Ties that Bind: Dynamics of Group Radicalisation in Italy’s Jihadists Headed for Syria and Iraq

In recent years, thousands of radical citizens and residents from Europe have joined the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (IS) in Syria and Iraq. Unlike other European countries, Italy has traditionally been characterised by the prevalence of individual pathways of radicalisation over group mechanisms. Nevertheless, recent cases show interesting indications of the increasing role of small groups based on pre-existing personal relationships (family and friendship ties). This kind of bond can be particularly salient for IS, a jihadist “proto-state”, which needs not only ‘foreign fighters’ but also new ‘citizens’ of different sexes and ages, including entire families.     

Refugee Law and Protection in Brazil: a Model in South America?

Brazil has been committed to International Refugee Law sincethe 1950s. For much of this period, however, the country wasunder a dictatorship which made the implementation of refugeeprotection precarious, although refugees and asylum seekerscould count on the assistance of UNHCR and its implementingpartners—NGOs connected to the Catholic Church which remainpartners of UNHCR till today. Following re-democratization,Brazil has not only passed a specific law on refugees, but hasevolved to become a resettlement country. These changes haveled Brazil to be regarded as a model in refugee protection inSouth America. This paper aims to assess whether or not Brazilis fulfilling the said role by describing the evolution of refugeelaw and protection in the country.     

From Jerusalem to Baghdad? Israel and the War in Iraq

The prevailing opinion that the Bush administration took the United States to war against Iraq in March 2003 under false pretenses has led many to believe that Israel's security was the secret rationale for the war. According to this "war for Israel" thesis, neoconservative policymakers in the Bush administration, the pro-Israel lobby in the United States, and Israel's government all pushed the United States to go to war with Iraq for the sake of Israel's security. This article critically assesses this controversial claim and examines Israel's role in the U.S. decision to invade Iraq. I argued that while neoconservatives were instrumental in promoting the Iraq war, Israel was not their primary concern and that although American Jewish organizations and the Israeli government did largely support the Iraq war, they did not seek it or actively lobby for it.     

What does New Delhi’s engagement with the war in Syria (and Iraq) reveal about India as an International Actor?

This article examines whether New Delhi’s engagement with the ongoing conflict in Syria (and Iraq) demonstrates that India is leaving behind its traditionally cautious and risk-averse foreign policy stance and becoming a more proactive international actor. India has not engaged actively with and has not tried to wield substantial influence over the course of this conflict; instead, after a moderate burst of diplomatic activity in the second half of 2011 India has largely tried to avoid involvement. There are some indications that India is trying to become more proactive in its region, in trade diplomacy, and toward a rising China; yet, results sometimes fail to meet ambitions. Accordingly, the article concludes that, on balance, India’s foreign policy orientation has not yet changed significantly; it remains a cautious, reactive international actor unwilling to engage with and actively shape the outcome of crucial crises or conflicts.     

Whack-a-Mole or Coup de Grace? Institutionalization and Leadership Targeting in Iraq and Afghanistan

Targeting the leadership of terrorist and insurgent groups has become a major component of US strategy since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Despite attracting modest scholarly attention, the conditions that increase or decrease the efficacy of leadership targeting remain unclear. A major limitation of current scholarly work is the lack of exploration of the internal organization of these groups and the relationship of that organization to leadership targeting effects. A close examination of leadership targeting of armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan reveals that leadership targeting is highly effective against groups that are poorly institutionalized but has limited effects against well-institutionalized groups. This suggests that the level of resources devoted to leadership targeting should be inversely proportional to the level of institutionalization of the target.     

Iraq War and Principal contradictions in World Politics

Nobody denies that the Iraq war launched by America is a local war that is of global influence and beyond the anti-terror campaign. The various contentions among major world political powers before and after the war reveal that the world strategic structure that is changing since the end of the Cold War has gone through another grave impact after the 9/11 events. The paper does not want to make an in-depth     

Sharing Power and Faking Governance? Lebanese State and Non-State Institutions during the War in Syria

ABSTRACT

The war in Syria has caused both external and internal pressures on the Lebanese political system and state institutions. Yet, the Lebanese power-sharing system rests on a set of institutional mechanisms, both state and non-state, which allow its politicians to continue to govern, even in this tumultuous situation, and to respond to crisis. Empirical evidence on how policies were negotiated concerning security, elections, and refugees between 2012 and 2018 shows an interaction between state and non-state institutions and highlights the role of such mechanisms in power-sharing institutions.     

After Khamenei: Who Will Succeed Iran's Supreme Leader?

Since succeeding the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, Ali Khamenei has striven to make himself indispensible to the fate of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran. However, the measures Khamenei has taken to secure his power have left his succession in doubt, with no consensus heir. The lack of clear successors among the clergy, weakness of the government institutions, and concerns about regime strength could lead to instability and the potential for an Islamic Revolution Guard Corps coup.     

