Quality Is Job One: Professional and Volunteer Voter Mobilization Calls

Campaigns rely upon both paid and volunteer phone calls to mobilize voters. Past field experiments show calls from volunteers to increase turnout and paid calls to be wholly ineffective. This article argues that the quality of phone calls rather than the presence or absence of a payroll explains this regularity. Three aspects of quality are considered: monitoring pace and interactivity, timing, and message. A fully randomized field experiment with over 100,000 subjects comparing professional and volunteer phone banks simultaneously was conducted during the 2002 congressional elections to test this hypothesis. The experiment discovers precisely the opposite relationship of prior research: effective professional phone banks and inefficient volunteer phone calls. The experiment also finds substantial temporal decay. The specific messages appear less important than tone or timing. The implications for the role of campaign consultants, replacing social capital, voter psychology, and the capacities of civic organizations are discussed.     

Comparing Experimental and Matching Methods Using a Large-Scale Voter Mobilization Experiment

Alan S. Gerber and Donald P. Green Yale University, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, P.O. Box 208209, 77 Prospect Street, New Haven, CT 06520 e-mail: kevin.arceneaux{at}temple.edu (corresponding author) e-mail: alan.gerber{at}yale.edu e-mail: donald.green{at}yale.edu In the social sciences, randomized experimentation is the optimalresearch design for establishing causation. However, for a numberof practical reasons, researchers are sometimes unable to conductexperiments and must rely on observational data. In an effortto develop estimators that can approximate experimental resultsusing observational data, scholars have given increasing attentionto matching. In this article, we test the performance of matchingby gauging the success with which matching approximates experimentalresults. The voter mobilization experiment presented here comprisesa large number of observations (60,000 randomly assigned tothe treatment group and nearly two million assigned to the controlgroup) and a rich set of covariates. This study is analyzedin two ways. The first method, instrumental variables estimation,takes advantage of random assignment in order to produce consistentestimates. The second method, matching estimation, ignores randomassignment and analyzes the data as though they were nonexperimental.Matching is found to produce biased results in this applicationbecause even a rich set of covariates is insufficient to controlfor preexisting differences between the treatment and controlgroup. Matching, in fact, produces estimates that are no moreaccurate than those generated by ordinary least squares regression.The experimental findings show that brief paid get-out-the-votephone calls do not increase turnout, while matching and regressionshow a large and significant effect.     

Biases at the Ballot Box: How Multiple Forms of Voter Discrimination Impede the Descriptive and Substantive Representation of Ethnic Minority Groups

Political Behavior - Research shows that ethnic minority candidates often face an electoral penalty at the ballot box. In this study, we argue that this penalty depends on both candidate and voter...     

Gender-Related Political Knowledge and the Descriptive Representation of Women

Past scholarship has documented that women tend to know less about politics than men. This study finds that political knowledge of one kind—knowledge about the actual level of women's representation—is related to support for having more women in office. Individuals who underestimate the percentage of women in office are more likely than individuals who know the correct percentage to support increasing women's representation. Meanwhile, individuals who overestimate the percentage of women in office are less likely to support increasing women's representation. Ironically, women are more likely than men to overestimate the presence of women in office. I also find that gender predicts support for having more women in office, with women more supportive than men. Women would be even more supportive of electing more women to office if they were as knowledgeable as men about the extent of women's underrepresentation.     

Electoral Participation in Pursuit of Policy Representation: Ideological Congruence and Voter Turnout

In this article, we examine whether lack of ideological congruence with the viable party options discourages turnout, and under which conditions. We conceive congruence from the perspective of the individual citizen, and, drawing on policy-based arguments for non-voting, we hypothesize that: having no party in the political menu sharing similar views should especially reduce turnout of citizens holding extremist views and that this effect would be greatest in proportional electoral systems. Relying on data collected by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), we show that lack of congruence with the electoral menu reduces extremists’ turnout and does so particularly in PR systems.     

Is There Backlash to Social Pressure? A Large-scale Field Experiment on Voter Mobilization

Using social pressure to mobilize voters has generated impressive increases in turnout (Gerber et al. Am Polit Sci Rev 102:33–48, 2008). However, voters may have negative reactions to social pressure treatments that reduce their effectiveness. Social psychologists have observed this ‘reactance’ to persuasive pressure about other behavior, but it has been overlooked in voter mobilization. Using a large-scale field experiment, we find treatments designed to reduce reactance are just as effective as heavy-handed social pressure treatments in mobilizing voters. The success of gentler social pressure treatments should make the use of social pressure more palatable to voter mobilization organizations.     

