Introducing “Cooperative Push”: How Inefficient Environmental Policy (Sometimes!) Protects the Global Commons Better

In this paper we argue that the incentive structures of the gamesnations play in international environmental negotiations dependupon the choice of environmental policy instruments. Bargainingon the use of some instrument (e.g. an effluent charge) mayput the players into a dilemma game (like Chicken). Negotiationsto apply a different instrument (say, an emission reductionquota) may lead to a cooperation game (like Stag Hunt). The higherthe incentive to cooperate in the type of game which is built upby a specific instrument, the higher is this instrument's``cooperative push''. Of course, comparing two instruments,the one with the higher cooperative push might well be the lessefficient one. In this Paper, we analyse a situation where thehigher cooperative push of an instrument overcompensates thisinstrument's lower efficiency: Aggregate welfare withbilateral cooperation (the equilibrium of Stag Hunt) is higher than withunilateral cooperation (the equilibrium of the Chicken game).The question remains whether sovereign countries decide to playStag Hunt ending up in the welfare superior equilibrium. It isshown below that they do not in an uncoordinated optimising setting.However, we develop a particular frame where the proposedsolution meets the criteria of individual rationality,stability and fairness. It thereby establishes the politically mostdesired result – international cooperation.     

Rent-seeking and optimal regulation in replenishable resource industries

In this paper, wasteful rent-seeking behaviour has been shown to have important implications for the determination of the welfare maximizing regulatory policies of replenishable natural resource industries. In general, the incorporation of wasteful rent-seeking activity into the analysis leads to policies which suggest a greater level of industry output than has been advocated by tradition policies that do not take rent-seeking into account. Our analysis therefore supports a more laissez faire policy than has been recommended in the literature.Specifically, we find that when rents are completely dissipated by wasteful rent-seeking activity (t = 1), the role of the regulator is simply to guarantee biological efficiency, should this be threatened by the economic equilibrium achieved by the free-access of firms. One of two possibilities can occur. In the first, the economic equilibrium determined by the free-access of firms is biologically efficient, i.e., the equilibrium steady state of the replenishable natural resource exceeds or is equal to the maximum sustainable yield stock size (x _MSY). If this occurs, the regulator needs to take no action whatsoever. In the second case, the economic equilibrium generated by the free-access of firms does not yield biological efficiency. The equilibrium is characterized by a steady state stock of the natural resource that is smaller that the maximum sustainable yield stock size, namely (x _MSY <>x _MSY). In this case, therefore, the regulator does need to intervene, but his best policy takes the simple form of setting the total quota equal to the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of the resource. Thus, while the results are to some extent consistent to those derived by Buchanan for the regulation of externalities, the fact that we are dealing here with replenishable resources adds a further dimension to the issue and changes some of the policy implications.     

Asian crisis,transparency and the international media in Singapore

Abstract

The issue of Taiwan and relations across the Taiwan Strait is not only of fundamental interest to China, but also crucial to peace and stability in the Asian Pacific, thereby also making it of key concern to major players such as the United States and Japan. Beijing has faced enormous challenges over how to solve its dilemma. I would like to achieve reunification with Taiwan through a peaceful path, but perceive that it must be prepared for a war scenario if Taiwan insists on breaking from the mainland for its independence. The dilemma facing Beijing in terms of war or peace with Taiwan has become more acute since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) moved to power in 2000. This article analyses Beijing's dilemma over the above policy choices by examining five stages of Beijing's assessment toward regime change in Taiwan from late 1999 to early 2005. It also illuminates the potential impact on major power relations in East Asia.     

“Beggar thy Neighbor:” Testing for Free Riding in State-Level Endangered Species Expenditures

An important public policy question that remains unresolved iswhether devolution will enhance sensible policy making byexploiting informational asymmetries or, instead, trigger a``beggar thy neighbor'' response and stimulate free ridingamongst localities. We analyze this question within theframework of U.S. environmental policymaking by scrutinizing aunique panel data set on state-level endangered speciesexpenditure patterns. Our empirical estimates are consistentwith the notion that states free ride, which may lead to anexpenditure equilibrium that is not Pareto efficient.     

