Democratization,regional integration,and human rights: the case of the ASEAN intergovernmental commission on human rights

Abstract

In the post‐Cold War era, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has attempted to maintain and enhance its institutional status in the Asia‐Pacific by increasing its membership and range of activities. ASEAN has tried to assume significant responsibilities for regional security and economic relations through initiatives like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and by demanding a major role in the Asia‐Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. This paper critically evaluates ASEAN's attempts at institutional expansion. It argues that ASEAN lacks the political, economic and military resources necessary to play the dominant role that it envisions for itself within the Asia‐Pacific. Its attempts to increase its diplomatic weight by increasing its membership actually have the potential to undermine ASEAN's unity as well as its standing in the world community. The East Asian economic crisis is largely exacerbating ASEAN's inherent weaknesses. If ASEAN is to remain relevant in the twenty‐first century its members need to modify their expectations of the level of international influence that ASEAN can afford them. They must also use ASEAN to directly address issues of dispute between member states. There is little evidence that ASEAN's members are prepared to reform the organization in this way. Therefore, ASEAN is likely to lose its pre‐eminent regional status to other institutions, and may even fade into irrelevance, in the next century.     

Beyond religious affinity: Malaysia's relations with countries in the Arab Gulf

Abstract

Economic and political changes at the global level have simultaneously shifted Malaysia's interests in the Arab Gulf countries. The economic liberalisation and transformation agenda that emerged in these economies are argued to be contributing factors to Malaysia's interest in expanding its economic relationships with the countries. Although the current cooperation between Malaysia and the Arab Gulf countries is aimed at reaping economic benefits, religious values also constitute an important foundation for these relationships. This article seeks to understand why politics, economics and religion remain the key drivers in determining Malaysia's relations with the Arab Gulf countries. The paper also suggests a future direction for engagement between Malaysia and Gulf Cooperation Council countries.     

Institutional transformation of ASEAN: ZOPFAN,TAC, and the Bali Concord I in 1968–1976

Abstract

Many international relations (IR) scholars discuss whether the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) possesses institutional utility in maintaining security in Southeast Asia or East Asia. While this has important implications for both academics and policy-makers, ASEAN's role has been too often evaluated in terms of what has persisted within the association rather than what changed. Yet, exploring the causes and processes of institutional transformation are particularly important because they have made ASEAN expand its security utility by creating security dialogues and fostering security cooperation in the region. In this context, the crucial question is: when and how has ASEAN changed?

Focusing on the causes and processes of institutional transformation which have occurred within ASEAN, this article explores ASEAN's transformation from 1968 to 1976, by using a theoretical model, developed from historical institutionalism and the punctuated equilibrium model. Applying this approach to institutional transformation of ASEAN in the political-security field, three transformation processes are constructed. First, ASEAN member states’ expected changes in the external security environment triggered internal discussions regarding ASEAN's political-security function; second, these internal political discussions fostered institutional consolidation of ASEAN during this period; and third, such direction of institutional transformation was fundamentally guided by ideas provided by institutional norm entrepreneurs (INEs), especially Malaysia's neutrality proposal.

In particular, this article examines the process of ASEAN's creation of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the Bali Concord in 1976, and argues that this model shed light on the significance of ZOPFAN that created a foundation of TAC and the Bali Concord, for which conventional wisdom has dismissed as an insignificant institutional concept by academics and practitioners.     

Walking a tightrope: democracy versus sovereignty in ASEAN's illiberal peace

Abstract

Since 1967, ASEAN has established intramural relations that forsake war as a means for resolving conflict. While this is a remarkable achievement for the region, it must be balanced against a concomitant hindrance of democratic reform. I argue in this paper that ASEAN's nascent security community must be seen as an ‘illiberal peace’. Underlying ASEAN's peaceful community are the same principles that support illiberalism in the region, namely sovereignty and non-interference. While sovereignty has historically been a cherished norm for developing countries, ASEAN lags behind other regions, particularly Latin America, in attempting to reconcile tensions between democratic norms and the respect for sovereignty. This tension is most evident in ASEAN's relations with Myanmar. Recent events indicate that ASEAN's non-interference norm may no longer be sacrosanct, but the association is a long way from shunning illiberal politics for the sake of democratic values.     

