Spatial patterns of homicide and political legitimacy in Europe*

Political legitimacy, or a state's “right to rule,” has been a concern for philosophers, political scientists, and sociologists for centuries. This paper examines the relationship between European states' level of political legitimacy and violence, as represented by their homicide rate. It is theorized that political illegitimacy affects homicide through deteriorating social institutions of control, violating the rules of reciprocity between the state and citizens, and/or creating an environment of “virtual statelessness” that encourages methods of “self-help.” Focusing on the modernized societies of Europe, where legitimacy may be more important to maintaining order, the present study reveals two important findings: political legitimate states have significantly lower levels of homicide, and high and low homicide rates in Europe are significantly clustered among post-Soviet states (high) and Western Europe (low).     

The Revolution and the Criminal Law

Egyptians had many reasons to overthrow the government of Hosni Mubarak, and to challenge the legitimacy of the interim military government. Strikingly, among the leading reasons for the uprising and for continued protest are reasons grounded in criminal justice. Reflection on this dimension of the Egyptian uprising invites a broader examination of the relationship between criminal justice and political legitimacy. While criminal justice is neither necessary nor sufficient for political legitimacy, criminal injustice substantially undermines political legitimacy and can provide independent reasons for revolution. A state may compromise its legitimacy by committing criminal acts, by perverting or subverting the criminal process, and by failing to discharge its duty to punish serious wrongdoing—a duty that then falls to individuals to discharge either directly (through vigilantism) or indirectly (through revolution). Contrary to the views of many leading criminal law theorists, the duty to punish serious wrongdoing applies to individuals and not only to states. The relevance of political legitimacy to criminal justice is more complicated. Individuals are morally obligated to follow the morally justified laws of an illegitimate state, but are not morally obligated to follow the morally unjustified laws of a legitimate state. Nor may any state punish in the absence of moral wrongdoing and moral fault. However, illegitimate states may be incapable of justly holding individuals accountable to the state, to the community, or to victims through criminal trials. This incapacity provides an additional reason to overthrow illegitimate states and replace them with legitimate states capable of justly administering a just criminal law.     

Requirement‐Sensitive Legal Moralism: A Critical Assessment

Requirement‐sensitive legal moralism is a species of legal moralism in which the legitimacy of turning moral into legal demands depends on the existence of a legitimate moral requirement, producing a legitimate social requirement, which can then ground a legitimate legal requirement. Crucially, each step is defeasible by contingent or instrumental, but not intrinsic moral factors. There is no genuinely moral sphere (e.g., a private sphere) in which the law is not to interfere; only contingent, non‐moral factors can defeat this. Using William A. Edmundson's Three Anarchical Fallacies as a foil, this idea is spelled out; it is shown why considerations based on the harm principle, consent, and the fact of pluralism do not immediately defeat it, but several problems with Edmundson's account are examined to point out where the idea could be further developed.     

Punishment as Moral Fortification and Non-Consensual Neurointerventions

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, I defend and expand the Fortificationist Theory of Punishment (FTP). Second, I argue that this theory implies that non-consensual neurointerventions – interventions that act directly on one’s brain – are permissible. According to the FTP, punishment is justified as a way of ensuring that citizens who infringe their duty to demonstrate the reliability of their moral powers will thereafter be able to comply with it. I claim that the FTP ought to be expanded to include citizens’ interest in developing their moral powers. Thus, states must ensure that their citizens develop their moral reliability, not only because they must enforce their citizens’ compliance with certain duties, but also because states have the duty to maintain the conditions for stability and satisfy their citizens’ interest in developing their moral powers. According to this account of the FTP, if neurointerventions are the only or best way of ensuring that offenders can discharge their fortificational duties, states have strong reasons to provide these interventions.

     

Constitutional Legitimation for Political Acts

The question of legal legitimacy, liberally understood, is that of whether anyone has a morally justified complaint about impressment into compliance with a particular law or set of laws. A good constitution may possibly contribute towards a liberally legitimate practice of national politics. This essay is concerned with one way in which a constitution, no matter how excellent, cannot thus contribute. We cannot use judgments regarding constitutionality to bridge the gap that must always exist between judgments regarding the validity of controversial laws and judgments regarding their legitimacy. We cannot hope to solve in that 'contractual' or 'procedural' way the riddle of government by consent in modern social conditions of deep ethical plurality and conflict, because we cannot successfully combine a proceduralist idea of constitutional legitimacy with a content-based conception of the binding virtue for constitutions.[O]ur exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational. This is the liberal principle of legitimacy. ¹     

Retributivism and Legal Moralism

This article examines whether a retributivist conception of punishment implies legal moralism and asks what liberalism implies about retributivism and moralism. It makes a case for accepting the weak retributivist thesis that culpable wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for blame and punishment and the weak moralist claim that moral wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for legal regulation. This weak moralist claim is compatible with the liberal claim that the legal enforcement of morality is rarely all‐thing‐considered desirable. Though weak moralism has some plausibility, it does not follow from weak retributivism if legitimate state functions are limited in certain ways.     

