Optimal Taxation,Economic Growth and Income Inequality

That there is a trade-off between equityand efficiency (economic growth) is wellknown. Two models have been developed thatlink government spending and taxation toeconomic growth. This paper uses thesemodels to provide estimates of thegrowth-maximizing tax rate. Then, a twoequation structural model is developed andestimated that is used to find thetrade-off rate between economic growth andincome inequality and the growth-maximizinglevel of income inequality for the UnitedStates over the period 1960–1990.     

Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement

What effect, if any, does the extent of economic inequality in a country have upon the political engagement of its citizens? This study examines this question using data from multiple cross‐national surveys of the advanced industrial democracies. It tests the theory that greater inequality increases the relative power of the wealthy to shape politics in their own favor against rival arguments that focus on the effects of inequality on citizens' objective interests or the resources they have available for political engagement. The analysis demonstrates that higher levels of income inequality powerfully depress political interest, the frequency of political discussion, and participation in elections among all but the most affluent citizens, providing compelling evidence that greater economic inequality yields greater political inequality.     

Community Income Inequality and the Economic Gap in Participation

Political Behavior - This paper reveals how community-level income inequality affects political participation. We theorize that local experiences of inequality increase awareness of the unequal...     

An Empirical Note on Economic Freedom and Income Inequality

I report estimates for a fixed-effects model of country-level Gini coefficients as a function of economic freedom along with relevant control variables. Gini coefficients are drawn from the UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database Version 2.0a, while economic freedom is measured by the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World index. Controls are included for per capita income, political structure, education, demographics, and industrial composition. Over a broad range of freedom, the estimated relation between economic freedom and income inequality is positive, statistically significant, but relatively inelastic.     

Politics and Economic Growth

Traditional growth theory viewed economic growth as a resultant of economic factors, in particular capital investment. Development economics implied a broader approach, emphasizing social structure change and human capital. Finally, it was also hinted that political factors could influence the rate of change in the development of the economic system. Testing various theories of economic growth we find that institutional sclerosis is the basic political factor that is related to the process of economic growth. The next step is to analyse how political structures and public policy have an impact on the basic factor in economic growth, viz. investments.     

Economic Growth and Social Capital

Recent interdisciplinary theoretical work has suggested that social capital, or the interpersonal trust of citizens, plays an important role in explaining both the efficiency of political institutions, and in the economic performance of contemporary societies. This paper examines the relationship between social capital and economic growth in a sample of thirty-four countries over the period 1970 to 1992, within the framework of a modified neo-classical model of economic growth. The findings suggest that social capital has an impact on growth which is at least as strong as that of human capital or education, which has been the focus of much of the recent work on endogenous growth theory. It appears to have about the same impact on growth as catch-up or the ability of poorer nations to adopt technological innovations pioneered by their richer counterparts.     

The Political Implications of American Concerns About Economic Inequality

This article presents a national measure of Americans’ level of concern about economic inequality from 1966 to 2015, and analyzes the relationship between this construct and public support for government intervention in the economy. Current research argues that concerns about economic inequality are associated with a desire for increased government action, but this relationship has only been formally tested using cross-sectional analyses. I first use a form of dynamic factor analysis to develop a measure of national concern over time. Using an error correction model I then show that an increase in national concern about economic inequality does not lead to a subsequent increase in support for government intervention in the economy. Instead there is some evidence that, once confounding factors are accounted for, an increase in concern could lead to reduced support for government intervention.     

Economic Inequality and Intolerance: Attitudes toward Homosexuality in 35 Democracies

Using hierarchical linear models fitted to data from the World Values Survey and national statistics for 35 countries, this article builds on the postmaterialist thesis by assessing the impact of economic inequality across and within nations on attitudes toward homosexuality. It provides evidence that tolerance tends to decline as national income inequality rises. For professionals and managers, the results also support the postmaterialist argument that economic development leads to more tolerant attitudes. On the other hand, attitudes of the working class are generally less tolerant, and contrary to expectations of the postmaterialist thesis, are seemingly unaffected by economic development. In other words, economic development influences attitudes only for those who benefit most. These findings have political implications, suggesting that state policies that have the goal of economic growth but fail to consider economic inequality may contribute to intolerant social and political values, an attribute widely considered detrimental for the health of democracy.     

Inequality and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: The Self‐Reinforcing Link Between Economic Inequality and Mass Preferences

This article assesses the influence of income inequality on the public's policy mood. Recent work has produced divergent perspectives on the relationship between inequality, public opinion, and government redistribution. One group of scholars suggests that unequal representation of different income groups reproduces inequality as politicians respond to the preferences of the rich. Another group of scholars pays relatively little attention to distributional outcomes but shows that government is generally just as responsive to the poor as to the rich. Utilizing theoretical insights from comparative political economy and time‐series data from 1952 to 2006, supplemented with cross‐sectional analysis where appropriate, we show that economic inequality is, in fact, self‐reinforcing, but that this is fully consistent with the idea that government tends to respond equally to rich and poor in its policy enactments.     