The elusiveness of regional order: Leifer,the English school and Southeast Asia

Abstract

‘Regional order’ was Michael Leifer's yardstick of choice to assess the international relations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Leifer's recurrent theme was how elusive, and at times how illusory, regional order was for Southeast Asia. The elusiveness of regional order is attributed to ASEAN's lack of a set of genuinely shared assumptions about their interrelationships with each other and external states. This article challenges Leifer's portrait of a Southeast Asia devoid of regional order. I argue that Leifer's notion of order is theoretically underdeveloped and methodologically imprecise, allowing the analyst to see disorder in every minor perturbation in the region. I propose replacing ‘regional order’ with ‘peace and stability’, the preferred terms of the discourse by ASEAN's policy elites. By the latter criteria, ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific, contrary to the skeptics, have made impressive progress in the last forty years.     

The North Korean factor in the improvement of Japanese intelligence capability

Abstract

Since the early 1990s, human rights have been a contentious issue for relations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU), especially in the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM). It is an issue that has constantly led to tensions in interregional cooperation. However, the ASEAN–EU dialogue on human rights has, in fact, had a significant impact on regional dynamics by stimulating the process of regional identity formation, especially in Southeast Asia. The core mechanism through which this development takes place is that of interaction, the process in which the two regional groupings engage while negotiating human rights policy. It can be argued, therefore, that interregional and intraregional human rights interactions are mutually dependent. ASEAN's rather confrontational mode of interaction with the European Union in relation to human rights has served as a catalyst for the dynamic growth of a collective definition of self in ASEAN. It has led to an ‘essentialization’ of ASEAN's idea of self as opposed to a common other, something which has undermined the possibility of maintaining an interregional dialogue that is not confrontational. However, it has also contributed to the development of a regional space for communicating about human rights and has thus played a central role in the gradual transformation of ASEAN's collective identity formation.     

ASEAN as the ‘regional conductor’: understanding ASEAN's role in Asia-Pacific order

This paper analyses ASEAN's prominence in regional order negotiation and management in Southeast Asia and the Asia-pacific through the lens of social role negotiation. It argues that ASEAN has negotiated legitimate social roles as the ‘primary manager’ in Southeast Asia and the ‘regional conductor’ of the Asia-Pacific order. It develops an English School-inspired role negotiation framework and applies it to three periods: 1954–1975 when ASEAN's ‘primary manager’ role emerged from negotiations with the USA; 1978–1991 when ASEAN's role was strengthened through negotiations with China during the Cambodian conflict; and 1991-present when ASEAN created and expanded the ‘regional conductor’ role. Negotiations during the Cold War established a division of labour where great powers provided security public goods but the great power function of diplomatic leadership was transferred to ASEAN. ASEAN's diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia provided a foundation for creating its ‘regional conductor’ role after the Cold War. ASEAN's ability to sustain its roles depends on maintaining role bargains acceptable to the great powers, an increasingly difficult task due to great power rivalry in the South China Sea.     

‘Back Regions’ and ‘Dark Secrets’ in Singapore: The Politics of Censorship and Liberalisation

The political transition from Lee Kuan Yew to Goh Chok Tong to Lee Hsien Loong has generally been interpreted as a trajectory of gradual liberalisation in Singapore. This discourse of liberalisation is encouraged by a variety of factors such as policy changes over censorship regulations, a younger and more cosmopolitan polity, the government's global city ambition and desire to turn the city-state into a creative hub. Such factors, however, often obscure the contemporary policing dynamics of the People's Action Party (PAP) state. Using Erving Goffman's concepts of the ‘back’ and ‘front’ regions, this paper will demonstrate how the PAP state operates in different social spaces and how it engages in the different politics of these spaces. Using specific cases from the theatre community, this paper argues that the discourse of liberalisation has grown because the PAP state has, in recent times, exercised its censorship powers in the ‘back regions’ of theatre, away from the media and public. Finally, it will examine recent amendments to the Films Act and the Public Order Act which clamps down on acts of civil disobedience, and show that this is consistent with what Goffman calls ‘dark secrets’—that is, facts that are incompatible with an individual's or institution's public image.     

