Let's Agree to Agree: Regional Interest Representation in the Negotiations for the 2007–13 and 2014–20 Structural Funds in Germany

The negotiating powers of regional authorities in the European Union (EU) have become more evident, especially with decentralization and regionalization happening across Europe. This empirical case study of regional interest representation offers a comparative analysis of the negotiations for the 2007–13 and 2014–20 EU Structural Funds. Based on qualitative interviews with German subnational officials, this paper explores how the German federal states (Länder) represented their interests at the federal and supranational level. It will be shown that the modes of interest representation changed which can largely be attributed to social learning. This article contributes to existing literature by illustrating the move towards co-operative interest representation with intra-state subnational mobilization.     

The Third Force? Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected Politicians in Europe

Governments and legislatures in Europe have created or greatly strengthened independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). Yet they also retain many formal controls over those agencies. The article analyzes whether elected politicians have used their powers to create IRAs in their own image and kept IRAs under tight control or whether they have allowed IRAs to become a distinct set of actors, hence a "third force" in regulation. Principal–agent (PA) theories, largely based on U.S. experience, emphasize the importance of certain formal controls for elected politicians to limit "agency losses." However, an analysis of four European nations between 1990 and 2001 shows that elected politicians did not use their powers to appoint party politicians, force the early departures of IRA members, reverse IRA decisions, or reduce IRA budgets and powers. Using PA theory, two interpretations of this apparent puzzle are offered, each with differing implications for agency autonomy. One is that elected politicians used alternative methods of control, hence they suffered low "agency losses" and IRAs in practice had little autonomy. The other is that elected politicians found that the benefits of IRA autonomy in practice and the costs of applying their formal control outweighed agency losses, and hence accepted agency autonomy.     

Regulatory change and environmental protection in the British and German chemical industries

Abstract. Business interest associations in the European chemical industry have traditionally been well organized and enjoyed a harmonious relationship with governments of various complexions. This very favourable balance for the industry has been disturbed by the salience of the environmental issue. This has led to a certain deregulation, or breakdown of existing regulatory mechanisms. Increasing concentration on the European Community level as the locus of environmental policymaking has led to a dual response on the part of business interest associations, reflecting an older contrast between national styles of government/business relations. The British chemical industry has preferred the national route, is much more hostile to environmental regulation than its German counterpart, and often finds itself isolated, depending on the Department of Trade and Industry to ensure that its viewpoint is articulated by the British Government in EC negotiations. The German industry still clings to self-regulation, but, given the high level of environmental consciousness in the Federal Republic, has developed a reluctant preference for action at the European level. This has been manifested both in the Europeanisation of its links with the German Economics Ministry and in its support for the European Council of Chemical Manufacturers Associations; the latter is well placed to exert influence on both the EC Commission and the European Parliament.     

Patterns of Local Policy Disruption: Regulatory Responses to Uber in Ten North American Cities

Since its inception in 2009, Uber has grown into a technology behemoth, with operations in over 70 countries and 500 cities around the world. Along the way, it has successfully forced regulatory upheaval in hundreds of local taxi markets controlled by municipal authorities. In this sense, Uber is not only a market disruptor, but also a policy disruptor. This paper examines the nature of such policy disruption at the local level by reviewing regulatory responses to Uber in ten North American cities. We find that regulatory outcomes are a function of two factors: Uber’s government relations strategy, either cooperative or confrontational, and the degree to which local governments perceive Uber as complementary or harmful to the existing marketplace. We conclude by proposing a typology of regulatory responses to Uber as a basis to identify patterns in the behavior of municipal regulatory authorities and political leaders.     

The European Commission: The Limits of Centralization and the Perils of Parliamentarization