Immigrant-Serving Non-profit Voter Mobilization in Off-Cycle Elections: An Institutional Explanation of Differential Political Participation Patterns

Abstract

Immigrants in the USA tend to vote less than other groups, and immigrants vote at even lower levels during off-cycle elections. The aim of this article is to analyse whether these same patterns can be observed in the electoral activities of non-profit organizations that represent immigrants. I argue for a theory of reflective non-profit representation to explain how immigrant-serving organizations make decisions about electoral activities. By analysing original survey data collected in 2012 and 2013, the article finds that immigrant-serving non-profits are less likely to mobilize immigrants in off-cycle compared to on-cycle elections, and less likely to mobilize voters than organizations serving other communities. These findings suggest that immigrant voting could increase if non-profits increased their political involvement, reimagined their identities to include politics as a part of their mission, and generated new revenues to support these activities.     

Coalition-Targeted Duvergerian Voting: How Expectations Affect Voter Choice under Proportional Representation

Inspired by analyses of majoritarian systems, students of consensual polities have analyzed strategic voting due to barriers to party success, namely, district magnitude and threshold. Given the prevalence of coalition governments in proportional systems, we analyze a type of strategic voting seldom studied: how expected coalition composition affects voter choice. We identify Duvergerian behavior by voters targeted at the coalition formation stage. We contend that when voters perceive their preferred party as unlikely to participate in the coalition, they often desert it and instead support the lesser of evils among those they perceive as viable coalition partners. We demonstrate our argument using data on coalition expectations from the 2006 Israeli elections. We find an appreciable albeit differential effect of coalition expectations on voter choice. Importantly, results hold controlling for ideological and coalition preferences. Lastly, we explore a broad cross-national comparison, showing that there is less, not more, proximity voting where coalitions are prevalent.     

Keeping Up with the Joneses: The Interplay of Personal and Collective Evaluations in Voter Turnout

Do citizens turnout to vote because of changes in their personal financial situation or are they influenced by the nation’s economic performance? Previous research on this question is far from united. We attempt to unify the disparate literature on the effects of pocketbook and sociotropic evaluations on voter turnout in midterm and presidential elections. Our analysis of ANES data from 1978 to 2004, based on a reference-dependent model of voter turnout, indicates that both pocketbook and sociotropic considerations affect individuals’ decision of whether to vote in midterm elections. Those who perceive that over the last year their own financial situation has improved relative to the economy are less likely to vote than those who view the economy as outperforming their own financial situation.     

Looking for Locals: Voter Information Demands and Personal Vote-Earning Attributes of Legislators under Proportional Representation

Proportional representation systems affect the extent to which elected legislators exhibit various attributes that allow them to earn a personal vote. The sources of variation in personal vote-earning attributes (PVEA) lie in informational shortcuts voters use under different electoral rules. List type (closed or open) and district magnitude (the number of legislators elected from a district) affect the types of shortcuts voters employ. When lists are closed, legislators' PVEA are of decreasing usefulness to voters as magnitude (and hence the number of candidates on a list) increases. When lists are open, legislators' PVEA are increasingly useful to voters as magnitude increases, because the number of candidates from which voters must choose whom to give a preference vote increases. As predicted by the theory, the probability that a legislator will exhibit PVEA—operationalized as local birthplace or lower-level electoral experience—declines with magnitude when lists are closed, but rises with magnitude when lists are open .     

利益表达、资源动员与议程设置——对于“闹大”现象的描述性分析

在当前社会转型时期的利益冲突中",闹大"已经成为公民抗争的重要逻辑。本文以近年来大量具有闹大特点的社会事件为研究对象,从理论上归纳了闹大的发展过程,概括和抽象了闹大的逻辑,并在公民与政府关系的框架下,从利益表达、资源动员和议程设置三个方面对闹大的功能性作用进行了深入的描述性分析。从利益表达的角度分析,闹大主要涉及到谁来表达、如何表达以及表达了什么的问题;从资源动员的角度分析,闹大的主要问题是动员的对象、动员过程的特征和动员的机制等问题;从议程设置的角度分析,闹大则与公民成为问题的界定者、问题是如何引起政府官员的注意的以及由谁用什么办法来解决问题等密切相关。闹大是透视公共治理状况的一面镜子。对闹大的描述性分析有助于深入把握和理解当前我国公共治理的规律和逻辑。     

Roadmaps to Representation: An Experimental Study of How Voter Education Tools Affect Citizen Decision Making

Efforts to educate citizens about the candidates and issues at stake in elections are widespread. These include distributing voter guides describing candidates’ policy views and interactive tools conveying similar information. Do these voter education tools help voters identify candidates who share their policy views? We address this question by conducting survey experiments that randomly assign a nonpartisan voter guide, political party endorsements, a spatial map showing voters their own and the candidates’ ideological positions, or both a spatial map and party endorsements. We find that each type of information strengthens the relationship between voters’ policy views and those of the candidates they choose. These effects are largest for uninformed voters. When spatial maps and party endorsements send conflicting signals, many voters choose candidates with more similar policy views, against their party’s recommendation. These results contribute to debates about citizen competence and demonstrate the efficacy of practical efforts to inform electorates.