Troubles,partnerships and possibilities: a study of the Making Belfast Work development initiative in Northern Ireland

This article examines the theory and operation of development partnerships through an analytical study of the Making Belfast Work (MBW) Initiative in Northern Ireland. This initiative of the Northern Ireland Department of the Environment contributed to the building of the current Northern Irish Peace Process. It illustrates the difficulties faced by a government in engaging in socio‐economic development in one of the world's most difficult policy environments. The history of the MBW initiative also provides insight into the interaction of two contending models for organizing European Society, namely ‘Regulated Capitalism’ and ‘Neoliberalism’ and the relationship of these models to partnership theory. This study argues that motivations for the development of partnerships in Belfast defy easy theoretical classification; yet empirical evidence suggests that a twin‐track approach—one from above, the European Union; and one from below, of indigenous policy evolution—have together through policy diffusion made MBW a leading pioneer in partnership theory and practice. The article discusses the literature on partnership within New Public Administration outlining ideas on various classifications of partnerships operative in the public sector. Particular attention is paid to how partnerships of societal actors and government can effectively involve the local community through community development approaches. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Legislative agenda-setting in parliamentary democracies

Various strands of literature in comparative politics regard governments as the only noteworthy initiators and mainsprings of legislative policy making in parliamentary democracies. Opposition activity in policy making is more often associated with the intention to prevent, rather than to shape, policy. Does this perception reflect real‐life politics? To answer this question, this article discusses different arguments that link institutional and policy‐related characteristics to the incentives and constraints of different government and parliamentary actors to initiate or co‐sponsor legislative bills. More specifically, it relates policy‐, office‐ and vote‐related incentives, as well as institutional and resource constraints of legislative actors, to the likelihood that these actors will take the lead in legislative agenda‐setting. These arguments are confronted with original data on the universe of all legislative bills in four parliamentary systems over one and a half decades. The article concludes that opposition and, in particular, bipartisan agenda‐setting is indeed rare. Yet, in contrast to widely held maxims, it is neither absent nor spurious, but related to the allocation of power and the intensity of ideological conflict both within and between the (coalition) government and parliament.     

Local government decentralization and the health sector in Tanzania

An evaluation of primary-level healthcare undertaken in Tanzania 1989-91 found that district health managers felt powerless to address health care performance weaknesses, although the district is the unit to which government management functions have been decentralized. In order to understand the managers views, this article analyses the pattern of decentralization within the health system from their perspective. It reviews the hislorical development of government structures and the theory and practice of decentralization within Tanzania. The matrix of accountability for health care has become very confusing, with multiple and cross-cutting flows of authority within and between levels of the system. District health managers have limited authority to take management action, such as managing resources, in ways that would begin to address problems of inefficiency and poor quality of care within primary care. District health management also suffers from weak resource allocation and financial management piocedures. The main obstacles preventing more effective management are: resource constraints; conflicts between the demands for central control and local discretion; limited institutional capacity; and political and cultural influences over the implementation of decentralization. Evaluation of past experience suggests that future policy influencing the organizational structure of government health services must be developed cautiously, recognizing the critical importance of complementary action to develop both institutional capacity and political and economic support for the health system.     

The organization of influence on the EC's common agriculturalpolicy: A network approach

The common agricultural policy of the EC with its market regulations is decided at EC level by a multilevel system of government, in which the Commission and the parliamentary parties of the European Parliament play the supranational role and the national ministries of agriculture act as parts of the intergovernmental system of the Council of Ministers. National interest groups have thereby three major access routes to the EC system, first through their national governments, or second indirectly, transmitted by their European peak organizations, or third directly to the supranational EC actors. The network approach is applied to study empirically the densities of access through these various routes. The links between actors in the agricultural policy domain are conceptualized as links for the exchange of resources, the most important resource of a policy domain being the final control of policy decisions. The political actors of the governance system originally hold full control of this valuable resource which they exchange for influence resources possessed by the interest groups, as public support or expert knowledge. Empirically, answers to the network questions depend on the type of resource and the viewpoint of the interviewed actors. An index is developed which indicates the resource flows between actors and the distribution of equilibrium control of policy decisions. It is shown that the national ministers of agriculture depend very much on the support and expertise of their national farmers' lobby, whereas the Commission relies more on contacts within the political sector itself. Multilevel systems need a lot of political coordination, so that the political actors within such systems, especially at the supranational level, seem to deal first of all with each other and not so much with the demand side of politics, compared to the national ministers of agriculture.     

