The electoral budget cycle

This article begins with a review of the now substantial literature on the thesis that polticians manipulate governmental outputs so as to favor their chances of reelection. It concludes that while this “electoral cycle” thesis was initially overstated by its proponents, it retains more plausibility than recent critics have allowed. This conclusion is then demonstrated through an analysis of expenditures by the ten provincial governments in Canada between 1951 and 1984.     

Party system dynamics in post-war Japan: A quantitative content analysis of electoral pledges

Qualitative accounts of Japanese party politics allude to the standard left-right spectrum, but they invariably devote much more space to discussions of foreign policy differences than to socioeconomic conflict. Quantitative estimates of Japanese party positions treat short party responses to newspaper interviews as if they were true manifestos, and fail both to confirm the claims of the qualitative literature and to demonstrate any consistent basis for party differentiation at all. We address both puzzles by applying a text scaling algorithm to electoral pledges to estimate Japanese party positions on three major policy dimensions. Our analysis largely confirms the findings of the qualitative literature, but also offers new insights about party movement and polarization over time.     

Explaining the electoral success of the new right: The German case

Immigrants are blamed for economic and social problems throughout Europe. This article explores the theoretical argument that electorates support new right parties because they are placing more emphasis on specific issues like immigration. The findings provide evidence that immigration explains much of the electoral support for the new right parties in Germany. Areas with larger immigrant populations provide fewer votes, while areas where immigrants ‘commit more crime’ provide greater support. This suggests the problems associated with immigration explain the new right's support, rather than simple xenophobia. As long as such problems continue, the potential for new right success will remain.     

Partisan self-interest and electoral reform: The new Italian electoral law of 2005

In December 2005, Italy's mixed-member electoral system was replaced with a system of bonus-adjusted proportional representation. The reform conformed with rational-choice models in that it was imposed by the ruling coalition, which sought to bolster its own power interests. But the case illustrates the impossibility of reducing such power-based motivation to a single goal, such as seat maximization. Power is shaped by many factors, and electoral systems influence many of these. This article develops a theoretical framework for understanding the various power-oriented considerations that may operate in electoral reform. It then analyses the role these played in Italy. It argues, in particular, for the need to take account of coalition dynamics when studying such processes.     

The electoral connection in staggered parliaments: Evidence from Australia,France, Germany and Japan

This article explores whether differential time horizons in legislative chambers that result from staggered membership renewal affect legislative behaviour. The analysis focuses on patterns of bill initiation and the introduction of amendments in the upper chambers of Australia, France, Germany and Japan – all four of which contain two or more classes of members that face re‐election at different times. Drawing on original comparative data, clear evidence is found of over‐time variation in legislative activity levels in the upper chambers. Approaching elections lead to increased activity levels, with increases in the introduction of bills, but also, to a lesser extent, amending activity. Such variation is found not only for those members facing the most proximate election, but for all members of the chamber. Importantly, there are no significant differences in legislative behaviour between those members up for re‐election and those not facing the electorate in the most proximate election. These patterns are interpreted tentatively as evidence of the paramount importance of political parties in parliamentary systems.     

Individual level dynamics of PTV change across the electoral cycle

Propensity-to-vote (PTV) scores are ever more commonly used in electoral research as a measure of electoral utilities. Yet a growing literature employs them as dependent variable in the voting equation in place of the lower information granted by vote recall questions. However, this choice can be seen as problematic because of the very structure of election survey research. To the extent that voters' PTVs are measured in post-election surveys (as it is often the case) these are likely to result endogenously produced by actual voting behavior in the past election – thus partly undermining the validity of the PTV question which, ideally, should not be related to any specific election. In this paper, we try to disentangle the relationship between short-term political attitudes (leader evaluations, issue proximity, economic assessments) and voters' changing patterns of propensities to vote in both an electoral and a non-electoral context. The latter scenario serves as a means to rule out the potentially contaminating effect of voting choices on voters' PTVs. The data comes from two panel surveys of Italian voters conducted by ITANES in occasion of the 2006 general election, and in 2011 (that is, in a non-electoral year) respectively.     

