Unjust Enrichment and Contract

Benedetti v Sawiris was concerned with the measure of a quantum meruit, and in particular whether a ‘subjective’ or ‘objective’ measure should be preferred. The Supreme Court addressed the issue broadly in line with the approach in the mainstream academic literature on unjust enrichment, according to which this is a problem of how to measure benefit. The article argues that this unjust enrichment approach is misguided because it obscures the role of agreement and conflates transfer and exchange, and that a contractual analysis of the case would make the issues clearer and easier to resolve.     

Delfi AS v Estonia: The Liability of Secondary Internet Publishers for Violation of Reputational Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights

In October 2013, the European Court of Human Rights in Delfi AS v Estonia upheld a decision of the Estonian Supreme Court to impose liability on the owners of an internet news portal for defamatory comments which had been posted on their website by anonymous third parties. This note suggests that the decision is important in the context of publications with a ‘public interest’ element to them, because it appears to afford more protection to the right to reputation (deriving from the Article 8 right to privacy) and less to freedom of expression than was formerly the case. It is further argued that the Court's emphasis on the positive obligation of states to protect this right to reputation may mean that the existing English law in this area, including, potentially section 5 of the Defamation Act 2013, is inconsistent with the ECHR jurisprudence.     

Desperately Seeking ‘Justice’ in Classical Chinese: On the Meanings of Yi

This essay sets out to search for an equivalent Chinese word to the English word ‘justice’ in classical Chinese language, through ancient Chinese philosophical texts, imperial codes and idioms. The study found that there does not seem to be a linguistic sign for ‘justice’ in classical Chinese, and further, yi resembles ‘justice’ in some ways and has been used sometimes to translate  ‘justice’, but yi is a complex concept in traditional Chinese philosophy with multiple meanings and it is dissimilar to ‘justice’ in their semantic and pragmatic meanings in Chinese and English legal culture. While ‘justice’ is a keyword and fundamental to Western law, yi is not a legal word or concept in classical Chinese in traditional China. Given its complexity, yi does not have a one-to-one equivalent in English. It sometimes carries a sense of ‘righteousness’ and occasionally ‘justice’, but yi and ‘justice’ are not equivalent. In view of these, it becomes understandable that the translations of yi in contemporary Chinese usage vary ranging from ‘friendship and justice’ to ‘greater good’, among others. The meaning of yi is still uncertain and context sensitive as it was two thousand years ago.

     

The Devilish Details: Key Legal Issues in the 2015 Climate Negotiations

The ongoing UN negotiations for a 2015 climate agreement have yet to resolve two fundamental legal issues on which its effectiveness will hinge. The first is the precise legal form this agreement will take. Parties had agreed to work towards a ‘protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties’. This leaves scope for a range of possible legal forms, only some of which are legally binding. Second, they have yet to determine the legal nature of the ‘nationally determined contributions’ submitted by Parties. This article addresses these two critical issues: on ‘legal form’, it identifies the instruments that could form part of the Paris package, focussing on their legal status, significance and influence; and on the ‘legal nature’ of nationally determined contributions, it considers their nature and scope, the range of options for ‘housing’ these contributions as well as their relationship to the core 2015 agreement.     

RESPONSE

This is a response to “A Comment on William J. Howe and Hugh McIsaac's Article ‘Finding the Balance’ Published in the January 2008 Issue of Family Court Review.”     

Reforming the United Kingdom Constitution: Law,Convention, Soft Law

The Governance of Britain Green Paper continues the programme of constitutional reform begun in 1997, and appears to reinforce the juridification of the UK's constitution. Nevertheless, several key reforms will be implemented not by legislation, but by creating new conventions. This article argues that such ‘declared’ conventions are best understood as a form of constitutional ‘soft law’, which attempt to influence constitutional behaviour rather than generating binding norms. Applying a regulatory analysis, it then argues that the case for a soft, rather than hard law approach to constitutional reform is weaker than its widespread use in the UK suggests. Finally, the article challenges the thesis that the political constitution is being replaced by a legal constitution, arguing that the government's attitude to constitutional reform still exhibits basic characteristics of political constitutionalism. Moreover, there is more to contemporary constitutional developments than a bipolar contest between political and legal constitutionalism.     