Outsiders’ Responsibility to Answer for Crime

R. A. Duff has revived the tradition of “answerability” for crime. In this philosophical and jurisprudential tradition, a person is answerable to the criminal law of a state and the process of that state’s courts only if there is some appropriate relationship between the state and the person. Duff’s great contribution has been to develop the idea of accountability of persons to a state or other polity as a philosophical notion which, he argues, underlies all just implementations of criminal law. Duff has centered his views around the relationship between the citizen and the polity (in today’s world, the state) to which the citizen belongs. His focus has been on insiders, rather than outsiders. This article argues that, in the current world, the relationship among cocitizens, outsiders, and the state is based in part on the moral idea that the state exists to protect citizens from evil acts, specifically those that we call public and criminal wrongs, wherever the acts originate. Outsiders understand this, and understand that states other than their own use criminal law to protect their citizens. Duff’s writings contain an idea which turns out to be very useful in cases of outside acts, even though he does not apply it directly to them. Some states or other entities may have only an incomplete relationship with an accused person (compared with the relationship of citizen and state), but nonetheless may have the moral and political authority to try her for crime. This paper extends this notion to show that such incomplete relationships exist in a great many common cases of outsiders (noncitizens who act outside the territory of a state) who commit crime. These relationships support criminal prosecution of outsiders, so long as we admit that protection of persons from crime is a legitimate goal of the criminal law.     

Cosmopolitan Duty and Legitimate State Authority

In this paper I apply a suitably developed version of Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority to the debate over the legitimacy of state action aiming to fulfill cosmopolitan moral obligations. I aim to advance two interrelated theses. First, viewed from the perspective of Raz’s service conception of authority, citizens’ moral duties to non-compatriots are an appropriate ground for authoritative intervention by agents of the state. Second, international law based on these duties can also enjoy moral authority over government decision makers. An important source of the moral force of international law is derived from the power of international law to improve officials’ ability to recognize and conform to the totality of their reasons, which contributes to their states’ legitimacy.     

Rights,responsibilities and regulation – the three Rs of education: a consideration of the state's control over parental choice in education

Education is both a right and a responsibility. International instruments such as the International covenant on civil and political rights and the International convention on the rights of the child affirm the right of all children to education. This right is spelt out in the education legislation of all states and territories in Australia. Education is not only free but is compulsory for all children between certain ages. The obligation is imposed on parents (in accordance with definitions contained therein) to ensure that their children are both enrolled at and attend school. However, parental choice of education provider is allowed within each jurisdiction by way of state, private or church schools, all of which are registered and regulated to varying degrees by the state. The legislation of each jurisdiction also makes some degree of provision for parents who choose to opt out their children from any formal education setting and to educate them at home. Home education is also subject to state regulation. The assumption by the state of the responsibility for education guides this policy and legislation. The argument for state control of all education, no matter how and by whom it is provided, is that the state has an overriding interest in ensuring the economic well-being of its citizens and the growth of its intellectual capital. The state acknowledges that the responsibility for education is shared with parents, primarily by providing penalties for parents who fail to ensure enrolment and attendance of their children at a school. There is evidence that more and more parents in developed countries worldwide are choosing to educate their children at home, and anecdotal evidence suggests that Australia is part of this trend. To this end, this article critically examines the balance and relationship between the exercise of parental choice and responsibility in education, and state regulation and control. It does so by examining the means by which the legislation of different jurisdictions allows for choice in the exercise of the right to education, with particular reference to home education, places limitations on that choice and imposes control on the delivery of education outside state schools.     

A systematic justification for the EU's pouvoir constituant mixte: Principles of constitutional politics in supranational polities

This article presents a rational reconstruction of the practice of constitutional politics in supranational polities. In doing so, it seeks to refocus the ongoing debate about constituent power in the EU on the question of who, under what conditions, is entitled to decide on the EU constitutional order. The analysis leads to a number of principles of democratic legitimacy, which include the political autonomy of the members of the state demoi as well as the political autonomy of the members of a cross‐border demos. In explicating these parallel entitlements to political autonomy, I provide a systematic justification for the notion of a pouvoir constituant mixte, according to which the citizens should take control of EU constitutional politics in two roles: as European citizens and as Member State citizens.     

