Last Post for “The Greatest Generation”: The Policy Implications of the Decline of Military Experience in the U.S. Congress

This paper characterizes the behavioral and policy implications of the decline in the number of military veterans in the U.S. Congress, from more than 70% of legislators in the early 1970s to less than 30% in the contemporary House and Senate. Many scholars argue that military service shapes information and beliefs, and that this decline has had negative effects on defense policy. The analysis tests these arguments using voting data from the House and Senate in the 1990s and the House in the 1970s, showing that the impact of veteran status on votes is generally small and has a relatively minor effect on legislative outcomes.     

Bicameralism and Minority-Party Influence on Legislative Development: Evidence from House Standing Committee Votes

The ability of the minority party to influence legislation in Congress is debated. Most bills are passed with large bipartisan majorities, yet the House, where most legislation is developed, is seen as a majority-party-dominated institution. I develop a theory of House minority-party influence at the committee markup stage as a result of the Senate’s institutional rules. An original data set of congressional committee votes shows that minority-party support in House committees predicts House and Senate passage. During unified party control of the chambers, an increase in Senate majority-party seats results in lower minority-party support for the legislation in the House committee, while during divided party control of Congress, the House majority passes more extreme bills as the chambers polarize. Even in the majority-party-dominated House, the minority’s preferences are incorporated into legislation, and the Senate’s institutional rules moderate bills to a significant degree.     

Different Houses: The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House and Senate

Nearly all studies of pork‐barrel politics in the U.S. Congress focus on the House, biasing our conception of how politics influences federal spending and skewing our attention toward factors that are active in the House. This article highlights differences between the Senate and House in how pork is allocated. We identify four important differences between the House and Senate, generate hypotheses regarding how each difference should influence the distribution of pork projects, and test these hypotheses using data from earmarks in the Appropriations bills passed by the two chambers for fiscal year 2008. The results support three of our four hypotheses, suggesting that senators are driven by different motivations than House members. These results imply that theoretical accounts of pork‐barrel spending need to account for these interchamber differences. Our findings also highlight how studies of legislative behavior, more generally, need to account for important differences in legislative structure and organization.     

The “Golden Age” Senate And Floor Debate in the Antebellum Congress

An image of an antebellum “golden age” of Senate debate and deliberation has passed virtually unblemished from one generation of historians and political analysts to the next. In what ways, if any, is the image of a more deliberative Senate evident in the realities of antebellum House and Senate debates? In this article, I present a series of case studies to examine elements of the quantity and quality of floor debate in each chamber. By providing comparative evidence about House and Senate debate during the antebellum period, I offer an assessment and critique of the bicameral implications of the largely untested “golden age” understanding of the Senate and join other recent efforts to reassess the nature of the early Senate and its relation to the House. My results show the conventional wisdom to be an oversimplification, at least in its implications about the scope and depth of House debates. The House debated as long, and arguably as well, as the Senate on the signal issues of the day.     

Laws and Roll Calls in the U.S. Congress, 1891–1994

Recent empirical studies of lawmaking activity by legislatures rely heavily on roll call based measures and assume that roll call activity reflects lawmaking activity. We question this assumption for the case of the U.S. Congress. We examine several plausible sources of dissonance between the set of enacted public statutes and the universe of recorded votes in the U.S. Congress, using a comprehensive dataset of public enactments and roll call activity between 1891 and 1994. Because only 11.9% of the bills signed into law receive a recorded vote in the House, only 7.9% receive a recorded vote in the Senate, and only 5.5% receive a recorded vote in both the House and Senate, we provide guidance as to when studying voting behavior is likely a reasonable proxy for lawmaking behavior. There are sometimes important differences between the laws that do and do not receive a roll call that researchers should account for when using roll calls to study lawmaking in the U.S. Congress.     

A Bridge Too Far? Examining Bridging Assumptions in Common-Space Estimations

While most common-space estimations rely upon members who served in both the House and Senate as “bridges” to scale the remaining members, this assumes that these “bridge members” do not change their preferences when they change chambers. Such an assumption conflicts with standard notions of representation, that is, that legislators’ votes reflect (at least to some degree) the wishes of their constituents. We examine the constancy of this common-space voting assumption by focusing on a subset of House members who move to the Senate: those who come from statewide House districts. Using these members as the bridge actors—and thus bridging by constituency explicitly—in a one-dimensional item response theory model, we find that the standard assumption of chamber switchers in common-space estimations is technically, but immaterially, false. While there are statistically distinguishable differences in House and Senate voting records for chamber switchers, they are not sufficiently large to meaningfully undermine bridging.     

