侵权债权在破产程序中的优先受偿顺位建构——基于“给最少受惠者最大利益”的考量

破产法的公平理念以及侵权债权的非自愿属性,决定侵权债权具有从现行破产法所规定的普通破产债权中分立出来,并优先于一般交易债权受偿的正当性。基于侵权债权类型化以及罗尔斯的公平的正义理念——给最少受惠者最大利益,侵权债权在区分人身侵权债权和财产侵权债权的基础上,应做以下受偿顺位安排:破产费用和公益债务之外,人身侵权债权——工资债权和社会保险费用——劳动补偿金债权——财产侵权债权——国家税收——一般交易债权。人身侵权债权甚至有可能优先于担保债权,如果担保债权的设立发生于人身侵权债权产生之后。社会强制责任保险费用债权视其保障范围可以先于人身侵权债权或财产侵权债权。     

(Un)secured debt and the likelihood of court-supervised reorganization

Secured and unsecured creditors engaged in a bankruptcy process have different preference on the issue of financial distress. Secured creditors generally prefer liquidation whereas unsecured creditors tend to promote firm??s reorganization. As a consequence, secured creditors might be an obstacle to reorganization when all classes of creditors have to vote to approve the reorganization plan. To complete this analysis, we study the link between bankrupt firm??s capital structure and the likelihood of reorganization when bankruptcy Courts (instead of creditors) decide whether or not firms are reorganized. Our main result is that the reduction of secured creditors?? influence on the reorganization process might constitute a means to promote bankrupt firm??s reorganization. More generally, the paper analyses the link between the amounts/numbers of both secured and unsecured claims and the final issues of a Court-supervised reorganization process.     

有担保债权在公司重整程序中的限制

在传统破产法上,有担保债权一直处于一种较为优越的地位,无论是破产清算程序还是破产和解程序,都较少对该种权利及其权利人产生实质的影响。重整制度的出现打破了这一既有状态,为了实现债务人重建与复兴的目标,需要对有担保债权的内容及其行使进行必要的限制,这种限制应具体反映在重整法律的制度设计中,如此既能够完成债务人重建与复兴的目标,也能同时兼顾相关债权人的利益。     

破产法中法院审判职能的理性回归与改革路径探析

本文认为,新破产法对法院的职能定位存在着公权越位和私权错位的立法失误。当前破产法中法院职能应向"去行政化"与"去民事化"方向改革,以实现破产审判职能的理性回归。在"去行政化"改革方面,可以在现行司法行政体系内设置破产管理人监管处(科)的司法行政管理部门,并推行破产管理人执业许可制度;在"去民事化"改革方面,在破产管理人的选任和报酬确定上,则应实行以债权人会议决定为主、人民法院指定为辅的立法模式。     

Bankruptcy: Past Puzzles, Recent Reforms, and the Mortgage Crisis

This paper discusses four bankruptcy-related policy issues.First, what is the economic rationale for having a bankruptcyprocedure at all and what defines an economically efficientbankruptcy procedure? Second, why did the number of U.S. bankruptcyfilings increase so dramatically between 1980 and 2005? Third,a major bankruptcy reform went into effect in the United Statesin 2005—what did it do and how did it affect credit andmortgage markets? Finally, the paper discusses the mortgagecrisis, the high social cost of foreclosures, and the difficultyof avoiding foreclosure by voluntarily renegotiation of mortgagecontracts, even when such renegotiations are in the joint interestof debtors and creditors. I also discuss the pros and cons ofgovernment programs to refinance mortgages and the argumentfor giving bankruptcy judges new power to change the terms ofresidential mortgage contracts in bankruptcy.     

人身侵权之债债权人在破产清偿中的优先权分析

在破产案件,特别是由大规模侵权引发的破产案件之中,人身侵权之债的债权人是否享有优先权是一个非常重要又颇具争议的问题。从优先权的价值取向、人身侵权之债的特殊性以及社会现实的需求等方面综合分析,人身侵权之债在破产中理应具有一定的优先性。从各国的司法实践来看,许多国家都对破产中的人身侵权之债给予了特殊保护,而且有越来越多的国家开始重视人身侵权之债的优先保护问题。     

破产别除权理论与实务研究

别除权是破产程序中一项重要的优先受偿权利,其优先权的行使不受破产清算与和解程序的限制。根据新破产法的规定,别除权之债权属于破产债权,其担保物属于破产财产。别除权的基础权利是担保物权及特别优先权,定金担保债权和一般优先权不享有别除权。同一担保物上存在两个以上的担保性质相同或不同的别除权时,应依据相关法律规定确定各项别除权间的清偿顺序,以保证破产程序的公平、顺利进行。别除权人享有破产申请权,也应当申报债权,未依法申报债权者不得依照破产法规定的程序行使权利。别除权人是债权人会议的成员,未放弃优先受偿权者也有表决权,但对债权人会议与其无利害关系的特定决议事项无表决权。新破产法对债权人会议表决标准的规定仍有需完善之处。     

