War and Democratization: Lessons from the Portuguese Experience

The literature on democracy suggests that new democracies should have difficulty emerging during war or in the aftermath of armed struggle, yet Portugal's current democracy emerged simultaneously with the end of the nation's unsuccessful war in Africa. This article addresses the reasons and argues that democracy triumphed not simply in spite of the war but also, in part, because of it. The costs and geography of the war itself, the capacity and rootedness of the state that waged the war, the political culture of the regime's military officers, and the war-related timing of Portugal's first elections all helped prevent the emergence of an anti-democratic coalition and contributed to ensuring a successful transition to democracy. The article ends with three ideas that merit closer examination: that different sorts of wars leave different legacies for democracy; that wars that leave state bureaucracies intact or stronger are more likely to be followed by lasting democracy than those which do not; and, finally, that the ideologies of military elites are pivotal to the outcome of post-war democratic transitions.     

A Rising Power & the Coming of a Great War

This article examines the strategic decisions that led to the struggle between Britain and Germany, exploring how a great war involving Europe's leading powers could come to pass. In 1914, there were no forces beyond the control of decision makers pushing them into the grisly war of attrition that destroyed the social and political fabric of nineteenth-century Europe and ushered in the horrors of the twentieth century. Rather, those horrors resulted from poor policy and strategic choices made by the leaders of the great powers. The war's outbreak underscores history's contingent nature, dramatically showing how errors in judgment on the part of political and military leaders can ruin great countries. One stark lesson of the Great War is that no leader sought as an outcome the conflagration produced by their decisions. Today, China's weapons programs and foreign policy assertiveness conjures up fears that Beijing seeks to establish a new international order, much as Germany's rulers tried to do a hundred years ago with such catastrophic consequences. Shaping the internal debate among China's rulers, so that they judge self-restraint in armaments and strategy as being in their best interest, will test the strategic acumen of American leaders in the years ahead.     

Globalization,Systems Integration,and the Future of Great Power War

Contemporary economic globalization differs from past increases in global commerce, especially because modern foreign direct investment and systems integration techniques allow factories in different countries to specialize in the design and production of parts rather than complete products. Stephen Brooks has argued, based on both liberal and realist logics, that this new form of globalization might bring a “commercial peace,” at least among the great powers. But economic globalization did not simply appear by itself. Firms and governments made conscious decisions through a process of systems integration and strategic planning that led to a wide variety of international economic relationships. That diversity of economic connections combines with the variety of strategic situations in the international environment—variations in geography, national intentions, policy history, etc.—to suggest a range of possible constraints on countries' offensive capability and on the prospects for economic gains from conquest. As has always been the case, conquest in the future will sometimes prove valuable and other times will not. Globalization does not imply the dawn of an era of commercial peace.     

The Rise of Great Powers and War

War and peace is a permanent theme in the discussion of international relations theory.……     

Identity,Insecurity, and Great Power Politics:The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War

Why did Germany pursue naval expansion at the turn of the twentieth century? This question has long puzzled scholars of international security, who consider German naval ambition to be an instance of suboptimal arming—a decision that decreased Germany's overall security and risked the survival of the German state. This article argues that the social desire to be recognized as a world power guided Germany's decision to challenge British naval hegemony. From the beginning of its naval planning, Germany had one clear aim: a powerful fleet of battleships stationed in the North Sea would alter the political relationship with Britain in such a way that it could no longer ignore Germany's claim to world power status. Reconceptualizing Germany's naval ambition as a struggle for recognition elucidates the contradictions at the center of German naval strategy, explaining how the doomed policy could proceed despite its certain failure. The article concludes that the power-maximizing practices of great powers should be seen as an important component of identity construction and an understudied dimension of contemporary security practice.     

美国在阿富汗战争中的收获与教训

虽然阿富汗战争使美国在政治、经济等方面都获益,但美依靠武力、以暴制暴的战争手段无法从根本上真正铲除恐怖主义,同时又给自己带来一系列难以消除的负面影响.     