The idea of an inevitable process of centralization in the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) is a myth. Also, the metaphor of “creeping competences,” with its suggestion of a surreptitious but continuous growth of the powers of the Commission, can be misleading. It is true that the functional scope of EC/EU competences has steadily increased, but the nature of new competences has changed dramatically, as may be seen from the evolution of the methods of harmonization. The original emphasis on total harmonization, which gives the Community exclusive competence over a given policy area, has been largely replaced by more flexible but less “communitarian” methods such as optional and minimum harmonization, reference to nonbinding technical standards, and mutual recognition. Finally, the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam explicitly excluded harmonization for most new competences. Thus, the expansion of the jurisdiction of the EC/EU has not automatically increased the powers of the Commission, but has actually weakened them in several respects. In addition, the progressive parliamentarization of the Commission risks compromising its credibility as an independent regulator, without necessarily enhancing its democratic legitimacy. Since the member states continue to oppose any centralization of regulatory powers, even in areas essential to the functioning of the internal market, the task of implementing Community policies should be entrusted to networks of independent national and European regulators, roughly modeled on the European System of Central Banks. The Commission would coordinate and monitor the activities of these networks in order to ensure the coherence of EC regulatory policies. More generally, it should bring its distinctive competence more clearly into focus by concentrating on the core business of ensuring the development and proper functioning of the single European market. This is a more modest role than that of the kernel of a future government of Europe, but it is essential to the credibility of the integration process and does not overstrain the limited financial and legitimacy resources available to the Commission.     

A Regulatory Analysis of Australia's Anti-dumping Law and Policy: Statutory Failure or Regulatory Capture?

Anti-dumping and countervailing (AD/CVD) law and policy permits nations to impose corrective duties against unfairly traded imports found to have injured domestic industries. However, administrators of AD/CVD policy around the world are criticised for misusing the remedy as an elaborate and complex protectionist mechanism.
A problem with many critical reviews is that explanations as to how misuse occurs, or at what point in the administrative process regulatory authorities are able to exercise bias, are rarely provided. In the Australian context, the task of identifying a source and opportunity for misuse is made complicated by three major forces affecting the decision-making processes of the Australian regulatory authorities, the Australian Customs Service and Australian Anti-Dumping Authority (ACS and ADA). This article examines the influence which Australia's international obligations, government and public policy processes and the Federal Court have upon the administration of AD/CVD law and policy in order to determine the degree of autonomy afforded to the ACS and ADA.     

The Securities and Exchange Commission: A Small Regulatory Agency with a Gargantuan Challenge

Multibillion–dollar accounting scandals have brought down Enron and WorldCom, while other corporations continue to revise and restate earnings. The gradual stock market tumble has played havoc with investment portfolios of retirees, parents saving for education, small business owners, and corporate America. All eyes are on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a small, independent regulator of the securities markets with a gargantuan challenge. On the one hand, it faces great public expectations for rigorous reform of Wall Street. Politicians have mandated rules and sanctions for cleaning up the practice of outside audits and for improving the veracity of financial disclosures. Yet the public's expectations for a vigorous market recovery are even greater. If sanctions and rules are too severe, though, reform efforts could slow capital accumulation. This special report examines the SEC's regulatory past in order to understand the task it faces today. Management challenges posed by recent legislation are discussed, and recommendations for strengthening the SEC are presented.     

Corporate Environmentalism, Regulatory Reform, and Industry Self-Regulation: Toward Genuine Regulatory Reinvention in the United States

Increasingly, corporations are proactively managing environmental impacts in response to pressures from the consumer, business-to-business, financial, and government procurement markets. In many cases, these efforts have produced results well beyond what could be required under public regulations. Although the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency began a process of regulatory reinvention in the 1990s as a means of promoting such innovations, the results have been somewhat disappointing. This article examines the recent trends in corporate environmental management and regulatory reform. It concludes with a discussion of changes in regulatory design that could promote ongoing gains in corporate environmental performance through the creation of a hybrid system combining elements of public regulation, government-supervised corporate self-regulation, mandatory information disclosure, and green procurement.     

When trade liberalization turns into regulatory reform: The impact on business–government relations in international trade politics

Business–government relations on trade issues are generally characterized as protectionist lobbying or – less often – lobbying for the liberalization of markets. However, with the evolution of the trading system, negotiations today concern not just market opening, but also the regulatory frameworks that structure international trade. This transformation has important consequences for the ways in which private interests can contribute to trade negotiations. Instead of simply trying to exert pressure, businesses and other private actors now form working relationships with governments based on expertise, learning, and information exchange. This article illustrates these new forms of public–private interactions with examples from the USA, the European Union, and Brazil.     

U.S.‐Style Leadership for English Local Government?