‘Opening up’ by default: North Korea,the humanitarian community and the crisis

In April 1999, ASEAN formally admitted Cambodia thereby completing its declared goal of grouping together all ten Southeast Asian countries under its umbrella. This was the culminating event in the latest phase of ASEAN's enlargement. This process, however, had been problematic from the start. The entry of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam without any clear criteria for admission has raised questions regarding the preparedness of these countries to participate in ASEAN. More importantly, it led to strains in ASEAN's relations with its dialogue partners over the legitimacy of some of the governments in power in these countries. The was further complicated by the economic upheaval caused by the financial crisis which struck Southeast Asia in 1997. The impact of these events on ASEAN has put into question the association's growing role as a leading player in Asia-Pacific affairs. More importantly, it has raised issues which are central to ASEAN's continued existence.     

ASEAN and human rights: resisting Western pressure or emulating the West?

Abstract

Observers of Southeast Asian affairs commonly assume that the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are reluctant to pursue liberal agendas, and that their main concern is to resist pressure from Western powers to improve their human rights practice. This article, however, argues that such a conventional view is too simplistic. The Southeast Asian countries have voluntarily been pursuing liberal agendas, and their main concern here is to be identified as ‘Western’ countries – advanced countries with legitimate international status. They have ‘mimetically’ been adopting the norm of human rights which is championed by the advanced industrialized democracies, with the intention of securing ASEAN's identity as a legitimate institution in the community of modern states. Ultimately, they have been pursuing liberal agendas, for the same reason as cash-strapped developing countries have luxurious national airlines and newly-independent countries institute national flags. Yet it should be noted that the progress of ASEAN's liberal reform has been modest. A conventional strategy for facilitating this reform would be to put more pressure on the members of ASEAN; however, the usefulness of such a strategy is diminishing. The development of an East Asian community, the core component of which is the ASEAN–China concord, makes it difficult for the Western powers to exercise influence over the Southeast Asian countries. Hence, as an alternative strategy, this article proposes that ASEAN's external partners should ‘globalize’ the issue of its liberal reform, by openly assessing its human rights record in global settings, with the aim of boosting the concern of its members for ASEAN's international standing.     

Who's socializing whom? Complex engagement in Sino-ASEAN relations

Abstract

This article draws on constructivist approaches to explore processes of socialization in the context of evolving relations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Constructivist discussions have challenged traditional accounts of socialization; however, left under-examined are the processes by which social learning and social change take place. This article contributes to the theoretical discussion with its examination of ASEAN's regional engagement processes. It treats ASEAN states' ‘complex engagement’ of China as an exercise in argumentative persuasion, which seeks common agreement via a deliberative, non-coercive process. In contrasting ASEAN's particular style of engagement with other models that emphasize more coercive and utilitarian strategies of persuasion, the article draws attention to how particular kinds of interaction may facilitate social learning, as well as the conditions that may make social learning more likely. Particular attention is paid to the roles played by power asymmetries, uncertainty, and different kinds of engagement (mutual and interactive versus closed and unidirectional) in social learning, as well as the importance of viewing socialization as a process that involves different stages.     