Majority Party Power and Procedural Motions in the U.S. Senate

While the metaphor of House parties as cartels is widely accepted, its application to the Senate is difficult as the majority party lacks the power to unilaterally manipulate rules and pass legislation. Nevertheless, several scholars have argued that the Senate majority party is able to employ nondebatable motions to table to exclude unwanted amendments with procedural rather than substantive votes. Does the motion to table yield negative agenda control or special party influence? Using an analysis of individual Senators' behavior on thousands of votes and an assessment of interest group scores, we find that motions to table do not elicit higher party influence or provide much political cover. A desire to speed up the legislative process, rather than to insulate members from electoral scrutiny, seems to motivate the use of motions to table.     

Bicameralism and Geographic Politics: Allocating Funds in the House and Senate

Because they represent different kinds of constituencies—states versus parts of states—senators and House members have different incentives in constructing federal distributive programs. In order to claim credit for providing particularized benefits, House members need to use policy tools—earmarks and narrow categorical programs—that target funds to their constituencies. Senators, by contrast, are able to claim credit for the large formula grants that distribute the bulk of intergovernmental grant money. Examining House‐Senate interactions in one of the largest distributive programs, federal aid to states for surface transportation, I show that the different bases of representation in the House and Senate structure the chambers' preferences on distributive programs and affect the outcomes of interchamber conflicts.     

The Italian Senate

This article analyses the composition and the functions of the Italian Senate. There are 315 senators, three-quarters of them elected in single-member constituencies through a first-past-the-post system, the remaining ones are elected according to the additional member system among the best losers. The voting age for the Senate is 25 and only Italian citizens who are 40 years or older can be elected. All former Presidents of the Italian Republic are life senators - at present two. Moreover, the President may appoint additional life senators among outstanding Italian citizens - at present five. The Italian Senate has the same powers and performs the same functions as the House of Deputies. According to some scholars and politicians, this system accounts for a better legislation; according to the critics, the Italian model of bicameralism is simply old, cumbersome and useless. The Senate provides a number of ministers commensurate to its size, but only one Prime Minister has ever held a seat in the Senate. The most important debates take place in the House of Deputies, but the government may be defeated in the Senate because all Italian governments must enjoy the confidence of both chambers. Though several proposals for the reform of the Senate have been entertained, none has been approved so far. It is unlikely that even the transformation of the Senate into a Chamber representing the regions, along the model of the German Bundesrat, will take place.     

Seats, Votes, and Gerrymandering: Estimating Representation and Bias in State Legislative Redistricting

The Davis V. Bandemer case focused much attention on the problem of using statistical evidence to demonstrate the existence of political gerrymandering. In this paper, we evaluate the uses and limitations of measures of the seat-votes relationship in the Bandemer case. We outline a statistical method we have developed that can be used to estimate bias and the form of representation in legislative redistricting. We apply this method to Indiana state House and Senate elections for the period 1972 to 1984 and demonstrate a maximum bias of 6.2% toward the Republicans in the House and a 2.8% bias in the Senate.     

The Canadian Senate: Chamber of Sober Reflection or Loony Cousin Best Not Talked About

The Canadian Senate has been the object of much debate and scorn. An appointed body, the Senate has never successfully fulfilled its original purposes, namely to be a voice for regional and propertied interests. Its anti-democratic foundations have made the Senate easy prey for public cynicism, despite the fact that its appointed members are more reflective of the Canadian population than the elected members of House of Commons. There have been many attempts at Senate reform in the past quarter-century, none of which have been implemented. This article argues that most attempts at Senate reform have failed because they have been linked to larger constitutional reform packages. The best hope for change to the structure of the Senate lies in smaller, incremental moves that do not require amending the Canadian constitution.     

Congressional Frequent Flyers: Demand‐ and Supply‐Side Explanations for Privately Sponsored Travel

Privately sponsored congressional travel raises questions about the influence of interest groups on lawmakers and about legislative behavior. I used multiple regression to explain variation in congressional travel, looking at 15,825 trips, both domestic and overseas, taken by House and Senate members and their staff between 2001 and 2004. I found that both supply‐side and demand‐side factors influence congressional travel. Electoral vulnerability corresponds with reduced trip‐taking, and institutional power is associated with greater trip‐taking, although not to the extent that rent‐seeking theory might predict. Members' racial or ethnic minority status also corresponds with greater trip‐taking in the House. Pending retirement also influences trip‐taking, but in the opposite direction from what some “shirking” theories would predict.     

Legislative recruitment to upper houses: The Australian senate and house of representatives compared

Although a majority of liberal democracies are bicameral, only four – Australia, the United States, Germany and Switzerland – have upper houses which have any significant legislative authority. However, it is unclear to what extent upper house members differ – in their backgrounds and beliefs – from their lower house counterparts. This article applies multivariate methods to survey data collected among 1993 Australian federal election candidates to examine patterns of legislative recruitment and political attitudes among Australian Senate and House of Representatives candidates. The results show that Senate candidates differ significantly in their personal : and political backgrounds when compared to House of Representatives candidates, although there are few, if any, differences in political views. The findings confirm the strong discipline that the major parties exercise over the Senate, particularly by selecting candidates who are more party – oriented than their lower house counterparts. This is anomalous given that the original purpose of the upper house was to defend the interests of the smaller states and territories. Finally, the article discusses the implications of this increasing partisan control of upper houses for responsible party government.     