Mapping Defamation Defences

The general neglect of tort defences is most significant in defamation actions. This paper attempts to reduce to a few guiding principles the numerous, and apparently unrelated, doctrines recognised as defences by the law of defamation. Defining the cause of action as an injury to the claimant's reputation, it argues that they fall into three classes: (i) defences which exclude unlawfulness because the injury was inflicted in pursuance of a right or liberty of the defendant; (ii) defences which exclude blameworthiness because the defendant was not at fault for causing the injury; (iii) defences which relieve the defendant of liability despite the injury being both non iure and negligent: this group, not being underpinned by recognised principles, deserves particular scrutiny. The rule of repetition should be qualified by recognition of a defence of ‘warranted republication’; the remainder should be abolished, being an anachronistic hangover from the old requirement of malice.     

When a ‘Like’ Is Not a ‘Like’: A New Fragmented Approach to Data Controllership

In Fashion ID, the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) held that an operator of a website featuring a Facebook ‘Like’ button is a data controller under EU Directive 95/46 (‘Directive’) jointly with Facebook in respect of the collection and transmission of the personal data of website visitors to Facebook, but Facebook alone is a data controller for any subsequent data processing. While the CJEUs expansive interpretation of joint controllership aims to leave ‘no gaps’ in the protection of individuals, we question whether the proposed solution to ‘fragment’ controllership into different stages of processing helps to achieve that goal. We argue that CJEUs ‘fragmented’ approach is incompatible with the GDPR, as it does not reveal the intended purposes of data processing, and thus negates informed and specific consent. We suggest that such ‘fragmentation’ undermines the consistency, predictability and transparency of EU data protection law by obscuring the pervasiveness of data commodification in the digital economy.     

The Recognition,and Res Judicata Effect,of a United States Class Actions Judgment in England: A Rebuttal of V ivendi

United States' courts have proven willing to certify multi‐jurisdictional class actions which purport to adjudicate the claims of both American and foreign (i.e., non‐US‐domiciled) class members. This article contends, however, that a class actions judgment/settlement issued by a US court would not be recognised, and would not be given preclusive effect, in England, should absent English class members wish to re‐litigate the same grievance before an English court. Specifically, it is argued that two separate preconditions for such recognition and preclusive effect would fail, viz, a US court would usually lack the requisite ‘personal jurisdiction’ over absent English class members; and the necessary ‘identity of parties’ would be absent. The article seeks to anticipate the appropriate answer to a conundrum which is certain to arise for future English judicial consideration, whilst acknowledging the uneasy fit which currently exists between English private international law and multi‐jurisdictional class actions.     

法律与道德：正义的法哲学及其发展——以瑞特纳帕拉法学思想研究为核心

正义的概念和范畴,在持不同理论立场的思想家眼中呈现出不同的样态,引发了人们对正义是否是一个值得法理学研究的对象这一问题的深刻思考。瑞特纳帕拉(Suri Ratnapala)通过对法律是什么、为何以及如何遵守法律的法哲学演进的梳理和追问,独创性地区分"依法的正义"和"法律的正义"两种概念,对于法律与道德以及正义的法哲学内核做出了当代诠释和发展。所谓"依法的正义",是指法律是实现正义的手段和工具;"法律的正义",则指特定法律的正义性或道德正当性。但是,只有个体间认知的耦合,才会导致关于正义行为的道德规则的汇聚和产生,因而正义的实现其实就是对以人类经验积累的方式得以建立的基本行为规范的遵守。不同正义理论的建构,旨在使我们共同走向一个美好的理想——运用法律手段建构一种适于人类生活和自由全面发展的社会秩序。     

Pornography and the construction of misogyny

Summary

In this paper I return to my work in Pornography: Women, Violence and Civil Liberties, the edited volume published in 1992 by Oxford University Press, and subsequently my work on pornography, harm and human rights (Itzin, 1995, 1996a), and to pornography and child sexual abuse (Itzin, 1996b, 1997a,b, 2000a,b,c). I draw from and build on that work and from the contents of the pornography special issue of the Journal of Sexual Aggression (Itzin and Cox, 2000). This paper covers key issues such as legislation and regulation, censorship' and ‘freedom’, the literature on pornography effects, the role of pornography in the aetiology of sex offending and in the construction of desire. In particular, the paper is concerned with theorising aetiology, causality and the ‘epistemology of public policy’ on pornography. It draws from and builds on the scholarship and activism of radical feminism in conceptualising and campaigning against pornography-related harm.     