The organization of influence on the EC's common agricultural policy: A network approach

Abstract The common agricultural policy of the EC with its market regulations is decided at EC level by a multilevel system of government, in which the Commission and the parliamentary parties of the European Parliament play the supranational role and the national ministries of agriculture act as parts of the intergovernmental system of the Council of Ministers. National interest groups have thereby three major access routes to the EC system, first through their national governments, or second indirectly, transmitted by their European peak organizations, or third directly to the supranational EC actors. The network approach is applied to study empirically the densities of access through these various routes. The links between actors in the agricultural policy domain are conceptualized as links for the exchange of resources, the most important resource of a policy domain being the final control of policy decisions. The political actors of the governance system originally hold full control of this valuable resource which they exchange for influence resources possessed by the interest groups, as public support or expert knowledge. Empirically, answers to the network questions depend on the type of resource and the viewpoint of the interviewed actors. An index is developed which indicates the resource flows between actors and the distribution of equilibrium control of policy decisions. It is shown that the national ministers of agriculture depend very much on the support and expertise of their national farmers' lobby, whereas the Commission relies more on contacts within the political sector itself. Multilevel systems need a lot of political coordination, so that the political actors within such systems, especially at the supranational level, seem to deal first of all with each other and not so much with the demand side of politics, compared to the national ministers of agriculture.     

Is government good for Greens? Comparing the electoral effects of government participation in Western and East-Central Europe

Abstract.  Examining the record of Green parties that have been involved in government at national level, two distinct pictures emerge. While the electoral fortunes of Green parties in East-Central Europe sharply declined after their stint in government, Green parties in Western Europe on the whole have not fared badly, with most experiencing gains in support. This article seeks to address the variety of factors that could account for different Green electoral fortunes. Among the approaches considered are economic voting, environmental issue salience, portfolio allocation, policy impact and strategic voting. While economic and environmental background factors clearly were important in the East-Central European cases, they are less useful in explaining variation between the West European experiences. The ability of Greens to improve their perceived policy competence and the profile of their leading politicians has helped them benefit from a period in office. Most crucially, Greens can benefit from strategic voting where a Green vote comes to represent support for the government as a whole. The main conclusion is that there are two paths to post-incumbency success: either Greens try to remain distant from taking full government responsibility, thus deflecting any electoral costs of incumbency, or they embrace government and the chance of demonstrating their competence fully to survive or fall with the government as a whole.     

Interlocal Service Cooperation in U.S. Cities: A Social Network Explanation

Local governments increasingly confront policy problems that span the boundaries of individual political jurisdictions. Institutional theories of local governance and intergovernmental relations emphasize the importance of networks for fostering service cooperation among local governments. Yet empirical research fails to examine systematically the effects of social networks on interlocal service cooperation. Do the individual networks of local government actors increase their jurisdiction's level of interlocal service delivery? Drawing data from the National Administrative Studies Project IV (NASP‐IV), multivariate analysis is applied to examine this question among 919 municipal managers and department heads across the United States. The findings indicate that interlocal service cooperation increases when jurisdictional actors network frequently through a regional association or council of government and when they are united by a common set of professional norms and disciplinary values. Manager participation in professional associations, however, does not increase interjurisdictional cooperation. The key conclusion for local government practitioners searching for ways to increase collaboration: networks that afford opportunities for more face‐to‐face interaction yield better results for effective service partnerships.     

