宪法权威的生成机制辨析

宪法权威的大小受制于社会发育的情况,只有在市民社会发育良好,并且能同政治国家形成有力制衡的条件下,宪法权威才有可能逐步形成。宪法实施的积极的、主要的、基本的方式是立法机关的立法,在违宪审查机制的作用下,确保立法机关的立法符合宪法精神和原则,保障宪法实施的内在统一;在相关立法不足的情况下,通过宪法司法化,直接援引宪法规范维护宪法主体的宪法权利,乃是宪法实施的一种辅助方式。在宪政秩序不健全的社会,关注各种宪政事件,对于实施宪法,维护宪法权威具有重要意义。     

Can Strict Criminal Liability for Responsible Corporate Officers be Justified by the Duty to Use Extraordinary Care?

The responsible corporate officer (RCO) doctrine is, as a formal matter, an instance of strict criminal liability: the government need not prove the defendant’s mens rea in order to obtain a conviction, and the defendant may not escape conviction by proving lack of mens rea. Formal strict liability is sometimes consistent with retributive principles, especially when the strict liability pertains to the grading of an offense. But is strict liability consistent with retributive principles when it pertains, not to grading, but to whether the defendant has crossed the threshold from noncriminal to criminal conduct? In this essay, I review the two most plausible arguments supporting an affirmative answer in the context of the RCO doctrine. First, perhaps this doctrine reflects a rule-like form of negligence, akin to a rule that prohibits selling alcohol to a minor. Second, perhaps this doctrine expresses a duty to use extraordinary care to prevent a harm. Neither argument is persuasive. The first argument, although valid in some circumstances, fails to explain and justify the RCO doctrine. The second argument, a duty to use extraordinary care, is also inadequate. If “extraordinary care” simply means a flexibly applied negligence standard that considers the burdens and benefits of taking a precaution, it is problematic in premising criminal liability on ordinary negligence. If instead it refers to a higher duty or standard of care, it has many possible forms, such as requiring only a very slight deviation from a permissible or justifiable standard of conduct, placing a “thumb” on the scale of the Learned Hand test, identifying an epistemic standard more demanding than a reasonable person test, or recognizing a standard that is insensitive to individual capacities. However, some of these variations present a gratuitous or incoherent understanding of “negligence,” and none of them sufficiently explain and justify the RCO doctrine.     

论普通法的“宏大风格”

普通法的宏大风格是美国著名现实主义法学家卡尔·卢埃林提出的旨在取代形式主义法学的一种新的法学理论。这一理论认为,法官承担着双重义务,既要执行法律,又要追求公平、正义;如何平衡和协调这两种义务是一门高超的司法艺术。强调法官的情境感悟,主张灵活解释法律,关注规则背后的立法理由,坚持对规则的适用不得超出规范目的,是这一理论的核心思想。     

国人对民决团在英美法庭中的功能的误解

民决团仅仅负责事实审,决定事实问题;法官则负责法律审,决定法律问题。这个认识的错误在于：普通法中没有“事实审”、“法律审”的术语,这是国人杜撰出来的。普通法事实发展出来法律,法律是事实的积累。民决团事实上既决定法律又决定事实。它在美国,具有最高权力,大于总统、国会和最高法庭。另外民决团在美国7个州还决定量刑,在有死刑的州,还决定死刑。事实与法律的区分和混合,有助于法官将复杂问题交给民决团决定并在上诉中捍卫民决团的最高权力;也有助于法官对法律问题下命令、进行违宪性审查。总之,理解民决团的最高权力,是理解普通法的关键。     

A statistical approach to drug sampling: a case study.

In many countries it is left to the discretion of the court to accept or reject conclusions based on sampling procedures as applied to the total drug exhibit. As an alternative to this subjective approach, a statistical basis is presented using binomial and hypergeometric distributions to determine a lower limit for the proportion of units in a population which contains a drug, at a given confidence level. A method for calculating the total weight of a drug present in a population within a given confidence interval is also presented. In the event of no failures (all units sampled contain a drug), a sample size of six or seven units is generally sufficient to state that a proportion of at least 0.70 of the population contains a drug at a confidence level of at least 90%. When failures do occur in the sample, point estimation is used as the basis for selecting the appropriate sample size.     

