Frogs,mice and mixed electoral institutions: party discipline in Italy's XIV Chamber of Deputies1

Through the analysis of nearly 5,700 electronic votes cast by members of the Italian lower house, this article focuses on the electoral incentives shaping legislative behaviour in assemblies elected under mixed electoral rules. The study finds that the incentives indirectly engendered by the interaction between the majoritarian and proportional components of the Italian mixed system strengthen party discipline, which is high for every legislator type regardless of mandate and specialisation. Legislators elected in single-member districts are equally, if not more, susceptible to pressures to stick to the party line as their colleagues elected from a party list. Moreover, indicators of ‘electoral path’, like relative seat safety and dual candidacy, matter to party discipline more than simple seat type.     

Pre-parliamentary backgrounds of Australian major party MPs: effects on representation

Legislative recruitment patterns are an important study in the field of political science, given their consequences for the practice of parliamentary government. The Australian parliament is a bicameral legislature, including a powerful elected upper chamber. This article details the pre-parliamentary party backgrounds of Australia's two major parties, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Liberal/National Party coalition (LNP) in the 39th Australian Parliament (1998–2001). It is hypothesised that the pre-parliamentary backgrounds of Upper House major party MPs are dominated by central party experience, while the party experience of Lower House MPs is more significantly localised. It is further hypothesised that these differences in pre-parliamentary backgrounds will remain constant when the respective parties are evaluated individually. This appears something of a paradox given that one would expect central party activists to prefer a legislative career in the lower house, affording them greater ministerial opportunities. The causes of such deviations from expected background distributions amongst legislators is explored. Contrary to traditional findings, upper house MPs are highly partisan, performing functionary roles to assist their lower house colleagues secure re-election. Strong senator partisanship is reflected in the non-parliamentary practice of major party senators. Such partisanship is a consequence of party selection methods, the electoral system and pre-parliamentary party backgrounds, not necessarily the uniquely powerful Australian Senate. It is therefore significant in the Australian polity and may have consequences for less powerful and/or unelected upper chambers in other bicameral parliaments.     

Bonding in Pursuit of Policy Goals: How MPs Choose Political Parties in the Legislative State of Nature

How do MPs in nascent legislatures choose a political party? We argue that MPs self‐select into groups of like‐minded colleagues to achieve favored policy outputs. MPs identify colleagues with similar preferences based on observed behavior and informative signals such as socioeconomic status, cultural background, and previous political experience. We test this explanation in the first democratically elected German parliament, the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848, that developed a differentiated party system in the absence of electoral and career incentives. Our statistical analysis shows that MPs were significantly more likely to join parties that were similar to them with regard to ideology, age, regional provenance, confession, noble status, and previous parliamentary experience. Qualitative evidence suggests that major changes in the party system were driven by disputes over policy. Our findings are particularly important for countries with more turbulent paths towards parliamentarization than those witnessed by archetypical cases like Britain or the United States.     

Parliamentary party groups and their parties: A comparative assessment

This article presents a comparative study of the interrelationship between parliamentary party groups and their extra‐parliamentary party organisations in liberal democracies. Starting with a historical overview of the most important party changes that have taken place since the 1960s, a typology of parliamentary party/party organisation relations is suggested. The following variables are identified as being of particular importance in shaping the structure of power in political parties: position of parliament in the political system; (non‐)existence of the incompatibility rule; effects of the electoral system; competition structure and degree of polarisation of the party system; political culture; conditions under which parties emerged; (non‐)existence of public funding for parties; degree of professionalisation of the political elite.     

Incumbency Effects under Proportional Representation: Leaders and Backbenchers in the Postwar Italian Chamber of Deputies

We study incumbency effects for individual legislators from two political parties (Christian Democracy and the Italian Socialist Party) in Italy's lower house of representatives over 10 legislatures (1948–92) elected using open‐list proportional representation. Our analysis finds no reelection advantage for the average incumbent legislator. Only a tiny elite in each party successfully creates an incumbency advantage. We find incumbents advantaged for reselection by their political party. We interpret reselection advantage as a party loyalty premium. Our study depicts a political environment monopolized by party leaders who reward party loyalty but hamper legislators in appealing directly to voters.     

Parliamentary questions in the European parliament: Representation,information and control

Parliamentary questions and the membership of the European Parliament have both remained under‐researched. This article redresses the deficit by using a content analysis of written questions to analyse the behaviour of MEPs. Since tabling a question is one of the last formal rights of the backbencher, the study of parliamentary questions may be regarded as a particularly useful tool for increasing our knowledge of the way that MEPs understand their role as representatives. First the formal rules, function, and importance of parliamentary questions are explained. The following dimensions of questions are analysed: the questioning activity of MEPs, party groups, and national delegations; the issues MEPs raise in their questions, and the territorial dimension of the questions.     

