Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model

Terrorism in general, and suicidal terrorism in particular, is popularly seen as “irrational,” but many economists and political scientists argue otherwise. This paper distinguishes three different senses of irrationality: unresponsiveness to incentives, deviation from narrow self-interest, and failure of rational expectations. It concludes that an intermediate position on the rationality of terrorism is appropriate. The typical terrorist sympathizer deviates only slightly from homo economicus. But active terrorists arguably stray from narrow self-interest and rational expectations, and suicidal terrorists probably violate both. Deterrence remains a viable anti-terrorism strategy, but deviations from rational expectations increase the potential of persuasion and appeasement.     

Extending the rational choice model from the economy to society

That the extension of the rational choice model beyond the economy to all society can finally lead to integration of social theory is often claimed by the model’s advocates. The underlying assumption is that this model is valid for both the economy and society, in the form of an economic approach to, or a utilitarian paradigm of, all social behaviour. The meta-theoretical presupposition or injunction that agents are (should be) profit-seekers or utility-optimizers is therewith given the mission to integrate and ‘save’ contemporary social science. However, such extensions of the rational choice model from the economy to society neglect the fact that this presupposition has been partly mitigated and compromised within economics itself. If so, then suspicion is strong that the rational choice model would be even less appropriate for the other social sciences and thus fall short of achieving its self-designated role of integration of social theory. The conclusion of an interdisciplinary analysis drawing both from economics and sociology is that rational choice is far from being an integrative model of the economy and society.     

Interpreting the dynamics of public housing: Cultural and rational choice explanations

Abstract

This article uses culture of poverty and rational choice theories of poverty to explain how quickly nonelderly household heads leave public housing. Data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics serve as the basis for the analysis.

Although a significant proportion of all household heads have public housing spells lasting five or more years, the majority have spells lasting less than five years. The availability of other housing options has a strong impact on how quickly individuals move out of public housing. Family structure and human capital play a more modest role. To the extent that one's childhood experiences affect the likelihood of exiting public housing, they appear to do so mostly through their effect on the acquisition of human capital. Finally, the evidence presented is inconsistent with the notion that public housing is a trap from which it is more difficult to escape the longer one lives in it.     

Incorporating groups into rational choice explanations of turnout: An empirical test

This study examines the problem of voter turnout from a rational choice perspective. It reviews the “paradox of voting” and finds one model, which incorporates the role of intermediary social groups and leaders, to be a promising solution. It tests the hypothesis that leader mobilization increases voter turnout, using an ecological analysis of turnout in five Montreal ethnic communities during three recent elections: the 1993 Canadian federal, the 1994 Quebec provincial, and the 1994 Montreal municipal elections. Data on mobilization are taken from semi-directed interviews with association leaders in each community. The results compare predicted and actual rankings of turnout for each community and election. The overall results are weak, indicating that the model does a poor job of predicting voter turnout.     

A rational choice model of citizen participation in high and low commitment electoral activities

Weisberg and Grofman (1981) propose a rational choice model of voter turnout which they test with data from the 1976 Presidential election. We extend and generalize that model to cover a wide variety of forms of electoral participation including working on a campaign, wearing campaign buttons, and talking to others about the campaign. We find that voters who see a difference between the candidates, with one candidate positively evaluated and the other negatively, are roughly twice as likely to participate in high involvement electoral activities as are those who are alienated from or indifferent to the candidates.     

论密尔对功利主义的证明

密尔对功利主义的证明可以分以下几个步骤：首先他探讨伦理学和科学的区分，说明功利主义不可能有科学的证明；其次他探讨伦理学方法，对直觉主义伦理学和归纳主义伦理学进行分析，说明功利主义在什么意义上是可以证明的；再次，对功利主义予以证明。他首先假设人的认知机能和意欲机能是可以统一起来的，然后再从三个方面进行证明：(1)从“可见的到可欲求的”证明；(2)从个人幸福到公共幸福的证明；(3)只有幸福是值得欲求的，其他一切或是幸福的组成部分，或是达到幸福的手段。最后，对最大多数人的最大幸福予以证明。     

公共服务均等化“善治”取向下的理性选择

公共服务均等化问题是公共管理改革和实践的重要命题。诞生于西方社会的治理理论及其“善治”理念，已成为当今国际社会公认的公共管理研究语境和改革实践的普遍诉求。目前，中国城乡之间、地区之间公共服务的不均等化状态引发了众多社会矛盾，严重偏离了公共管理的善治取向。本文基于不同于公共财政范畴善治框架，以公平和效率为尺度，研究公共服务均等化策略的合理性，认为公共服务均等化有利于实现善治理念的公平取向和效率取向，达到公平和效率的高度统一，中国政府应该从理念和制度两个层面加强公共服务均等化建设。     