The politics of universal access: the Massachusetts Health Security Act of 1988

This article analyzes the passage of an unprecedented state law, promising every resident access to affordable health insurance. The Massachusetts Health Security Act of 1988 was the product of a set of political and financial pressures that had been developing for nearly a decade. Hospital, insurance, and business interests were unable to reach a new accommodation on hospital payment. This logjam created the opportunity for a policy breakthrough, but did not inherently lend itself to progressive reform. It was consumer activism that forced the traditional powers in health policy to address the interests of the uninsured. By imposing a more public-interest agenda on the process, consumers were able to change the configuration of the stalemate, but could not resolve it. The particular terms of the stalemate, however, made possible a new, more aggressive role for state government in health policy. Unable to satisfy their competing interests within a policy framework that had universal access as a goal, traditionally powerful interest groups found themselves increasingly dependent on the state to broker a new agreement. While the many concessions made to these groups are likely to prove to be the bill's undoing, the unraveling of the agreement will not end the story. The same pressures which led to passage of the Massachusetts law and which are now causing other states to act will continue to exert their effect until a more durable solution is found.     

Promises Schmomises

In this piece, I argue that promises need not be kept just because they were made. This is not to say, however, that unwise, unhappy, and unfortunate promises do not generate obligations. When broken promises will result either in wrongful gains to promisors or wrongful losses to promisees, obligations of corrective justice will demand that such promises be kept if their breach cannot be fully repaired. Thus, when a broken promise will constitute a deliberate loss transfer for personal gain, the duty not to exact unjust enrichment (a wrongful gain) will require a promisor either to honor her promise or craft a means of ensuring that the promisee’s impoverishment is not traded for her enrichment. And when a broken promise will constitute the culpable imposition of a reliance-based injury on a nonculpable promisee (a wrongful loss), the duty to make others whole when one has purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly injured them will require one either to keep one’s promise or to fashion a remedy for its breach that ensures that the promisee is left no worse off than he would be had the promise not been made. This account explicitly parts ways with normative powers theories of promising. It places no weight at all on the raw fact that a promise has been made. Instead, it locates the gravamen of a promissory violation in the harm that is caused to a promisee who nonculpably relies upon and changes her position in anticipation of the prediction about the promisor’s future conduct that is embedded in his promise. Absent any adverse reliance on the part of a promisee, there is nothing that gives rise to an obligation of performance or repair on the part of the promisor. But this account is also to be distinguished from utilitarian theories that take promises to be instruments of wealth maximization that properly give way whenever the reason for honoring them speaks in favor of violating them. On my account, the balance of reasons for action that determines the morality of performance includes deontological rights and duties, agent-relative permissions, and Hohfeldian liberties. As I shall argue, even if one rightly concludes that one has no duty either to keep a promise or to craft a remedy for its breach, one must nevertheless remember that virtue requires one to be or become the kind of person who often goes beyond the call of duty. But the fact that virtue often requires us to do what we have no duty to do should not cause us to confuse its conditions with the conditions of right and wrong action. We have a duty to keep promises or to otherwise protect the reliance interests that they generate only when failing to do so will lead either to our own unjust enrichment or to others’ unjust injury. And this means that we have a duty to keep promises in far fewer circumstances than is commonly believed.     

Medical device reporting--FDA. Reproposal

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is issuing a revised proposal to require manufacturers and importers of medical devices to report to FDA whenever the manufacturer or importer has information that reasonably suggests, or a person alleges and the manufacturer or importer is aware of the allegation, that a device has caused or contributed to a death or serious injury or that a device has malfunctioned, if a recurrence of the malfunction is likely to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury. After FDA analyzes the results of its manufacturer complaint file inspection program, the agency will consider whether any reports in addition to those proposed in this rule are necessary and, if so, will propose additional reporting requirements.     

A bad trip for health-related human rights: implications of Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 85 ALJR 957

Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 85 ALJR 957; [2011] HCA 34 arose from a prosecution for drug trafficking brought under the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 (Vic). The Australian High Court held that the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (the Charter) validly conferred a power on the Victorian Supreme Court and Court of Appeal to interpret legislation in a manner consistent with a defined list of human rights. By a slim majority it also held that the Charter validly created a judicial power to "declare" a law inconsistent with one or more enumerated human rights. In reaching its decision, however, the majority supported a narrow interpretation likely to undermine the intended capacity of the Charter to act as a remedial mechanism to reform laws, regulations and administrative practices which infringe human rights and freedoms. Although Momcilovic involved interpretation of a specific State human rights law, the High Court judgments allude to significant problems should the Federal Government seek to introduce a similar charter-based human rights system. Momcilovic, therefore, represents a risk to future efforts to develop nationally consistent Australian human rights jurisprudence. This has particular relevance to health and medically related areas such as the freedom from torture and degrading and inhuman treatment and, in future, enforceable constitutional health-related human rights such as that to emergency health care.     