破产法的程序结构与利益平衡机制

我国2006年破产法因在程序设计中采取了“一个大门,三个小门”的设计思路,因而,破产法必然含有破产清算程序、和解程序与重整程序共同适用的部分,也含有各自的特别规定。“三种程序”的共用部分,包括:申请程序;公告与通知程序;管理人及其职责;破产债权;破产债权的申报;债务人的财产;破产费用与共益债务;取回权、抵销权、撤销权;法律责任等。而特别部分包括各种程序的启动主体、启动后的效力、程序之间的转换等。除此以外,因破产法是对债务人财产的一次性概括处理,因此,各种利害关系人的利益冲突在破产法上尤为突出,主要表现在:债权人与债务人之间的利益冲突、债权人与出资人之间的利益冲突、债权人与债权人之间的利益冲突、有担保债权人与无担保债权人之间的利益冲突、申报债权的债权人与未申报债权的债权人利益冲突、共益债权人与一般债权人之间的利益冲突、管理人与债权人之间的利益冲突、职工利益与其他利害关系人利益的冲突等,破产法对于这些利益冲突进行了平衡性制度安排。但在对这些冲突进行了平衡性制度安排的背后,却存在着有争议的价值判断。     

试析应收账款受让人与破产管理人的权利冲突

保理中的应收账款转让属于一般债权让与。在供应商破产的情况下,保理商对应收账款的权利与破产管理人的权利发生冲突。美国破产法和《统一商法典》对应收账款转让的调整值得我国破产法借鉴。根据我国破产法的规定,应收账款一般不应作为破产财团,破产管理人不应享有对保理合同的撤销权,保理合同应当继续履行。对该等权利清偿顺序的确定需要建立应收账款转让的适当公示程序,并应当进一步完善破产法中的相关规定,建立一般与例外以及对例外进行限定的完整制度。     

Does a Reorganization Law Improve the Efficiency of the Insolvency Law? The Finnish Experience

This paper provides empirical evidence on issues related to the role of reorganizations. The results show that creditors receive a better payoff in a reorganization than in a going concern sale in liquidation bankruptcy. The study finds support for one explanation, namely that the direct costs of a reorganization are lower than the costs of liquidation bankruptcy. However, direct costs can explain only a part of the reorganization surplus, since the reorganization surplus is much higher than the difference in direct costs.     

论担保物权在破产程序中的实现

担保物权的实现既涉及精细繁多的技术规范,又涉及取舍难断的价值考量,破产的发生又进一步增加了这一过程的复杂性.在价值选择层面,应在承认担保物权效力的同时,对其在破产程序中的实现加以适当限制,以促进破产财产整体价值的最大化.在技术规范层面,基于对美国与德国相关制度的比较分析,并结合我国实践,我国<破产法>在解释上及未来可能的修正中,应扩大中止制度的适用范围,同时应对担保债权在中止期间的利息给予适当而非过度的保护.在破产清算与破产和解中,我国<破产法>关于担保物权人享有不受限制的独立变现权的规定,会影响清算程序中破产财产最大价值的实现及和解协议的可行性,应修正为既限制担保物权人的变现权,又允许其参与破产程序并享有表决权的制度安排.在破产重整程序中,除应尊重当事人自愿达成的重整计划外,也应适当参酌其他国家的法律规定,于重整计划的表决分组时,更细致地体现担保物性质的差别,于确定对担保物权人的补偿时,也与中止制度一样,设置必要的限制.     

Reorganization in US and European Bankruptcy law

European countries have amended their bankruptcy statutes in the past decades to increase the likelihood of a company’s continuation in bankruptcy. Liquidation procedures are ill suited to realize the full value of the company as a going concern. An infusion of new finance raises company valuation and makes continuation through reorganization more likely. Reorganization preserves value, if general creditors as the main beneficiaries of reorganization play a crucial role in reorganization proceedings. Legal origins of national bankruptcy legislations are less important in explaining the incidence of reorganization than national attitudes towards failure and the prevalence of equity over debt finance. JEL Classification K12     

Forced to make mistakes: Reasons for complaining about Bebchuk's scheme and other market-oriented insolvency procedures