The ``Power of the Purse' and its Implications for Bureaucratic Policy-Making

A dilemma of the ``Power of the Purse'' is thatcutting an agency's budget may make a desired policyinfeasible. I examine the implications of thisdilemma with a repeated game in which a bureau choosesunobservable policies after a legislature sets itsbudget. The bureau is work-averse and has its ownpolicy preferences and therefore may cheat, but thelegislature may perform an audit to recover ``slack''funds. A main result is that if the legislaturedesires a higher policy level than the agency, then itfaces a trade-off between ``good'' but wasteful policiesand ``bad'' but efficient ones.     

The effects of alternative power-sharing arrangements: Do “moderating” institutions moderate party strategies and government policy outputs?

Advocates of consensual political institutions, i.e. institutions that promote compromise and powersharing among political parties, claim that these institutions promote moderation in government policy outputs. To date, however, there exists little research – either theoretical or empirical – that evaluates whether consensual institutions promote moderation in parties' policy declarations. We develop a multiparty spatial model with policy-seeking parties operating under proportional representation, in which we vary the extent to which government policies reflect power-sharing among all parties as opposed to being determined by a single party. We determine parties' optimal (Nash equilibrium) policy positions and conclude that power-sharing does not typically motivate parties to moderate their policy declarations; in fact, policy positioning under power-sharing appears to be similar to or more extreme than under single-party dominance. Consistent with previous research, however, we find that power-sharing does promote moderation in government policy outputs. Our results have implications for parties’ election strategies, for the design of political institutions, and for representative government.     

Towards resonant places: reflections on the organizing strategy of the International Transport Workers’ Federation

This article explores a geographical dilemma at the heart of union organizing in transnational corporations; namely, how to circulate union power across different spaces when existing labour struggles are generally restricted to single sites. Reflecting on the experience of the International Transport Workers' Federation, this paper argues that single site campaigns have been crucial to its organizing programme. Analysing cases involving dock workers in India and logistics workers in Turkey, it is noted that these struggles are resource intensive but potentially transformational, and should be theorized as ‘resonant places’ in a wider global organizing strategy.     

The issue of instability in a simple policy game between the central bank and a representative union

In the recent economic literature the independence of the central bank is often considered to be one of the most effective guarantees to achieve price stability. A strong theoretical basis for this proposition is that the monetary policy delegation given to an independent central bank is an optimal instrument to avoid the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy. This paper investigates the stability properties of this solution in a simple game in which the private sector (i.e. the trade unions) and the public sector (i.e. the central bank) simultaneously interact. A representative monopoly union is considered, and – in line with the recent economic debate – two types of unions are investigated: (i) the standard micro-founded trade union; (ii) the inflation-averse trade union. In both cases, we find that the requirement for the Nash equilibrium to be stable imposes a limit to the conservativeness of the central bank. Instability of the Nash equilibrium reveals a strategic co-ordination failure between the public and the private sector.     

Postclassical realism and Japanese security policy

The recent domestic constructivist studies characterize Japanese security policy as a serious anomaly to realism and a crucial case vindicating their approach to the larger study of world politics. The present paper challenges this view. It advances a postclassical realist interpretation of Japan's core security policy in the past quarter century. Japan's military doctrine expressed in the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) is consistent with postclassical realism's predictions, as opposed to neorealism's predictions, which focus on the dynamics of the regional security dilemma and the question of financial burden resulting from military build-up. In addition, postclassical realism offers a more compelling theoretical guide for understanding Japan's core security policy than defensive realism or mercantile realism. This paper backs up its argument with the empirical evidence that Takuya Kubo, the author of the NDPO, himself intentionally based the NDPO on a postclassical realist line of thinking.     