The state action doctrine and the Local Government Antitrust Act: the restructured public hospital model

This Article analyzes the development and complexities of the antitrust state action doctrine and the Local Government Antitrust Act as these doctrines apply to both "municipalities" and private entities. The restructuring of a public hospital is used as a model to facilitate the antitrust analysis. The restructuring model, which typically involves the leasing of a hospital facility by a public entity to a private nonprofit corporation, offers the unique opportunity to compare the different standards employed under the state action doctrine and the Local Government Antitrust Act. As a practical matter, the Article provides a framework for a public hospital to evaluate the impact of corporate restructuring on its antitrust liability exposure and to develop strategies to minimize antitrust risks.     

Unity Dow v. Attorney-General (Botswana) [June 1991

The plaintiff was a citizen of Botswana, married to a non-citizen, whose children had been denied citizenship under a provision of the Citizenship Act 1984 that conferred citizenship on a child born in Botswana only if "a) his father was a citizen of Botswana; or b) in the case of a person born out-of-wedlock, his mother was a citizen of Botswana." The plaintiff claimed that this provision violated guarantees of the Botswana Constitution. The High Court agreed, holding that the provision infringed the right to liberty, the right not to be expelled from Botswana, the right not to be subjected to degrading treatment, and the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of sex. It concluded that the right to liberty had been infringed because the provision hampered a woman's free choice to marry a non-citizen and, in fact, undermined marriage; that the right not to be expelled from Botswana was infringed because, if the plaintiff's resident permit was not renewed she would be forced to leave Botswana if she desired to stay with her family; and that the right not to be subjected to degrading treatment was infringed because any law discriminating against women constitutes an offense against human dignity. This decision was subsequently upheld by the Botswana Court of Appeal.     

Cardiac concussion: definition, differential diagnosis, and cases presentation and the legal ramification of a misdiagnosis

A cardiac concussion is caused by a sudden, nonpenetrating, localized impact to the chest that is theorized to result in almost simultaneous sudden death from a disruption to the conductive system. The detailed external/internal forensic examination of the body reveals no evidence of structural, pathologic, or histologic signs of trauma to the heart. A cardiac concussion is a rare and often overlooked cause of sudden death. This type of sudden death is typically seen among younger individuals participating in sports involving projectiles and, to a lesser degree, where collisions occur. Cardiac concussions are clinically, pathologically, and chemically different from a cardiac contusion. The objective of this paper will be to define cardiac concussion, differentiate between cardiac concussion and cardiac contusion, and describe the clinical and pathologic features of a 32-year-old white male who died of a cardiac concussion following a collision with a catcher during a softball game. The civil ramification of incorrectly diagnosing the manner of death in cases of death involving a cardiac concussion will also be addressed.     

Deferred Prosecution Agreements and the Presumption of Innocence

A deferred prosecution agreement, or DPA, allows a corporation, instead of proceeding to trial on a criminal charge, to settle matters with the state by acknowledging the facts on which any charge would be based, pay a reduced fine, and agree to change the way they conduct business. Critics of DPAs have suggested that, because the defendant corporation must pay a fine and submit to structural reform without having been found guilty at trial, DPAs violate the Presumption of Innocence. This paper argues that they do not. The paper appeals to the role of civic trust in a liberal political community. The obligations a corporation assumes in a DPA can be framed as a reasonable retributive response to a breach by that corporation of the community’s laws, and an appropriate reassurance by that corporation to the community that such breaches will not reoccur. This framing is sufficient to deny that DPAs violate the Presumption of Innocence.     

