Does Spatial Variation in Heterogeneity Matter? Assessing the Adoption Patterns of Business Improvement Districts

Because they supplement the municipal provision of local public goods, Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) provide an opportunity to examine the space, scope, and determinants of the provision of local public goods. A BID is formed when a group of merchants or commercial property owners in a neighborhood vote in favor of package of self‐assessments and local public goods to be funded with those assessments. These districts solve a collective action problem in the provision of public goods because once a majority has voted in favor, participation is compulsory for all merchants or commercial property owners in the neighborhood. I use a unique dataset on adoption patterns of BIDs in California to test two main claims suggested by the theoretical literature: first, that businesses respond to individual heterogeneity that determines the quality of local public goods, and second, that the type of heterogeneity—overall or spatial—matters. In contrast to the literature on residents, this study finds at best a weak correlation between a city's adoption of a BID and heterogeneity. In addition, despite the theoretical preference for spatial over overall heterogeneity, BIDs are not more likely to be adopted by spatially heterogeneous cities.     

Tax morale and (de-)centralization: An experimental study

We consider an economy composed of two regions. Each of them provides a public good whose benefits reach beyond local boundaries. In case of decentralization, taxes collected by members of a region are spent only on that region's public good. In case of centralization, tax receipts from the two regions are pooled and used to finance both public goods according to the population size of each region. The experiment shows that centralization induces lower tax morale and less efficient outcomes. The reasons are that centralization gives rise to an interregional incentive problem and creates inequalities in income between regions.     

All Together Now? An Empirical Study of the Voting Behaviors of Homeowner Association Members in St. Louis County

Homeowner associations (HOAs), by design, collect homogenous members of a community into a residential development with defined boundaries and contain at least some very active individuals. This implies that HOAs may lower the transaction costs involved with voting resulting in HOA membership increasing voter participation. Further, as more HOAs provide goods and services to their members as substitutes for goods and services provided by the public sector, one would expect HOA members to vote more conservatively and in support of more privatization. Using a detailed population database constructed for Saint Louis County, Missouri, and results from the November 2004 general election, this article analyzes the effect that living in an HOA has on voter participation and on the results of several election issues. Following a similar study by the Public Policy Institute of California, the results show that, once population characteristics are controlled for, there is no HOA effect on the likelihood of HOA members to vote Republican. Unlike previous work, this study shows that if the vote reporting districts are broken into five mutually exclusive categories rather than using the 60% rule used in other studies, areas with more HOAs do show an increase in participation rates and an increased likelihood to vote against property tax increases. The results hold up even after the presence of spatial autocorrelation is confirmed and controlled for.     

Ideological change and the economics of voting behavior in the US, 1920–2008

This paper tests the proposition that voters advance a more liberal agenda in prosperous times and turn more conservative in dire economic times. A reference-dependent utility model suggests that, with income growth, the relative demand for public goods increases and the median voter is more likely to vote Democrat. With slowing income growth, the median voter derives increased marginal utility from personal income—making taxation more painful—and is more likely to vote Republican. Ordinary and instrumented analyses of a new time series for the US median voter are encouraging of this income growth model. This work links voting behavior to economic business cycles and shows that ideological change is endogenous to income growth rates.     

Multiparty electoral competition in the Netherlands and Germany: A model based on multinomial probit

A typical assumption of electoral models of party competition is that parties adopt policy positions so as to maximize expected vote share. Here we use Euro-barometer survey data and European elite-study data from 1979 for the Netherlands and Germany to construct a stochastic model of voter response, based on multinomial probit estimation. For each of these countries, we estimate a pure spatial electoral voting model and a joint spatial model. The latter model also includes individual voter and demographic characteristics. The pure spatial models for the two countries quite accurately described the electoral response as a stochastic function of party positions. We use these models to perform a thought experiment so as to estimate the expected vote maximizing party positions. We go on to propose a model of internal party decision-making based both on pre-election electoral estimation and post-election coalition bargaining. This model suggests why the various parties in the period in question did not adopt vote maximizing positions. We argue that maximizing expected vote will not, in general, be a rational party strategy in multiparty political systems which are based on proportional representation.     

The political cost of public–private partnerships: Theory and evidence from Colombian infrastructure development

Infrastructure public–private partnerships (PPPs) eschew traditional public management to provide distributive goods worldwide. Yet, in Colombia, the context of our study, both the promise of and voters' experience with PPPs hinder incumbent parties in elections when theories of distributive politics expect otherwise. We argue that negative experiences with PPPs introduce a sociotropic turn in individual voting: bad experience crowds out the possibility that promising a new project will improve a voter's own welfare. Studying what are, to our knowledge, all 109 Colombian PPP projects between 1998 and 2014, and over 8,700 individual survey responses, our evidence shows that vote intention for the incumbent executive or his party decreases as experience with more PPPs in respondents' districts increases. Our analysis and results introduce an important agenda for research into the political significance of these legacies of new public management.     

