Back to the future: the Arab uprisings and state (re)formation in the Arab world

This article contributes to debates that aim to go beyond the “democratization” and “post-democratization” paradigms to understand change and continuity in Arab politics. In tune with calls to focus on the actualities of political dynamics, the article shows that the literatures on State Formation and Contentious Politics provide useful theoretical tools to understand change/continuity in Arab politics. It does so by examining the impact of the latest Arab uprisings on state formation trajectories in Iraq and Syria. The uprisings have aggravated a process of regime erosion – which originated in post-colonial state-building attempts – by mobilizing sectarian and ethnic identities and exposing the counties to geo-political rivalries and intervention, giving rise to trans-border movements, such as ISIS. The resulting state fragmentation has obstructed democratic transition in Syria and constrained its consolidation in Iraq.     

Assessing the Future Threat: ISIS's Virtual Caliphate

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria's (ISIS) Virtual Caliphate shows no signs of diminishment. With the group's loss of territory and with social media platforms increasingly policed, Telegram, a messaging application, remains ISIS's key platform for disseminating propaganda and recruiting new members. Telegram's security features, cross-platform construction, and secret chat option offer a secure environment for interaction between ISIS and its supporters. On Telegram, ISIS manipulates an environment rich with addictive properties, creating online spaces that encourage group identity, shared opinions, and dominant ideologies, while exploiting an individual's need to be a part of the group. This research investigates how Telegram is used by ISIS and its supporters and assesses what kind of threat the use of Telegram poses for the future.The research is supported in part by the Office of Naval Research “Documenting the Virtual Caliphate” #N00014-16-1-3174. All opinions are exclusively those of the authors and do not represent the Department of Defense or the Navy. This article is part of a special project conducted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, titled: “After the Caliphate: Reassessing the Jihadi Threat and Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent,” which includes a book, a thematic issue of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018), and a series of podcasts. Each element of the project can be found here: https://www.fpri.org/research/after-the-caliphate-project/.     

Beyond Kinetic Operations: A Road Map to Success in Syria and Iraq

Kinetic operations—either overt, covert, or clandestine— should only be employed with ample forethought as to what they are intended to achieve and whether the costs are worth the benefits. Notwithstanding their advantages and disadvantages, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) will not be defeated through kinetic operations alone. When linking tactical operations to the strategic goal of degrading a terrorist threat, post-conflict stabilization and rebuilding are often required to cement tactical victories into a desired and sustainable end state. Terrorism, including ISIS, is not an existential threat to the U.S. and requires a multi-layer approach that is not linear and should encompass locally derived goals. The U.S. government should envision kinetic operations as only one part of a broader strategy to stabilize Iraq and Syria after the collapse of ISIS, or it will continue to find itself in a perpetual war.This article is part of a special project conducted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, titled: “After the Caliphate: Reassessing the Jihadi Threat and Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent,” which includes a book, a thematic issue of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018), and a series of podcasts. Each element of the project can be found here: https://www.fpri.org/research/after-the-caliphate-project/.     

A More Forward Role for the Gulf States? Combatting Terrorism at Home and Abroad

Though a vast coalition of some 75 countries has retaken much of the territory once comprising ISIS's Caliphate, the threat to the Fertile Crescent is far from over. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and a number of the other Gulf States represent a few of the many regional and global stakeholders currently engaged in this arena in the name of stability and other more personal interests. This article will explore the motivations, capabilities, and activities of the Gulf States vis-à-vis ISIS, the Fertile Crescent, and the larger threat that groups like ISIS represent more broadly.This article is part of a special project conducted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, titled: “After the Caliphate: Reassessing the Jihadi Threat and Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent,” which includes a book, a thematic issue of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018), and a series of podcasts. Each element of the project can be found here: https://www.fpri.org/research/after-the-caliphate-project/. The author is the Project Lead.     