Endogenous Parties in an Assembly

In this article, I show how members of an assembly form voting blocs strategically to coordinate their votes and affect the policy outcome chosen by the assembly. In a repeated voting game, permanent voting blocs form in equilibrium. These permanent voting blocs act as endogenous political parties that exercise party discipline. In a stylized assembly I prove that the equilibrium parties must be two small polarized voting blocs, one at each side of the ideological divide.     

Simulation Analysis of the Effect of Party Identification on Finnish Parties' Optimal Positions

The Finnish National Election Study of 2003 revealed that most voters in Finland do not identify with parties and are self‐described as independents. In this article it is asserted that partisan attachments affect Finnish parties' optimal positions despite the large amount of independents. To show this, the article is divided in two parts. In the first part, voters' decisions are assumed to be deterministic. To show the effect of party identification under deterministic voting, two different types of simulations are conducted: the partisan type, where the partisans' voting behaviour depends on their distance from the party and on a degree of partisan attachment, and the apartisan type, where voting behaviour depends solely on policy issue distance. Results show that partisan attachments drive parties to adopt different ‘one‐off’ optimal positions than they would if party competition was solely based on policy issue distance. In the second part of the article, it is assumed that voters' decisions are probabilistic. Upon showing that party identification makes a voting model solely based on distance significantly more fit, the predicted probabilities of party choice are computed. Results indicate that the probability that a voter will vote for a party is higher when the party is located at its optimal position according to the partisan type of simulations rather than the apartisan one.     

Achilles' heels of governance: Critical capacity deficits and their role in governance failures

This article assesses the usefulness of conceptions of policy capacity for understanding policy and governance outcomes. In order to shed light on this issue, it revisits the concept of governance, derives a model of basic governance types and discusses their capacity pre‐requisites. A model of capacity is developed combining competences over three levels of activities with analysis of resource capabilities at each level. This analysis is then applied to the common modes of governance. While each mode requires all types of capacity if it is to match its theoretically optimal potential, most on‐the‐ground modes do not attain their highest potential. Moreover, each mode has a critical type of capacity which serves as its principle vulnerability; its “Achilles' heel.” Without high levels of the requisite capacity, the governance mode is unlikely to perform as expected. While some hybrid modes can serve to supplement or reinforce each other and bridge capacity gaps, other mixed forms may aggravate single mode issues. Switching between modes or adopting hybrid modes is, therefore, a non‐trivial issue in which considerations of capacity issues in general and Achilles' heel capacities in particular should be a central concern.     

Signaling through Obstruction

Obstruction is a time‐honored tradition in legislative politics. In many cases, obstruction can be foreseen to be ultimately unsuccessful, and in some of these cases, purely costly even to the obstructor. In this article, I construct a model of obstruction in which the individual obstruction of a fait accompli policy proposal is potentially informative precisely and ironically because it is inefficient. The theory, based on the legislators' reelection motivations, offers comparative static predictions about the frequency and length of obstruction as a function of the individual characteristics of the legislator and his or her electoral setting, including the legislator's value for reelection, the appeal of the legislator's challenger, the legislator's individual‐specific seniority, competence, and/or valence, and the visibility of the legislator's obstruction efforts to the voter. Finally, the theory illustrates the potential for transparency of legislators' individual actions to be strictly welfare reducing, even in the absence of pandering.     

反事实分析与公共政策制定——以“自行车难题”为例

本文尝试将反事实分析法引入公共政策制定,用于预先评估某项公共政策可能引发的预期效果和非意愿后果。选取城市治理中的"自行车难题"为案例,探讨反事实分析法在公共政策制定过程中的适用范围、应用方法和分析过程。现有研究认为,惩罚成本过低是导致"自行车难题"的主因,因而提高惩罚的治理政策就能解决"自行车难题"。本文采用犯罪经济学的分析框架,通过反事实分析,系统地考察惩罚严厉的治理政策的社会效果,得出与之相反的结论:惩罚严厉的治理政策仅考虑了单一的盗窃成本与收益,但实际上犯罪者的行为选择受各种社会条件制约,严厉的惩罚政策不但不能解决治理问题,并有可能导致社会治安恶化的非意愿后果。单一政策目标和复杂社会系统之间的矛盾是中国公共治理中广泛存在的问题,而在政策制定中引入反事实分析则是避免这一困境的有效途径。     