Significant changes in the political management of local authorities in the United Kingdom are now taking place as a result of legislation passed by the Labour government since 1997. The new political management models aim to modernize local governance by strengthening local leadership, streamlining decision making, and enhancing local accountability. These changes owe much to U.S. experience: They involve the introduction of a separation of powers between an executive and an assembly, and they allow local authorities to introduce directly elected mayors for the first time ever. Is U.K. local government beginning to adopt what might be described as U.S.‐style approaches to local governance? The evidence suggests the new institutional designs for U.K. local authorities represent a radical shift toward U.S.‐style local leadership and decision making. However, the U.K. central state remains heavily involved in the details of local decision making, to an extent that would be unthinkable in the United States.     

The rewards of cooperation: The effects of membership in European regulatory networks

Networks famously epitomize the shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ as governing structures for exercising control and coordination besides hierarchies and markets. Their distinctive features are their horizontality, the interdependence among member actors and an interactive decision‐making style. Networks are expected to increase the problem‐solving capacity of political systems in a context of growing social complexity, where political authority is increasingly fragmented across territorial and functional levels. However, very little attention has been given so far to another crucial implication of network governance – that is, the effects of networks on their members. To explore this important question, this article examines the effects of membership in European regulatory networks on two crucial attributes of member agencies, which are in charge of regulating finance, energy, telecommunications and competition: organisational growth and their regulatory powers. Panel analysis applied to data on 118 agencies during a ten‐year period and semi‐structured interviews provide mixed support regarding the expectation of organisational growth while strongly confirming the positive effect of networks on the increase of the regulatory powers attributed to member agencies.     

Regulatory independence, public accountability and the Victorian prison system

One of the most frequently used arguments supporting the introduction of privatization into a prison system is that it will strengthen accountability. However, to meet this claim it is maintained that a number of preconditions are necessary—one being independence of the regulator. This article examines the claims made by the Victorian Minister for Corrections that the Seamless System model would provide more independent monitoring and review of Victoria's prisons. Changes to regulatory arrangements are probed to determine if there has been any loss of independence in Victoria's prison system since the introduction of the latest model. It is concluded that the latest restructuring in 2003 of Victoria's part-privatised prison poses a significant risk for public accountability and requires attention to ensure both the private and the public prisons are held to account.     

National de-delegation in multi-level settings: Independent regulatory agencies in Europe

National politicians in Europe have created independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) with significant powers over markets such as communications and energy. After delegation, they have engaged in institutional politicization of IRAs and undertaken numerous attempted or actual de-delegations. Yet overall de-delegation over the period 2000–2020 has been limited, as many de-delegations have been abandoned, temporary or reversed, and also counterbalanced by extensions of IRA powers. The article examines different explanations for this pattern. It looks especially at Europeanization, which has operated through normative and particularly coercive mechanisms. EU coercion has involved threats of legal action, monitoring and enforcement of existing EU legal requirements, and EU legislation expanding IRA powers and protection. IRAs are more vulnerable to de-delegation than trustee non-majoritarian institutions because their position can be altered with simple legislative majorities. Yet even for such agents, the ability of national politicians to reverse delegation is constrained by multi-level institutional settings.     

The first supranational policy in the European Union: Competition policy

Abstract. Competition policy has become a salient issue in the last decade. The purpose of this article is to widen discussion amongst political scientists of an issue that has been dominated by the disciplines of economics and law. The concept of a competition policy is the foundation stone of the entire European Union. It lies at the very heart of efforts to establish a common market and within the EU competition policy arena the decision making powers have laid firmly with the supranational institutions. This article provides an overview of the issue; it traces the constitutive foundations of policy and discusses the functions of the core EU competition policy actors. It is primarily concerned with the European Commission, in particular, DGIV. The paper accounts for DGIV's metamorphosis in the 1980s and the myriad of problems now confronting its procedures and efficiency in the 1990s. Whether these defects can be resolved will ultimately determine the fate of DGIV. Arguments for institutional reform are raging through the European institutions and DGIV provides no exception. The paper concludes with a discussion on the plausibility of the creation of an independent European Competition Office, modelled on the role of the German Federal Cartel Office.     

