Toward a public choice theory of monopoly regulation

This paper benefited from valuable comments when presented at the Sixth Annual Conference of the Rutgers University Advanced Workshop in Public Utility Economics and Regulation at Bolton Landing, New York in May 1987.     

Endogenous bargaining power and the theory of small group collective choice

Contrary to some criticism (Musgrave and Musgrave, and West) the small group collective choice model may yield a determinate, Pareto optimal solution even with all or none bargaining. Such bargaining as well as the solution are implied by the basic assumptions of the theoretical model.     

Empirical social choice: an introduction

The year 2012 was the 30th anniversary of William H. Riker’s modern classic Liberalism against populism (1982) and is marked by the present special issue. In this introduction, we seek to identify some core elements and evaluate the current status of the Rikerian research program and its empirical applications. Special attention is given to three phenomena and their possible empirical manifestations: The instability of social choice in the form of (1) the possibility of majority cycles, (2) the non-robustness of social choices given alternative voting methods, and (3) the possibility of various forms of manipulation of the decisions (heresthetics). These topics are then connected to the contributions to the current special issue.     

Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control

The paper analyzes the coalition formation process in a global emission game with asymmetric countries where the number of signatories, the abatement target and the policy instrument are chosen simultaneously. Exemplarily, a uniform emission reduction quota and an effluent charge are considered. Stability is analyzed in a supergame framework by applying the concept of coalition-proofness. The analysis also considers the impact of impatient agents, restricted and simple punishment profiles. Two main results may be mentioned: First, paradoxically, IEAs achieve only little (if signed at all) if the externality problem is distinct. Second, our model helps to explain the frequent appearance of emission quotas in international pollution control despite the recommendations by economists to use market-based instruments like effluent charges.     

Interpreting the dynamics of public housing: Cultural and rational choice explanations

Abstract

This article uses culture of poverty and rational choice theories of poverty to explain how quickly nonelderly household heads leave public housing. Data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics serve as the basis for the analysis.

Although a significant proportion of all household heads have public housing spells lasting five or more years, the majority have spells lasting less than five years. The availability of other housing options has a strong impact on how quickly individuals move out of public housing. Family structure and human capital play a more modest role. To the extent that one's childhood experiences affect the likelihood of exiting public housing, they appear to do so mostly through their effect on the acquisition of human capital. Finally, the evidence presented is inconsistent with the notion that public housing is a trap from which it is more difficult to escape the longer one lives in it.     

Health maintenance insurance: Toward an optimal HMO

The financial incentive structure of today's health maintenance organizations addresses certain problems attributed to fee-for-service medical care, but at a theoretical level it does not induce optimal provider behavior. Health maintenance insurance—a combined package of medical, morbidity/disability, and life insurance—encourages providers to compete for the health dollar, and not simply the medical care dollar, thereby remedying deficiencies in prepayment and promoting true health maintenance. The principle underlying health maintenance insurance emphasizes the need to search for effective means of preventing disability, morbidity, and premature death.This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 105th Annual Meeting of the American Public Health Association, Washington, D.C., October 30–November 3, 1977.     

The public choice of educational choice

The very small literature explaining (i) how citizens have voted in two California voucher referenda, (ii) how legislators have voted on voucher bills in the State of Florida and the US Congress, and (iii) the variation across states in charter school provisions is summarized. New empirical evidence documenting the cross-state variation in the success of voucher referenda and voucher bills is examined. Voucher bill characteristics and state characteristics play important roles. Voucher bills have been passed only in the more conservative Republican states, and almost all of the successful voucher programs have been targeted at large, struggling school districts.     

Chasing an elusive concept: Ideological identifications and candidate choice

This research examines the manner in which ideological identifications covary with candidate choice. Ideological ID is not purely an independent variable for evaluating candidates; evaluations of the candidates affect both individual identification and candidate placements. Prospective voters try to create a consistent cognitive system of candidate preference, ideological ID, and ideological placement of their candidate. Results demonstrate that candidate preference has a strong effect on less salient attitudes.     

Penology,economics, and the public: Toward an agreement

In this paper we confront the problem of why prisons are not a more effective tool for dealing with criminals. Several sources of this problem are suggested, and reasonably operational solutions are proposed. These solutions are motivated by basic principles of economics, and some broader consequences of this framework for dealing with criminal activity are briefly discussed.This article stems from general issues which arose while the author was at SUNY/Binghamton preparing a dissertation on somewhat more specific cost-benefit questions of prison management. He is indebted to Clifford Kern, A. G. Holtmann, and B. A. Weisbrod for lively comments on an earlier draft of this paper.