The Darfur Report and Genocidal Intent

The author argues that the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur,in excluding any genocidal intent in the Government authoritiesof the Sudan, while leaving open the possibility for individualstate officials or members of militias to entertain such intent,did not duly take into account the various views on genocidalintent put forward in legal literature. In the author's opinion,genocide — typically, that is, for all practical purposes— requires a collective activity of a group, state orentity — activity in which individual perpetrators participate.As for the genocidal intent of individual perpetrators —in this typical scenario, according to the author — oneshould distinguish between (i) the view, upheld by the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), as well as the Commissionof Inquiry, that such intent is the aim physically to destroya protected group, and (ii) the more correct view that suchintent consists of the individual's (a) knowledge of a genocidalcampaign and (b) at least dolus eventualis as regards the atleast partial destruction of a protected group. This legal constructionof genocidal intent does not, however, lead to conclusions substantiallydifferent from those reached by the Commission of Inquiry withregard to the mental attitude of the Sudanese Government andmilitias: as they did not act pursuant to a collective goalto destroy a protected group, no genocidal intent could materialize.However, contrary to the Commission's conclusions, it followsfrom this proposition that no genocidal intent could be foundeither if, in some instances, single individuals were held tohave acted with the desire to see the protected group destroyed.For, in this event, the two requirements for individual genocidalintent would be lacking, namely knowledge of a genocidal campaign(on the premise that no such campaign was carried out), anda fortiori dolus eventualis.     

The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur & Genocidal Intent — A Critical Analysis

Netherlands International Law Review -     

论目的犯目的的地位

目的犯目的的地位是指目的犯中目的与故意的关系,对此,我国刑法学界争议很大,但是各种观点都没有注意区分目的犯的类型,因而难免有片面性的缺点。实际上,断绝的结果犯与短缩的二行为犯的结构有很大的差异:前者,目的是故意的内容;后者目的是故意之外的独立主观要素。其理由可以从目的犯"目的"与"故意"两方面的内容来论述。论题的进一步展开则是对我国法定目的犯的归类。     

意思表示与法律行为

民法的基本问题是法律行为 ,而法律行为的核心问题是意思表示。所以 ,作者在此所谈的是基本问题中的基本问题 ,是民法学中最核心的问题。“当代德国法学名著”传译了梅迪库斯和拉伦茨等权威著述以来 ,我国民法学界对此问题的探讨显然深入了许多。然而 ,关于意思表示和法律行为的一些基本理论问题 ,尤其是两者之间的关系与本质内涵至今并无太多系统全面的考察。朱庆育此文 ,当为出于大陆法学者之手的发掘开拓之作。文章不仅对上述基本问题作了深入细致的考察 ,而且还对若干基本概念及内容给出了独到的、严谨的分析判断与评论。是一篇有资料、有见解、有功力的作品。荐之学界 ,或可展示少壮派学者的治学精神与风格。     

The Significance of Transferred Intent

The doctrine of transferred intent (or transferred “malice” in England) generally provides that if A attempts to harm B but, because of bad aim, misses and accidentally causes the same harm to befall C, A’s harmful intent vis-à-vis B is transferred to C, thus rendering A guilty of intentionally harming C. Commentators acknowledge the doctrine to be a legal fiction, but they differ regarding whether the fiction produces just results, some believing it does, others believing that A is guilty at most of attempting to harm B rather than intentionally harming C. Commentators who agree that the fiction produces just results nevertheless differ regarding whether the fiction should be retained or whether A’s intent to harm “a” person, in this case, B, is the only intent that signifies for crimes of intentional harm, regardless of whom A eventually harms. Doug Husak sought to achieve reflective equilibrium between intuition and theory regarding bad-aim cases by proposing in 1996 that A be punished for attempting to harm B (rather than for harming C) but sentenced as if he had harmed B. I once believed that Husak was correct. But I now have doubts, in part because Husak, along with others, cannot explain why the strength of people’s intuitions regarding A’s responsibility in bad-aim cases depends upon (1) C’s being a reasonably foreseeable victim, and (2) C’s being harmed by the same threat of force that A initially unleashed against B. I argue that one cannot achieve reflective equilibrium in bad-aim cases without inquiring into why resulting harm matters in criminal law, and that when one does, one discovers that just as people’s intuitions regarding whether intentional harms are proximate depend upon how resulting harms occur, so, too, people’s intuitions regarding whether an actor is guilty of intentional harm depend upon how resulting harm comes about.     