伊拉克战争与世界大势

伊拉克战争对国际形势和国际关系全局及其走向产生重大而深远影响。美对外用武频率上升对世界和平与发展造成更大挑战。国际关系单边与多边之争空前深化。称霸与反霸成为当前世界主要矛盾。国家主权在国际法体系中的核心地位凸显。联合国在世界政治舞台上的地位与作用虽受冲击,仍不可替代。地区合作势头趋于增强。国际地缘政治正在酝酿深刻变化。     

On the Struggle for International Power of Discourse on Climate Change

With climate change developing into one of the global focal issues, the struggle for the international power of discourse on climate change tends to be intensified. The struggle is in essence the contest for national interest revolving around economic and development interest. The weight of international power of discourse acquired by each country is determined by its national strength and its relevant policies as well.     

The Privatization of Security: Lessons from Iraq

Images of private forces in Iraq—killed and mutilated in Fallujah, implicated in prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, and shooting up civilian vehicles—have provided a dramatic illustration of the role private security companies (pscs) now play in U.S. military operations. Though the United States’ use of contractors on the battlefield is not entirely new, the increased number of contractors deployed and the use of private security forces to perform an escalating number of tasks has created a new environment that poses important trade-offs for U.S. policy and military effectiveness and for U.S. relations with other states. This article outlines the history of U.S. contractors on the battlefield, compares that with the use of private security in Iraq, discusses the benefits and risks associated with their use, and proposes some trade-offs that decision-makers in the United States should consider while contemplating their use in the future.     

论中日海权矛盾中的南海问题

本文研究中日海权矛盾中的南海问题。日本并非南海沿岸国家,作为一个区域外国家,何以与中国在南海问题上发生矛盾?本文通过国际关系理论现实主义流派中的海权论等理论工具对此问题进行研究得出结论:冷战结束后作为东亚地缘政治主体板块国家的中国免除了长期遭受的来自北方的威胁,开始得以放手发展海权,而作为二战战败国的日本则开始追求政治大国地位。中国在2010年超越日本成为世界第二大经济体,使得东亚第一次出现了两强并立的地缘政治格局,遂引起日本的强烈猜忌。以此为背景,日本视中国建设海洋强国的战略为对亚太地区和平与繁荣的威胁。于是,日本开始在海洋领域挑起争端,两国的海权矛盾由此产生并迅速升级。由于日本在东海问题上日渐处于下风,并且在短期内看不到改观的希望,因此日本开始围魏救赵,在南海问题上挑起争端,企图使中国陷入战略两难的困境。而为达到海上围堵并牵制中国的目的,日本采取法律、防务、外交、舆论等多重手段在南海问题上为中国设置障碍。为此中国有必要采取相应措施进行反制。     

从海陆二分到海陆统筹——对中国海陆关系的再审视

近来,陆权、海权问题及中国的战略取向已成为广大学者及社会各界广泛关注的热点。本刊2007年第6期刊登了北京大学叶自成教授《从大历史观看地缘政治》一文,该文认为海上力量"聚集得快,消失也快",陆权发展的成果"更能长期支撑一个国家的发展和地位",更具持久性。他主张每个国家应当根据自己的自然禀赋来选择海权与陆权的孰先孰后,并强调制度建设是一国发展陆权或海权的重要内涵。叶文发表后,不少学者纷纷来稿阐述自己的看法。本刊本期刊登李义虎教授的《从海陆二分到海陆统筹——对中国海陆关系的再审视》一文,以飨读者。李义虎教授提出,中国是一个海陆度值高、兼具陆地大国和濒海大国双重身份的地缘实体,在战略上需要消解海陆二分的现实,而采取海陆统筹的全方位选择。本刊将陆续刊登围绕这些问题而展开的讨论文章,并热诚期待有更多学者踊跃来稿。     

Power and Rhetorical Bargaining: The UN Security Council Debate on the Iraq War

The UN Security Council (UNSC) was an important arena of confrontation between the major powers during the recent pre-war crisis on Iraq, yet the realist-materialist focus of IR theory does not provide a useful perspective for analysing the debate and the ensuing defeat of American interests. This paper seeks to establish the meaning of “power” within a rhetorical context, applying insights from Searle's theory of institutional facts, constructivism, and self-presentation theory. Rhetorical strategies are then examined empirically by means of thematic and structural analyses of key texts from the UNSC debate on Iraq.     