Bebchuk's proposal for bankruptcy reform is analysed, in particular his claim that using options is fair and prevents justified complains. However, the proposal has a systematic bias against junior creditors and former shareholders because they have to pay for unavoidable mistakes in estimating the company's value, may lack the financial resources to exercise their options and lose by a day of reckoning. A market solution will be specified that is simpler and at least as fair as Bebchuk's scheme according to his own standards. However, a complete solution to these problems may have to be a non-market one. JEL Classification G33 · K39 · K22     

论债权之罹于时效与担保物权之存续

关于担保物权在被担保的债权罹于诉讼时效后的法律地位,有不同的立法例。基于诉讼时效的立法宗旨,以及我国担保物权以担保债权实现为功能,在我国,应确立如下改革方向:债权罹于诉讼时效时,担保该债权的担保物权应仍然存续,且其效力不受任何影响;关于质权和留置权,应明确规定,被担保的债权消灭之前,质权或留置权不消灭;关于抵押权,应以除斥期间限制其存续期间。     

金融机构破产债权人会议程序之研究

债权人会议作为全体债权人的自治组织,既是企业破产的一种利益平衡器,也是统一债权人意志与行动,保证破产有序进行的自治性团体。金融机构破产是企业破产的一个分支。金融机构本身的特殊性决定了其破产时债权人权利与普通商事企业破产时债权人权利的差异性,同时,债权人的权利内容和权利行使还会受到一定的限制,因此,金融机构破产债权人会议与传统的债权人会议在功能、履职程序、价值目标方面存在冲突。但是,不能因为这种冲突而否定债权人会议的作用及其存在的价值,立法者所应该做的是对其功能、职权和履职程序进行适应性修正。     

Secured debt and the likelihood of reorganization

Theory suggests that secured creditors may increasingly oppose a debtor’s reorganization as the value of their collateral approaches the amount of their claims. If reorganization occurs and the value of the firm appreciates, the secured creditor receives only part of the gain. But if the firm’s value depreciates, the secured creditor bears all of the cost. Secured claimants, thus, often have more to lose than to gain in reorganizations. This study of Finnish reorganizations filed in districts that account for most of the country’s reorganizations finds that creditor groups most likely to be well-secured are most likely to oppose reorganization. We also find a negative correlation between how well-secured banks and other institutional lenders are and the likelihood of a confirmed reorganization plan. Limiting the priority of secured debt might stimulate reorganizations.     

对新破产法实施状态下的职工权益保护

新破产法否定了既往我国破产实践中广泛存在的，将破产国有企业劳动债权优先于担保债权清偿的政策性做法，而规定劳动债权作为一般债权受偿。此一规定的改变，理顺了一般劳动债权与担保债权的关系，符合一般法治理念，但也给政府的破产企业职工劳动者权益保护政策带来挑战。政府应未雨绸缪，采取多种措施保护企业劳动者权益。     

破产撤销权的制度设计

破产撤销权作为一种保护破产宣告之前债权人利益的制度,设定的目的在于保护全体债权人的整体利益,对于任何损害债权人整体利益的个别清偿行为或减少破产财产的行为予以撤销,以期实现破产法许可债权人公平合理的分配债务人破产财产的基本宗旨。破产撤销权制度设立的理论基础为具体制度的构建提供了合理性标准,为具体制度的实施提供了有力保障。     

What Liquidation Does For Secured Creditors, And What It Does For You

This article analyses the liquidation process, challenging the much repeated proposition that secured claimants 'stand outside' liquidation. It is argued that this proposition (i) is a product of a misunderstanding of the dual duality in the nature of liquidation proceedings, in that, in principle, they serve both public and private functions, and they further the interests of both secured and unsecured creditors; (ii) overlooks how secured creditors benefit from liquidation, and also how unsecured creditors have a real interest in the proper administration of their debtor's encumbered assets; (iii) mistakes the secured creditor's choice in usually being able to gain immunity from the liquidation process, for a compulsion to stand exiled from this process; (iv) is incorrect as a matter of history and practice; and (v) is rendered unsustainable by the statutory text. It concludes that secured creditors have never 'stood outside' liquidation, that liquidation is an important tool for the protection of their interests, and that it is right to require floating charge holders to pay their fair share of liquidation expenses.     

Optimal Trust Design in Mass Tort Bankruptcy

Many firms have filed for bankruptcy to manage mass tort liabilities,most notably asbestos producers. We model a bankruptcy procedurethat optimally balances the liquidity needs of present claimantsand an uncertain number of future claimants. We find that futureclaimants should receive greater awards in expectation thanpresent claimants as compensation for bearing greater futureclaims risk. We also find that allocating more value to contractualcreditors in bankruptcy makes an earlier filing more likely,which may increase overall welfare. Optimal risk-sharing impliesthat creditors should receive equity in a trust fund, with tortclaimants receiving senior debtlike securities.