Totemism of the Modern State: On Hans Kelsen’s Attempt to Unmask Legal and Political Fictions and Contain Political Theology

This paper argues that the writings of Hans Kelsen deserve more attention from those engaged in the debate on secularization and political theology. His lifelong struggle with various forms of legal‐political metaphysics is an identifiable thread in many of his writings. Kelsen’s concern with the theological‐political issues found in the theory of the state (Staatslehre) is far from being marginal. Kelsen claims that his theory aims at resolving the traditional dualism of law and state prevailing in the Staatslehre and contributes  to an “uncompromising destruction of one of the most effective ideologies of legitimacy.” Kelsen maintains that the contents of this “ideology of legitimacy” derive from both political metaphysics and the deep‐seated ancient ways of thinking on nature and society. In order to illustrate this thesis, I propose calling this phenomenon “totemism of the modern state.”     

论我国公民的免于匮乏权

美国前总统富兰克林.罗斯福面对经济危机提出了包括公民应该享有"免于匮乏的自由"的著名四大自由。我国的法学理论中虽然没有这一概念,但宪法中关于"国家合理安排积累和消费,兼顾国家、集体和个人的利益,在发展生产的基础上,逐步改善人民的物质生活和文化生活"的规定,实质上就是关于公民免于匮乏权的表述。本文从现代国家的职责、国家权利(义务)与公民权利(义务)关系的角度论述了保障公民免于匮乏权是国家的法律义务,不能将此任推给公民家庭及个人,并通过对我国实践的剖析,提出应当避免过度从政策层面、经济层面及公民个人努力层面对公民进行免于匮乏权保障的路径选择,而应靠国家义务性、实践路径上的法律制度性来实现。     

Property Offences as Crimes of Injustice

The article provides an outline of the basic principles and conditions of criminalisation of interferences with others’ property rights in the context of a specific context: a liberal, social democratic state, the legitimacy of which depends primarily on its impartiality between moral doctrines and the fair distribution of liberties and resources. I begin by giving a brief outline of the conditions of political legitimacy, the place of property and the conditions of criminalisation in such a state. With that framework in place, I argue that interferences with others’ property rights should be viewed as violations of political duties stemming from institutions of distribution. I then discuss three implications of this view: the bearing of social injustice on the criminal law treatment of acts of distributive injustice; the expansion of criminalisation over the violation of distribution-related duties, which are considered criminally irrelevant under moral conceptions of criminalisation; and, finally, the normative significance of the modus operandi.     

All Citizens are Created Equal,but Some are More Equal Than Others

Nationality is the legal bond between a person and a state that connotes full and equal membership of the political community. Yet, in the practice of states, not everyone who is admitted as a national enjoys the full package of rights attached, nor the same security of status. The phenomenon of inequality among citizens is particularly apparent when examining the question of how protected the legal bond itself is: citizenship by birth is more secure than citizenship acquired otherwise—such as by naturalisation—and mono citizens are less prone to withdrawal of nationality than persons with dual or multiple nationality. As nationality revocation gains new attention from states as a tool to counter terrorism, prompting much political, public and academic debate, the reality that this measure often applies only to particular sub-groups of citizens demands closer scrutiny. This article explores how law and practice on citizenship deprivation is to be evaluated against contemporary standards of international law. While states justify unequal application of citizenship deprivation measures by invoking the duty to avoid statelessness, this article shows that the application of other international standards such as non-discrimination and the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality calls into question the legitimacy of citizenship stripping as a security instrument. Finally, the article reflects on the broader implications of the current trend towards greater inequality of citizenship status as a reaction to the perceived threat that terrorism poses to the integrity of the state, discussing how the creation of different classes of citizen is in fact likely to have a deeper and more lasting impact on the foundations of liberal democracies.

     

Financial Institutions between Effectiveness and Legitimacy – A Legal Analysis of the World Bank,Global Environment Facility and Prototype Carbon Fund

Environmental financing is one of the crucial issues of international environmental law and its implementation. From an environmental perspective a prerequisite for success is that financial resources are used in an environmentally effective way. Whether the World Bank, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) can be perceived as effective environmental actors has to be measured by their objectives, their potential to promote accepted environmental standards and their relevant funding practices. After significant improvements of their environmental policies, the World Bank must be considered the most important institution for environmental financing due to its involvement in environmental trust funds but also in regard to its regular lending practices. The GEF remains exceptional due to its institutional structure and scope, whereas the PCF is an example of public–private partnerships that might be a model for future financing via trust funds. Since acceptance of institutions can only be created if they are considered to be legitimate, legitimacy is closely tied to effectiveness. The main criteria for legitimacy are state consent and the equality of states as well as supplementary considerations such as transparency and public participation. From this perspective the World Bank, GEF and PCF structures of voting and participation have come a long way, and despite their particularities and deficiencies they reflect to a varying degree elements of legitimate decision making.     