Under the shade of AK47s: a multimodal approach to violent extremist recruitment strategies for foreign fighters

Two notable features of the current conflict in Syria and Iraq are the number of foreign fighters from western countries fighting for Sunni militant organisations, and the use of the Internet and social media by some extremist groups to disseminate propaganda material. This article explores how the group which refers to itself as Islamic State and an affiliated British group, Rayat al Tawheed, deploy combinations of images and text which serve as bonding icons to rally supporters. The data consists of the English language edition of ISIS’s online magazine Dabiq and online materials produced by Rayat al Tawheed. The results suggest that ISIS and Rayat al Tawheed adopt similar but different iconisation strategies. While ISIS adopts a global strategy to present a unified world view utilising a range of ISIS values in its iconisation, Rayat al Tawheed foregrounds jihad using strategies specifically targeting young, English-speaking men of Islamic/Arab backgrounds.     

Immunizing Iraq Against al-Qaeda 3.0

Iraq still faces the same economic challenges that contributed to the rise of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. And unless these challenges are resolved, the likelihood of future political stability is low. The extremely high level of unemployment and underemployment among Iraq's youth, combined with massive corruption, is contributing to widespread poverty and radicalization. The Iraqi government's efforts to deal with these challenges are hamstrung by the expectation that current low oil prices will continue for a decade or more. These obstacles will constrain state-led development efforts severely. Iraq needs to execute successfully anti-corruption and pro-youth employment strategies that draw on the experience of other states, but are crafted to meet Iraq's unique conditions.This article is part of a special project conducted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, titled: “After the Caliphate: Reassessing the Jihadi Threat and Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent,” which includes a book, a thematic issue of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018), and a series of podcasts. Each element of the project can be found here: https://www.fpri.org/research/after-the-caliphate-project/.     

A Weary Hercules: The United States and the Fertile Crescent in a Post-Caliphate Era

Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has tended to engage in regime change missions with a short-term and improvisational approach that focuses on removing adversaries from the battlefield rather than achieving consolidated political gains. Today, Washington may repeat the same mistake by prioritizing the military destruction of ISIS, rather than creating a tolerable political order. The policy challenges are particularly acute because, like a weary Hercules, Washington is confronted with endless labor, but limited capability. The answer is to pursue a long-term strategic approach that aligns the ends and means of war, seeks ugly stability rather than illusory goals, accepts that nation-building in some form is inevitable, and wins the narrative war.This article is part of a special project conducted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, titled: “After the Caliphate: Reassessing the Jihadi Threat and Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent,” which includes a book, a thematic issue of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018), and a series of podcasts. Each element of the project can be found here: https://www.fpri.org/research/after-the-caliphate-project/.     

Video games,terrorism, and ISIS’s Jihad 3.0

This study discusses different media strategies followed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In particular, the study attempts to understand the way ISIS’s video game that is called “Salil al-Sawarem” (The Clanging of the Swords) has been received by the online Arab public. The article argues that the goal behind making and releasing the video game was to gain publicity and attract attention to the group, and the general target was young people. The main technique used by ISIS is what I call “troll, flame, and engage.” The results indicate that the majority of comments are against ISIS and its game, though most of the top ten videos are favorable towards the group. The sectarian dimension between Sunnis and Shiites is highly emphasized in the online exchanges, and YouTube remains an active social networking site that is used by ISIS followers and sympathizers to promote the group and recruit others.     

The Internet and Its Potentials for Networking and Identity Seeking: A Study on ISIS

ABSTRACT

With the accelerating process of globalization and the development of its technological dimension, more and more opportunities and channels are available to the terrorist groups in the world to mobilize resources and advocates. “Islamic State of Iraq and Sham” (ISIS), as the most modern terrorist-excommunicative group (Takfiry), has been able to utilize the Internet and social networks highly adeptly. While ignoring the function of long-term structural and essential factors underlying the formation of ISIS, and also combining the networked society theory and triple forms of identities proposed by Manuel Castells with theoretical discussions on identity making, networking, and mobilization of media, the current article seeks to analyze the role of cyberspace and social networks as accelerating and opportunistic agents in mobilizing resources and disseminating ISIS. Using an explanatory analytical research method, the current article mainly intends to find a reply to the question: What has been the role of online social networks in connection with ISIS as an excommunicative and terrorist group? According to the research hypothesis, due to ISIS’s subtle, prevocational-emotional and targeted utilization of online social networks, the networks have played the role of an accelerator and opportunity maker in some areas including network building, guidance of public opinion, identity making, and the promotion of project identity of this terrorist group. The general conclusion obtained from the article is that ISIS, as the most terrifying and the most modern group equipped with cyber media, has been able to attract many forces out of fanatical religious groups, unemployed people, criminals, etc., worldwide. Additionally, with the recruitment of fanatics, ISIS has been able to accomplish identity making and network building. As a result, regional security and even security in Western countries is also highly endangered.     

