The concept of flexible engagement and the practice of enhanced interaction: Intramural challenges to the ‘ASEAN way’

Abstract

This article examines the challenges to the diplomatic and security culture of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as posed by Thailand's spurned proposal for ‘flexible engagement’ and the pursuit of ‘enhanced interaction’ by some ASEAN members in intramural relations. It asks whether these challenges should be understood as turning points in the way in which regional leaderships in Southeast Asia interact. The article argues that while the ‘ASEAN way’ is indeed changing, this change, at least for the moment, focuses mainly on extending the range of issues and contexts traditionally defined as internal affairs in which other ASEAN governments may now legitimately become involved. Considerations about ASEAN cohesion, regime security and regional influence do not suggest an imminent or complete abandonment of ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture. The likelihood that enhanced interaction will continue to be pursued by ASEAN leaderships should therefore not be seen to imply that principles such as quiet diplomacy or restraint have already become obsolete.     

The ASEAN Way as a symbol: an analysis of discourses on the ASEAN Norms

Has the ‘ASEAN Way’ – a set of rules of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) centered on the principle of non-interference and consensus decision-making – really established its position as an ASEAN norm? This paper aims to analyze the discourses of each ASEAN country and empirically explain their attitudes toward the norm. Specifically, I review various documentations to examine how various ASEAN diplomats have used the term ‘ASEAN Way.’ How did they come to call the principle of non-interference and consensus decision-making ‘ASEAN Way’ in the early 1990s? Why have they begun using the term negatively, as something to be reformed, in recent years? By describing the discourses on the ‘ASEAN Way’ and their changes over the years, I show that the rationality of non-interference and consensus decision-making has changed over time and shifted the positioning of the ‘ASEAN way’ as a symbol. This presents a new and empirical interpretation of the changes in ASEAN Norms.     

ASEAN's norm adherence and its unintended consequences in HADR and SAR operations

This paper examines the effects and expressions of norm compliance in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ‘unintended consequences’ arising from such compliance. This is done through an analysis of ASEAN's responses in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) efforts in the Typhoon Haiyan disaster and in the search for missing flight MH370. It argues that the lethargic ASEAN responses in the Haiyan disaster and the uncoordinated search efforts for missing flight MH370 are unintended outcomes arising from norm adherence specifically to the norms of ‘respect for sovereignty’ and ‘consensual decision-making’ which constrained the range of ASEAN responses.     

ASEAN as the ‘regional conductor’: understanding ASEAN's role in Asia-Pacific order

This paper analyses ASEAN's prominence in regional order negotiation and management in Southeast Asia and the Asia-pacific through the lens of social role negotiation. It argues that ASEAN has negotiated legitimate social roles as the ‘primary manager’ in Southeast Asia and the ‘regional conductor’ of the Asia-Pacific order. It develops an English School-inspired role negotiation framework and applies it to three periods: 1954–1975 when ASEAN's ‘primary manager’ role emerged from negotiations with the USA; 1978–1991 when ASEAN's role was strengthened through negotiations with China during the Cambodian conflict; and 1991-present when ASEAN created and expanded the ‘regional conductor’ role. Negotiations during the Cold War established a division of labour where great powers provided security public goods but the great power function of diplomatic leadership was transferred to ASEAN. ASEAN's diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia provided a foundation for creating its ‘regional conductor’ role after the Cold War. ASEAN's ability to sustain its roles depends on maintaining role bargains acceptable to the great powers, an increasingly difficult task due to great power rivalry in the South China Sea.     