The rise of public sector innovation labs: experiments in design thinking for policy

Governments are increasingly turning to public sector innovation (PSI) labs to take new approaches to policy and service design. This turn towards PSI labs, which has accelerated in more recent years, has been linked to a number of trends. These include growing interest in evidence-based policymaking and the application of ‘design thinking’ to policymaking, although these trends sit uncomfortably together. According to their proponents, PSI labs are helping to create a new era of experimental government and rapid experimentation in policy design. But what do these PSI labs do? How do they differ from other public sector change agents and policy actors? What approaches do they bring to addressing contemporary policymaking? And how do they relate to other developments in policy design such as the growing interest in evidence-based policy and design experiments? The rise of PSI labs has thus far received little attention from policy scientists. Focusing on the problems associated with conceptualising PSI labs and clearly situating them in the policy process, this paper provides an analysis of some of the most prominent PSI labs. It examines whether labs can be classified into distinct types, their relationship to government and other policy actors and the principal methodological practices and commitments underpinning their approach to policymaking. Throughout, the paper considers how the rise of PSI labs may challenge positivist framings of policymaking as an empirically driven decision process.     

Critiquing Food Security Inter‐governmental Partnership Approaches in Victoria,Australia

Food security is an issue, not only in developing countries but also in developed economies such as Australia where people from vulnerable groups cannot access affordable and appropriate food on a daily basis. Agencies emphasise the need for collaborative approaches to such complex, multi‐sectoral challenges. This article analyses two inter‐governmental partnership approaches facilitating local government's response to food insecurity in 12 municipalities within the state of Victoria. We focus on the partnership approaches to collaboration, processes and structures, and collective outcomes. The comparative data analysis from in‐depth interviews and document analysis of project‐associated materials and municipal policies provides insight into the different partnership approaches. Results suggest that while strategically designed and focused inter‐governmental partnerships can build local government capacity to respond to food security, there are systemic, regulatory, and resource barriers in play. In conclusion, the implications of these findings for future inter‐governmental approaches to address complex challenges are considered.     

The technocratic tendencies of economists in government bureaucracy

Economists are by many accounts the most influential group of experts in contemporary political decision-making. While the literature on the power of economists mostly focuses on the policy ideas of economic experts, some recent studies suggest that economists also hold particular technocratic ideas about the policy process. The article systematically tests this argument. Focusing on economists within government bureaucracy, the study is based on a quantitative analysis of a large-scale survey of Norwegian ministerial civil servants. It finds that economists are more likely to hold technocratic role perceptions than officials with other educational backgrounds only if they work in the finance ministry or in higher administrative grades. The findings contribute to scholarship on the political sway of economists and to debates about technocracy and the technocratic views of civil servants.     

The Politics of Fiscal Responses to the Crisis of 2008–2009

The national fiscal responses to the economic crisis of 2008/2009 varied considerably. Some countries reacted with a strong demand stimulus, others intended to slash public expenditures, while a third group pursued mildly expansionary policies. There are strong reasons for governments to pursue a mildly expansionary policy. If governments depart from this default strategy in favor of a significant counter‐cyclical policy, they must be able to swiftly make decisions. Therefore, effective use of counter‐cyclical policy will be unlikely in cases where lengthy negotiations or significant compromises between governing parties with different views on economic and fiscal policy are likely. Therefore, a major determinant of the expansionary strategy is a unified government, usually in form of a one‐party government. If governments opt for pro‐cyclical policy in a major economic crisis, they do so because they have few other viable options. In this situation they tend to shift blame to international organizations.     