Iran's Hezbollah Model in Iraq and Syria: Fait Accompli?

This essay argues the wars in Iraq and Syria are not over. Iran has used the war against the Islamic State, and, more generally, the instability in Iraq and Syria, to successfully spread and legitimize its influence. If the U.S. intends to challenge Iran's influence in Syria and Iraq, it needs to demonstrate its long-term commitment to its local partners, and it needs to work with its partners to secure and stabilize eastern Syria and western Iraq. Countering Iran's influence in Iraq and Syria is a long-term project, and creating viable alternatives to Iranian influence in Damascus and Baghdad is the best way to prevent them from becoming long-term Iranian dependencies.This article is part of a special project conducted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, titled: “After the Caliphate: Reassessing the Jihadi Threat and Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent,” which includes a book, a thematic issue of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018), and a series of podcasts. Each element of the project can be found here: https://www.fpri.org/research/after-the-caliphate-project/.     

In the eye of the storm: Ambassador James Richards' mission to Iraq in April 1957

This article discusses the visit of James Richards, President Eisenhower's special emissary to the Middle East, to Iraq in April 1957 following the pronouncement of the Eisenhower Doctrine. An analysis of the Richards Mission encompasses a range of specific issues, including the relationship in Iraq between the US and UK and American assessments of the stability of the Iraqi government. Moreover, this article examines the American strategy for navigating the rising tide of Arab nationalist sentiment in Iraq after the Suez War. This article explores the ways in which US policy-makers privileged the notions of ‘stability’ and ‘order’ in Iraqi political affairs and reflects on the critical dilemmas and contradictions underlying American policy towards Iraq and the Middle East after the 1956 Suez War.     

Navigating ISIS’s Preferred Platform: Telegram1

ABSTRACT

Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) online recruitment has been the subject of considerable interest by journalists and technology writers, but there has been no scholarly work to date exploring ISIS Telegram channels and chat rooms. Telegram has played an important role in recruitment and coordination in recent ISIS/terror attacks in Europe. Further, Telegram is quickly replacing the group’s online presence on more open platforms such as Facebook and Twitter as these companies aggressively police and shut down ISIS-linked accounts. This research note aims to demystify Telegram, explain how it can be used for research, and discuss some of the addictive qualities associated with user engagement.     

Playing the Diversity Card: Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy under the Salmans

ABSTRACT

Since the 2003 regime change in Iraq and the 2011 Arab uprisings, the political map of the Middle East has been in flux. Regional actors have taken advantage of emerging windows of opportunity, which have affected the outcome of this process. Saudi Arabia’s role as an aspiring regional hegemon in the region is salient: the country’s assertive course in shaping its neighbourhood coincides with a more independent foreign policy that goes beyond the traditional US alliance and seeks to diversify its international partners. This diversification of Saudi foreign policy since the ascension to the throne of King Salman in 2015 is explained by using the IR concept of hedging.     

The Muslim paranoia narrative in counter-radicalisation policy

With the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the issue of radicalisation has loomed large in Western policy debates. Recent summits on countering violent extremism have sought to highlight the importance of undermining extremist narratives, mobilising moderate Muslims who oppose ISIS and working to address drivers of radicalisation. This article explores the ideological underpinnings of this approach. It focuses on what I call the “Muslim paranoia narrative”, a recurring feature of Western radicalisation discourse that helpfully captures its ideological commitments and their contemporary significance. Analysing its manifestation in American political culture, I argue that the Muslim paranoia narrative indicates a powerful process of ideological reproduction that works against approaches to counter-radicalisation centred on engagement and collaboration with Muslim communities.     