Asia's competing multilateral initiatives: quality versus quantity

East Asia has many distinctive features that set it apart from other comparable regions, not least attitudes to regional development and cooperation. Despite a growing number of regional initiatives in East Asia, however, they are generally distinguished by their ineffectiveness. It is entirely possible that ‘institutional balancing’, like its more well-known power balancing counterpart, is designed not to facilitate but to prevent something from happening. The sort of ‘multilateralism 1.0’ developed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has a lot to answer for in this regard: having established its own pattern of institutional effectiveness ASEAN's ‘leadership’ has caused it to be replicated under the new wave of ‘multilateralism 2.0’. Consequently, I suggest that not only is China very comfortable with the idea of a rather feeble and ineffective institutional architecture, but the USA is also unlikely to do anything to change this picture, especially under a Trump administration that is highly skeptical about the efficacy of multilateral institutions at the best of times.     

From ambiguity to contestation: discourse(s) of non-traditional security in the ASEAN community

‘Non-traditional security’ (NTS) is prominently featured in the agenda of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other ASEAN-led institutions in the Asia-Pacific. ‘NTS’ brings together a series transnational and non-military security threats that are considered common among regional states, urgent for them to attend to, and non-sensitive all at the same time. This a priori makes it a self-evident focus of attempts to bring regional security cooperation ‘to a higher plane’. However, this paper reveals that the uncontroversial character of NTS is overestimated, by shedding light on the co-existence of divergent – and potentially contradictory – interpretations of its meaning and implications in ASEAN and the wider region. In a context where ASEAN's relevance to the pursuit of regional security is increasingly being measured against its (in)ability to provide a coherent approach to security challenges that affect the region, the contested nature of NTS has important implications for the grouping's resilience in the twenty-first century.     

The elusiveness of regional order: Leifer,the English school and Southeast Asia

Abstract

‘Regional order’ was Michael Leifer's yardstick of choice to assess the international relations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Leifer's recurrent theme was how elusive, and at times how illusory, regional order was for Southeast Asia. The elusiveness of regional order is attributed to ASEAN's lack of a set of genuinely shared assumptions about their interrelationships with each other and external states. This article challenges Leifer's portrait of a Southeast Asia devoid of regional order. I argue that Leifer's notion of order is theoretically underdeveloped and methodologically imprecise, allowing the analyst to see disorder in every minor perturbation in the region. I propose replacing ‘regional order’ with ‘peace and stability’, the preferred terms of the discourse by ASEAN's policy elites. By the latter criteria, ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific, contrary to the skeptics, have made impressive progress in the last forty years.     

Idealism,realism, and immigration: David Miller’s Strangers in Our Midst

David Miller’s Strangers in Our Midst is an important contribution to the debate among political philosophers about how liberal democratic states should deal with the issue of migration. But it is also a thoughtful statement concerning how best to do political philosophy and, as such, contributes also to the growing debate within Anglo-American political theory about the relative merits of ‘ideal’ versus ‘non-ideal’ normative theorising. Miller’s argument in the book builds on his earlier published work in suggesting that political philosophy should be ‘for Earthlings’: it should not be understood as a process of ideal theorising which ignores political reality. He argues that normative theorists should seek to resolve complex political problems by taking seriously the political context that makes these problems complex, rather than putting aside that context in the interests of deriving first principles. This is a controversial approach, which requires political philosophers to take more seriously than they often do the expressed concerns of citizens living in democratic states and the practical problems associated with applying normative principles in ways which actually help address the issue at hand. This piece discusses some of these themes, and the issue of migration more generally, in order to help frame the debate which follows.     

China's dual strategy of coercion and inducement towards ASEAN

ABSTRACT

This article contributes to the discussion about China's divisive influence on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It argues that recent China–ASEAN relations are based on Beijing's successful implementation of a dual strategy of coercion and inducement. The effectiveness of this strategy is tested against the South China Sea disputes – the issue that lies in the core of regional security and a key platform of power display. The article outlines Beijing's recent interaction with individual ASEAN member-states and its implications for the regional multilateral diplomacy. While by no means identical, Beijing's dual strategy of coercion and inducement with individual ASEAN states have resulted in an effective abuse of the ASEAN consensus principle – a tactic often referred to as ‘divide and rule’. Consequently, the group's internal discord has further eroded and affected the institutional confidence of ASEAN. This article draws attention to the psychological effect of coercion as a perception of punishment, and inducement as a perception of reward.     