‘Done to death by father or relatives’: Irish families and infanticide cases, 1922–1950

In February 1929 the Bishop of Ossory commented on the fact that in Ireland illegitimate infants were often ‘done to death by father or relatives’ (Irish Catholic, 16 February 1929). There were many instances where family members of unmarried women who gave birth were the sole defendants or co-defendants in infanticide cases in post-independent Ireland. Although illegitimate infants were ‘done to death’ by their fathers in a number of cases that were tried at the Central Criminal Court in Dublin between 1922 and 1950, this article will focus on cases where infants were murdered or suspected of having been murdered by relatives of the birth mother both in the Twenty-Six Counties and in Northern Ireland (Irish Catholic, 16 February 1929). For the purposes of this article I have referred to the murder of illegitimate infants as ‘infanticide’ even though there was no separate charge of infanticide in the Irish Free State until 1949. The English infanticide acts of 1922 and 1938 also applied to Northern Ireland. This article discusses the motives of the relatives of single mothers who played a part in the deaths of illegitimate infants. Unmarried motherhood was severely frowned upon in Ireland and the relatives of single pregnant women assisted their female kin in destroying the evidence of extra-marital conception in order to protect the family's honour and moral reputation in the wider community. The records of infanticide trials provide a great deal of insight into the ways in which mainly working-class families dealt with the strain of pregnancy outside wedlock in Ireland between 1922 and 1950.     

Knowing receipt: continuing trusts and conscionability Byers v Saudi National Bank

In Byers v Saudi National Bank [2022] EWCA Civ 43 the Court of Appeal examined a seemingly straightforward question: where rights are dissipated in breach of trust, is it a necessary condition of the recipient being liable for ‘knowing receipt’ that the dissipation did not extinguish the beneficiary's rights? The answer sheds considerable light on the juridical nature of liability for ‘knowing receipt’. This note argues that the Court of Appeal's analysis correctly supports the theory that so-called ‘recipient’ liability is in fact a species of liability for breach of trust. It also examines the implications of that conclusion for the elements of, and remedies for, ‘knowing receipt’.     

Where the Action Is: Macro and Micro Justice in Contract Law

In contemporary private law theory the relationship between ‘macro’ theories of distributive justice and the ‘micro’ site of interpersonal transactions remains under-explored. In this paper, I draw on the ‘macro’ theory of justice articulated by John Rawls and offer an account of ‘micro contractual justice’ that helps us understand how the micro domains of contracting introduce particular relational constraints on the infusion of distributive considerations into contract law, resulting in constrained conception of ‘relational Rawlsianism’ operating in contractual domains. My framework provides a bridge between the macro and micro, helping us understand how they are in various senses separate yet interlocking, and also provides a ‘third way’ between all or nothing positions on the place of distributive justice in contract.     

Once more with ‘sympathy’ but no resolution for intended mothers: the EU,Ireland and the surrogacy dilemma

This article examines the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Z v A Government Department and the Board of Management of a Community School and the court’s interpretation of existing EU legislation on whether commissioning or intended mothers are entitled to paid leave equivalent to maternity benefit. It highlights the failure of the CJEU in this case to call for specific EU legislation on the issue of surrogacy. The Irish Courts have been more proactive in this regard. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that ‘pending the introduction … of legislation dealing with this field, it is … not for the courts to attempt to resolve the complex questions that need to be addressed’. This article compares recent decisions of the Irish Courts to that of the CJEU as they struggle to keep abreast with modern society in the absence of legislation at national and EU level.     

Intoxication as a defence to murder in Seychelles

In Seychelles, the mens rea of murder can be established, as an alternative to an intention to cause death or grievous harm, on the basis of the defendant’s ‘knowledge’ that the act or omission causing death will probably cause death or grievous harm. However, a defendant is only allowed to plead intoxication as a defence where it had become impossible for him to form the necessary ‘intention’ due to intoxication. This article highlights the difficulties in the application of the defence of intoxication to cases where the mens rea for murder is based purely on a defendant’s ‘knowledge’. In analysing the defence of intoxication in Seychelles in cases of murder, the article examines the position under English and Australian law.     

