Undermining Adversaries: Unipolarity,Threat Perception,and Negative Balancing Strategies after the Cold War

This paper engages the ongoing soft balancing debate by suggesting a new analytical framework for states’ countervailing strategies—a negative balancing model—to explain why states do not form alliances and conduct arms races to balance against power or threats as they previously did. Negative balancing refers to a state's strategies or diplomatic efforts aiming to undermine a rival's power. By contrast, positive balancing means to strengthen a state's own power in world politics. I argue that a state's balancing strategies are shaped by the level of threat perception regarding its rival. The higher the threat perception, the more likely it is for a state to choose positive balancing. The lower the threat perception, the more likely it is for a state to choose negative balancing. I suggest that the hegemon provides security as a public good to the international system in a unipolar world in which the relatively low-threat propensity of the system renders positive balancing strategies incompatible with state interests after the Cold War. Instead, states have employed various negative balancing strategies to undermine each other's power, especially when dealing with us primacy. China's negative balancing strategy against the United States and the us negative balancing strategy against Russia are two case studies that test the validity of the negative balancing model.     

The Case of the Missing Hegemon: British Nonintervention in the American Civil War

Balance of power theories have come roaring back into prominence in recent years as international relations theory grapples with new developments, including offshore balancing and soft balancing. Recent works demonstrate the importance of more than just the distribution of power, and have addressed the role that domestic politics plays in balancing. One overlooked aspect of this debate, with implications for offensive realism and the current discussion on the United States and soft balancing, is the role that nonintervention conventions play in decision making. British nonintervention during the American Civil War presents a case at odds with offensive realist theory, as Britain should have intervened to protect its national interests—cotton, trade, and shipping—while also restraining a regional hegemonic power. Domestic cleavages, democratic peace norms, and public opinion pressures do not sufficiently explain this behavior. Instead, this paper posits that nonintervention was a result of British adherence to precedents and conventions.     

Stability and Change in U.S. Grand Strategy

Since the Global War on Terror (more recently termed the Long War) emerged as the centerpiece of U.S. grand strategy in 2001, the post–Cold War U.S. debate has narrowed significantly. Essentially three alternative strategies now compete for pride of place. Two are variants of a “primacy” strategy; one is a variant of “restraint,” sometimes termed “offshore balancing.” All three strategies take globalization as a given and as a positive development. None specifically connects U.S. military power to globalization. To the extent that globalization can be argued to have negative consequences, restraint offers a different remedy than either version of primacy. This article offers a brief characterization of globalization and speculates on its positive and negative results. The three grand strategies that remain visible in the U.S. public policy debate, and their suggested remedies, are then discussed. Finally, the U.S. military strengths and weaknesses are evaluated in order to gauge which strategy's remedies are most feasible.     

British Neutrality versus Offshore Balancing in the American Civil War: The English School Strikes Back

The American Civil War is an important test case for offensive realism because it was the last occasion when offshore balancing by Britain could have prevented the United States from becoming a regional hegemon. Instead, Britain drew on the norm of nonintervention to justify a policy of neutrality. Offensive realists reject the idea that Britain was constrained by normative considerations but disagree about why Britain failed to operate as an offshore balancer. I acknowledge the importance of the offensive realists' regionalized approach to the international system, but use English School thinking to argue that the normative framework that Britain and the United States subscribed to must be taken into account to provide a coherent explanation of Britain's response to the Civil War. Detailed archival research demonstrates that despite concern about u.s. regional hegemony, Britain was unequivocally constrained by normative considerations. The case study suggests, therefore, that societal constraints were stronger than systemic ones.     

If Not Soft Balancing,Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China

Some scholars argue that soft balancing is a typical state behavior against the hegemon under unipolarity. Others contend that soft balancing against the hegemon is ineffective. We challenge both arguments and suggest that soft balancing is not only a product of specific configurations of the power distribution in the system, unipolarity, but also a rational behavior under another condition, economic dependence. We argue that the interplay between power disparity and economic dependence shapes a state's decision in choosing different balancing strategies. The higher the power disparity and economic dependence, the more likely a state chooses soft balancing to pursue its security. Using U.S. policy toward China after the Cold War as a crucial test, we suggest that the huge power gap and increasing economic interdependence between the United States and China shape U.S. soft balancing rather than hard balancing toward China. We conclude that future U.S.-China relations depend on whether the United States declines as a result of China's rise and on the degree of economic interdependence between the two countries.     