Whose House is this Anyway? IDP and Refugee Return in Post-Saddam Iraq

Although many people displaced by Saddam's regime over the yearslooked forward to returning as soon as the 2003 war ended, anumber of problems emerged which continued to bedevil the returnprocess as late as one year after the war. These problems includedan unclear political future for the country, competing politicaland sectarian forces that often view IDPs and refugees as strategictools or weapons, a hesitant and initially undecided Coalitionpolicy on the return issue, unclear mandates for the variousactors that could assist with returns, lack of funding, andmost importantly of all, an extremely poor security situationwhich has impeded or even blocked all progress on the returnissue. Nonetheless, because Iraq's Ba'athist dictatorship wasthe overwhelming cause of displacement in the country to beginwith, the future does hold some hope for Iraqi displaced persons.This paper examines the causes of return problems in Iraq andhow various authorities in post-Ba'athist Iraq are addressingthe return issue. Particularly around the contested city ofKirkuk, problems relating to the return issue risk ignitingethnic conflict and possibly even civil war in Iraq as a whole.The article examines the return issue for the period from March2003 to June 2004, focusing especially on northern Iraq andKirkuk. The research presented here is based on fieldwork conductedin Iraq by the author between September 2003 and May 2004. Theauthor went to Iraq independently, with the assistance of aCanadian Department of National Defence post-doctoral researchgrant. Interviews were conducted with US and Coalition ProvisionalAuthority officials, Iraqi Interim Government officials, KurdistanRegional Government officials, NGO workers, and IDPs themselvesduring visits to camps around Kirkuk and Baghdad.     

Stability in Syria: What Would it Take to Make it Happen?

The Syrian Civil War has taken a devastating toll on the country's civilian infrastructure and population. Tackling the legacy of the conflict and restoring a measure of stability will constitute a monumental and generational challenge. The article addresses the “day after” in Syria by mapping out the main issues that a future post-conflict recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation process would need to address in order to attain some level of stability and to be sustainable. It then describes and analyzes one of the most complex challenges of a future post-war transition, namely the need to reign in the proliferation of non-state armed groups and to ensure a process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, including those hailing from the jihadi camp. Finally, the article briefly addresses the role that local actors can play in beginning to build stability.The views expressed here are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect her employer's position. This article is part of a special project conducted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, titled: “After the Caliphate: Reassessing the Jihadi Threat and Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent,” which includes a book, a thematic issue of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018), and a series of podcasts. Each element of the project can be found here: https://www.fpri.org/research/after-the-caliphate-project/.     

Why did the United States Invade Iraq in 2003?

Why did the United States invade Iraq in 2003? Most scholars cite the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), a neoconservative desire to spread democracy, or the placating of domestic interest groups as the Bush administration’s objectives, but I suggest these arguments are flawed. Instead, I proffer the “performative war” thesis resting on the concepts of status, reputation, and hierarchy to explain the Iraq war. Hegemons desire generalized deterrence, such that others do not challenge their territory, preferences, or rule. However, the challenging of a hegemon’s authority—as occurred on 9/11—generates a need to assert hegemony and demonstrate strength to a global audience. Only fighting a war can demonstrate such strength; no peaceful bargain, even a lopsided one, can achieve the same effect. Consistent with this framework, the United States fought Iraq mainly for its demonstration effect—defeating the recalcitrant Saddam would lead other states to fear the United States and submit to its authority and global order.     

Exporting Iran's Islamic revolution: Steering a path between Pan‐Islam and nationalism

This article focuses on the question of whether Iran's foreign policy over the period 1979–94 was a pure reflection of the clerical regime's millenarian crusade and its stated doctrine of exporting the Islamic revolution worldwide. Taking, inter alia, the controversy surrounding Iran's takeover of the island of Abu Musa in 1992, the article argues that Iran's actions were determined by a persistent sense of nationalism which was not less potent than its pan‐Islamic vision. Iran's nationalist tradition has been able to survive as a major force in Iranian political culture, its sometimes ‘Islamicized’ form notwithstanding.     

The “Syria traveller”: reintegration or legal sanctioning?

This article analyses discourses on Islamist radicalisation and threats of terrorism in Norway, with a focus on a new category of people known as “Syria travellers”, i.e. young Norwegians who go to Syria to fight for the Islamic State. Our analysis of debates in the media, policy documents and parliamentary discussions revealed two main narratives regarding the authorities’ response to Syria travellers: the first emphasises legal sanctions, and the second highlights the reintegration of returnees. We found that contentions about how to react to the new kind of people (the Syria travellers) are intertwined with the way these people are portrayed, understood or “made up”. In the political realm, there is also a striking consensus on the need for both reintegrative and legislative responses.     