提存论——《合同法》第101-104条的解释论

《合同法》中的提存属清偿提存,以提存代替清偿,达到使合同权利义务终止效果。提存是债务人与提存部门之间缔结的一种向第三人履行的保管合同。提存的原因分为三类,债权人拒绝受领、债权人不能受领以及债权人不确知。《合同法》并非不认有提存人取回提存物的权利,在解释上应当承认提存人有取回权。对提存消灭债务之效力,宜采“停止条件说”。由提存便当然发生债权人的提存物领取请求权和提存人的清偿拒绝权;仅当取回权消灭后,债务始真正(溯及自提存时)归于消灭。     

Use of gold nanoparticles as molecular intermediates for the detection of fingermarks

Among the numerous methods dedicated to the detection of latent fingermarks, the MultiMetal Deposition (MMD) offers, as a main advantage, the ability to be applied on a great number of porous and non-porous surfaces, e.g., paper, plastic, glass, latex, and polystyrene, even if wetted. While considered as a powerful and sensitive technique, MMD is often neglected, mainly because of operational limitations (siliconized vessels, restrictive pH domain, numerous immersion baths, ...). In this contribution, we propose a modification of the standard MMD method so that the procedure is simplified with a number of baths reduced to a minimum. To reach this goal, it was necessary to obtain a fully operable solution which could detect fingermarks in a single step. We chose to take advantage of the molecular recognition mechanisms by functionalizing the gold nanoparticles with a molecular host able to bind itself to gold while keeping the ability to trap molecules in solution. Cyclodextrins were chosen as they can be easily chemically modified to offer gold-binding abilities. Moreover, they are widely used as hosts for various molecular guests (dyes, luminescent molecules, ...). This new formulation has been tested on three different surfaces to attest the feasibility of this strategy. Successful results were obtained with detailed fingermarks offering a good contrast to allow their identification without the need to enhance the results (such as with a physical developer). If the new formulation behaves very similarly to the old one, in terms of experimental conditions, it offers the additional advantage to develop fingermarks after immersing them in only one bath. The goal is thus reached.     

Reasoned ‘Balance’ in Europe's Area of Freedom,Security and Justice

This article considers how we might understand a constitutional ‘balancing’ of goods. In doing so, the article considers the EU's ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ) which poses the challenge as to how we balance our desire to feel secure with commitments to freedom and justice. The approach taken will be to argue that a ‘balance’ is a reasoned judgment, which must be understood in both a symbolic sense but, at the same time, also rooted in the practice of our constitutional decision making. This enables a political community to make sense of its value commitments so as to achieve a reflective balance between them. The article concludes that if the EU is to achieve an area of freedom, security and justice then it must be capable of developing a balance that can be a reasoned understanding of this constitutional commitment.     

Privacy Act of 1974; system of records--PHS. Notification of a new system of records: 09-30-0046, "Survey of alcohol use among youth and young adults"

In accordance with the requirements of the Privacy Act, the Public Health Service (PHS) is publishing notice of a proposal to establish a new system of records entitled, "Survey of Alcohol Use Among Youth and Young Adults, HHS/ADAMHA/NIAAA," to create a single comprehensive research data base so that critical issues associated with alcohol use among 16- to 27-year-olds can be analyzed. PHS invites interested persons to submit comments on the proposed routine uses on or before March 19, 1984. DATES: PHS has sent a Report of a New System to the Congress and to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on Februrary 8, 1984 PHS has requested that OMB grant a waiver of the usual requirement that a system of records not be put into effect until 60 days after the report is sent to OMB and Congress (If this waver is granted, PHS will publish a notice to that effect in the Federal Register.)     

Minors' rights to consent to treatment: navigating the complexity of State laws

State laws recognize that a competent adult patient has the right to consent to or refuse medical treatment. While the law is clear with regard to the right of competent adults, state statutes are more complicated when the patient is a minor. While the law should, and does, attempt to balance the rights and obligations of parents and guardians against the access and privacy rights of minors, complicated state statutory schemes often fail to simultaneously address those contrasting goals in a consistent and uniform manner. The result is a confusing set of seemingly arbitrary and sometimes conflicting provisions that require the detailed attention of healthcare providers to ensure legal compliance. With the aim of helping healthcare practitioners meet their legal obligations, this Article examines state laws governing minor's consent rights byfocusing on the instances in which a minor's parent, guardian, or other authorized adult is permitted to consent to treatment on behalf of a minor and the instances in which a minor is authorized to act independent of adult intervention.     

The power of advancement and charitable donations

Can the discharge by a trustee of a beneficiary's moral obligationconstitute a benefit? The answer to this question was fundamentalto an application to the High Court in London by trustees fordirections of whether they could exercise a power of appointmentunder a trust deed and release a substantial part of the trustcapital to the life tenant who wanted to devote the money tocharitable causes. In principle the court decided that the exercise of the relevantpower in this way could be taken as being of benefit for thebeneficiary but, under the circumstances of this case, the intendeduse of the funds could not properly be said to be for her benefit. Under a marriage settlement, created in 1964, the trust deedgave the trustees a general