Media scrutiny and the quality of public officials

I investigate whether attempts by the media to determine a candidate's fitness for office lowers the average quality of public officials, what I call the media scrutiny paradox. Media scrutiny imperfectly signals heterogeneous candidates' type, but imposes privacy costs and reputational costs on politicians. The quality of office holders falls if the selection effect is adverse and outweighs the screening effect. A low quality information signal, which could result if the media focus on irrelevant aspects of behavior, makes the screening effect small and the media paradox more likely to hold. Individuals of good character might invest more in their reputation and have more at stake from being (falsely) identified as a rapscallion. The actual malice standard established in New York Times v. Sullivan likely increased (relatively) the cost of candidacy for good people and lowered the quality of officials.     

Competition among officials and the abuse of power

Traditional economic theory suggests that competition among officials providing government goods tends to reduce corruption. However, empirical evidence does not yet support this view. In this paper, I show that a corrupt and powerful central authority can use competition among officials to amass resources for itself. While competition reduces corruption at the lower level of government, corruption at the higher level of government is increased. To avoid widespread theft from the central authority, competing officials are monitored more intensively than a monopolist. Hence, even though competition among officials generates more consumer surplus, it may reduce welfare.     

Fiscal dynamics of local elected officials

The fiscal behavior of local elected officials is examined in a dynamic model where officials maximize an intertemporal objective function in two stages. Officials first decide upon an optimal mix of revenue and expenditure and then minimize loss and adjustment-cost functions. The model is tested using data from the 20 most populated U.S. cities whose mayor was elected on a four-year cycle. The empirical results support the model. Fiscal behavior differs between cities and local fiscal decisions made by elected officials are in part dependent on the timing of elections.     

Representative bureaucracy and seconded national government officials in the European Commission

The bureaucratic arms of modern international organizations increasingly consist of staff with ambiguous organizational affiliations. This article analyses the implications of this trend from the perspective of representative bureaucracy – using seconded national experts (SNEs) in the European Commission (Commission) as the empirical laboratory. Using a variety of datasets, we unveil Commission SNEs' profiles (to assess their passive representativeness) and link these profiles to their role perceptions (to evaluate their potential for active representation). This illustrates that Commission SNEs' background characteristics do not match those of their constituent population (i.e. the EU27 population) – suggesting a lack of passive representativeness. However, we also find that SNEs from countries favoring stronger national rather than European regulatory and policymaking powers are more likely to see themselves as a representative of their home country government. This suggests a potential for active representation in terms of SNEs' home country's policy preferences.     

Which government officials leak unauthorized information to the press in Washington?

Every modern president of the United States has been bedeviled by unauthorized leaks of government information to the press. Who is responsible for such leaks? Presidents of the United States have accused civil servants of attempting to undermine them. However, journalists have suggested that the presidents' own political appointees leak more. Using interviews conducted in 2013 with both presidential political appointees and civil servants who worked in public affairs for the U.S. Treasury Department during the administrations of Presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush, as well as interviews with reporters with whom the Treasury officials interacted frequently, this case study finds that political appointees and civil servants leak unauthorized information that does not serve the president's interests to the press with roughly the same frequency. The findings shed light on behavior that is typically shrouded in secrecy and call into question the effort by modern U.S. presidents to gain greater control of the federal government by hiring record numbers of political appointees. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The productivity of elected and appointed officials: the case of school superintendents

For over 40 years researchers have attempted to test the relative efficiency of governments run by elected versus appointed officials with conflicting results. The focus of prior research has been the expenditure levels of municipal and county governments. In this paper, we consider the achievement of students in public schools. Using data from Florida??s 67 school districts, we compare academic outcomes of students in districts run by elected and appointed superintendents. To overcome selection bias, we utilize both instrumental variable methods and panel data techniques. We find no consistent differences in the performance of elected and appointed superintendents.     

Governing at the frontier of the European commission: The case of seconded national officials

Political Integration and Disintegration in the British Isles. By A. H. Birch. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977. Pp. 184. £6.50 hardback, £2.95 paperback.

Divided Loyalties. British Regional Assertion and European Integration Edited by M. Kolinsky. Manchester University Press, 1978. Pp. 224. £9.50

The Break up of Britain: Crises and Neo‐Nationalism. By Tom Nairn. London, New Left Books, 1977. Pp. 318. £750.

The British Right: Conservative and Right Wing Politics in Britain. Edited by Neill Nugent and Roger King, Westmead : Saxon House, 1977, Pp. vi + 230 £7.50     

RPR officials: a report on an inquiry into the Neo-Gaullist Party elite

Abstract. Based upon a questionnaire survey of delegates to the RPR National Congress held in Grenoble in November 1984, this paper summarizes a three-dimensional analysis of RPR officials (demographic and sociological identification; political mobilization, party functions and activism; ideological trends and political attitudes) which seeks to appraise how the evolution of the Gaullist movement correlates with changes in French politics between 1976 and 1986.     

