To fix or not to fix? How corruptors decide to fix football matches

This paper examines the decisions of the internal corruptors in fixing football games. The methodology is a mixture of interviews, database analysis and examination of a specific series of taped phone calls of a corrupt Russian football official. It finds that generally, this type of match-fixing occurs only after a specific point in the season. There are five implicit questions that corruptors must answer: is the game important enough to fix? Is it morally ethical? Can my team win honestly? Can I afford to fix the game? If I am caught is there a high risk of sanctions? The second section of the paper examines the question of who to bribe? The data indicate that out of the three possible options – referees, players and team officials – the best chance of delivering a successful fix are the team officials. The final section is an examination of the use trust, favour banks and guarantors among the team officials who are willing to sell matches.     

Directed embryo donation: free choice or discrimination?

The issue of whether to allow or prohibit the directed anonymous donation of human embryos for reproductive use has been publicly contentious. The claims that directed donation are a donor's autonomous right contrast with claims that the practice is discriminatory. Recent legislation and legal recommendation on the issue has been inconsistent or contradictory. This article specifically addresses the question as to whether the directed donation of embryos is the exercise of free choice or an act of discrimination. This question is considered from both ethical and legal viewpoints.     

The right to health in public health: is this a new approach?

The international human rights community has frequently reaffirmed the importance of full respect for the right to health. However, there remains a large gap between the standards set out in Art 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the situation prevailing in most countries. While there has been a substantial amount of work done to expand upon the content of the right to health, there has been little consideration of what a right to health means for public health programming generally. This article addresses this issue by considering the compatibility of the essential elements of contemporary public health programming practice with the principles contained in General Comment No 14, para 43(f) (a minimum core obligation of the right to health). The article considers that while both contemporary public health practice and para 43(f) do contain compatible elements, the right to health brings with it new elements of monitoring (through right to health indicators) and accountability, both of which will require new tools to be adopted by the public health sector.     

Subject for discussion: is sexual abuse of a sleeping person possible or fantasy or simulated?

There have been reports of sexual acts on sleeping women since ancient times. Whether this is possible at all has been under controversial discussion by lawyers and lay people. The paper presents two cases of non-consenting penetrating intercourse with sleeping women and various legal and expert opinions. The authors discuss the possible influence of drugs and alcohol.     

Donation of 'spare' fresh or frozen embryos to research: who decides that an embryo is 'spare' and how can we enhance the quality and protect the validity of consent?

This paper analyses elements of the legal process of consent to the donation of 'spare' embryos to research, including stem-cell research, and makes a recommendation intended to enhance the quality of that process, including on occasion by guarding against the invalidity of such consent. This is important in its own right and also so as to maximise the reproductive treatment options of couples engaged in in vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment and to avoid possible harms to them. In Part 1, with reference to qualitative data from three UK IVF clinics, we explore the often delicate and contingent nature of what comes to be, for legal purposes, a 'spare' embryo. The way in which an embryo becomes 'spare', with its implications for the process of consent to donation to research, is not addressed in the relevant reports relating to or codes of practice governing the donation of embryos to research, which assume an unproblematic notion of the 'spare' embryo. Significantly, our analysis demonstrates that there is an important and previously unrecognised first stage in the donation of a 'spare' embryo to research, namely: consent to an embryo being 'spare' and so, at the same time, to its disuse in treatment. This is not explicitly covered by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Act 1990, as amended by the HFE Act 2008. Having identified this important initial stage in the process of consent to the donation of a 'spare' embryo to research in conclusion to Part 1, in Part 2 we analyse the idea of consent to an embryo's disuse in treatment on the basis that it is 'spare' with reference to the legal elements of consent, namely information as to nature and purpose, capacity, and voluntariness. We argue that there are in fact three related consent processes in play, of which the principal one concerns consent to an embryo's disuse in treatment. If the quality of this first consent is compromised, in turn this will impact on the quality of the consent to the donation of that 'spare' embryo to research, followed by the quality of consent to future cycles of assisted reproduction treatment in the event that these are needed as a result of a donation decision. The analysis overall is of central relevance to the debate as to whether, and if so when, it should be permissible to request the donation of fresh embryos for research, as opposed to those that have been frozen and, for instance, have reached the end of their statutory storage term. This has a particular bearing on the donation of embryos to stem-cell research since there is a debate as to whether fresh embryos are most useful for this.     

Independence or autonomy: which is the goal?

At times in psychiatric treatment practice in the United States, the notion of individualism or independence (an American ideal) is confused with autonomy (a rights goal). Client autonomy is defined as the ability of clients to make their own choices. When the societal ideal of independence overrides individual autonomy, inclusion and client well-being may be jeopardized. A case will be presented to illustrate these points. We make recommendations for professional education to protect client rights through understanding the distinction between autonomy and independence.