The Making and Unmaking of Feminicidio/Femicidio Laws in Mexico and Nicaragua

This article examines the contested process of law‐making related to the killing of women which resulted in the criminalization of feminicide (feminicidio) and femicide (femicidio) in Mexico and Nicaragua, two countries in which feminists engaged in legal activism to increase state accountability for gendered violence. Through comparative analysis, we demonstrate the importance of (1) the interaction between shifting local political conditions and supranational opportunities and (2) the position of feminist actors vis‐à‐vis the state and its gender regime in shaping regional variation in the making of laws concerning gendered violence. In Mexico, the criminalization of feminicidio resulted from a successful naming and shaming campaign by local feminist actors linked to litigation in various supranational arenas, and the intervention of feminist federal legislators. In Nicaragua, the codification of femicidio resulted from the state's selective responsiveness to feminist demands in a moment of narrow political opportunity within an otherwise highly consolidated regime. We also examine the unmaking of these laws through their perversion in practice (Mexico) and their intentional undermining (Nicaragua) at the hands of the state. Our analysis demonstrates how states' decisions to enact legislation against gendered violence does not occur solely because they are invested in international legitimacy, but also in response to states' shifting acceptance of the legitimacy of supranational authority itself.     

The Legitimacy of Judicial Responses to Moral Panic: Perceived vs. Normative Legitimacy

In some instances, the criminal justice system is affected by a moral panic; that is, by an exaggerated social reaction to an assumed threat to moral values. When influenced by moral panic, courts demonize defendants and aggravate punishments. Are such responses legitimate? This article argues that by contrast to legitimate condemnation of criminal conduct, demonizing defendants ought never be legitimate. The legitimacy of aggravating punishment requires distinguishing between the sociological concept of legitimacy (“perceived legitimacy”) and the moral concept (“normative legitimacy”). Aggravation of punishment in response to moral panic might be perceived as legitimate since it expresses public perceptions about the severity of the threat to a social value, even when these perceptions are exaggerated; however, punishments that are proportionate to such a perceived, exaggerated, threat to a social value are unjust and unfair, and therefore are normatively illegitimate. When the panic subsides, courts tend to return to lower levels of punishment. The subsidence of the panic enables one to realize that a gap between perceived and normative legitimacy has been created during the panic. Should and can the gap be bridged retroactively in order to gain full legitimacy? One way to bridge the gap is to grant clemency that will reduce the punishment of defendants whose sentences were exaggerated unduly during the panic. The article proposes a more radical mechanism that allows for sentence re-evaluation in cases of moral panic.     

"Training in Citizenship": Tax Compliance and Modernity

Do the attempts of modern states to foster tax compliance reflect wider attributes of modernity? This article analyzes the history of the creation of a tax compliance culture in Israel of the 1950s and the various practices, techniques, and discourses that were deployed by the state to create model taxpaying citizens. It shows how the specific history of tax compliance can be understood as part of a wider phenomenon: the desire of modern states to create self‐policing, normalized subjects. By interpreting the history of tax compliance critically, as part of the attempt of the state to control its citizens, the article suggests a new way of understanding the history of twentieth‐century tax compliance generally and more specifically the history of judicial attempts to tackle tax evasion and tax avoidance.     

Punishment, Socially Deprived Offenders, and Democratic Community

The idea that victims of social injustice who commit crimes ought not to be subject to punishment has attracted serious attention in recent legal and political philosophy. R. A. Duff has argued, for example, a states that perpetrates social injustice lacks the standing to punish victims of such injustice who commit crimes. A crucial premiss in his argument concerns the fact that when courts in liberal society mete out legitimate criminal punishments, they are conceived as acting in the name of all citizens—on behalf of the whole political community. Resisting this premiss, Peter Chau has suggested that courts ought to be conceived as acting only in the name of “just citizens”: citizens who cannot be plausibly seen as having contributed to distributive injustice. When conceived in this way, Chau argues, courts can no longer plausibly be regarded as lacking standing to punish. This article uses the debate between Duff and Chau to explain why the question of whether to punish socially deprived offenders can only be answered adequately when connected to broader concerns of democratic theory. Specifically, it argues that Chau’s proposal is not available within the context of the kind of political community upon which (Duff rightly believes) a system of liberal criminal law depends for its justification and maintenance: a community in which citizens see the law as embodying shared norms whose specific demands they disagree about. State officials are morally permitted to see themselves as acting on behalf of a subset of the citizenry, I argue, only in circumstances of democratic crisis: circumstances in which a moral community can no longer be plausibly said to exist.