How Grand was Reagan's Strategy, 1976-1984?

This article disputes the assertions of the new Reagan literature. Drawing upon radio broadcasts, speeches, correspondences, and documents from his presidential library, as well as recently published diaries from his White House years, it argues that Ronald Reagan had no grand strategy in the years 1976-1984. Indeed, throughout this period, he possessed two less-than-grand strategies I label “peace through strength” and “a crusade for freedom.” Each of these contained its own respective set of goals and employed its own corresponding set of tactics. Yet there was no grand strategy for ending the Cold War.     

On Strategy,Grand and Mundane

Is “grand strategy” a useful concept? What is it, and how is it different from “strategy”? Some definitions of grand strategy—as an all-encompassing idea for coordinating the resources of an entire nation to achieve its ultimate goals—are unachievable, overly focused on strategy as a master concept, could unintentionally militarize domestic policy, and blur the lines between strategy and policy. The concept is salvageable. Grand strategy is best thought of as both the intellectual framework or master concept that ties together whole-of-government (but not whole-of-nation) planning, and the long-term pattern of behavior that reveals states’ behaviors and priorities in action.     

Rhetoric,Legitimation, and Grand Strategy

This introductory framing paper theorizes the role of legitimation—the public justification of policy—in the making of grand strategy. We contend that the process of legitimation has significant and independent effects on grand strategy's constituent elements and on how grand strategy is formulated and executed. Legitimation is integral to how states define the national interest and identify threats, to how the menu of policy options is constituted, and to how audiences are mobilized. Second, we acknowledge that legitimation matters more at some times than others, and we develop a model specifying the conditions under which it affects political processes and outcomes. We argue that the impact of legitimation depends on the government's need for mobilization and a policy's visibility, and from the intersection of these two factors we derive five concrete hypotheses regarding when legitimation is most likely to have an impact on strategy. Finally, we explore who wins: why legitimation efforts sometimes succeed in securing public assent, yet at other times fall short. Our framework emphasizes what is said (the content of legitimation), how it is said (technique), and the context in which it is said. We conclude by introducing the papers in this special issue, revisiting the larger theoretical stakes involved in studying rhetoric and foreign policy, and speculating about how changes in the technologies and sites of communication have, or have not, transformed legitimation and leadership in world politics.     

结构理论、地理政治与大战略

本文认为,当今大战略研究长期以来一直都深受结构理论的重大影响,这种影响主要体现在当今大战略研究一般都是以国际体系中的权力分布作为主要的自变量,尽管在具体研究中技术因素和地理因素都可以作为干扰性变量,但这些变量并不影响到结构理论的内在逻辑.本文指出,以结构理论为基础的当代大战略研究的主要弊病在于,忽视了技术因素与地理因素的相互作用对大战略运行环境的潜在含义,而对此种相互作用的探讨可在很大程度上向人们提示以其作为主要考察对象的地理政治视角对大战略研究具有的重要意义.     

Uneasy Democratizations - Pariah Regimes,Political Conditionality and Reborn Transitions in Central and Eastern Europe

With the diversity of regime changes in post-Communist Europe, it is important for democratization studies to accommodate cases that do not readily conform to liberal democracy as conventionally defined. Pariah regimes in transition is one category that needs exploring, focusing as it does on the international dimension of regime change. A thematic framework is developed for exploring this phenomenon which is now more visible given tighter conditionality demands by international organisations. This is applied to four cases in Central and Eastern Europe (Belarus, Romania, Croatia and Serbia) and then, in greater detail, to Slovakia which became renowned for its flouting of political conditionality. It is found that these cases are variable examples of pariah regimes, but their commonalities include substantial issues most likely to provoke European opinion, a high level of personalisation of pariah status and a significant influence of international pressures. Also, on the one hand, these pressures may be reduced when security interests of outside powers so dictate; on the other hand, the pull of the 'European core' - in particular, the European Union - has a reinforcing effect on democratization, thus tending to demarcate Central & Eastern Europe from most ex-Soviet republics.     