A New Phase of European Integration: Organised Capitalisms in Post-Ricardian Europe

In the past, economic integration in Europe was largely compatible with the preservation of different national varieties of capitalism. While product market integration intensified competition, member states could build on and foster their respective comparative advantage. Today, this no longer unequivocally holds true. This article contends that a new, ‘post-Ricardian’ phase of European integration has emerged in which the Commission's and the European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) attempts to promote economic integration systematically challenge the institutions of organised capitalism. It demonstrates this by discussing recent disputes over the Services Directive, the Takeover Directive, and company law. In the current phase of European integration, the Commission's and the ECJ's liberalisation attempts either transform the institutional foundations on which some of the member states' economic systems rely or they create political resistance to an extent that challenges the viability of the European project.     

The Pacific and the Global economy

Abstract

This paper asks: ‘is ASEAN powerful?’ The argument is made that there is a divide over this question between two broad groups of scholars who are referred to as ‘neo-realists’ (including realists) and ‘constructivists’. Focusing attention on this question is useful because it helps to bring into view three, not always explicit, points of argument between constructivists and neo-realists in their assessments of ASEAN. First, the two groups draw different empirically based conclusions about ASEAN's efficacy in East Asian affairs. Neo-realists are generally sceptical about the Association's role in the region because they view it, along with multilateral organizations more generally, as peripheral to great power politicking, what they see as the real stuff and substance of international affairs. A second, conceptual, point of argument is over understandings of power. For neo-realists, power is frequently used interchangeably with force and coercion. Scholars influenced by social constructivist ideas offer a challenge to this equation of power and dominance on the grounds that power is neither necessarily negative-sum nor limited to conflictual situations. Third, we suggest that closely related arguments are marshalled by both sides in debates over ASEAN's future role and organizational structure. Neo-realists argue that a shift to a more rules-based institutional form is in order, while constructivists place their emphasis on identity building.     

Explaining the Vientiane Action Programme: ASEAN and the institutionalisation of human rights

Abstract

Existing explanations for the emergence of human rights on the political agenda in ASEAN focus either on the role of external pressure on ASEAN member states to ‘do something’, or on the way those states copied the form, but not the function, of other regional organisations such as the EU. Both approaches tacitly acknowledge that given the strong preference for intergovernmental governance displayed by ASEAN, regardless of interpretations, that it was states that drove the institutionalisation of rights forwards. Through examining in detail the causes and consequences of the Vientiane Action Programme this article disagrees with that assertion. At crucial moments before and after 2004 it was the Working Group for the Establishment of an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, a track III actor, which both inserted human rights into ASEAN discussions and forged the link between protecting those rights and the continuing success of ASEAN's security goals. Through understanding the role of the Working Group as a norm entrepreneur, assisting in the localisation of human rights standards, this article suggests that existing explanations of ASEAN institutionalisation need to be revised to include a wider range of political dynamics than previously were acknowledged.     

Devolution and outsourcing of municipal services in Kampala city,Uganda: an early assessment

The late 1980s saw the beginning of wide‐ranging economic and political reforms in Africa, prompted by both external and internal pressures. Demands for political reform pushed for democratisation, including decentralisation of power and resources to lower levels of government. Alongside pressures for democratisation were those for economic liberalisation, including the rolling back of the state characterised by, among other things, reducing its role in service provision. This article looks at aspects of political and economic liberalisation in Uganda, involving devolution and outsourcing of service provision in Kampala city. It focuses on the city's experience with devolution and outsourcing of solid waste management. It shows that, pockets of resistance notwithstanding, the reforms enjoyed widespread popularity and led to many positive changes. In addition, it shows that they begot problems and encountered others that rendered the process of change more problematic than its advocates had anticipated. Its major conclusion is that while devolution and outsourcing are useful tools for improving service delivery, they cannot ensure long‐term success in the absence of financial, technical and managerial capacity on the part of contractors and contracting authorities. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Political will and government anti‐corruption efforts: What does the evidence say?