Laboratories of Statehood: Legal Intervention in Colonial Africa and Today

The immense body of contemporary work aimed at ‘promoting the rule of law’ is often accused of ‘neo‐imperialism’. Yet, despite many points of contiguity between past and present legal interventions, the charge is overbroad and rarely illuminating. This article attempts to move beyond polemic to track concrete historical and structural forerunners of today's rule of law work. Focusing mainly (though not exclusively) on late imperial British endeavours, it traces colonial legal interventions over time, the techniques adopted (and rejected), the shifting normative bases of legitimacy, and moments of strategic recalibration in the face of resistance. Three broad attitudes towards law across the period are (provisionally) characterised as ‘regulative’, ‘constitutive’ and ‘institutive’ moments. In each phase, the Powers treat colonial territories as laboratories of statehood, within which experiments are conducted to locate the optimal configuration of law. In conclusion some counterparts to these moments in today's ‘rule of law’ activities are identified.     

Does accessible technology need an ‘entrepreneurial state’? The creation of an EU market of universally designed and assistive technology through state aid

EU State aid law has sought to enable people with disabilities to obtain employment, yet has not been explicitly included in the toolbox of policy options to improve the availability and choice of accessible technology within the EU Internal market. This seems to be the consequence of an inherent bias against State intervention in the market, which is mostly unwelcome since it can limit open and free competition. This also reiterates the ‘less-aid’ policy and the purely economic approach to State aid professed by the European Commission. Against this background, this article discusses the potential for EU State aid policy to foster both ‘design for all’ and innovative assistive devices for people with disabilities. It seeks to argue that the goal of an EU-wide market of accessible technology can be achieved using EU State aid law. In particular, this article aims to highlight that a more targeted use of EU State aid law can lead developers to increase the production of accessible goods, to adjust or reduce prices and to provide consumers with a greater degree of choice in a greater number of marketplaces. Whilst it adopts a legal approach, this analysis relies inter alia on economic evidence and recalls the pamphlet recently published by Mazzuccato, from which the title of this work has drawn inspiration.     

The NHS Information Revolution: ‘Choice of Control’ to ‘Choice’ and ‘Control’

This paper provides a novel and critical analysis of the necessary and important balance between ‘individual privacy’ and ‘collective transparency’. We suggest that the onset of the Information Revolution has created a dilemma for the National Health Service (NHS) in terms of how it addresses its obligation to use information to improve best practice in healthcare for society (‘collective transparency’) whilst also keeping sensitive personal information confidential (‘individual privacy’). There is clearly a need to consider both whether the NHS is balancing this critically important informational relationship and whether its approach is fit for purpose. We argue that the NHS's ‘proxy-individual’ information guardian role could inadvertently mask individuals' intended roles, effectively circumventing autonomy-based laws by limiting the power of individuals to be autonomous. In this article we have identified three issues – first the prevailing ‘Mindset’ (the ‘M’) of ‘privacy’, which is viewed as individualistic, resulting in an overpowering concept of confidentiality; second, the quality and control of Information (the first ‘I’); and third, the concept of innovation (the second ‘i’), which is being used as a ‘solution’ rather than a vehicle for transparency. Indeed, transparency is our target of ‘best practice,’ and we suggest that individual privacy and collective transparency are best embedded within a complementary privacy framework that offers a better fit than the current split of control between the roles of the NHS and the roles of the individual. It is suggested that when facilitated by transparency, ‘control’ and ‘privacy’ form a continuum, aligning through the desire for choice. Therefore, the choice of control could facilitate control and choice. Together, they could replace the concept of privacy by empowering ‘informed patients’ to support the NHS's ‘No decision about me, without me’ pledge.     

Libel: Its Purpose and Reform

Discussion of libel often fails to define defamation law's purpose and thus properly to assess its value. This article argues that defamation's purpose relates to fundamental human interests in sociality, directly linked to important aspects of human health and well‐being. Protecting such interests is arguably required by the right to private life under ECHR article 8 and should not count as a violation of the right to freedom of speech. Some current reform proposals are criticised as failing to appreciate the importance of protecting sociality. ‘Business’ libel, however, often protects not sociality but purely economic interests. The article therefore argues that the protection of libel law, as opposed to that offered by malicious falsehood and the economic torts, should be withdrawn from purely economic reputation, starting with removing the rights of corporations to sue in defamation, a position compatible with the ECtHR's decision in Karako v Hungary.