The Three Exit, Three Voice and Loyalty Framework: A Test with Survey Data on Local Services

The article presents a modified Hirschman framework with three types of exit: moving location; moving from the public to a private sector provider; and moving between public sector providers; and three types of voice: private voice (complaining about private goods); voting; and collective action. Seven hypotheses are generated from this framework. The article then presents evidence from the first round of an online survey examining citizen satisfaction with public services and the relationship between exit and voice opportunities. We find dissatisfied people are more likely to complain privately, vote and engage in other forms of collective participation; but only a weak relationship exists between dissatisfaction and geographical exit. We find some evidence that the exit–voice trade-off might exist as more alert consumers are more likely to move from the public to the private sector and those 'locked in' are more likely to complain than those who have outside options. Overall the results tend to corroborate the hypotheses drawn from the modified Hirschman framework.     

Immigration and income redistribution: A political economy analysis

This paper examines the effect of immigration on the extent of income redistribution via majority voting on the income tax. The tax outcome depends on the size of the native majority and the initial amount of redistribution in the economy, which in turn determines the skill composition of immigrants. As a main result, we derive conditions for multiple tax equilibria: if the native majority of either skilled or unskilled is not too strong and immigrants are allowed to vote, both a high-tax and a low-tax outcome is possible. In a referendum, natives will then vote against immigrant voting. At best, natives are indifferent towards immigrant voting.     

From polls to votes to seats: Forecasting the 2015 British general election

This paper develops a three-stage method to forecast parliamentary election results from vote preferences in British opinion polls: (1) adjusting and aggregating vote-intentions from different polling organizations; (2) forecasting how public support for parties will change in the period before election day; and (3) translating, through simulations, the forecast of election day vote shares into seat totals while incorporating constituency-level information, including local vote-intention polls. Overall, this approach seeks to combine relevant national, regional and local information, and uncertainty about that information, to better reflect the fragmentation and diversity of political contexts found in the new era of five/six-party British politics.     

Explaining the electoral effects of public investments: The case of the expansion of the underground in Madrid, 1995–2007

According to the literature, governments have strong incentives to use the public budget tactically in order to either obtain the electoral support of new voters or strengthen the loyalty of their traditional supporters. Yet vote‐seeking strategies only become rational when voters follow their self‐interest and reward governments when their constituency benefits from public transfers. The literature has focused on the governments' incentives, largely ignoring the importance of knowing whether the electorate is responsive to public investments. This study tests empirically whether incumbents strategically use public investments to gather more electoral support; and whether voters take these investments into account at the polls. These two questions are pursued simultaneously by using as a case study the expansion of the underground network in Madrid, Spain. Only a little evidence is found to support the idea that regional governments constructed new metro stations in neighbourhoods where they had more to gain electorally. Also, the inauguration timing strictly followed the electoral cycle, something that indicates a strategic calculus on the part of the incumbent. However, the models are also consistent with the idea that the government's investments were primarily driven by motives of efficiency. Indeed, although governments are tempted to follow vote‐seeking strategies, they are also aware that they cannot deviate too much from an efficiency‐based allocation of public resources. From the perspective of the voters, robust evidence has been found to show that regional voters rewarded this policy at the neighbourhood level. Neighbourhoods that received new metro stations voted in higher numbers for the incumbent than those quarters without new investments. All in all, these findings may have some implications for normative democratic theory.     

Are Voters More Likely to Contribute to Other Public Goods? Evidence from a Large‐Scale Randomized Policy Experiment

Voting has been described as a contribution to a public good. Are people who vote frequently therefore more likely to contribute to other public goods? Does partisanship affect how likely a person is to engage in these cooperative behaviors? Although surveys suggest that the answer to these questions is “Yes,” few empirical studies examine these questions using observed behaviors. We examine them in the context of a large‐scale, randomized controlled trial to induce voluntary action in a common‐pool resource dilemma. During a drought in the southeastern United States, pro‐social messages that encouraged water conservation were randomly assigned to 35,000 out of 106,000 households. Frequent voters in primary and general elections (1990–2008) were substantially more responsive to the messages, but there was no detectable difference in the responses of Republican and Democrat households. Our results suggest that internalized pro‐social preferences promote action for the public good across behavioral contexts.     