International Capital Mobility and Domestic Institutions:Corporate Finance and Governance in Four European Cases

This article considers the impact of international capital mobility on thecharacter of corporate finance and corporate governance in four European countries (Germany, France, Spain, and Italy). We take issue with the widespread view that the growth of international financial markets and the lifting of capital controls will in themselves produce convergence in national systems of corporate finance and governance. Although we find evidence of convergence in specific aspects of financial regulation (e.g., the abandonment of selective credit regulation and the dismantling of barriers to universal banking), these regulatory changes have not produced any clear convergence toward either the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate finance and governance predicted in much of the literature or the alternative German bank-based model. The reasons for this, we suggest, have much to do with the way in which the politics of financialreform are likely to differ from those postulated in market-driven models of regulatory change and the fact that countries are susceptible to international pressures in different ways.     

Regulatory Contradictions: The Political Determinants of Labor Market Inequality in Korea and Japan

Growing labor market inequality in Korea and Japan is often blamed on increased trade competition with China, the information technology revolution, and aging populations. This study shows that labor market inequality is not simply driven by such structural changes but by the nature of the ways in which new labor market regulations were created and the resulting regulatory contradictions. Although its state-centric strategies designed new labor market regulation favoring marginal workers, the Korean government failed to resolve labor market inequality. This is because the government's new regulatory goal was not backed by sufficient policy resources or adequately coordinated with other policy areas. Conversely, Japanese authorities prioritized the employment stability of regular workers on the basis of consensus among labor and business groups and the government. However, this narrow goal continues to inhibit progress in closing the gap of labor market inequality.     

Thalidomide, BSE and the single market: An historical-institutionalist approach to regulatory regimes in the European Union

Abstract.  The success of the European Union in regulating the safety of products in the single market differs widely. In the last decade, the regulatory regime for pharmaceuticals has functioned without raising public concerns. The establishment of a European agency for pharmaceuticals in the early 1990s has been evaluated positively by both producers and consumers, and there have been no large scandals so far. At the same time, the food sector was subject to a whole range of crises, of which the BSE scandal was certainly the most significant one. In reaction to this, the regulatory regime for foodstuffs was reformed by setting up the European Food Safety Agency in 2002. This article adopts an historical-institutionalist approach, and thus tries to give an explanation for the striking differences between the two regulatory regimes. Accordingly, the development of supranational regulatory regimes is distinguished by two critical junctures: a crisis of consumer confidence and the establishment of a single market. It is crucial which of these occurred first. If a crisis of consumer confidence leads to the establishment of national regulatory authorities, these authorities act as stakeholders, which could be an obstacle for harmonization, but also ensures a necessary commitment to health and consumer protection once a single market is set up. If national regulatory authorities are missing, it might be easier to set up a single market, but a regulatory deficit is more likely to occur and, in case of a crisis, the whole regulatory regime has to be established at the supranational level.     

The Usage of Scientific Knowledge by Independent Regulatory Agencies

The normative justification for delegation to independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) is that they operate by using technical analysis and expertise rather than political considerations in their decision‐making processes. Although delegation has been discussed as a design principle, systematic evidence on the conditions under which IRAs make use of scientific knowledge and how is still scarce. Scientific knowledge can be used to achieve instrumental learning, but also to seek legitimacy from the policy environment or to improve the agency's standing in the political games with the principal. This article will suggest how comparative empirical research can be usefully organized, by enriching delegation and organizational theories with the insights of the literature on knowledge utilization. Drawing on the methodological device of explanatory typologies, the article aims at shedding light on different types of knowledge utilization and the scope conditions that lead to a certain use of knowledge by IRAs.     

The Limits of Europeanization: Regulatory Reforms in the Spanish and Portuguese Telecommunications and Electricity Sectors

The creation of a European Union‐level regulatory regime for telecommunications and electricity was a highly successful political initiative of the European Commission. However, this article argues that the causal link between European initiatives and national policy change is weak. Building on an emerging tradition of cross‐sector research of these two sectors, and considering two most similar European countries, the article applies a series of comparisons, including a stepwise comparative analysis of two countries (one a reluctant liberalizer, the other an enthusiastic one), of two sectors (a pacesetter and a footdragger), and of two time periods (before and after the regulatory reforms). We suggest that Spain and Portugal were able to shape their sectors according to the preferences of their national policy communities and in a context of a global shift in the way countries both within Europe and outside it defined their interests.