐演变成为一个"社会帝国主义"国家。其标志就是形成了核心—边缘的帝国结构体系,以苏联统治中枢莫斯科及俄罗斯为核心,向外形成了三层边缘地带,其中第一层是苏联的加盟共和国,第二层是中东欧华约成员国,第三层是在亚洲和美洲的经互会成员国。苏联解体实际上是"帝国终结"历史的一个组成部分,是一次迟来的非殖民化,也是人类历史发展的自然进程。这方面的具体原因至少有以下三个:其一,苏联领导人对当时局势的认识及判断和采取的对策及政策;其二,边缘地区民族主义产生了重要的动员和发动作用;最后,"帝国的负担"成为难以承受的现实负担。     

苏维埃制度崩溃原因的初步分析

苏联解体的轻率和突然令人震惊,但官方的苏联历史是神化的.并非国有制过度这种所谓的恶疾导致了苏维埃体制的崩溃.苏联经济落后及其被军备竞赛所耗尽只是意识形态的神话.石油价格波动同样未在苏联解体过程中发挥重要作用.后苏联时期俄罗斯相当长时期内的危机,不是从苏联延续下来,而是在拆解苏联时形成的.只有极少数公民有意识地否定苏维埃制度的主要基础.厘清苏联解体的原因,需要我们应打破教条和陈词滥调以及意识形态语言的藩篱.应区分苏维埃构想和其在实践中的具体表现--苏维埃制度.苏维埃构想并没有消灭自己,也没有退化或自我毁灭,而只是在成长中出现了疾病,其一系列制度无法适应苏联社会和苏联人发展的新形势.苏联体系的主要特点,或者说斯大林主义,是在 1905-1917年革命、内战、20 世纪 20 年代的新经济政策、30 年代的集体化和工业化、卫国战争期间形成的.当时的环境导致苏共在具体的制度设计上选择的范围很小,只能基于现实的威胁、资源潜力和历史上造就的具有惯性的文化环境.二战结束后,苏联的领导层未能妥善解决摆脱"斯大林主义",摆脱动员发展状态这样的复杂问题,进而导致了一系列的政治危机并由于冷战而深化其严重性.苏联既是被冷战的对手所扼杀,更死于自己的双手.苏联合法性的危机酝酿了 30年才成熟.苏维埃制度早期的合法性源自对群众对社会苦难的记忆.伴随着城市化的发展,至 20世纪 60-70年代,苏联社会从根本上发生了改变.但城市化给对苏维埃的不满制造了客观的前提条件.一种隐性的危险日益增大,即以前的苏维埃制度的思想基础迅速急剧地衰弱乃至消失.苏联短期内有两代感觉自己毫无生活保障的年轻人被改革、公开性、集会以及文化多元论弄得神魂颠倒.精英阶层的反苏部分的行动利用了这种世界观危机并使之加剧.而新一代领导人既无法迅速揭示也无法预防社会上已经出现的矛盾,而且无法找到有效的方法解决成熟的问题.党的高层与苏联社会现实的脱离令人震惊,他们自以为掌控着国内进程,但实际上底层的干部掌握着形势.这使得戈尔巴乔夫日益激进的改革导致雪崩式的后果.从这一意义上讲,苏联的解体是文明和世界观危机的结果.其实质在于,苏联社会与国家没能胜任在代际更替的过程中更新社会制度合法性手段的任务;无法保障文化历史类型嬗变的延续性,这种递嬗发生在现代化和城市化过程中并和整个社会走出20世纪20至50年代的动员型发展状态的危机相吻合.     

俄罗斯问题的中国表述——关于20世纪中国对苏俄认知的研究

现在是重新认识20世纪中国如何表述俄罗斯问题的时候了.20世纪很长一段时间,俄国之于中国是一个挥之不去的迷思,这个迷思全方位地存在于中国社会,影响力至今不绝.我们需要澄清造成这种状况的自身原因.其中,一些著名知识分子因为时代原因,在无法直接触碰苏俄、不了解苏俄的情形下,却满怀热情地去认同或拒绝经由苏维埃所确认的那个俄国,不经学术研究和学理性判断,把原本是在国际反资本主义浪潮下获得成功的苏俄革命这一地域性现象,泛化为一种普世性的规律.1950年代以后,知识界依据苏联社会主义理论,把"解冻"以降的苏联变革理解为背离社会主义,把苏联解体看成是国际共运的失败.相应的,知识界这种缺乏现代民族国家考量的意见,又成为党政和社会理解苏俄问题的理论根据,在中国社会广泛流行.这种情况几乎持续到20世纪末.反思这些历史性表述,对中国在21世纪提升认识俄罗斯问题的水平、建构恰当的中俄关系,既有历史的警示作用,又有理论价值.