Electoral Reform and Parliamentary Debates

The early twentieth century saw many democracies adopt proportional representative systems. The textbook explanation, pioneered by Rokkan, emphasize between‐party electoral competition; the rise of the Socialist vote share made Bourgeois parties prefer PR systems to maximize their seat share. While appealing, this account is not entirely compelling. Consequently, scholars are investigating within‐party explanations of support for such reforms. Particularly, Cox, Fiva, and Smith show how list PR enable party leaders to discipline members and build cohesive parties. Relying on roll‐call votes across the Norwegian 1919 electoral reform from two‐round single‐member plurality to closed‐list PR, they show that the internal party cohesion increased following the reform. We investigate how the Norwegian electoral reform changed the content of parliamentary speeches. Comparing speeches from MPs present both before and after the reform, we show how parties become more cohesive in parliamentary debates under list PR than they were under the single‐member‐district system.     

Influence without Confidence: Upper Chambers and Government Formation

In most parliamentary democracies, governments must maintain the confidence of a single legislative chamber only. But in bicameral parliaments, upper chambers can affect the fortunes of government policy proposals. Recent work shows that parliamentary governments that lack control over the upper house also tend to collapse sooner than those with upper‐house majorities. In this article, we show that coalition builders anticipate the importance of upper‐chamber status (majority or minority) in making their formation decisions. After controlling for a host of “usual suspect” variables concerning the institutional, ideological, and partisan context of coalition building, and examining 15,590 potential governments in 129 bargaining situations, we found that potential coalitions that control upper‐house majorities are significantly more likely to form than are those with upper‐house minorities. Our findings are important for students of bicameralism, government formation, institutions, and, perhaps most significantly, for those who study policymaking in parliamentary democracies.     

Subnational Determinants of National Multipartism in Latin America

Recent research points to the importance of subnational elections as variables shaping the national party system in federal states (Jones 1997b; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Samuels 2000). I propose that the effects of subnational elections are not limited to federal states but instead can be seen throughout the region. This paper examines the impacts of gubernatorial elections across eighteen Latin American countries during the most recent democratic period. The analysis suggests that intermediate subnational elections do exert an influence on national party systems, whether the state is federal or not, and particularly influence how many parties are elected to a legislature's lower house.     

Constraining a Shadowy Future: Enacting APAs in Parliamentary Systems

Single‐party parliamentary governments often have no institutional checks on their authority. Such governments can pass and implement policies constrained only by the need to maintain party loyalty and win elections. Literature on delegation suggests that such governments would never adopt reforms such as Administrative Procedures Acts (APAs) that are designed to constrain this freedom. Nevertheless, such governments do pass APAs: Greece, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden have all done so in the past 30 years. We argue that the possibility of losing power motivates parliamentary governments, both single‐party and coalition, to trade current policy loss for future gain with APAs.     

Constructing a New Scottish parliament for the ‘Europe of regions’: Can institutional engineering assure subsidiarity?

The creation of an elected parliament in Scotland raises questions for legislative scholars, among them how a parliamentary body representing a stateless nation within a member state of the European Union can influence and implement European legislation. One version of the ‘principle of subsidiarity’ states that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen, encouraging assemblies throughout the EU to articulate and implement their own preferences in key policy areas. Reporting findings from a survey of the Scottish parliament's first cohort of legislators, this article identifies conflicting perceptions of subsidiarity, charts how best to pursue it, and evaluates the institutional norms, rules and procedures put in place to help secure it. Data demonstrate that preferences vary by level of MSP knowledge about European policy, by party membership and by method of election. Low levels of legislator knowledge combined with internal divisiveness constitute barriers to institutional strength in the pursuit of subsidiarity.     

The Impact of Parliamentary Specialisation on Cosponsorship

This study seeks to establish the effect of parliamentary specialisation on cosponsorship of parliamentary proposals in parliamentary systems with high levels of party unity. Existing studies on presidential systems suggest that cosponsorship is mainly related to legislators’ policy preferences. It is proposed that in parliamentary systems cosponsorship is, in the first place, structured by the division of labour in parliamentary party groups: MPs who do not have overlapping policy portfolios will not cosponsor proposals. Other explanations, such as policy distance and the government–opposition divide, only come into play when MPs are specialised in the same field. This expectation is tested using data from the Netherlands, a parliamentary system with a clear division of labour between MPs. It is found that specialisation has a very large impact on cosponsorship.     

Electoral Reform – Cui Bono? Attitudes of Romanian MPs to the Electoral System Change

Drawing on an original parliamentary survey, an analysis is undertaken of what motivates MPs elected in a closed proportional representation (PR) setting to consider changing this electoral system. Moves in this direction are quite rare and for this reason a case study of Romanian parliamentarians is proposed. Bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques are used to assess the impact of both power maximisation incentives and values. The main findings indicate that MPs were willing to replace the closed-list PR with a single member district alternative only when they perceived clear benefits for them (that is, re-election) or their party (that is, a positive impact, either at intra-party level or within the party system). These self-interested motivations are prioritised over nomination-related reasons and the possibility of a constituency-centred focus of representation.     