The governance of the World Bank: Lessons from the corporate sector

The World Bank Group (WBG) is a multilateral organization as well as a large financial conglomerate. The debate on its governance, however, has mainly focused on how to ensure more inclusive decision-making by strengthening the voice and representation of its entire membership. The WBG’s governance as a set of arrangements that enable the principal (shareholders) to oversee the agent (management) has so far been overlooked, even though the adequacy of such arrangements is relevant in all institutions wherein shareholders delegate to management the achievement of organizational objectives. In reviewing the institutional, historical, and current underpinnings of the WBG’s decision-making, we elaborate on the extent to which the Group follows best-practice corporate governance standards that have been designed with the aim of improving shareholders’ oversight. Drawing from a methodology developed by the IFC, an entity of the WBG, we analyze the Group’s internal governance, highlighting which aspects are furthest from (or closest to) current financial-sector best practices. In so doing, we provide a framework for prioritizing the most critical areas in which the WBG’s governance falls short of private-sector standards, and we identify the nature of possible remedies.

大国外交的权威基础——中国共产党的外交领导力研究

党的十八大以来,随着中国综合国力快速上升,中国领导人也越来越强调中国特色大国外交,在国内强调维护党中央权威和集中统一领导,在国外强调做一个负责任、敢担当的国家.从理论上来说,权威是大国外交的本质和核心,与普通的国家相比,大国就意味着不仅有实力,更要有权威,在外交上得到其他国家和民众的尊重和支持.中国是一个有着大国外交基因的国家,五千年的文明古国历史沉淀了大国心态,确立了独具特色的大国外交权威基础.近代以来,随着西方世界的兴起,中国外交的权威基础遭到严重侵蚀,缺乏必要的国力支撑.新中国成立后,中国在重塑大国外交权威基础上走过了曲折发展的历程.在中国与世界关系发生历史性变化的背景下,如何成为一个有权威的大国,实现大国外交权威基础的再造,是中国特色大国外交的内在要求.     

The Great Powers and Regional Conflicts: Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post–Napoleonic Era to the Post–Cold War Era

The objective of this article is to provide an analytical framework for addressing the sources of great power regional involvement and its effects on regional conflicts. The thesis of the article is that variations in the degree of intensity of conflicts and the likelihood of successful conflict resolution in different regions are affected by the character of great power involvement in these regions. Our argument is that although great power involvement or noninvolvement cannot cause or terminate regional conflicts, it can either intensify existing local conflicts or mitigate them. We will propose causal linkages between balances of great power capabilities and interests, types of great power involvement in regional conflicts, and patterns of regional conflicts. The study will distinguish among four types of great power involvement in regional conflicts: competition, cooperation, dominance, and disengagement. The empirical section will examine the application of these propositions in seven historical illustrations, representing the four patterns of great power involvement in regional conflicts. All the illustrations will deal with one conflict-ridden region-Eastern Europe and the Balkans, in successive historical periods from the post-Napoleonic era to the post-Cold War era. Because of the variety of patterns of great power involvement in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, this region is uniquely suited to examine the propositions derived from the theoretical framework. Drawing on both the theoretical deductions and the historical illustrations should make it possible in the last section to discuss briefly the implications of the proposed framework for regional conflict management or mitigation in the Balkans in the post-Cold War era.     

The Structure of Negotiation: Lessons from El Salvador for Contemporary Conflict Resolution

During more than a decade of violent conflict (1980–1992) involving the military, rebel forces, and paramilitary "death squads," El Salvador suffered some 75,000 casualties, mostly civilians. After three years of negotiations, the government and the largest rebel group signed a historic comprehensive peace accord that brought an end to the war and instituted wide-reaching political and social reforms. This agreement, and the peace process that produced it, has been widely hailed as a successful example of a negotiated end to civil war. In order to understand the conditions that led to the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords ending the war, this article tests ripeness theory in the context of the Salvadoran peace process.
This article affirms the validity of theories of ripeness and the mutually hurting stalemate as structural explanations for the initiation of dialogue and notes the role of "indicators of ripeness" in forcing the parties to recognize a hurting stalemate that may already exist. It also proposes several hypothesized explanations for the effectiveness of the Salvadoran negotiations themselves. These explanations include the presence of strong, empowered policy entrepreneurs on both sides with the political will and capability to make credible commitments; the combination of internal and external pressure for a negotiated solution that raised the cost of defection; and the active involvement, based on consent of both parties, of a neutral, empowered, and credible mediator who provided both technical assistance and vigilance to move the process forward. After analyzing the Salvadoran case through this theoretical lens, the article applies the same concepts to contemporary conflict cases such as Iraq and Colombia, discussing how the lessons learned in El Salvador do and do not provide instructive guidance for managing civil conflicts today.