Anything goes: Lefort,ideology and the “adventure of democracy’

This article initially introduces and outlines the main aspects of Claude Lefort's theorising of democracy as a radically antagonistic and contingent political formation. This is followed by a critique of those theories, primarily through the application of Slavoj Zizek ‘s work on the politics of community as it applies to the emergence, in Australian politics, of Pauline Hanson and her ^‘One Nation’ party and policies.     

ASEAN and human rights: resisting Western pressure or emulating the West?

Abstract

Observers of Southeast Asian affairs commonly assume that the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are reluctant to pursue liberal agendas, and that their main concern is to resist pressure from Western powers to improve their human rights practice. This article, however, argues that such a conventional view is too simplistic. The Southeast Asian countries have voluntarily been pursuing liberal agendas, and their main concern here is to be identified as ‘Western’ countries – advanced countries with legitimate international status. They have ‘mimetically’ been adopting the norm of human rights which is championed by the advanced industrialized democracies, with the intention of securing ASEAN's identity as a legitimate institution in the community of modern states. Ultimately, they have been pursuing liberal agendas, for the same reason as cash-strapped developing countries have luxurious national airlines and newly-independent countries institute national flags. Yet it should be noted that the progress of ASEAN's liberal reform has been modest. A conventional strategy for facilitating this reform would be to put more pressure on the members of ASEAN; however, the usefulness of such a strategy is diminishing. The development of an East Asian community, the core component of which is the ASEAN–China concord, makes it difficult for the Western powers to exercise influence over the Southeast Asian countries. Hence, as an alternative strategy, this article proposes that ASEAN's external partners should ‘globalize’ the issue of its liberal reform, by openly assessing its human rights record in global settings, with the aim of boosting the concern of its members for ASEAN's international standing.     

The Pacific and the Global economy

Abstract

This paper asks: ‘is ASEAN powerful?’ The argument is made that there is a divide over this question between two broad groups of scholars who are referred to as ‘neo-realists’ (including realists) and ‘constructivists’. Focusing attention on this question is useful because it helps to bring into view three, not always explicit, points of argument between constructivists and neo-realists in their assessments of ASEAN. First, the two groups draw different empirically based conclusions about ASEAN's efficacy in East Asian affairs. Neo-realists are generally sceptical about the Association's role in the region because they view it, along with multilateral organizations more generally, as peripheral to great power politicking, what they see as the real stuff and substance of international affairs. A second, conceptual, point of argument is over understandings of power. For neo-realists, power is frequently used interchangeably with force and coercion. Scholars influenced by social constructivist ideas offer a challenge to this equation of power and dominance on the grounds that power is neither necessarily negative-sum nor limited to conflictual situations. Third, we suggest that closely related arguments are marshalled by both sides in debates over ASEAN's future role and organizational structure. Neo-realists argue that a shift to a more rules-based institutional form is in order, while constructivists place their emphasis on identity building.     

Explaining the Vientiane Action Programme: ASEAN and the institutionalisation of human rights

Abstract

Existing explanations for the emergence of human rights on the political agenda in ASEAN focus either on the role of external pressure on ASEAN member states to ‘do something’, or on the way those states copied the form, but not the function, of other regional organisations such as the EU. Both approaches tacitly acknowledge that given the strong preference for intergovernmental governance displayed by ASEAN, regardless of interpretations, that it was states that drove the institutionalisation of rights forwards. Through examining in detail the causes and consequences of the Vientiane Action Programme this article disagrees with that assertion. At crucial moments before and after 2004 it was the Working Group for the Establishment of an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, a track III actor, which both inserted human rights into ASEAN discussions and forged the link between protecting those rights and the continuing success of ASEAN's security goals. Through understanding the role of the Working Group as a norm entrepreneur, assisting in the localisation of human rights standards, this article suggests that existing explanations of ASEAN institutionalisation need to be revised to include a wider range of political dynamics than previously were acknowledged.     