Strategizing in small group decision-making: Host state identification for radioactive waste disposal among eight southern states

Experimental work in economics has long focussed attention on strategic interaction amongst individuals. A robust result is that a large fraction of participants in public goods experiments act cooperatively. This paper tests for the extent of strategic behavior in a non-laboratory setting. These data were generated when representatives from eight southeastern states voted to identify one state as host for a regional disposal facility for low-level radioactive waste. We find that no state plays its dominant (free-riding) strategy, but none plays in a completely cooperative fashion either. This result is similar to that found in laboratory public goods experiments.     

Federal tax reform and the financing of state and local governments

Although the Reagan Administration tax reform proposals would reduce federal income tax liabilities for most taxpayers, federal tax reform would also create strong pressures on state and local governments to cut taxes and public services. These pressures would arise primarily because itemizers would no longer be able to deduct state and local taxes in determining their federal income tax liabilities. In New York City and Boston, it is likely that the Administration's tax reform would induce cuts in spending that range from 2.5 to 7.5 percent. While the elimination of state and local tax deductibility may promote allocative efficiency in the provision of local public goods, the cost would be a decline in the degree of redistribution through the state and local public sector, and a reduction in local public services for the poor.     

Bureaucratic choice and nonoptimal provision of public goods: Theory and evidence

Local governments' allocation decisions are modeled in the context of a slack maximizing bureaucrat who produces public goods according to a production function that includes both provision and the constituents' socio-economic characteristics. To gain a better understanding of the determinants of slack, comparative statics and an empirical study of Illinois municipalities are conducted. The indirect output distance function provides efficiency scores upon which we regress several variables, representing socio-economic characteristics, costs and competition measures. We find that slack or inefficient behavior is associated with richer communities, lower education levels and a lack of competition for residents among municipalities.     

The rational voter paradox revisited

The rational voter paradox rests on two fundamental assumptions. First, that voters are risk neutral. Second, that voters make decisive vote computations. The implications of maximizing the expected utility of wealth rather than the utility of expected wealth are explored. The validity of decisive vote computations are examined through concepts of weak and strict in the limit free rider assumptions. The paper proposes a margin of victory model of voting behavior based on information levels and the political division of labor.     

Voters,dictators, and peons: expressive voting and pivotality

Why do the poor vote against redistribution? We examine one explanation experimentally, namely that individuals gain direct expressive utility from voting in accordance with their ideology and understand that they are unlikely to be pivotal; hence, their expressive utility, even if arbitrarily small, determines their voting behavior. In contrast with a basic prediction of this model, we find that the probability of being pivotal does not affect the impact of monetary interest on whether a subject votes for redistribution.     

An Opposing View of Scotland's Ballot Paper Problem: Arbuthnott and the Government had the Right Idea

The May 2007 Scottish Parliament election used a different ballot format from the one used in the previous elections, one that combined the regional and constituency votes onto one ballot paper (two separate papers were used before). Because there were many more invalid votes in 2007, the problem was blamed on the two‐vote ballot paper, which was recommended by the Arbuthnott Commission to prevent misunderstandings about what the two votes were for. Other places that use the mixed‐member proportional (MMP) electoral system tend to use a two‐vote ballot paper, with Germany and New Zealand seeing low levels of invalid votes. While the decision to revert to two separate papers in future Scottish Parliament elections might reduce the number of invalid votes, the price could be more confusion about the proportional nature of the electoral system unless public education improves significantly.     

Follow the Candidates,Not the Parties? Personal Vote in a Regional De-institutionalized Party System

This article analyses how personal vote shapes electoral competition and predicts electoral results in a regional de-institutionalized party system. After having analysed the connection between unpredictable political environment and personal vote, we build an original empirical model that explores preferential vote and patterns of re-candidacies and endorsements of the most voted candidates in the Calabrian regional elections. The analysis shows that leading candidates retain a more stable and predictable support over time with respect to parties and that candidates and their system of interactions are able to predict the electoral results better than parties and their alliances.     

Bribing votes: A new explanation to the ``inequality-redistribution' puzzle in LDC's

The recent empirical literature on redistribution and developmentemphasizes two main evidences: (i) more redistribution generallyinduces higher growth rates and (ii) more inequality does notnecessarily increase the political demand for redistribution.These stylized facts are at odds with the correlations observedin developed countries. Several theoretical arguments can beadvanced to explain these puzzles. In this paper, it is shownthat ``vote purchases'' may be seen as an additional argument toexplain puzzle (ii). We formalize this idea and examine theconditions under which vote bribes may be an obstacle toredistribution (and thus to growth) in a developing economy.