The nationalization of electoral cycles in the United States: a wavelet analysis

We take a new look at electoral sectionalism and dynamic nationalization in presidential elections. We treat this problem as one of synchronism of electoral cycles, which we estimate by using wavelets. After providing a self-contained introduction to wavelet analysis, we use it to assess the degree and the dynamics of electoral synchronization in the United States. We determine clusters of states where electoral swings have been more and less in sync with each other and with the national cycle. Then, we analyze how the degree of synchronism of electoral cycles has changed through time, answering questions as to when, to what extent, and where has a tendency towards a “universality of political trends” in presidential elections been more strongly felt. We present evidence strongly in favor of an increase in the dynamic nationalization of presidential elections taking place since the 1950s, largely associated with a convergence in most (but not all) Southern states.     

The effects of campaign spending on electoral outcomes: A data envelopment analysis

Data envelopment analysis is used to analyze the efficiency of candidate campaign spending. Analysis of the measured efficiency scores of the incumbents and challengers shows that there are significant systematic effects of both district and candidate characteristics. The incumbent's residuals from the efficiency score regressions indicate those candidates who do well because of the nature of their district and those who do well because of their own abilities. Incumbents are ranked according to their observed efficiency, their unobserved efficiency and their vote share. Correlations among the rankings are significant and of the expected signs. More efficient candidates receive higher vote shares.     

The effect of electoral rules on voting behavior: the electoral college and shift voting

The Electoral College has a measurable effect on the propensity of the rational voter to vote for the candidate he most prefers. The ‘slippage’ between the individual's articulated preference ordering and his actual vote is analyzed (using 1968 data) with respect to the strategic position of the voter in his state. The direction of the findings support the theoretically-derived propositions. Nevertheless, the low overall incidence of shifts and the reluctance of voters to shift from nationally-viable candidates demonstrates the overwhelming influence of the national electoral environment.     

The refundable tax credit: A cubist policy analysis

A cubist policy analysis sets forth several interacting realities about a policy proposal in order to arrive at an optimum reconciliation of their demands. In relation to the proposal of a refundable tax credit, one must consider the political climate in 1984 and 1985 with respect to income taxes, the effect on families that are poor or have marginally middle-class or middle-class income, of relatively small increments or reductions of money, trends with respect to income for such families, and the manner in which established income transfer mechanisms respond and are able to respond to problems that emerge. Taking all this together, we are led to a proposal to replace the personal exemption in income taxes with a tax credit of $400 per person, reduced by 5 percent of household Adjusted Gross Income in excess of $10,000 a year. Costs and benefits and alternative designs for a refundable tax credit (including one that a taxpayer may choose or decline) are provided.     

Designing a tax incentive scheme: The case of a wage tip

Governments are constantly attempting to use their tax systems for purposes other than the collection of revenue. Each such use entails difficult decisions of both design and administration. Consideration of a tax-based policy that might reduce wage inflation—a so-called TIP—serves to reveal the wide range of difficult choices that need to be made. In addition to problems of measuring the behavior of the tax payer who is to be benefited or penalized, the analyst must settle on such questions as whether the program should be permanent or temporary, whether it should emphasize rewards or punishments, and whether it should be administered by existing government agencies or by special agencies. None of these problems is insuperable. But lurking behind all of them is the question whether, is the end, the chosen policy will actually contribute to reducing wage inflation.     

Contextual variation in interdependent policy making: The case of tax competition

Many studies show that policy makers react to the policy choices made in other jurisdictions, but we still know relatively little about the factors driving interdependent policy making, especially about how context shapes interdependence. Theoretical arguments suggest that contextual factors, such as stable institutions and geographic location, explain variation in interdependence. However, there is a lack of empirical research investigating contextual heterogeneity in interdependent policy making, mainly because it cannot be analysed with standard spatial econometric methods. This article introduces multilevel modeling that allows the study of contextual variation in interdependence and illustrates the method with the analysis of uneven tax competition in Switzerland. The findings of fine‐grained data show that cantonal governments compete more strongly with their competitors the closer a unit is located to a metropolis with comprehensive public good provision. The analysis demonstrates that we can better understand the mechanisms of interdependent policy making by studying its contextual drivers.     

