Austen Chamberlain and the continental balance of power: strategy, stability, and the league of nations, 1924-29

As foreign secretary from November 1924 to June 1929, Austen Chamberlain dominated British foreign policy. Central to his diplomatic strategy was the maintenance of the European balance of power and, in this circumstance, pursuit of a leadership role for Britain within the League of Nations. The foundation upon which Chamberlain based his European strategy lay with his determination to have Britain play the vital role of stabilizing relations between France and Germany, whose mutual antipathy after the Great War, compounded by the severity of the Treaty of Versailles, threatened continental security. By October 1925, his work bore fruit with the conclusion of the Locarno agreements. For the remainder of his tenure at the Foreign Office, Chamberlain used Locarno - and Germany's membership in the League that was part of that settlement - as the diplomatic mechanism to underwrite his strategic conception of the balance of power. This article addresses the neglected issue of the strategic base of Chamberlain's European policy and addresses three criticisms of his record as foreign secretary.     

Mixing Grand Strategies: Trump and International Security

ABSTRACT

When a new President is elected in the United States, the first thing analysts do is define that President’s grand strategy; yet, naming Donald Trump’s grand strategy was a difficult task as his pre-election speeches often contradicted traditional US foreign policy norms. Trump’s ambiguous grand strategy combines two US foreign policy strategies: nationalism in the sense that his preference is for unilateral policies prioritising American interests, and a traditional foreign policy approach, as seen in the moves taken against China and Iran. Surprisingly, this grand strategy unintentionally contributes to cooperation in Eurasia, as actors like Russia, China, Turkey, India and the European Union continue to try to balance the threat from the United States instead of competing with each other, while smaller countries are reluctant to challenge the regional powers due to mistrust towards Trump.     

Bridging the Realist/Constructivist Divide: The Case of the Counterrevolution in Soviet Foreign Policy at the End of the Cold War

The surprising end of the Cold War has led to a debate within international relations (IR) theory. Constructivists have argued that the end of the Cold War is best explained in terms of ideas and agency—specifically Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev's new thinking. A few realists have countered that Soviet material decline was "endogenous" to the new ideas. Can these two theoretical perspectives be reconciled with respect to this case? They can be partially integrated with a path-dependent strategy that places an emphasis on "institutions." Nevertheless, explaining the end of the Cold War largely requires a theory of Soviet foreign policy and its relation to the state. As a former or ossified revolutionary state, Soviet foreign policy for at least several years was largely based on the principle of externalization: outside threats were used to rationalize radical centralization, repression, and the dominance of the Party. In using the USSR's institutionalized legacy as a revolutionary state, Gorbachev acted as a counterrevolutionary and reversed this process with his revolution in foreign policy. In creating a new peaceful international order, he sought—through the "second image reversed"—to promote radical decentralization, liberalization, and the emergence of a new coalition. The case examines how Gorbachev's domestic goals drove his foreign policy from 1985 to 1991.     

Carter and the Soviets: The Origins of the US Return to a Strategy of Confrontation

Conventional wisdom holds that American foreign policy took a decisive turn towards confrontation under President Ronald Reagan after 1981. However, a reconsideration of the administration of President Jimmy Carter shows that it was Carter who broke with the failed policies of his detentist predecessors, and made opposition to the Soviet system a moral rather than geopolitical issue. These policies were not, however, part of a coherent strategy, but rather were a reaction to the unrestrained nature of Soviet military and geographic expansion; still, the confrontational strategy that emerged in 1981 was rooted in Carter's rejection of détente after 1977.     

Austen Chamberlain and Britain's Relations with France, 1924-1929

Several historians have suggested that Austen Chamberlain's Francophile tendencies during his period as foreign secretary between 1924 and 1929 were the defining features of his European diplomatic strategy. By examining four key events: the rejection of the Geneva Protocol, the conclusion of the Treaty of Locarno, the Anglo-French Compromise on disarmament and the negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, this article argues that Chamberlain's relationship with the French was not entirely harmonious. After the high point of Locarno, Britain's relations with France became increasingly tense because of Chamberlain's growing disillusionment with Briand's willingness to pursue a diplomatic agenda that did not have at its heart a reinvigorated Entente Cordiale.     

Austen Chamberlain and Britain's Relations with France, 1924–1929

Several historians have suggested that Austen Chamberlain's Francophile tendencies during his period as foreign secretary between 1924 and 1929 were the defining features of his European diplomatic strategy. By examining four key events: the rejection of the Geneva Protocol, the conclusion of the Treaty of Locarno, the Anglo–French Compromise on disarmament and the negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, this article argues that Chamberlain's relationship with the French was not entirely harmonious. After the high point of Locarno, Britain's relations with France became increasingly tense because of Chamberlain's growing disillusionment with Briand's willingness to pursue a diplomatic agenda that did not have at its heart a reinvigorated Entente Cordiale.     