The Bipartisan Patient Protection Act: greater liability on managed care plans

Mrs. Mayers' article notes the substantial differences that exist between the Senate and the House of Representatives' version of the Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001. While observing the remedies made available to participants, beneficiaries, or enrollees under both bills, she shows that the Senate bill places greater liability on managed care plans because it favors consumer protection, while the House of Representatives' bill does not. In order to develop an understanding of why an act of this nature is needed, Mrs. Mayers provides a brief historical overview of how managed care entities developed. She also examines the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") and proposes amendments to them. She concludes her article by raising an even deeper concern, and that is: what happens to individuals without access to health care coverage.     

Explicating the Australian Senate

This article is a revised version of a paper outlining the role and performance of the Australian Senate originally prepared for the seminar in March 2002 on House of Lords Reform organised by the Constitution Unit, University College London and the Centre for Legislative Studies, University of Hull. For the most part, the article follows the original conference form of brief answers to questions identified by the conference organisers. The article argues that the Senate provides an important working model of an elective upper house in a Westminster-derived parliamentary system. It does not pretend to be a comprehensive account of the Australian Senate. Rather, the main aim is to examine the Senate's evolving place in the Australian system of responsible parliamentary government.     

Override propensity in the US congress: veto challenge and override vote by the two chambers

In contrast to the study of the US presidential veto, the study of the congressional override of vetoes has been scarce. This study examines the influences of partisanship in Congress, presidential popularity, presidential legislative assertiveness and the chamber in which a bill originated. By using the logit model, the article examines the models of House veto challenge, Senate veto challenge, House vote for override and Senate vote for override. The study shows substantial influences of the presidential party's margin, the cameral origin of a bill and the president's legislative assertiveness on the veto challenges by the two chambers. However, none of the variables are significant in the models of override vote. This may suggest fragmented decision-making in Congress after it decides to challenge a veto.     

The Influence of Conference Committees on Policy Outcomes

This article examines the effect that the spatial location of conference committees relative to the parent bodies has on congressional policy outcomes. The article presents a theoretical model proposing that conferees choose policies that maximize their policy utility subject to the constraint of gaining House and Senate majorities on the conference report. I tested the model using conferences on bills associated with votes that generated liberal‐conservative divisions. The results confirm that, under specified conditions, conferees pull outcomes away from the parent bodies toward conferee preferences.     

Congressional Party Defection in American History

In this paper, we analyze the roll‐call voting behavior of House and Senate members who changed party affiliation during the course of their political careers. We analyze members who switched during the stable periods of the three major two‐party systems in American history: the Federalist‐Jeffersonian Republican system (3d to 12th Congresses), the Democratic‐Whig System (20th to 30th Congresses), and the Democratic‐Republican System (46th to 106th Congresses). Our primary findings are that the biggest changes in the roll‐call voting behavior of party defectors can be observed during periods of high ideological polarization and that party defections during the past 30 years are distinct from switches in other eras because of high polarization and the disappearance of a second dimension of ideological conflict.     

The Statistical Analysis Of Roll‐Call Data: A Cautionary Tale

Roll‐call voting and congressional procedures are two of the most heavily studied aspects of the U.S. Congress. To date, little work has focused on the effect of procedures on the composition of the roll‐call record. This article takes a step in this direction by demonstrating the effect of chamber rules and institutional constraints on House and Senate roll‐call data, as well as on the inferences that scholars have drawn from the roll‐call record. More specifically, I focus on recent efforts to measure party effects and ideological alignments, and I demonstrate that the composition of the roll‐call record can affect these measures.     

论财政预算的法律效力——基于财政立宪主义的理论视角

财政预算具有何种法律效力，此为当今财政宪法上重要问题之一。在德国，财政预算主要是一种“授权性规范”，虽具有“限制支出最高金额”之“拘束效力”，但人民不得据此主张权利。而在美国，参众两院的“拨款委员会”依据国会的预算方案举行听证，并由其下设委员会通过具体的拨款法案，该法案具有强制支出之法律效力。在制度形式上，我国的财政预算与美国颇为接近；但是因其缺乏充分的保障机制，故而难以遏制违反财政预算的行为。今后，我国的人大及其常委会可以通过行使监督权等方式来强化财政预算的法律效力，亦可通过建立“纳税人诉讼”等制度适当扩张财政预算的外部效力。