“印太战略”:以美印日澳的战略逻辑、利益与策略选择为分析视角

"印太战略"是美国均势+有限遏制+规制+话语诋毁的混合型战略。它意在前沿、中间地带与后方的三层构建不对称的对华遏制性力量,突破中美双边、单区域战略竞争的狭窄战略空间;在多地域与多维度孤立中国,拉拢更多国家在产业价值链、数字经济等层面与中国切割;制订基础建设投资透明化的新标准,嵌入有利于美国利益的规制;通过国际法、舆论等软性手段抹黑中国的"一带一路"与海权发展。虽然共同逻辑都是制衡中国崛起,但日澳印在策略上强调非对抗性。其中避免成为中国优先反制是日本重要的策略目标;印度在拉达克边界冲突后尚没有形成一个完全倒向美国的战略,因为这必定使其背上沉重的战略包袱,成为美国的附庸;澳大利亚作为地缘政治影响有限的中等国家,在美国反华行动中冲在最前列已使其利益严重受损。而"印太战略"与东盟所推动的包容性、合作安全理念也有着本质的区别,东盟要在"印太地区"发挥中心领导作用,定位"印太"为对话与合作区域。所以由于东盟的抵制、印日澳的消极政策,这个战略形成的攻势将很难保持可持续性,其长期前景并不看好。     

美国东北亚政策的进攻性现实主义解读

以米尔斯海默为代表的进攻性现实主义是现实主义理论的最新发展,其从历史分析与理论论证的角度为美国的东北亚政策提出了"离岸平衡手"的解读与构想。然而朝核危机爆发后,美国的东北亚政策正朝着建立多边安全机制的方向发展,进攻性现实主义提出的"中国威胁论"也不攻自破。     

Repression,Grievances, Mobilization,and Rebellion: A New Test of Gurr’s Model of Ethnopolitical Rebellion

The concept of polarity has been subject to imprecise and often diverse use. This note explores problems associated with the varied use of the term and proposes an alternative approach to classifying international systems which treats horizontal and vertical dimensions of power as distinct structural variables. In this approach, the present system is distinguished from the classical balance of power system containing pluralized patterns of conflict on the one hand and from the Cold War system with a marked concentration of power on the other. In the contemporary system polarized patterns of conflict coexist with processes of power diffusion. To the extent polarizations persist in a more diffuse power setting, the decentralized power balancing system through which stability was sought in multipower systems cannot function‐nor are the polarized conflicts likely to be controlled as a result of the two‐power effort at balancing power which occurred during the post‐war period. The factors affecting the stability of the present system, it is suggested here, can be better understood by examining analogous structures in which processes of power diffusion occur in the context of polarized conflict and not as a result of spurious comparisons which mistake the diffusion of power for the pluralization of conflict.     

Why unipolarity doesn't matter (much)

This article first argues that states have not balanced against US unipolar power because the potential balancers do not view the United States as a major threat, because they believe it has benign security-seeking motives, at least with regard to other major powers. This explanation runs counter to the Brooks–Wohlforth argument, which holds that states are not balancing because the magnitude of the United States’ power advantage makes balancing essentially infeasible. The second part of the paper challenges the conventional wisdom on the benefits of unipolarity, arguing that the benefits the United States derives from unipolarity are generally overrated. More specifically, US security need not be significantly reduced by growth in China's economy that supports a return to bipolarity.     

