The electoral budget cycle

This article begins with a review of the now substantial literature on the thesis that polticians manipulate governmental outputs so as to favor their chances of reelection. It concludes that while this “electoral cycle” thesis was initially overstated by its proponents, it retains more plausibility than recent critics have allowed. This conclusion is then demonstrated through an analysis of expenditures by the ten provincial governments in Canada between 1951 and 1984.     

The Spanish electoral cycle of 2019: a tale of two countries

Abstract

In 2019 alone, Spanish citizens went to the polls at least four times – two general elections, European elections, local elections and, for some, regional elections. Moreover, in the 2016–19 legislature, the country witnessed a successful vote of no confidence that replaced a Conservative prime minister with a Socialist one; experienced an important constitutional crisis over the 2017 referendum on Catalan independence; observed the emergence for the first time of a viable far-right party; and ended with the first coalition government in the modern democratic history. The November 2019 election, the last in this long electoral cycle, left a fragmented and polarized political landscape and a left-wing cabinet – PSOE and Podemos – that does not have a majority in the chamber. This article presents the background, the results of the different elections and discusses how and why Spanish politics experienced a radical transformation likely to have an impact in the next years.     

Party system dynamics in post-war Japan: A quantitative content analysis of electoral pledges

Qualitative accounts of Japanese party politics allude to the standard left-right spectrum, but they invariably devote much more space to discussions of foreign policy differences than to socioeconomic conflict. Quantitative estimates of Japanese party positions treat short party responses to newspaper interviews as if they were true manifestos, and fail both to confirm the claims of the qualitative literature and to demonstrate any consistent basis for party differentiation at all. We address both puzzles by applying a text scaling algorithm to electoral pledges to estimate Japanese party positions on three major policy dimensions. Our analysis largely confirms the findings of the qualitative literature, but also offers new insights about party movement and polarization over time.     

Explaining the electoral success of the new right: The German case

Immigrants are blamed for economic and social problems throughout Europe. This article explores the theoretical argument that electorates support new right parties because they are placing more emphasis on specific issues like immigration. The findings provide evidence that immigration explains much of the electoral support for the new right parties in Germany. Areas with larger immigrant populations provide fewer votes, while areas where immigrants ‘commit more crime’ provide greater support. This suggests the problems associated with immigration explain the new right's support, rather than simple xenophobia. As long as such problems continue, the potential for new right success will remain.     

Public support for electoral reform: The role of electoral system experience

What affects public support for electoral reform? How does experience with different electoral systems affect people's willingness to support electoral reform? Given the salience of changes to election rules even when they are passed via the legislature and the increasing use of referenda as alternative mechanisms for change, these questions are critical to understanding when electoral reform will occur. I argue that experience (specifically, with an electoral system similar to that under consideration) affects public opinion by reducing uncertainty about the likely effects of reform and thus affects support for reform (although the direction of the effect depends on partisan bias). Moreover, I argue that experience is most important in the absence of strong party cues. I leverage subnational electoral system variation in the United Kingdom and find that experience does affect support for reform — negative experiences decrease support for reform. The results have implications for the possibility of electoral reform in the UK and beyond.     

Corruption and electoral campaigns in Mexico: A case study of the federal electoral process in 2018

The article analyzes the relationship that exists between electoral campaigns and corruption, studying the case of Mexico. The most common ways and means of practicing and presenting corruption during these electoral processes are described. In addition, the circle of corruption that begins during the electoral processes and continues once in the government is described. In the same sense, the results of an opinion survey in the Metropolitan Zone of Guadalajara (ZMG) on corruption during electoral campaigns are presented. It is concluded that, many times, corruption in the government begins during the electoral stage, so it is important to articulate various strategies and legal instruments to inhibit it from the electoral stage.     

Partisan self-interest and electoral reform: The new Italian electoral law of 2005

In December 2005, Italy's mixed-member electoral system was replaced with a system of bonus-adjusted proportional representation. The reform conformed with rational-choice models in that it was imposed by the ruling coalition, which sought to bolster its own power interests. But the case illustrates the impossibility of reducing such power-based motivation to a single goal, such as seat maximization. Power is shaped by many factors, and electoral systems influence many of these. This article develops a theoretical framework for understanding the various power-oriented considerations that may operate in electoral reform. It then analyses the role these played in Italy. It argues, in particular, for the need to take account of coalition dynamics when studying such processes.     