Contested multilateralism 2.0 and regional order transition: causes and implications

This article proposes a new concept of ‘contested multilateralism 2.0’ to describe the puzzling institutional building efforts by non-ASEAN members after the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) in the Asia-Pacific. It suggests that different to ‘multilateralism 1.0’ of the 1990s, which was mainly led by ASEAN, this wave of multilateralism has been initiated by other powers, such as the United States, China, Japan, Australia and South Korea, either by forming new institutions or by reinvigorating existing ones. This article advances an institutional balancing argument. It suggests that ‘contested multilateralism 2.0’ is a result of institutional balancing among major states under the conditions of high strategic uncertainty and high economic interdependence after the GFC. One unintended consequence may be that it could well lead to a more peaceful transformation of the regional order in the Asia-Pacific if regional security hotspots, such as the Korean crisis and the South China Sea dispute, can be managed appropriately.     

Transgressiveness,civil society and Internet control in Southeast Asia

This paper assesses the potential of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) to catalyze a process of economic and political integration in East Asia. The analysis first illustrates APT participants’ projected views of APT’s opportunities and limitations and then assesses the motives and objectives driving APT cooperation. Following a review of the major achievements of APT, the study gives an outlook on APT’s relevance and prospects. The findings of the article are that most APT states do not advocate ideas of distinctive pan-East Asian regionalism, but rather take an Asia-Pacific perspective. Only Malaysia and China appear to be promoting more exclusive forms of East Asian regionalism. Within APT, China is aggressively pushing a strong China–ASEAN axis, whereas Japan is seeking to balance China’s efforts and step up its political and economic cooperative profile in the region. A look at the achievements of APT does not suggest a rapid spread of pan-East Asian regionalism. On the contrary, the proposed ASEAN–China FTA proposal has triggered fierce competition between Japan and China and thus divided APT even further. Moreover, it is not at all certain whether the ASEAN–China FTA plan is going to work out in the end, due to objections from various ASEAN members, including a somewhat capricious Malaysia. Whereas pan-East Asian integration efforts are unlikely, the APT process is attractive enough to keep Japan and China, who are competing for influence in Southeast Asia, committed to the APT process. Regardless of APT’s internal fragmentation, its dynamic has already begun to change the political and economic landscape of East Asia. Thus, ASEAN has been able to enhance its leverage vis-à-vis Japan and China, profiting from their strategic opposition. Japan’s reluctance to discuss trade liberalization with ASEAN members already appears to be crumbling, as it is struggling to preclude Chinese domination.     

Non‐Departmental Public Bodies Under the Howard Governments1

There has been both continuity and change in the use of non‐departmental public bodies (NDPBs) during the Howard years. In terms of continuity, the statutory authority and its incorporated version, the statutory corporation (in whose development late 19th and early 20th century Australian governments played such an important part), have remained in wide use. In terms of change, however, two other NDPB forms offered some challenge to its popularity. The government‐owned company came to be a preferred form for government business enterprises (GBEs) and, more recently, for many other non‐commercial public activities as well. And the executive agency, first making its Australian appearance in 1999, seemed initially to be another significant challenger, but its numbers, never great, were soon cut back. The article examines these trends, relating them to several relevant systemic inquiries and policy changes, notably the Humphry review of the governance of GBEs, the final settlement (in 1997) of the package of financial management acts, the Uhrig inquiry of 2003 and the system‐challenging pressures that have followed it. Commonwealth participation in joint (Commonwealth/subnational and Commonwealth/private) activities is also noted, as is the lack of ‘fit’ of the Australian experience with international theorising about ‘agencification’. Finally, the article seeks to identify the leading figures within the Howard governments who have been directing both the changes and the continuities involved in these developments.     