In the belly of the beast: a personal perspective on apartheid South Africa's diplomacy

This article is a retrospective on the author' diplomatic career mainly up to the time of his first ambassadorial appointment in 1975. Besides detailing aspects of his career including the special circumstances of his first appointment, it reveals something of the nature of foreign service as an occupation. The white South African experience had points in common with that of other foreign services as well as points of difference. A major difference was the permanently embattled nature of the government's international relations. Another was that white South Africa was a divided society. Tensions within white society as a whole tended to be reflected in the foreign service.     

Obama's Legacy The Foreign Policy of the Late-Term Obama Administration

The year 2014 was a tipping point for the Barack Obama Administration-that was the year when it strove to forge a legacy of the Obama era but came up against challenges arising from major changes that were taking place internationally and domestically.The Administration was then focused on maintaining a fragile balance between creating this legacy and responding to these challenges.Obama stuck to his fundamental principles when dealing with overseas affairs,but he also came up with new responses.The dynamic balance struck between these two formed the basis of the global strategy of the late-term Obama Administration.The Administration's focus at this time highlights the dilemma it faced in forging a legacy.Further,the foreign policy of Obama and Trump are actually not so different;they both supported some degree of isolationism with a focus on domestic issues.     

Herbert Hoover,Anglo–American Relations and Republican Party Politics in the 1920s

Herbert Hoover is often portrayed as a business-centric relatively non-political historical figure. In particular during his time as Commerce Secretary in the administrations of Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, Hoover is often described as supporting a United States foreign policy that first and foremost served the needs of American corporations. This article attempts to recalibrate that picture by stressing Hoover’s political self-interest as a motivating factor in his policies. Far from being politically unconcerned, Hoover was a man desperate to become president of the United States. His disastrous campaign for the Republican nomination in 1920 made him doubly determined to use his power in the Republican cabinets to improve his chances for the nomination later. This can be seen in one of the most famous of Hoover’s foreign policy interventions, the Anglo-American rubber crisis. Far from serving the needs of American business, during this crisis Hoover was acting mostly from political self-interest. In particular attacking the British allowed him to reframe his image, which was seen as Anglophiliac in 1920. In the end it was a very successful rebranding, as Hoover was able to run for the presidency in 1928 from a position of strength when it came to foreign affairs.     

Through the Looking Glass: The Helsinki Final Act and the 1976 Election for President

The controversy surrounding the 1975 Helsinki Final Act made it an enduring issue in the 1976 campaign, and the political backlash against President Gerald R. Ford damaged his electoral chances. Ford's signature of the agreement, his continuation of détente, and his foreign policy more broadly may not have been decisive issues in his contests with Ronald Reagan and then Jimmy Carter, but they certainly were prominent throughout the election. Examining the influence of the Final Act on Ford's election campaign illuminates the extent to which a number of candidates sought to use popular opposition to the agreement to their advantage. Furthermore, it reveals how the 1976 presidential candidates, and Ford in particular, struggled to address growing questions about détente, human rights, and morality in foreign policy. Ford's failure to defend his signature of the Final Act adequately raised concerns about his foreign policy and personal leadership with the electorate.     

The Kennedy Administration and the Battle over Foreign Aid: The Untold Story of the Clay Committee

President John Kennedy made foreign aid a key component of his Cold War strategy, introducing it with much fanfare in 1961. He increased funding for aid projects and created several agencies aimed at modernising the under-developed world. A year later, aid was under pressure from elements in Congress that doubted both its value and accomplishments. In late 1962, Kennedy commissioned General Lucius Clay to assemble a committee to review the aims and management of America’s foreign aid programme. Reflecting the president’s desire to ensure optimal value and neutralise opponents, it also indicated Administration belief that the rhetoric of modernisation had overshadowed the relationship between aid and national security. Never intending Clay to assemble a mere rubber stamp Committee, Kennedy specifically tasked the members with investigating aid’s role in supporting the “Free World.” The effort failed. Scholars traditionally assume that it did so because Clay opposed Kennedy’s programme; however, he was supportive of the president’s efforts. Instead, its demise came at the hands of an unusual Congressional coalition that enthusiastically cut the president’s budget.     

中柬“特殊关系”的形成(1954-1965)

1954年日内瓦会议以后的10年是中国和柬埔寨关系发展的重要时期。在这一时期中,两国关系经历了一个从彼此缺乏了解到在国际事务中密切合作的过程。在冷战时期,中国领导人视美国为对中国革命和中国国家安全的主要威胁,因此,他们对外政策的一个主要目标就是要打破美国对中国的孤立和封锁。为了反对和削弱美国这个主要敌人,中国领导人在外交领域中运用统一战线策略,分化对手并争取中立势力。就柬埔寨而言,中国领导人的主要考虑就是如何赢得西哈努克对中国的好感,争取他的合作,防止柬埔寨加入美国组织的反华包围圈。此外,中国领导人也希望通过柬埔寨来扩大中国在亚非中立国家中的影响。     