Preface

ABSTRACT

Although first explicitly coined in Renaissance Italy, the notion of a ‘balance of power’ – the conduct of state actors to meet the logics of power balancing – goes back to pre-modern times. Traditionally, scholars have looked to the Punic Wars and the early modern period as early evidence for the balance. However, the ancient Near East during the second-millennium BC has received far less attention. Yet Western Asia existed as an international arena of states fully integrated in a system based on interdependence and power balancing. In the field of International Relations, systematic analyses of this phase in world history remain under-developed. Accordingly, the question of when a systemic environment for the balancing behaviour existed for the first time has been addressed less in International Relations theory where the literature leans primarily on the European experience.     

The Iraq War and International Relations: Implications for Small States

The Iraq War exposes the new shape of world politics. It discredits the idea of a benign hegemon defending world order, content to be an ‘offshore balancer’, exercising its power through multinational institutions and constrained by mutually agreed rules. Rather, the hegemon, facing few external constraints in a unipolar world, is driven by the particularistic interests of its ruling group, in the pursuit of informal empire wherein military force is used to impose client regimes and economic subordination. The impotence of both a realist power balance and of liberal institutions to restrain it calls into question the main bases of global order, leaving imperial overreach as the main limitation on hegemonic power. Small states may be able to adapt to, even temporarily profit from, bandwagoning with the hegemon, but it is they that are potentially most threatened when a hegemonic power undermines the international constraints on the use of power.     

Roosevelt, Truman and the Development of Postwar Grand Strategy

After its victory in World War II, it was clear that United States should move beyond the disastrous policies of the 1930s, but it was less clear how. Ultimately, a lasting postwar strategy was forged under President Truman. Appreciating how Truman moved well beyond Roosevelt's guiding assumptions is essential to understanding the evolution of American grand strategy. One sees that wartime planning and grand strategy formulation can prove quite inadequate for dealing with postwar challenges. An administration cannot be locked into assumptions, but must constantly test them. Thus, the Truman administration eventually developed and adopted containment and moved far beyond FDR's approach. More substantively, the fundamental geopolitical lesson of World War II and the early Cold War was that the United States must assume the essential balancing role relative to other major powers.     

安倍治下的日本对华政策:从战略制衡到战术避险

日本的对华外交深受国际体系和中美日三角关系的影响。由于中美两个大国在全球层面的战略竞争加剧,以2017年为分水岭,第二次安倍内阁领导下的日本的整体对华外交政策经历了从"战略制衡"向"战术避险"方向的转变。在2017年以前,日本为了联美对华实施"战略制衡",在外交方面,以"印太战略"孤立中国;在安全方面,加强岛屿防卫能力和强化日美同盟;在经济方面,大力支持"跨太平洋伙伴关系协定"和对"一带一路"倡议持冷淡态度。在2017年以后,在中美关系的不确定性增大的情况下,安倍领导下的日本对华实施"战术避险"。在外交方面,加强印太战略的开放性、领导人互访和对华自制;在安全方面,继续强化国防上的内部制衡;在经济方面,有条件地认同"一带一路"倡议并对华展开第三方市场合作。展望未来,令和时代的日本将是一个拥有部分战略自主的中等强国,在日美同盟框架下维持与中国有距离的交往,力图在瞬息万变的国际政治角力中实现日本国家利益的最大化。     

新时期印度海权战略的确立及其思想根源

新时期印度海权战略的确立不是一蹴而就的。经过长期的酝酿与积淀,21世纪初新时期印度海权战略最终确立。它集印度洋“区域控制”和向周边大洋“远洋延伸”为一体,以建立世界级“海权国”为终极目标。新时期印度海权战略有两大思想根源：其一是源于印度地理和历史的强烈海权意识,其二是马汉海权论影响下的潘尼迦海权思想。     

Doubly Dualistic Dilemma: US strategies towards China and Taiwan

In its relations with Taiwan and China, Washington has begunto implement separate dual strategies in order to simultaneouslydeter unilateral action while balancing out the rival politicaland military forces of each side. A simple standard strategyjust is not sufficient to maintain the status quo. The way tomaintain peace is for Washington to keep its role as a moderatorbetween the two sides while preventing both from taking unilateralsteps toward goals that would naturally provoke the other. USpolicy has to mirror the duality of the cross-strait arena byimplementing dual balancing and deterrent strategies. It isalso imperative that policymakers realize the complexity ofthe situation so as not to unwittingly provoke either side.This paper is an analysis of the emerging US strategy of deterringboth sides of the Taiwan Strait from taking unilateral actionwhile maintaining a balance of military and political forces,and gives some suggestions as to the further development ofthis strategy.     