Walking a tightrope: democracy versus sovereignty in ASEAN's illiberal peace

Abstract

Since 1967, ASEAN has established intramural relations that forsake war as a means for resolving conflict. While this is a remarkable achievement for the region, it must be balanced against a concomitant hindrance of democratic reform. I argue in this paper that ASEAN's nascent security community must be seen as an ‘illiberal peace’. Underlying ASEAN's peaceful community are the same principles that support illiberalism in the region, namely sovereignty and non-interference. While sovereignty has historically been a cherished norm for developing countries, ASEAN lags behind other regions, particularly Latin America, in attempting to reconcile tensions between democratic norms and the respect for sovereignty. This tension is most evident in ASEAN's relations with Myanmar. Recent events indicate that ASEAN's non-interference norm may no longer be sacrosanct, but the association is a long way from shunning illiberal politics for the sake of democratic values.     

Who's socializing whom? Complex engagement in Sino-ASEAN relations

Abstract

This article draws on constructivist approaches to explore processes of socialization in the context of evolving relations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Constructivist discussions have challenged traditional accounts of socialization; however, left under-examined are the processes by which social learning and social change take place. This article contributes to the theoretical discussion with its examination of ASEAN's regional engagement processes. It treats ASEAN states' ‘complex engagement’ of China as an exercise in argumentative persuasion, which seeks common agreement via a deliberative, non-coercive process. In contrasting ASEAN's particular style of engagement with other models that emphasize more coercive and utilitarian strategies of persuasion, the article draws attention to how particular kinds of interaction may facilitate social learning, as well as the conditions that may make social learning more likely. Particular attention is paid to the roles played by power asymmetries, uncertainty, and different kinds of engagement (mutual and interactive versus closed and unidirectional) in social learning, as well as the importance of viewing socialization as a process that involves different stages.     

Japan's ‘green’ economic diplomacy: environmental and energy technology and foreign relations

The principal regional organizations in East Asia and Asia-Pacific, ASEAN and APEC, are widely seen to be crisis-stricken, ‘becalmed’ or ‘adrift’. At the same time, East Asia is witnessing the emergence of a new, as yet embryonic body, ASEAN Plus Three (APT), and ambitious projects implying closer integration between Northeast and Southeast Asia are being mooted. Departing from an analysis of the determinants of the success and failure of regional integration, this article discusses the roots of the perceived decline of ASEAN and APEC and the origins of the rapid rise of APT. The Asian financial crisis in particular, it is argued, has been instrumental both in undermining ASEAN and APEC and in fostering the rise of APT. The crisis has brutally exposed the structural weaknesses of ASEAN and APEC, both of which are handicapped by the political and economic diversity of their member states and the absence of a benevolent dominant state or coalition of states. It has simultaneously fuelled the development of APT because it has greatly strengthened perceptions of mutual economic interdependence and vulnerability in East Asia and resentment against the West and the US. As APT is likely to exhibit similar structural weaknesses to ASEAN and APEC, the odds, however, are against it developing into a strong regional organization, notwithstanding the possibility that, in the near future, external forces and trends (stagnation of world trade liberalization, closer European and American integration) will, if anything, encourage plans for closer East Asian integration.     

ASEAN’s inheritance: the regionalization of Southeast Asia, 1941–61

This article explores the establishment of Southeast Asia as a regional space in the international system before the advent of ASEAN. It challenges the traditional view that the region emerged from Japanese and Allied strategies and operations during the Second World War, focusing instead upon the important role played by academics in the creation of ‘Southeast Asian studies’ in the United States and Britain in the 1940s and 1950s. On a broader level, the article highlights the cyclical nature of the regionalization process. It suggests that once a region has been ‘created’, the repeated use of the regional idea by a variety of state and non-state actors fixes it in a broad cultural context, and opens the way for subsequent appropriation by regionalizers.