当前朝鲜对外政策的特点及走向分析

朝鲜外交政策的基本目标是通过外交手段为确保国家生存权利、巩固和扩大国家生存空间创造条件。朝鲜总体外交战略是两轴战略,基本外交战略是先军战略,安保外交战略是均衡战略加搭便车战略,对南外交战略是民族共助加追求经济实利战略,对外经济合作战略是有限制的开放战略。朝美核危机最终通过和平解决的可能性还是大于通过其他方式解决的可能性。美伊战争的进程和结果将对朝美关系产生重大影响。     

The revolutionary model of Dr William L. Pierce

This essay explores the revolutionary model propounded by the late Dr William L. Pierce, the founder of the National Alliance. Pierce was keenly aware of the opposition arrayed against his movement and thus outlined a strategy that he saw as viable under current conditions. Although his National Alliance organization was large by American far right standards, it still constituted a relatively small movement. Furthermore, Pierce assumed that the mainstream media were generally hostile to his message. Thus Pierce developed a revolutionary strategy to take these and other factors into account. Although no previous single source fully captured his revolutionary strategy, this essay surveys his previous writings and broadcasts so that his model comes into clearer focus.     

浅议中国—东盟合作背景下来桂东盟留学生情感教育对策

近年来,随着来桂留学生规模的日益壮大,留学生的情感教育问题随之凸显出来。在中国—东盟"10+1"背景下开展东盟留学生的情感教育,其内涵和策略的调整与变化给当今广西高等教育国际化带来了诸多挑战。本文分析了来桂留学生情感教育的内涵以及广西开展东盟留学生情感教育的优势,提出了加强和完善来桂东盟留学生情感教育的对策。     

Applied Grand Strategy: Making Tough Choices in an Era of Limits and Constraint

This article hopes to contribute to the strategic content of U.S. foreign policy by offering a definition of grand strategy and case for reorienting U.S. policy around it. Rather than advocate a specific grand strategy—a matter still open for debate—the analysis concludes with a set of attributes to assess whether a proposed grand strategy constitutes a “good” grand strategy. It concludes by introducing the concept of an applied grand strategy approach, which may help to identify and assess the strategic implications of foreign policy choices.     

Origins of Regime Change: “Ideapolitik” on the Long Road to Baghdad, 1993–2000

How was the ouster of Saddam Hussein defined as the solution to America's Iraq problem? Current scholarship on the U.S. invasion of Iraq tends to focus on the post-9/11 road to war, promoting models of policy capture, intelligence manipulation, threat-inflation, or rhetorical coercion of Bush administration opponents. In this essay, I trace the “Ideapolitik” of regime change in the 1990s and show that Bush's post-9/11 rhetoric was firmly embedded in a preexisting foreign policy consensus defining Saddam Hussein as the “problem” and his overthrow as its “solution.” Drawing upon recent research in international relations and public policy, I show how the idea of regime change prevailed in redefining American strategy for Iraq. While the September 11, 2001 attacks had important effects on the Bush administration's willingness to use force, the basic idea that ousting Saddam Hussein would solve the Iraq problem was already embedded in elite discourse. Saddam Hussein's ouster was not simply the result of idiosyncratic or nefarious decision-making processes within the Bush administration, but was instead the realization of a social choice made by U.S. foreign policy elites well before George W. Bush came to power.     

Towards a Balanced and Sustainable Defense

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates defines “balance” as the critical principle of his defense strategy. This emphasizes achieving a balance between current conflicts and dangerous and more conventional wars in the future. But finding the right balance between types of war is only one form of balance. We also need to balance the nation's checkbook, and define the balance between what we spend on defense and what we can afford for the long term. Balance is not enough, our defense investments must be sustainable. Defense spending today, in inflation adjusted dollars, is at an all time high and exceeds Cold War levels. This has helped sustain the world's finest military, but the funding for this buildup and two wars has been borrowed from foreign sources. The accumulated debt and subsequent interest payments have reduced our ability to weather the current economic crisis and will drag on our economic recovery for years to come. The Obama administration must craft a grand strategy to get us out of the red—strategically and fiscally. This essay offers a set of strategy, structure and investment shifts to that end.     

印度外资政策改革：历程、经验教训和启示——基于文献梳理视角解读

随着外资政策改革不断深化,印度外资政策问题受到国内外学者的广泛关注,相关文献也逐渐增多。本文从印度外资政策改革历程、印度利用外资的经验教训、印度外资政策对中国的启示等方面对印度外资政策改革的研究文献进行梳理,以期深度解读和预测印度外资利用情况。     

俄罗斯对外能源战略和中俄能源博弈

俄罗斯对外能源战略具有一贯性,即使用"能源武器"开展对外能源合作。但与苏联和叶利钦时期相比,当前的俄罗斯对外能源战略更为灵活和务实。俄罗斯不仅要利用能源来壮大自身经济实力,还要运用能源武器提升自己的大国地位。中俄能源合作有着广阔的前景,但由于俄罗斯追求"国家利益"最大化,以及采取"捆绑式"能源外交,使中俄石油管线的修建一波三折,天然气合作依旧处在初级阶段。中国应加强对俄罗斯对外能源战略的研究,认清两国能源合作中存在的问题,以此推动双边和多边的能源合作。