The electoral connection in staggered parliaments: Evidence from Australia,France, Germany and Japan

This article explores whether differential time horizons in legislative chambers that result from staggered membership renewal affect legislative behaviour. The analysis focuses on patterns of bill initiation and the introduction of amendments in the upper chambers of Australia, France, Germany and Japan – all four of which contain two or more classes of members that face re‐election at different times. Drawing on original comparative data, clear evidence is found of over‐time variation in legislative activity levels in the upper chambers. Approaching elections lead to increased activity levels, with increases in the introduction of bills, but also, to a lesser extent, amending activity. Such variation is found not only for those members facing the most proximate election, but for all members of the chamber. Importantly, there are no significant differences in legislative behaviour between those members up for re‐election and those not facing the electorate in the most proximate election. These patterns are interpreted tentatively as evidence of the paramount importance of political parties in parliamentary systems.     

The range and limitation of sub-national regime variations under electoral authoritarianism: The case of Russia

ABSTRACT

As has been demonstrated by scholars, different levels of a polity may encompass different political regimes. In this study we examine variations in regional political regimes which have developed under Russia's system of electoral authoritarianism. Comparing the results of two cycles of regional assembly elections (2008–12 and 2013–17) we analyse and compare elections results and levels of electoral contestation in both the party list (PL) and single member district (SMD) contests. This allows us to identify the range of sub-national regime variations: ‘hegemonic authoritarian’, ‘inter-elite bargain authoritarian’, ‘clearly-competitive authoritarian’, and ‘moderately-competitive authoritarian’ regions. Approximately half of the regions demonstrate stable electoral patterns across both cycles. At the same time, none of the regions go beyond the authoritarian limitations imposed by the Russian regime. The variation is explained by a combination of structural and agency factors with a prevalence of the latter.     

Individual level dynamics of PTV change across the electoral cycle

Propensity-to-vote (PTV) scores are ever more commonly used in electoral research as a measure of electoral utilities. Yet a growing literature employs them as dependent variable in the voting equation in place of the lower information granted by vote recall questions. However, this choice can be seen as problematic because of the very structure of election survey research. To the extent that voters' PTVs are measured in post-election surveys (as it is often the case) these are likely to result endogenously produced by actual voting behavior in the past election – thus partly undermining the validity of the PTV question which, ideally, should not be related to any specific election. In this paper, we try to disentangle the relationship between short-term political attitudes (leader evaluations, issue proximity, economic assessments) and voters' changing patterns of propensities to vote in both an electoral and a non-electoral context. The latter scenario serves as a means to rule out the potentially contaminating effect of voting choices on voters' PTVs. The data comes from two panel surveys of Italian voters conducted by ITANES in occasion of the 2006 general election, and in 2011 (that is, in a non-electoral year) respectively.     

Competing loyalties in electoral reform: An analysis of the U.S. electoral college

A central tenet in the electoral systems subfield is that parties, when in power and motivated by partisan interest, seek desired outcomes via the strategic adoption of electoral rules. Such a focus, however, omits a key point: electoral rules also distribute power among geographic units. If, within a party, the partisan and geographic interests of some members conflict, then the canonical relationship between partisanship and rule choice may be conditional. The U.S. electoral college provides an opportunity to test for such intra-party variation, because it advantages some states over others and thus makes salient geographic allegiances. Using an original dataset on one reform proposal—the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC)—I find evidence of competing loyalties. Although NPVIC advances furthest when Democrats control state lawmaking, a state's status as a swing—but not as an overrepresented—state weakens the relationship to the point where even Democrats are unlikely to aid NPVIC.     

The nationalization of electoral cycles in the United States: a wavelet analysis

We take a new look at electoral sectionalism and dynamic nationalization in presidential elections. We treat this problem as one of synchronism of electoral cycles, which we estimate by using wavelets. After providing a self-contained introduction to wavelet analysis, we use it to assess the degree and the dynamics of electoral synchronization in the United States. We determine clusters of states where electoral swings have been more and less in sync with each other and with the national cycle. Then, we analyze how the degree of synchronism of electoral cycles has changed through time, answering questions as to when, to what extent, and where has a tendency towards a “universality of political trends” in presidential elections been more strongly felt. We present evidence strongly in favor of an increase in the dynamic nationalization of presidential elections taking place since the 1950s, largely associated with a convergence in most (but not all) Southern states.     