Coping with Poverty: The Impact of Fiscal Austerity on the Local Budgetary Process in Norway

This article examines the impact of public sector austerity on the budgetary process in local government. We initially propose that resource squeeze influences the criteria of resource allocation. More specifically, we suggest that austerity tends to generate a greater emphasis on performance-based criteria such as cost-benefit assessments, while arguments relating to production costs, previous commitments and relative standards of service supply tend to carry less weight. A regression model is developed to test these hypotheses. Response variables, drawn from a survey conducted among Norwegian local government officials, measure the success of a menu of arguments which justify increased appropriations, and we examine whether austerity affects the perceived success of these arguments. Consistent with previous studies, we find no impact of stress on decision-making behavior in local government. We do not believe that this result can be dismissed as merely a by-product of our research design. This conclusion leaves us with at least two possible interpretations. One suggests that austerity affects the criteria of resource allocation if, and only if, decision-makers perceive the squeeze to exert a persistent and inescapable pressure which requires a fundamental redefinition of managerial style. This has hardly been the case in Norwegian local government. The other interpretation suggests that the criteria for resource allocation in fact remain unchanged, even in situations when austerity is believed to be persistent. Inertia can be caused by (a) the disproportional disutility attributed to budgetary cut-backs compared to the benefits of appropriation increases, (b) the propensity to attribute austerity to "external" rather than "internal" causes, and (c), problems related to aggregating individual preferences and criteria into a coherent organizational policy of resource allocation.     

Economic globalization and regional penetration: The failure of networks in Baden-Württemberg

Abstract. This paper explores the emergence of direct linkages between the international economy and the state government of Baden–Württemberg, Germany. In the early 1990s Baden–Württemberg embarked on a plan in which the laender government took the lead in organizing a large–scale, high technology project for the development of interactive television. Creating a 'network' between itself and major economic actors the laender government sought to enhance the economic development of the region. However, as the economic actors involved in the project questioned the economic viability of interactive television, they began to withdraw from the project. The project's failure demonstrates the incompatibility of political objectives with the economic goals of actors in a globalized economy. We conclude that as attractive as the network approach may be for regional and national governments, it is likely to be successful only where both sets of actors see the outcome as enhancing their respective priorities (political legitimacy and economic gains).     

Performance of Public–Private Partnerships and the Influence of Contractual Arrangements

This article seeks to answer two research questions: does public-private partnerships (ppp) live up to its promises to government? How do contractual arrangements affect ppp performance? We propose a conceptual framework to evaluate ppp performance by comparing actual project outcomes to government goals in initiating the partnerships, and to explore how a set of contractual arrangements affect the ppp performance on each identified goal. The framework is applied to a comparative case analysis of highway ppp experiences in the commonwealth of virginia (us) since the 1990s. The results show that these ppp cases were successful in accessing innovative finance, but their performance was mixed on reducing construction risk and transferring revenue risk. Generally improved over time with later projects, the ppp performance was affected not only by interaction among contractual arrangements –private partner selection, financial arrangements, role division, risk allocation, and project characteristics – but also by authorizing and supportive legislation in the policy domain.     

Ideology and Ministerial Allocation in the Major Government 1992–1997

This article evaluates the allocation of ministerial portfolios according to ideological disposition within the Major government of 1992–1997. By examining the ideological attitudes of Conservative parliamentarians towards three ideological variables – economic policy, European policy and social, sexual and moral policy – it will analyse the ideological balance of the government vis-à-vis the Parliamentary Conservative Party (PCP); the ideological disposition of those departing and entering government; and the ideological profile of the ministers appointed to the 'key' ministerial positions. The article will demonstrate the following: first, the Thatcherite 'right' were underrepresented at ministerial level, whilst the Tory 'left' secured a level of ministerial representation disproportionate to their numerical strength within the PCP; second, this was despite the fact that the process of ministerial appointments and departures gradually enhanced the representation of the Thatcherite 'right' of the PCP at the expense of the Tory 'left'; and finally, the 'perception' amongst the Thatcherite 'right' was that they were being marginalised in terms of the key ministries of state.     