The Potential and Pitfalls of a Zero-Sum Grand Strategy

Grand strategy provides the strategic vision for a state in pursuit of its national interests. The current U.S. grand strategy straddles the line between isolationism and off-shore balancing. Based on the international relations theory of realism, these strategies view international actions as a zero-sum game. In other words, a country can only benefit at the expense of another. The zero-sum logic is clearly articulated in the “America First” strategic documents. It is also apparent in many of the president's speeches and policy actions. While the Trump administration's zero-sum approach has potential to rebalance burdens and level the playing field in such areas of trade, it is fraught with risks and jeopardizes the standing of the United States in the world.     

东北亚和解与合作:韩国的作用与角色冲突

冷战后韩国在东北亚地区的地位与作用均有明显的上升趋势。而卢武铉提出的东北亚平衡者外交战略,要在地区事务中发挥更大的独特作用,更使东北亚地区的国际关系有了新变化的可能。在国际事务中,韩国自主外交的"独立意识"及其作用的发挥,有利于地区安全的战略平衡。同时,在朝核问题、区域合作等问题上,韩国作用的发挥还是具有一定的局限性。中国应进一步加强与韩国在各领域的合作。这对呼应韩国自主防卫诉求、培植中韩互信、牵制美日、防止东北亚"新冷战"的发生都具有重要的战略意义。     

The India–US–China triangle from New Delhi: overcoming the “hesitations of history”

ABSTRACT

With the focus of global politics shifting to the Indo-Pacific and the maritime domain becoming the new theater of global power politics, the triangular relationship between India, the US, and China needs a fresh evaluation. This article examines the evolution of the India-US-China triangle since the end of the Cold War from the perspective of New Delhi. It argues that a combination of structural and domestic political variables has led to a significant shift from a soft balancing approach by China and India vis-à-vis the US to a more robust limited hard balancing by India and the US vis-à-vis China.     

The Nordic–Baltic Area: Divisive Geopolitics at Work

States in the Nordic–Baltic area reacted heterogeneously to the Iraq War operation: Denmark chose to participate; Iceland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania supported the operation diplomatically or materially; whereas Norway, Finland and Sweden were negative. The research tool used to explain this pattern is the parsimonious theory of ‘past and present geopolitics’, taking issue with systemic neorealism, primarily. In spite of official rhetoric emphasizing Baghdad or New York (the UN), states’ driving forces were mainly found in their different salient environments. The primary explanation, proximate power balancing, was at work regarding Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Iceland, with no big neighbour, could enjoy profit bandwagoning, while Sweden and Finland followed ‘standard operating procedures’. A minor aberration from expectations is noted regarding Finland: its EU balancing rather than US balancing of Russia. The Norwegian ‘no’ and Danish warfare were both an expression of geopolitical freedom of manoeuvre.     

State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State

Neorealist theory holds that the international system compels states to adopt similar adaptive strategies—namely, balancing and emulation—or risk elimination as independent entities. Yet states do not always emulate the successful practices of the system's leading states in a timely and uniform fashion. Explaining this requires a theory that integrates systemic-level and unit-level variables: a “resource-extraction” model of the state in neoclassical realism. External vulnerability provides incentives for states to emulate the practices of the system's leading states or to counter such practices through innovation. Neoclassical realism, however, suggests that state power—the relative ability of the state to extract and mobilize resources from domestic society—shapes the types of internal balancing strategies that countries are likely to pursue. State power, in turn, is a function of the institutions of the state, as well as of nationalism and ideology. The experiences of six rising or declining great powers over the past three hundred years—China, France, Great Britain, Japan, Prussia (later Germany), and the United States—illustrate the plausibility of these hypotheses.