2000年中东欧形势回顾与展望

2000年中东欧地区政治形势总体趋稳,经济普遍增长,加入欧洲一体化的进程也取得了进展。预计今后几年该地区将继续保持稳定发展的势头,加盟入约的步伐也将加快。一、政治形势趋稳2000年中东欧国家虽选举活动频繁,但各国政局普遍较为稳定,政权更迭顺利。(一)“大选年”局势平稳新一届领导产生。(1)总统大选。除波兰的克瓦希涅夫斯基在10月8日的总统选举中获得连任,克罗地亚、匈牙利、南联盟、罗马尼亚在2000年都产生了新总统。1月克人民党主席梅西奇当选总统。6月匈牙利无党派人士马德·费伦茨在匈总统选举中以2/3多数获胜。9月24日南大选,反…     

Roosevelt, Truman and the Development of Postwar Grand Strategy

After its victory in World War II, it was clear that United States should move beyond the disastrous policies of the 1930s, but it was less clear how. Ultimately, a lasting postwar strategy was forged under President Truman. Appreciating how Truman moved well beyond Roosevelt's guiding assumptions is essential to understanding the evolution of American grand strategy. One sees that wartime planning and grand strategy formulation can prove quite inadequate for dealing with postwar challenges. An administration cannot be locked into assumptions, but must constantly test them. Thus, the Truman administration eventually developed and adopted containment and moved far beyond FDR's approach. More substantively, the fundamental geopolitical lesson of World War II and the early Cold War was that the United States must assume the essential balancing role relative to other major powers.     

Democratization and party development in Eastern Europe

Awareness of the problems of prediction has come to the fore with the ending of the cold war and uncertainty has become a major feature of areas affected by it, not least the countries of eastern Europe in relation to the development of democratic institutions and practices. Party development is a central part of this process and one recent attempt to theorize it directs attention, rather like the approach taken by modern chaos theory, to the persistent influence of starting conditions and a particular blend of lightly structured growth from a more tightly coordinated set of preconditions. This framework is applied to the complex developments in post‐communist Poland, and three families of political parties are identified by applying Panebianco's genetic model. The components of this model are, it is argued, quite useful in accounting for the relative success of post‐communist parties and the failure of the political formations that derived from the previously authoritative Solidarity movement.     

American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk

If there is no single long-standing American grand strategy, one nonetheless sees through the course of U.S. history the tracks of a grand strategy. It started with the idea of a U.S. monopoly in the Western Hemisphere, along with balances of power in the chief theaters of the world; with belief in the primacy of sea and air power and the need for an economic system to support these; and the objective of transforming international politics. Since 9/11, even if the strategic hierarchy, intensity, and political basis have changed, the Bush administration has largely been continuing in this same project, with a sensible strategy but poorly considered tactics.     

Different cases,different faces: Chinese investment in Central and Eastern Europe

Chinese investment in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is booming. As China’s investment pattern has emerged so far, it appears to have little to do with Chinese firms’ preferences for liberal policy regimes, tolerance for corruption, or reliance on communist-era networks. This article documents the current size and shape of Chinese firms’ efforts to internationalize in this economic space, demonstrating an important difference between Chinese investment behavior in CEE and in the EU-15, namely the region’s much more active use of greenfield activity (and lighter use of M&A and strategic alliances). Case studies of each mode (greenfield, M&A, and strategic alliances) reveal little evidence of a “China, Inc.” approach and much evidence that Chinese firms are more motivated by market access than by technology or management assistance.     

The Political Fate of Market Reform in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe

Why did political leaders adopt drastic, costly neoliberal policies in a number of countries, but not in others? Why did these painful measures elicit popular support in some nations, while triggering rejection and protest elsewhere? To complement extant explanations for these puzzling developments, the article draws on the core finding of prospect theory, a psychological theory of decision making under risk: people tend toward bold, risky choices when facing prospects of losses, but opt for caution when anticipating gains. Accordingly, leaders enact and citizens support drastic reforms only when they face deep crises, such as hyperinflation. This argument yields predictions about the different stages of the reform process, which the article assesses through a wide-ranging examination of reform politics in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Boolean analysis corroborates most of the predictions derived from prospect theory, but also suggests the importance of economic andpolitical-institutional context factors.     

Mapping perception of China in Central and Eastern Europe

Asia Europe Journal - Since the 2008 Beijing Olympic and Global Financial Crisis, the rise of China has been a key topic in the international arena. Capitals in the USA and Western Europe, as...     

The Origins of Atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe

This article argues that the Atlanticism of Central and Eastern Europe originates in a specific set of historical experiences these countries have had with the United States over the past century. These include the Central and East European encounter with both Nazi and communist totalitarian regimes; a recognition of the leading role the US played in toppling communism and in facilitating the integration of these countries into Euro-Atlantic institutions; and the strategic calculation of many countries in the region that their national interests in Europe are better preserved via active American engagement that balances the influence of other major European powers.