Differences and Changes in Danish Party Organisations: Central Party Organisation versus Parliamentary Party Group Power

The subject of this article is the relationship between the central party organisation and the parliamentary party group. The article investigates whether Danish political parties are changing into parties dominated by their parliamentary party groups, as has been hypothesised. In contrast to most of the literature on party change, which is based on ideas of convergence caused by external changes, this article argues that party organisation is basically a party decision and therefore influenced by party preferences and characteristics. The analyses are based on data from the statutes of 16 Danish parties in over 50 years. One noteworthy finding is that Danish parties do not converge. Party ideology proves to be very important for the power structure of a party. Even though political parties are exposed to changing political circumstances they still organise according to their basic ideas about democracy and representation.     

Presidential Support in the Russian State Duma

Recent comparative research on presidential systems has analyzed the ways in which presidents build majorities for their legislative agendas. Through an analysis of roll‐call votes from the 2000‐03 Russian State Duma on a set of issues reflecting President Putin's legislative agenda, I examine the impact of parliamentary party affiliation, policy preferences, issue type, and electoral mandate type on structuring floor support for the president. I also assess the implications of a mixed electoral system for building legislative coalitions in multiparty legislatures. Further, my findings shed light on Putin's recent reforms of the Duma's rules and procedures and the country's electoral system.     

Rules and Speeches: How Parliamentary Rules Affect Legislators' Speech‐Making Behavior

By extending existing theories of legislative speech making, this study explores the importance of parliamentary rules governing floor debates for government and opposition parties. An original data set including speeches of members of the Italian Chamber of Deputies between 2001 and 2006 is used to test two hypotheses under different institutional scenarios, that is, rules either restricting or granting open access to the floor. Parliamentary rules are found to affect allocation of speaking time within both governing and opposition parties. Governing parties' leaders exploit their agenda control to a higher degree when allocating speaking time. Under restrictive rules, government party leaders control their MPs by essentially limiting the number of speeches and allocating them to frontbenchers. Restrictive rules give opposition party leaders an important chance to select MPs who are closer to their own position.     

Minority Rights and Majority Power: Theoretical Consequences of the Motion to Recommit

Abstract: Motivated by the U.S. Congress's motion to recommit with instructions to report forthwith, we analyze a simple spatial model to clarify the relationship between early‐stage agenda‐setting rights of a committee or the majority party, a late‐stage minimum parliamentary right of the minority party or a noncommittee member, and the distribution of power over outcomes. The extent to which certain parliamentary rights empower agents is dependent on the relative locations of the exogenous status quo and the preferences of the legislators. We derive comparative statics on the relationship between proposal order and power by considering a model that allows preference heterogeneity and status quo centrality to vary. Finally, we relate the findings to recurring substantive debates on majority party power and committee power.     

Party unity in parliamentary democracies: A comparative analysis

The level and causes of party unity are under-researched topics in parliamentary democracies, particularly in comparative perspective. This article presents a non-formal model explaining party unity in legislative voting as the result of individual legislators' decisions reacting to the incentives and constraints created by their respective institutional environments. Hypotheses derived from the model are tested against empirical data on party unity in 11 western parliamentary democracies since 1945. On the system level, central party control over nominations and intra-parliamentary resources as well as the strength of parliamentary committees with regard to policy decisions are shown to affect party unity as expected by the model. On the level of individual parties, governing parties are less unified than opposition parties and larger parties show higher unity than smaller ones. Both results shed doubt on frequent claims in the literature.     

When Territory Matters: Parliamentary Profiles and Legislative Behaviour in Italy (1987–2008)

This paper ponders the question of whether Members of Parliaments' (MPs) previous experiences and personal attributes may have any impact on the way they behave once elected. In agreement with a recent stream of literature, the authors hypothesise that MPs with strong territorial roots might behave as agents of the local community, promoting its interests and demands in their parliamentary activity. The assertion that individual biographies influence legislative activity in parliamentary democracies runs counter to the commonly held view that in this kind of institutional setting, legislative assemblies are dominated by parties, leaving little room for individually oriented behaviour and little incentive to do anything that is not coordinated by party organisations. The article builds an original ‘index of localness’, the main independent variable, based on the place of birth and previous political experience at local level of MPs. Then, taking into account territorially targeted Private Members' Bills as a proxy for the territorial behaviour of each legislator, the hypothesis is tested by looking at both aggregate evidence and individual-level data. Aggregate data support the hypothesis, as they show a monotonically increasing relationship between the two variables: the more a legislator is linked to his/her territory, the more (on average) he/she will sponsor bills concerning the local area. Individual-level data confirm this finding, as the correlation between the two variables also holds when entering a number of control variables.     

The Consequences of Electoral Institutions for Careerism

Although electoral institutions have been shown to have a variety of effects, scholars have not investigated if certain voting rules enable politicians to enjoy longer legislative careers. I took advantage of a natural experiment—a sudden transition from a semiproportional voting rule to single‐member districts with plurality voting (SMDP)—to measure the effect of electoral institutions on careerism. My analysis revealed that voting rules have a profound influence on the dynamics of legislative careers: politicians elected under SMDP are far less likely to suffer electoral defeat or to retire than those elected via cumulative voting. The findings of this study not only provide additional insight into the seat safety of politicians elected in first‐past‐the‐post systems, but moreover offer new criteria by which to evaluate the choice of electoral institutions.