Polarization,Politics and Property Rights: Links Between Inequality and Growth

We argue that social polarization reduces the security ofproperty and contract rights and, through this channel,reduces growth. The first hypothesis is supported by cross-country evidence indicating that polarization in the form ofincome inequality, land inequality, and ethnic tensions isinversely related to a commonly-used index of the security ofcontractual and property rights. When the security of propertyrights is controlled for in cross-country growth regressions,the relationship between inequality and growth diminishesconsiderably. This and other evidence provides support for oursecond hypothesis, that inequality reduces growth in partthrough its effect on the security of property rights.     

Does Economic Inequality Depress Electoral Participation? Testing the Schattschneider Hypothesis

Nearly a half-century ago, E.E. Schattschneider wrote that the high abstention and large differences between the rates of electoral participation of richer and poorer citizens found in the United States were caused by high levels of economic inequality. Despite increasing inequality and stagnant or declining voting rates since then, Schattschneider’s hypothesis remains largely untested. This article takes advantage of the variation in inequality across states and over time to remedy this oversight. Using a multilevel analysis that combines aspects of state context with individual survey responses in 144 gubernatorial elections, it finds that citizens of states with greater income inequality are less likely to vote and that income inequality increases income bias in the electorate, lending empirical support to Schattschneider’s argument.     

The Radical Critique of Economic Inequality in Early American Political Thought

This article examines the ideological roots and historical development of an early radical economic egalitarian tradition in American political thought. It concentrates on a group of thinkers and social critics that were active from the 1820s through the beginning of the Civil War. Inspired by republican themes, they forged a radical critique of the emerging capitalist order and a skepticism of economic modernity. By reworking the republican political notion of an equality of social relations as an essential context for individual liberty, these radical critics posed a challenge to the emerging capitalist order. They would also be unique in the way that they analyzed the workings of this new economic system arguing that it was a mechanism that would systematically reproduce economic inequality eroding republican forms of government and society making them a distinct voice in America's egalitarian tradition.     

中国的经济发展与制度变迁论纲

本文通过对制度变迁理论的分析,简要阐明了制度变迁理论的一般含义,并通过对中国经济体制改革实践的回顾,论证了制度变迁作为一个重要因素将在经济增长和经济体制的变革中起到重要作用.     

Democracy and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis

Despite a sizeable theoretical and empirical literature, no firm conclusions have been drawn regarding the impact of political democracy on economic growth. This article challenges the consensus of an inconclusive relationship through a quantitative assessment of the democracy-growth literature. It applies meta-regression analysis to the population of 483 estimates derived from 84 studies on democracy and growth. Using traditional meta-analysis estimators, the bootstrap, and Fixed and Random Effects meta-regression models, it derives several robust conclusions. Taking all the available published evidence together, it concludes that democracy does not have a direct impact on economic growth. However, democracy has robust, significant, and positive indirect effects through higher human capital, lower inflation, lower political instability, and higher levels of economic freedom. Democracies may also be associated with larger governments and less free international trade. There also appear to be country- and region-specific democracy-growth effects. Overall, democracy's net effect on the economy does not seem to be detrimental.     

Economic Freedom,Government Policy and the Trade-Off Between Equity and Economic Growth

This study investigates the role that economicfreedom plays in economic growth and in the distribution in marketincome, the role of government policy in advancingeconomic progress and in promoting income equality, and the effectthat the rate of economic progress has on thedistribution of market income. Structural and reduced formmodels are estimated that reveal that economic freedompromotes both economic growth and equity, and that there is apositive but relatively small trade-off between growth andincome inequality.     

威权政治与经济成长的关系——以威权体制时期的台湾为例

战后实行威权政治之国家或地区的不同发展绩效,所反映的是与经济发展密切相关的制度结构的不同.威权体制下台湾的发展经验表明,在非民主体制下要达成经济现代化的目标,某些结构性前提条件是必不可少的,包括经济和政治的结构分离、经济理性主义、以私有制为基础的企业制度、市场经济导向、经济决策系统的专业化和"非政治化".威权政体在推动现代化经济发展的同时,也创造了推动自身变化的条件.     

Civil Wars and Economic Growth: Spatial Dispersion

This article quantifies the impact of civil wars on economic growth at home and in nearby countries. Three alternative measures of nearness—contiguity, length of contiguous borders, and distance of closest approach—are used to capture the spatial dispersion of civil war consequences. We present short-run panel estimates (at five-year intervals) and long-run (1961–95) panel estimates for the world. Generally, the distance measures, novel to this study, and not contiguity provides the most accurate measure of the diffusion of the negative economic consequences of civil wars on other countries. Unlike earlier studies, we also investigate the temporal influence of civil wars on growth at home and in nearby countries. Both the duration and the timing of civil wars have an economic impact.