The effects of campaign spending on electoral outcomes: A data envelopment analysis

Data envelopment analysis is used to analyze the efficiency of candidate campaign spending. Analysis of the measured efficiency scores of the incumbents and challengers shows that there are significant systematic effects of both district and candidate characteristics. The incumbent's residuals from the efficiency score regressions indicate those candidates who do well because of the nature of their district and those who do well because of their own abilities. Incumbents are ranked according to their observed efficiency, their unobserved efficiency and their vote share. Correlations among the rankings are significant and of the expected signs. More efficient candidates receive higher vote shares.     

The refundable tax credit: A cubist policy analysis

A cubist policy analysis sets forth several interacting realities about a policy proposal in order to arrive at an optimum reconciliation of their demands. In relation to the proposal of a refundable tax credit, one must consider the political climate in 1984 and 1985 with respect to income taxes, the effect on families that are poor or have marginally middle-class or middle-class income, of relatively small increments or reductions of money, trends with respect to income for such families, and the manner in which established income transfer mechanisms respond and are able to respond to problems that emerge. Taking all this together, we are led to a proposal to replace the personal exemption in income taxes with a tax credit of $400 per person, reduced by 5 percent of household Adjusted Gross Income in excess of $10,000 a year. Costs and benefits and alternative designs for a refundable tax credit (including one that a taxpayer may choose or decline) are provided.     

The effect of electoral rules on voting behavior: the electoral college and shift voting

The Electoral College has a measurable effect on the propensity of the rational voter to vote for the candidate he most prefers. The ‘slippage’ between the individual's articulated preference ordering and his actual vote is analyzed (using 1968 data) with respect to the strategic position of the voter in his state. The direction of the findings support the theoretically-derived propositions. Nevertheless, the low overall incidence of shifts and the reluctance of voters to shift from nationally-viable candidates demonstrates the overwhelming influence of the national electoral environment.     

Designing a tax incentive scheme: The case of a wage tip

Governments are constantly attempting to use their tax systems for purposes other than the collection of revenue. Each such use entails difficult decisions of both design and administration. Consideration of a tax-based policy that might reduce wage inflation—a so-called TIP—serves to reveal the wide range of difficult choices that need to be made. In addition to problems of measuring the behavior of the tax payer who is to be benefited or penalized, the analyst must settle on such questions as whether the program should be permanent or temporary, whether it should emphasize rewards or punishments, and whether it should be administered by existing government agencies or by special agencies. None of these problems is insuperable. But lurking behind all of them is the question whether, is the end, the chosen policy will actually contribute to reducing wage inflation.     

Contextual variation in interdependent policy making: The case of tax competition

Many studies show that policy makers react to the policy choices made in other jurisdictions, but we still know relatively little about the factors driving interdependent policy making, especially about how context shapes interdependence. Theoretical arguments suggest that contextual factors, such as stable institutions and geographic location, explain variation in interdependence. However, there is a lack of empirical research investigating contextual heterogeneity in interdependent policy making, mainly because it cannot be analysed with standard spatial econometric methods. This article introduces multilevel modeling that allows the study of contextual variation in interdependence and illustrates the method with the analysis of uneven tax competition in Switzerland. The findings of fine‐grained data show that cantonal governments compete more strongly with their competitors the closer a unit is located to a metropolis with comprehensive public good provision. The analysis demonstrates that we can better understand the mechanisms of interdependent policy making by studying its contextual drivers.     

Personalised parliamentary behaviour without electoral incentives: the case of the Netherlands

Most theories of legislative behaviour explain the behaviour of MPs through electoral incentives. However, they fail to explain variation in parliamentary activity when individual electoral incentives are largely absent. This article studies MPs’ activity in such a parliament: the Dutch Tweede Kamer. It examines four clusters of incentives that may drive parliamentarians to be active. Party and committee environments provide the best explanation for the level of activity of individual MPs. Reselection and promotion prospects explain MPs’ behaviour, but only under more particular specifications. Re-election prospects were not found to affect activity levels.