Bargaining,Fear, and Denial: Explaining Violence Against Civilians in Iraq 2004–2007

From mid-2004 to mid-2007, the Iraq war was distinguished from other comparable insurgencies by its high rates of civilian victimization. This has been attributed to a number of different factors, including the role of Islamic fundamentalist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq as well as the regional ambitions of Iran and Syria. Using an unpublished dataset of violence in Iraq from 2003–2008 from the Iraq Body Count (IBC), this paper argues that the violence against civilians is best understood as a combination of three interacting logics—bargaining, fear, and denial—that are predominantly local in character. First, armed Iraqi actors bargained through violence both across and within sectarian communities, and were driven by mechanisms of outbidding and outflanking to escalate their attacks on civilians. Second, the pervasive fear about the future of the Iraqi state encouraged the “localization” of violence in Iraq, particularly in the emergence of a security dilemma and the proliferation of criminal and tribal actors. Finally, Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq played the spoiler in Iraq, using mass-casualty attacks to generate fear among the population and deny U.S. efforts to build a functioning state. Only by addressing each of these three logics as part of its counter-insurgency strategy can the U.S. put an end to violence against civilians and develop the Iraqi state into a credible competitor for the loyalties of the population.     

Suicide Bombers in Iraq, 2003–2010: Disaggregating Targets Can Reveal Insurgent Motives and Priorities

Extending data reported by Mohammed Hafez in 2007, we compiled a database of 1,779 suicide bombers who attempted or completed attacks in Iraq from 2003 through 2010. From 2003 through 2006, monthly totals of suicide bombers show a pattern different from the pattern of non-suicide insurgent attacks, but from 2007 through 2010 the two patterns were similar. This biphasic pattern indicates that suicide attacks sometimes warrant separate analysis but sometimes are just one tactic in a larger envelope of insurgent violence. We also show that only 13 percent of suicide bombers targeted coalition forces and international civilians, primarily during the early years of the conflict, whereas 83 percent of suicide bombers targeted Iraqis (civilians, members of the Anbar Awakening Movement, Iraqi security forces, and government entities) in attacks that extended throughout the duration of the insurgency. These results challenge the idea that suicide attacks are primarily a nationalist response to foreign occupation, and caution that “smart bombs” may be more often sent against soft targets than hard targets. More generally, our results indicate that suicide attacks must be disaggregated by target in order to understand these attacks as the expression of different insurgent priorities at different times.     

The structure-identity nexus: Syria and Turkey’s collapse (2011)

The relation between Syria and Turkey transformed from enmity in the 1990s to détente in the early 2000s, grew into amity after the rise to power of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) in 2002, and reverted to enmity in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. This research suggests that a combination of structural and identity-based factors, at regional and domestic levels, induced the collapse of the decade-long amity. This paper builds on the notion of a “structure-identity nexus”; and determines the orientation of foreign policy outcomes from the 1990s until 2011. The discussion outlines the merits of a hybrid theoretical perspective by elaborating on Barkin’s idea of ‘realist constructivism’, which draws on two rival traditions, realism and constructivism. The structure-identity framework explains the double transformation in the relationship, considering the return to inter- and intra-state conflict in 2011. The research draws on extensive primary and secondary sources, as well as interviews carried out with key figures. In addition to the relationship between Syria and Turkey, the structure-identity nexus provides potential broader explanations that fuel the shift from amity to enmity in the complex network of states found in the Middle East.     

Iraq War and Europe-U. S. Relations

Militarily, no one has suspected that American-British coalition forces would win their war against Iraq. But before, during or after the war, there existed some uncertainties, which are concerning the future world structure, the future of the United States itself, the Middle East     

Campaign Analysis: The “Surge” in Iraq, 2007-2008

In analyzing the “Surge” in Iraq during 2007 and 2008, the article contends that the campaign contributed greatly to Iraq's stabilizing, and did so because the “surge of ideas” facilitated crucial variables: population separation, both by U.S. forces and from ethnic cleansing; local Sunni insurgents’ reconciliation; a new, “networked” Special Operations Forces campaign, and a politically self-reinforcing impression that the United States had recommitted to Iraq. Ultimately, however, the essay concludes, the Surge needed to be more ambitious to be endurable.In January 2007 President George W. Bush announced the “new way forward in Iraq.”¹ He deployed 30,000 additional troops, replaced the commander, and endorsed a new counterinsurgency strategy. The campaign that followed became known as the Surge: these five additional brigades fanned out to Baghdad and neighboring provinces; and a “surge of ideas” shifted the goal to protecting the Iraqi population, instead of transitioning responsibility for security to Iraqi forces. The strategy, President Bush announced, was to reduce the violence enough so that “daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence in their leaders, and the government will have the breathing space it needs to make progress in other critical areas.”²

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