Policy divergence in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting

Existing models of multicandidate spatial competition with probabilistic voting typically predict a high degree of policy convergence, yet in actual elections candidates advocate quite divergent sets of policies. What accounts for this disparity between theory and empirical observation? I introduce two variations on the basic probabilistic vote model which may account for candidate policy divergence: 1) a model which incorporates candidate-specific variables, so that candidates may enjoy nonpolicy-related electoral advantages (or disadvantages); 2) a model which allows nonzero correlations between the random terms associated with voters' candidate utilities, thereby capturing situations where voters view two or more candidates as similar on nonpolicy grounds. I report candidate equilibrium analyses for each model, which show far greater policy divergence than exists under the standard probabilistic vote model. I then analyze the strategic logic which underlies these results.

     

Advocacy channels and political resource dependence in authoritarianism: Nongovernmental organizations and environmental policies in China

Nongovernmental organizations are important in policy processes, but most studies supporting this argument are conducted in democracies. This article, therefore, focuses on China's environmental policy to discuss how environmental NGOs (eNGOs) conduct policy advocacy in authoritarian contexts. Based on interviews with eNGOs and scholars in China, I provide a typology to describe policy advocacy channels based on their formality and consistency and explain how channels are selected based on the political resources of eNGOs. This article reveals how policy advocacy is affected by one of the prominent features of authoritarian states—a monopoly of political power—and indicates that many tactics identified in current literature can be explained by the political resource endowments of NGOs. Additionally, this article also provides insights on the potential changes of the advocacy channels when the political control is tightened in the Xi era and how eNGOs cope with the new political situation.     

Why do Policy Makers Stick to Inefficient Decisions?

This paper offers an explanation forwhy policy makers stick to inefficient policydecisions. I argue that repealing a policy is a badsignal to voters about the policy maker's competenceif voters do not have complete knowledge about theeffects of implemented policies. I derive the optimalpolicy maker's decision on continuation of a policy,assuming that voters' beliefs about the policy maker'scompetence are updated according to Bayes' rule. Ishow that if the policy maker cares sufficiently aboutreelection, he will never repeal a policy.     

On the (mis)measurement of legislator ideology and shirking

In this paper, we show that current statistical measures of legislator's shirking are implicitly based on the electoral concept of a unique majority rule equilibrium point in the policy space where elections are contested. We note that such equilibria do not exist generically and present statistical results showing that cross-sectional regressions where legislators' voting indices are predicted by district average demograhic and economic data are mis-specified. We also discuss a weaker equilibrium construct, the uncovered set, and present statistical evidence showing that differences in voting behavior between Senators from the same state are positively related to the heterogeneity of the electorate. We argue that current evidence alleged to show shirking by Senators is equally consistent with Senators who perfectly represent an idiosyncratic constituency that cannot be represented by district average data.     

Multiparty spatial competition with probabilistic voting

I develop a general model of multiparty competition in which parties model voters' choices by means of probabilistic choice rules. The model is specified in terms of an issue salience coefficient which varies with the importance voters attach to issues, as opposed to unmeasured nonissue motivations. I show that when the policy salience coefficient is sufficiently low, then both vote-maximizing and rank-maximizing parties have a dominant strategy: to adopt the “most popular platform,” which maximizes voter utilities over the entire electorate. This most popular platform therefore represents a convergent equilibrium when all parties are vote- or rank-maximizing. Numerical estimates suggest that this equilibrium result holds for degrees of issue voting which exceed the parameters behavioral researchers have estimated for various historical elections.