“Political will” is oft‐cited as the major obstacle to government's anti‐corruption efforts. Notwithstanding, there is remarkably little systematic analysis of the concept, with some scholars describing it as the “slipperiest concept in the policy lexicon,” whereas others are calling for its empirical relevance. This paper tries to unpack the “black box” of political will by making it an empirically relevant concept drawing on evidence from two Asian countries; Singapore and Bangladesh. Four key indicators based on the works of earlier scholars are used including origin of the initiative; comprehension and extent of analysis; credible sanctions; and resource dedication and sustenance are used. The paper also uses Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, World Bank's World Governance Indicators (Control of Corruption and Government Effectiveness), and Political, Economic and Risk Consultancy's annual survey in Asia, as outcome measures. Based on the empirical evidence from the two countries, the paper shows that political will indeed has a positive influence on government's anti‐corruption efforts. Although political will may not be sufficient, it is a necessary condition to fight corruption, and that the difference between the positions of Singapore and Bangladesh on various global corruption league tables may be attributed to political will.     

Learning,political regimes and the liberalisation of trade

In this article, the probability of opening to trade is related to a country's propensity to learn from other countries in its region. It is argued that countries have different motivations to learn, depending upon the responsiveness and accountability of their political regimes. Whereas democracies cannot afford to be dogmatic, authoritarian regimes are less motivated to learn from the experience of others, even if they embrace policies that fail. Using data on trade liberalisation for 57 developing countries in the period 1970–1999, it is found that democracies confronting economic crises are more likely to liberalise trade as a result of learning; among democracies, presidential systems seem to learn more, whereas personalist dictatorial regimes are the most resistant to learning from the experience of others.     

From ambiguity to contestation: discourse(s) of non-traditional security in the ASEAN community

‘Non-traditional security’ (NTS) is prominently featured in the agenda of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other ASEAN-led institutions in the Asia-Pacific. ‘NTS’ brings together a series transnational and non-military security threats that are considered common among regional states, urgent for them to attend to, and non-sensitive all at the same time. This a priori makes it a self-evident focus of attempts to bring regional security cooperation ‘to a higher plane’. However, this paper reveals that the uncontroversial character of NTS is overestimated, by shedding light on the co-existence of divergent – and potentially contradictory – interpretations of its meaning and implications in ASEAN and the wider region. In a context where ASEAN's relevance to the pursuit of regional security is increasingly being measured against its (in)ability to provide a coherent approach to security challenges that affect the region, the contested nature of NTS has important implications for the grouping's resilience in the twenty-first century.     

Predispositions and the Political Behavior of American Economic Elites: Evidence from Technology Entrepreneurs

Economic elites regularly seek to exert political influence. But what policies do they support? Many accounts implicitly assume economic elites are homogeneous and that increases in their political power will increase inequality. We shed new light on heterogeneity in economic elites' political preferences, arguing that economic elites from an industry can share distinctive preferences due in part to sharing distinctive predispositions. Consequently, how increases in economic elites' influence affect inequality depends on which industry's elites are gaining influence and which policy issues are at stake. We demonstrate our argument with four original surveys, including the two largest political surveys of American economic elites to date: one of technology entrepreneurs—whose influence is burgeoning—and another of campaign donors. We show that technology entrepreneurs support liberal redistributive, social, and globalistic policies but conservative regulatory policies—a bundle of preferences rare among other economic elites. These differences appear to arise partly from their distinctive predispositions.     

Malaysia's new economic policy and the global economy: The evolution of ethnic accommodation

Abstract

Developing countries commonly must deal not only with issues of economic development, but also with the problems associated with a multi‐ethnic population. Most analyses of ethnic programs, however, focus on the domestic political economy and fail to appreciate the importance of international factors. In this essay, I note that Malaysia's New Economic Policy (NEP) and its successors have been affected not only by the domestic ethnic situation but also by the global economy. Furthermore, I argue that current international pressures and constraints have forced a re‐evaluation of the NEP in the past decade. While a concern for ethnic factors is by no means absent from the policy‐making process today, ethnic concerns are now overshadowed by the realities of the international economic order and the government's realization that ethnic accommodation can only be successful within the confines of an outward‐looking, expanding economy.