Comparing Implementation of Internet Diffusion in the United States and France: Policies,Beliefs, and Institutions

Comparing Internet diffusion policies in the United States and France from an implementation perspective brings to light institutional and historical differences, even though both countries used the same top‐down approach. We find that France not only followed the technological lead of the United States in information technology but also emulated some of its more business‐oriented approaches in the implementation of the Internet, despite its own longstanding tradition of government intervention in industrial and commercial matters. This policy shift appears to be spurred by the global economy. Traditionally state‐controlled national economies are now increasingly leveraging private interests for successful industrial policy. When applying Sabatier and Jenkins‐Smith's advocacy coalition framework to the American and French diffusion of the Internet, we find policy communities actually expanding to private and public actors, including industry captains, legislators, and civil servants. These subsystems work together through classic lawmaking and lobbying under technological and economic constraints.     

Community engagement and public administration: Of silos,overlays and technologies of government

The public policy process in Australia is changing towards a more interactive, collaborative model, where governments seek to develop partnerships with civil society and private sector organisations to manage complex policy challenges. This article discusses research conducted into a project implemented by a Victorian government department that sought to involve stakeholders in addressing natural resource management issues in the agricultural sector. The research revealed that public administration practices associated with the new public management approach impeded the ability of the project to facilitate participation by diverse stakeholders in the decision‐making process. The article challenges the view that the discourse of collaboration and community engagement takes public administration down a constructivist path and suggests that agencies need to become reflexive about the way in which public administration practices are constitutive of the community engagement process if they are to facilitate genuine participation of other stakeholders.     

The politics of currency crises in Sweden: Policy choice in a globalised economy

In the two‐pronged debate on ‘globalising markets’ the ‘society‐centered’ perspective claims nation‐states are losing economic control whereas the ‘state‐centred’ perspective holds that ‘business as usual’ is possible. Both views are oversimplified. Looking at Sweden's 1992 currency crisis, we suggest that studies over time provide insights about the significance of political craftsmanship. We argue that market influence on domestic policy making should be regarded as a variable contingent on a fortuitous (from the point of view of market actors) confluence of political and economic circumstances. Our analysis suggests that this confluence, to some extent, can be controlled or manipulated by the state.     

Market making via regulation: The role of the state in carbon markets

Proponents as well as critics of carbon trading underestimate the institutional and political underpinnings of evolving carbon markets. Based on institutionalist approaches, this paper argues that the strong embeddedness of carbon markets explains why certain characteristics (positive and negative) materialize. Focusing on the actors who initiate and who influence carbon markets, this article also shows that currently only states and intergovernmental agreements provide the necessary regulation for carbon markets to exist and to work. Today, neither market actors nor NGOs nor public private partnerships have the political power to set up, regulate or capture evolving market structures. Thus, whether or not market‐based instruments bring about the desired results depends on good public regulation, which is – at least up to now – represented by the state. Four instances of the commodification of carbon serve as illustrations: the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS); the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM); the voluntary market; and new sectoral approaches, particularly Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+).     

The challenges of fractionalized property rights in public‐private hybrid organizations: The good,the bad,and the ugly

Policy designers seeking to harness profit‐driven efficiency for public purposes are increasingly creating organizations with fractionalized property rights that distribute “ownership” among public and private actors. The resulting hybrids are quite diverse, including mixed enterprises, public‐private partnerships, social entrepreneurship organizations, government‐sponsored enterprises, and various other hybrid forms. Marrying public purposes to private sector efficiency and strategic flexibility provides a tempting rationale for mixing public and private owners in hybrid organizations. Because public‐private hybrids involve fractionalized property rights, however, they exhibit tension among owners over both strategy and, more importantly, goals. To understand public‐private hybrids, we assess them in terms of six dimensions of property rights: fragmentation of ownership, clarity of allocation, cost of alienation, security from trespass, credibility of persistence, and autonomy (of both owners and managers). The unclear allocation of fractionalized ownership rights facilitates the appropriation of financial residuals and asset ownership opportunistically. Other weaknesses in the property rights configurations of public‐private hybrids create managerial dissonance or opportunistic behavior that typically leads to a narrowing of goals, but sometimes also to organizational failure.