论意思表示错误---中德民法比较研究

在德国民法中 ,有瑕疵的意思表示可以分为意思表示不自由和意思与表示不一致 (即非真意的意思表示 )两种情形。前者由受他人不正当干涉而产生 ,后者则出于表意人自身的原因 ,导致表示行为没有正确地反映效果意思。我国《民法通则》没有采取这种传统的分类 ,而是按行为人主观心理状态的不同作了另一种划分。第一种是行为人一方或双方故意造成的意思表示不真实的行为 ,这种行为属于无效的民事行为。第二种是行为人非故意而造成意思表示不真实的行为 ,这种行为属于可变更或可撤销的民事行为 〔 1〕(包括重大误解、显失公平、欺诈、胁迫和乘人之…     

“默示意思自治”解析

"默示意思自治"是由法官来推定当事人在订立合同时意图选法但未明确地选择准据法的意图,如果不给予法官必要的参考因素或者加以限制就会无法得知推出的意思到底是法官真意还是当事人真意;这样,当事人的意思自治就会遭到破坏和扭曲。实践中没有很好地对法官作一个限定,应从列举法官在推定"默示意思自治"时的考虑因素,如包括但不限于合同的签订地、履行地、双方当事人的国籍、合同中仲裁条款或管辖条款、合同使用的格式条款等入手,在综合考查这些多种因素后,为当事人完善其意思自治。     

Eliciting Cues to False Intent: A New Application of Strategic Interviewing

This article examined how to elicit cues to deception when a suspect is asked both about his/her intentions and his/her corresponding past planning, and when the investigator holds evidence on the suspect’s planning activities. In a new experimental set-up accommodating the main characteristics of intent, participants (N = 120) either planned a criminal or a non-criminal act. They were intercepted before completing the planned act. Each participant was interviewed in accordance with one of three interview techniques: Early Evidence disclosure or one of two versions of the Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) technique. All the interviews were transcribed and scored for consistency. As predicted, the liars were perceived as having a higher degree of inconsistency for two of the three relevant comparisons (Statement on Planning–Evidence on Planning; Statement on Intent–Evidence on Planning). Furthermore, using the evidence strategically resulted in differences between liars and truth tellers being magnified, as predicted. This article advances previous findings in showing that by interviewing strategically with respect to the evidence, it is possible to elicit reliable cues to deception when a suspect is asked about intentions and corresponding planning activities.     

双重视野中的犯罪目的

犯罪目的是行为人希望通过实施犯罪行为来实现的结果。从静态角度看,它是一种观念形态的犯罪意识,是危害结果的表象预先在行为人头脑中的反映。从动态角度看,它是在犯罪动机的基础上形成起来的,是犯罪动机在犯罪实施阶段的存在和表现形式,犯罪目的的展开和实现过程实际上就是犯罪意志的形成和表现过程。行为人犯罪未得逞,即是未达到犯罪目的,也就意味着行为人的犯罪意志还不完整;因此,从犯罪形态角度看,行为人未达到犯罪目的,可以作为犯罪未遂的最简单和最直接的认定标准。     

目的犯的目的研究

目的犯的目的是指目的犯行为人希望通过实施犯罪行为以达到某种结果的心理态度。这种心理态度是由具有不同心理内容的直接故意目的和特定犯罪目的构成的。其中 ,直接故意目的就是直接故意中的意志因素 ,其是否实现影响目的犯是构成既遂 ,还是未遂 ;特定犯罪目的是行为人所追求的超出直接故意意志因素的最终结果 ,其是否实现虽不影响目的犯是否完成 ,但当特定目的实现行为本身独立构成犯罪时 ,应以处理牵连犯的原则来对之进行刑法上的评价。     

目的犯的犯罪形态研究

本文从目的犯的未完成形态 (包括预备犯、中止犯、未遂犯 )与完成形态 (既遂犯 )、目的犯的共犯形态、目的犯的罪数形态 (包括继续犯、转化犯 )等三个方面对目的犯进行了研究 ,提出了自己的观点。     

类型学的犯罪故意概念之提倡——对德国刑法学故意学说争议的反思

百余年来德国刑法学在故意概念问题上发展出意志要素无用论、意志要素必要论和间接故意与有认识过失合一论三种基本主张的对立,以及十余种标记鲜明的理论学说。学说争议的出发点是为存在构造上具有区别的不同心理现象配置不同的责任,争议焦点在于意志要素无用和有用、行为意志和结果意志、客观危险和主观危险的对立。各种学说部分成功又部分失败的努力,以及彼此之间描述性而非实质性的区别都表明,故意界定的理论发展方向应由实体法视角转向程序法视角,由概念思维转向类型思维。在观念分界的意义上,故意是做成可能侵害法益的意志决定;在事实认定的意义上,提倡建构类型学的故意概念,通过对能够反映认识和意志强度的待证事实的解释性推论,来推断案件事实是否在整体上"充足"故意的类型。     

A Socio-Axiological Concept of Law

The author starts with the assumption that present-day Western society is complex, pluralistic and conflictual in nature. Because of these qualities of society, law appears as an ineluctable means for the regulation of societal relationships. Law does not express an amorphous common good, nor is it simply an instrument of power. Law turns the socio-ethical and political conception that discursively prevails in the competition among the diverging conceptions of dynamic social groups into generally binding standards of conduct. In the socio-axiological concept of law presented here, law exhibits the conflicting character of the open, pluralistic society and brings about understanding for democracy and discursive-deliberative politics. These are favourable presuppositions for the acceptability of law.     

贪污罪非法占有目的之推定规则初探

贪污罪是我国最常见的腐败犯罪之一.司法人员对如何认定贪污罪非法占有目的的问题存在认识上的误差,因而导致了司法裁判的不统一.制定推定规则是统一并规范司法裁判行为的有效路径之一.通过对现有规范性文件中相关规定以及201份典型案例裁判文书的分析,笔者总结了贪污罪非法占有目的的认识规律,并在此基础上提出了制定推定规则的具体建议.