Investigation of officials＇ behaviors of lnternet abuse under e-government in China

The paper investigated the lnternet abuse behaviors of government officials in public administration or public service departments in China. The time period and frequency being on Internet for private purposes, the non-official business surfing behaviors within working hours, as well as the main harms brought to the government affairs and government networks were analyzed statistically. The attitude of officials upon being online supervised and controlled by technical tools, the requirements of internal entertainment web construction, and the proposals to improve the management systems of e-government network were collected and analyzed systematically. This study has provided the first hand materials for treating Internet abuse in e-government environment in China.     

On Trojan Horses and revolving doors: Assessing the autonomy of national officials in the European Commission

National officials working in international bureaucracies regularly invoke the fear that member states strategically use such officials for influencing decision making and agenda‐setting to their advantage. This article theoretically analyses conditions under which the autonomy of national civil servants in international bureaucracies might become compromised. The ensuing predictions are then tested using a unique survey among seconded national experts (SNEs) in the European Commission (N ≈ 400). Finally, evaluating the characteristics linked to reduced autonomy among SNEs in the Commission, the article illustrates that these officials are, in practice, likely to be relatively independent from member state influence.     

Alternative strategies for coping with officials in different postcommunist regimes: the worm's eye view

This article uses focus group methods to see how citizens in Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic view their interactions with postcommunist officials. In the Czech Republic, while they complain that bureaucracy has increased with the transition from communism, and they gossip about the need to use contacts and bribery, their own experience is much more positive, and the reforms they propose centre on efficiency and convenience. At the other extreme, citizens of Ukraine complain that corruption has increased because officials are no longer afraid, and their tales about bribery and extortion extend from general gossip to specific personal experience. They see advantages in more ‘control’ and more ‘fear’. Slovakia and Bulgaria fall between these two extremes, though perhaps are rather closer to Ukraine. People seldom suggest that reform is impossible or undesirable anywhere, and, in terms of attitudes towards dealing with officials, there is no simple, clear and definitive line marking a quantum change in culture between Catholic and Orthodox traditions, or between former Hapsburg, Romanov and Ottoman territories. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How pre‐ and postrecruitment factors shape role perceptions of European Commission officials

Individuals' role perceptions are central guides to their behavior and choices as members of an organization. Understanding organizational dynamics thus requires knowledge about the determinants of such role perceptions, as well as whether—and when—organizations can influence them. This article brings forward a theoretical framework allowing for both prerecruitment (extraorganizational) and post‐recruitment (intraorganizational) determinants of individuals' role perceptions, and examines its empirical implications using a large‐N data set of temporary officials in the European Commission. We find that intergovernmental and epistemic role perceptions are strongly linked to pre‐recruitment factors (such as educational and professional background), whereas postrecruitment factors (such as length of affiliation and embeddedness within the Commission) are the main driving force behind supranational and departmental role perceptions. This heterogeneity in the importance of pre‐ and postrecruitment factors for distinct role perceptions has important consequences for conceptualizing organizational change.     

Assessing (and fixing?) Election Day lines: Evidence from a survey of local election officials

Despite recent studies that find few people face significant wait times when attempting to vote in U.S. elections, the 2012 election produced numerous anecdotal and journalistic accounts claiming otherwise. This study relies on a national survey of local election officials to systematically ascertain their views about the challenges and successes they had in administering the 2012 general election. Consistent with surveys of voters, most officials report that wait times and lines were minimal. Furthermore, the relative amount of money available to a jurisdiction for election administration was unrelated to the occurrence of these problems, while the presence of more poll workers—especially first-timers—may actually exacerbate them.     

Interactions between scientists and public officials: A comparison of the use of science in regulatory programs in the United States and West Germany

This essay compares and contrasts important attributes of the use of scientific knowledge and judgment in regulatory decisions in the United States and West Germany. It decribes the broader historical context for such decisions in each country. Although the system in America exhibits considerable conflict and assumption of adversarial positions, it is argued that a more fundamental attribute of the system is that policy decisions are reviewed according to rules of evidence and its interpretation. Similarly, although the German system involves a great deal of consultation, a more fundamental aspect of policy decisions there is that of the determination of the social obligation to act. In the United States, it is more important that a decisionmaker has properly developed and interpreted the evidence than that he or she has consulted with all the relevant parties. In Germany, the order of importance of the two is reversed.Based on seminars given in Berlin in December 1984 at the International Institute for Environment and Society of the Science Center Berlin and in Washington, DC in January 1985 at the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences.The author, a National Research Council Fellow, wishes to thank his colleagues in Berlin and Washington for their comments, many of which have been integrated into this essay. The ideas presented here, however, remain the responsibility of the author.     

The approach of senior public officials to information technology‐related reform: lessons from India

A review of global experience suggests that information technology (IT) has great potential to contribute to public sector reform. However, the Indian reality — like that for many countries — has been more problematic, with many failures of IT‐related reform; failures that can be described as total, partial or failures of sustainability and replication. Many factors help explain such failure, but a key component is the approach to IT and reform adopted by senior public officials. A ‘four Is’ model of approaches is described: the non‐IT approach of ‘ignore’ and the IT‐related approaches of ‘isolate’, ‘idolize’ and ‘integrate’. Analysis of Indian cases suggests that it is the last approach that is most likely to deliver reform objectives; yet it remains the least commonly adopted. Changes are therefore required in current strategies for public administration training and in the planning and management of change. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.