The classification of electoral systems

Abstract. The paper examines existing classifications of electoral systems, discusses their merits and limits, and proposes a more appropriate classification. It shows that it is possible to extract from the definition of an electoral system three basic dimensions: the ballot structure, the constituency structure, and the formula. It also shows that it is possible to distinguish three components of the ballot structure: the object of the vote, the number of votes and the type of vote, and two components of the constituency structure: its nature and its magnitude. It is argued that the classification proposed here is superior to existing ones. It clarifies and refines existing distinctions. It enables one to identify the basic dimensions of electoral systems as well as the logical connections between them. Finally, it has the property of applying the same criteria to all systems.     

The impact of the electoral system on post-communist party development: The case of the 1993 Russian parliamentary elections

This paper uses a case study of the 1993 Russian parliamentary elections to explore the influence of proportional representation and plurality electoral systems on party formation in a post-communist regime. The mixed PR-plurality electoral system used by Russia in the 1993 elections is a particularly useful case for such analysis for it allows the simultaneous study of these two electoral systems under the same set of social, economic, and cultural conditions. This study found that common emphasis placed on the number of parties allowed by PR versus plurality systems is misplaced in the context of Russian politics. The vital impact of electoral systems under post-communist conditions is their permeability to independent candidates. PR systems tend to impose party labels on the electorate and elites and thus bolster the status of parties as electoral agents. Plurality systems allow independents to compete on a level playing field with partisan candidates, robbing parties of the preferential treatment they need to get established in the initial years of democratic governance.     

Public support for private R&D: The case of the research tax credit

The U.S. government has long included in its tax code various special provisions designed to stimulate industrial R&D. In 1981, those provisions were substantially augmented by a special R&D tax credit, and various proposals are now under consideration to relax the antitrust statutes in order to encourage research through joint ventures. The case for any of these measures is difficult to establish, being based on assumptions that are not readily tested in objective terms. Nevertheless, one point is fairly clear: As between stimulating industrial R&D by individual firms and stimulating R&D joint ventures of such firms, the joint venture approach appears superior in its likely results.     

Political parties, electoral systems and democracy: A cross-national analysis

Abstract.  The number of political parties and the type of electoral system may impact the level of democratic functioning within a government. Models are used to explore whether the number of political parties increases a country's democracy score on the POLITY IV measure of democracy, and whether countries with proportional representation electoral systems have higher democracy scores than those without. Multiple regression analysis reveals that countries with proportional electoral systems have higher democracy scores. Countries involved in the Third Wave of democracy may find the choice of an electoral system among the most important issues in structuring a democratic government.     

Voting over taxes: the case of tax evasion

This paper studies majority voting on taxes when tax evasion is possible. We characterize the voting equilibrium where the agent with median taxed income is pivotal. Since the ranking of true incomes does not necessarily correspond to the ranking of taxed incomes, the decisive voter can differ from the median income receiver. In this case, we find unconventional patterns of redistribution, e.g., from the middle class to the poor and the rich.     

The electoral consequences of voter ignorance

A great deal of research has suggested that scholarly and popular concerns about low levels of citizen political knowledge are exaggerated. One implication of that research is that political history would have unfolded just as it did even if electorates had been more politically informed. This paper presents evidence that counters these claims, showing an infusion of electorally relevant information in twenty-seven democracies would have likely led to a lot of vote “switching”, ultimately changing the composition of many governments. The paper also directly and systematically examines what we might call the “enlightened natural constituency” hypothesis, which expects lower-income citizens to vote disproportionately for left parties once armed with more political knowledge. While the basic argument about how political ignorance disproportionately affects the left’s natural constituency is not new, the hypothesis has thus far not been tested. The analysis provides provisional support for the hypothesis.