Closeness matters: monotonicity failure in IRV elections with three candidates

A striking attribute of instant runoff voting (IRV) is that it is subject to monotonicity failure—that is, getting more (first-preference) votes may result in defeat for a candidate who would otherwise have won and getting fewer votes may result in victory for a candidate who otherwise would have lost. Proponents of IRV have argued that monotonicity failure, while a mathematical possibility, is highly unlikely to occur in practice. This paper specifies the precise conditions under which this phenomenon arises in three-candidate elections and applies them to a number of large simulated data sets in order to get a sense of the likelihood of IRV’s monotonicity problem in varying circumstances. The basic finding is that the problem is significant in many circumstances and very substantial when IRV elections are closely contested by three candidates.     

Quick counts in the Mexican presidential elections: A Bayesian approach

In all democracies, anticipating the final results of a national election the same day the voters go to the polling stations is a matter of interest, for television stations and some civil rights organizations, for example. The most reliable option is a quick count, a statistical procedure that consists in selecting a random sample of polling stations and analysing their final counts to forecast the election results. In Mexico, a particularly important quick count is organized by the electoral authority. The importance of its results requires this exercise to be designed and executed with specially high standards far beyond those used in commercial studies of this type. In this paper, the model and the Bayesian analysis of the quick counts conducted by the Mexican authority, during the presidential elections in 2006 and 2012, are discussed.     

Closeness counts if it matters for electoral victory: Some empirical results for the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany

It has been argued, that closeness counts not only with respect to the overall decision of a (general) election, but also with respect to the outcome in subelectorates. This proposition is tested using data both from the last German Bundestagswahl as well as the UK General Election in 1987. We find that (expected) closeness counts for turnout on the level of the individual electoral district, but not on any level below, e.g. on the level of precincts. Therefore, closeness seems to count only if it is relevant for electoral victories or defeats.     

Barometer elections in comparative perspective

This paper develops a conceptual framework for studying the performance of the government in what we term ‘barometer elections’. Barometer elections are defined as elections that reflect changes in citizens' attitudes toward the government in response to changing political and economic conditions, absent the opportunity to install a new executive. We classify British by-elections and German Land elections as barometer elections and test a general model that incorporates the electoral cycle; public opinion toward the government; economic conditions; and previous performance as determinants of election outcomes. Considering both short-term and long-term changes in public attitudes and economic performance in the empirical analysis, we find that barometer election outcomes can be explained with a similar set of independent variables across systems.     

Gubernatorial elections and attitudes toward the police: State elections as focusing events

Traditional views hold that citizens’ attitudes toward the police are driven by local concerns. We contend that public attitudes toward the police are also responsive to systematic and periodic state-level political factors. We show that state elections as a focusing event alter periodically the determinants of attitudes toward the police. Using an ordered logistic regression model and data from national public policy surveys from 1998 and 1999, we find that gubernatorial elections have a significant effect on the state/police relationship. State elections create conditions that separate the bureaucratic and partisan functions of the state government. In turn, the bureaucratic performance of the state government is less related to police approval, while partisan contestation for control of the governor office (control of the state) is significantly and positively related to police approval. During gubernatorial election years, attitudes toward the state government account for more of the variation in police attitudes.     

Activating voters in congressional elections

This paper shows that one of the consequences of electoral campaigns is activation. Much research in the last decade has shown that campaign spending is related to electoral outcomes, but nearly all of this research has been conducted on district-level data, so we do not know how campaigns influence individual voters. This research returns to the theoretical framework offered inThe People's Choice and shows that at least part of the effect of campaigns is due to the increased likelihood of people voting when campaigns are more intense.     

Succession effects in presidential elections

What is the impact of ex-presidents on the electoral performance of their party's successor candidates for the office and how long after a president has left office are successor effects electorally significant? Mattei and Weisberg (1994) argue that successor effects are large primarily when the vice president runs for office immediately at the end of the term of the president under whom they served. Timeliness and the association between presidents and their vice presidents account for succession effects. This paper challenges the Mattei-Weisberg successor effects perspective, arguing that significant successor effects can be possible for non-vice presidential candidates and long after a president has left office. Using American National Election Study data, I add numerous successions to those Mattei and Weisberg investigated. Analysis finds that succession effects apply to non-vice presidential candidates. Further, some ex-presidents may influence voting decisions long after they left office. There is also a hint in these data that succession effects have climbed over time, because as polarization has increased, the linkage between presidents and their parties has tightened.     

Late-deciding voters in presidential elections

This article examines the behavior of voters who decide on their presidential candidate preferences within the final two weeks of the presidential campaigns. Relying on data from American National Election Studies (ANES) for elections, between 1972 and 1988, we demonstrate that late deciders are different from other voters in a variety of respects. They are less involved politically and far less predictable in their behavior than other voters. More significantly, we find that the candidate preferences of late deciders are not determined by the conventional political forces that motivate other voters. Rather, the choices that late deciders make appear to be nearly random in character. The implications of these findings for the analysis of electorates are discussed.     

Parliamentary elections in Cambodia 1998

On 26 July 1998, Cambodia had a general election for the second time since the 1991 Paris Peace Accords ending the Civil War. The first elections took place in 1993 within the framework of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The 1998 elections were organised by Cambodian institutions with the international community supplying financial and material help, and electoral advice.     

Turnout and presidential coattails in congressional elections

Estimating the impact of turnout on House election results is problematic because of endogeneity and omitted variable bias. The following study proposes an instrumental approach to correct for these problems by using a series of fixed effects two-stage least squares panel-data regression models covering three congressional apportionment cycles (1972–1980; 1982–1990; 1992–2000). The analysis tests whether voter participation decreases the House incumbent’s electoral support, regardless of the level of competition in the district. The study also aims to determine if an increase in participation benefits Democratic candidates and whether this effect is constant across apportionment cycles. The results show that the influence of turnout on incumbency vote share is conditional on the level of presidential support in the district. This finding is explained by the surge and decline thesis of Campbell (1960).     

Non-competitive elections and national politics: The USSR Supreme Soviet elections of 1984

Elections to the ‘eleventh convocation’ of the USSR Supreme Soviet took place on 4 March 1984. The process by which the elections took place is examined in detail, from the calling of the election on 16 December 1983, through the nomination, approval and registration of the candidates, to the pre-election meetings with constituents and the poll itself. The level of turnout (99.99 per cent) and the vote in favour of the single list of candidates (99.94 and 99.95 per cent respectively for the two chambers) were in each case the highest in Soviet history; they must, however, be adjusted for the use of ‘absentee certificates’ and an apparent increase in the number of citizens not recorded on the electoral register. Elections without choice, as in the USSR. are not necessarily elections without political significance. Soviet elections appear in fact to perform at least three important functions: legitimation; political communication between regime and citizenry; and political mobilization and socialization. Given the increasing economic difficulties they are likely to face in the later 1980s and beyond, the Soviet authorities may be expected to make even more use of such mechanisms in the future in order to secure acceptance of their decisions without resort to overtly coercive means.     

Competitive primaries and party division in congressional elections

We examine the effects of competitiveness and divisiveness in the 2010 congressional election, as the emergence of the Tea Party resulted in many competitive Republican primaries and highlighted significant divisions within the party. We find that competitive Republican primaries and competitive Democratic primaries increased turnout in the general election. The presence of divisiveness in the Republican Party has no discernible effect on turnout on its own, but actually increases the vote share captured by the Republican Party in November. Additionally, we find that while either a competitive primary or the presence of a Tea Party candidate was advantageous to the Republican Party, the presence of both in the same election was no more beneficial than if there was either a competitive primary or a division in the party.