Plea bargaining and the decision to go to trial: The application of a rational choice model

What factors determine the plea bargain which prosecutors will offer defendants? What factors determine whether or not a defendant will demand a trial? The former question is relevant to our assessment of the fairness of plea bargaining; the latter question is relevant to prosecution management. Landes provides an economic model of the criminal courts which suggests answers to these questions. While several researchers have provided empirical analysis at least consistent with the Landes model, there has been no test of the model's power for predicting individual case decisions. After providing a derivation of a rational choice model similar to that of Landes but incorporating organizational considerations, the empirical validity of the model is tested using individual case data. Major predictions, including the structural form of the plea bargain offer equation, are validated. Other findings, which do not validate the model's predictions, are discussed in terms of the organizational incentive structure facing assistant prosecutors. A discussion of the application of the model to aid in prosecution management is presented, including an indication of the importance of looking at the distribution of prediction errors as well as the overall rate of prediction error. Finally, comments are made concerning the use of econometrics in an organizational context.     

论罗尔斯对功利主义的批判

罗尔斯对功利主义的批判是为了建立一种正义理论,以期代替居于统治地位的功利主义,他对功利主义的批评,涉及到功利主义的三个错误:即功利主义没有认真考虑在一个社会里如何分配利益和福利;功利主义没有认真地考虑人与人之间的差别;功利主义没有考虑欲望满足方面的特性.而这三个错误在罗尔斯看来是目的论和道义论之间的差异、是善与正义之间的差异、是效率原则与平等原则之间的差别.在<政治自由主义>中,他又联系社会多元论的事实,对功利主义的综合性学说进行批评,使他对功利主义的批判上升到一个新的阶段.罗尔斯对功利主义的批判给我们两点启示:如何正确处理效率原则和平等原则关系问题以及如何正确处理一元与多元的关系问题.     

The effect of misperception on strategic behavior in legislative settings: Social psychology meets rational choice

This paper is about the conditions under which simple social psychological processes can affect collective decisions. In rational choice theory, social psychological effects are said to cancel out, be randomized, or be corrected by communication. Yet as Janis and Mann (1977) argued, there are generally recurring conditions in which such factors influence individual decisions. The question is, Under what conditions can we expect these factors to affect collective decisions? This paper suggests a general approach to identifying the effects of strategic misperception, illustrates it with an example of a social psychological process that affects player perceptions, and describes the preference distributions in which this simple process would change majority voting outcomes. The general conclusion is that strategic misperception may affect majority decisions under so many distributions of preferences that decisions cannot be predicted from knowledge of actors' preferences alone.     

Reapplying behavioral symmetry: public choice and choice architecture

Public Choice - New justifications for government intervention based on behavioral psychology rely on a behavioral asymmetry between expert policymakers and market participants. Public choice...     

The public choice of educational choice

The very small literature explaining (i) how citizens have voted in two California voucher referenda, (ii) how legislators have voted on voucher bills in the State of Florida and the US Congress, and (iii) the variation across states in charter school provisions is summarized. New empirical evidence documenting the cross-state variation in the success of voucher referenda and voucher bills is examined. Voucher bill characteristics and state characteristics play important roles. Voucher bills have been passed only in the more conservative Republican states, and almost all of the successful voucher programs have been targeted at large, struggling school districts.     

评梁漱溟的儒家人生追求和事功思想的交葛

梁漱溟一生行谊 ,俱在求人生、中国两大问题之解决 ,但事实上梁漱溟的人生问题求解和中国问题求解存在着不可自解的矛盾。为此 ,梁漱溟时而为了其儒家人生追求而淡化事功主义 ,时而为中国问题焦虑而强化事功主义和淡化儒家人生追求 ,最后走向了儒家人生追求和事功主义的双向遏制     

Happiness and public choice

Measuring individual welfare using data on reported subjective well-being has made great progress. It offers a new way of confronting public choice hypotheses with field data, e.g., with respect to partisan preferences or rents in the public bureaucracy. Insights from public choice also help to assess the role of happiness measures in public policy. We emphasize that maximizing aggregate happiness as a social welfare function neglects incentive problems and political institutions while citizens are reduced to metric stations. The goal of happiness research should be to improve the nature of the processes through which individuals can express their preferences.