'Suez in reverse': The arab response to the iraqi bid for Kuwait, 1961-63

On 25 June 1961,';Abd al-Qarim Qassem, the ruler of Iraq, declared Kuwait to be an integral par of Iraq. The announcement ignited a crisis involving Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and aLL the Arab states. In retrospect, and in light of Saddam Husayn's subsequent invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, one may regard this event as a 'dress rehearsal'. Despite its being mainly an Arab crisis, most studies have focused on the role of the Western powers-in particular Britain. This article, in contrast, aims to shed new light on the conduct of the Arab states during the Arab world operated as a system with its own features and characteristics. The article shows that the crisis heralded the decline of President Nasser's central role in the Arab system - a trend that was reinforced with the demise of the Egyptain-Syrian merger shortly after. In addition, although the dialogue between the Arab rules was couched in pan-Arab terminology, the players acted according to thier own interests, thus strengthening the territorial Arab state.     

'Suez in reverse': The Arab response to the Iraqi bid for Kuwait, 1961-63

On 25 June 1961,';Abd al-Qarim Qassem, the ruler of Iraq, declared Kuwait to be an integral par of Iraq. The announcement ignited a crisis involving Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and aLL the Arab states. In retrospect, and in light of Saddam Husayn's subsequent invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, one may regard this event as a 'dress rehearsal'. Despite its being mainly an Arab crisis, most studies have focused on the role of the Western powers-in particular Britain. This article, in contrast, aims to shed new light on the conduct of the Arab states during the Arab world operated as a system with its own features and characteristics. The article shows that the crisis heralded the decline of President Nasser's central role in the Arab system - a trend that was reinforced with the demise of the Egyptain-Syrian merger shortly after. In addition, although the dialogue between the Arab rules was couched in pan-Arab terminology, the players acted according to thier own interests, thus strengthening the territorial Arab state.     

Bangladeshi Militants: What Do We Know?

ABSTRACT

Although militant groups have been present in Bangladesh since the 1990s, the country catapulted to international media attention on July 1, 2016, after an attack on a café in the upscale neighborhood of the capital Dhaka. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack which killed 29 people, mostly foreigners. The attack came in the wake of a series of attacks on religious and ethnic minorities, foreigners, liberal activists, authors, and publishers by both an AQIS affiliate and ISIS. The government denied the existence of militant groups tied to international terrorist organizations. Despite these developments and instances of Bangladeshis joining the ISIS in Iraq and Syria, there has been very little in-depth discussion about who these militants are and what is driving Bangladeshis to militancy. This article addresses this lacuna. This paper examines the common traits of alleged Bangladeshi militants and explores the factors of radicalization. Drawing on media reports of the profiles of the alleged militants, between July 2014 and June 2015, and between July 2016 and August 2017, the article finds that most of the Bangladeshi militants are young, educated males increasingly coming from well-off families. We have also found evidence that four factors—social relationships, use of the Internet, personal crises, and external relations—appear most frequently in the narratives of Bangladeshi militants.     

The Subjugation of Pacifism in UK Parliamentary Discourse: Analysing the 2015 Debate on Bombing Syria

ABSTRACT

This article shows how pacifism is discursively constituted within politics. Employing Critical Discourse Analysis, it demonstrates how official narratives worked to depoliticise pacifism during the 2015 House of Commons debate on taking military action against ISIS in Syria. It argues that the current rejection of pacifism within politics rests upon a flawed narrative and considers the interests that are served by this. Overall, this article calls for pacifism to be de-subjugated and considers the profound political implication this would have.     

Not Whether,But When? Governments’ Use of Militias in War

Abstract

Although government use of militias during civil conflict can ultimately undermine state authority, governments still use militias for battlefield assistance. This paper examines the selectivity of government decisions to use militias by disaggregating civil conflict to the level of battle phases. Civil-conflict battles typically consist of four phases: preparation, clear, hold, and build. I argue that governments decide to use militias based on the strength of government security forces, operational advantages of militias, and the type of battle phase. Governments will limit the use of militias during key battle phases that are likely to receive increased media attention unless a victory secured by government security forces is unlikely or militias hold an operational advantage. A comparative analysis of the offensive operations in Tikrit and Ramadi during Iraq’s war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) lends initial support to this theory.     

The Arab middle east and the question of democratization: Some critical remarks

While many of the contemporary writings on Middle Eastern political change contend that democratization is under way in the Arab world, this article maintains that much of the recent optimism is due to a lack of terminological clarity. Neither are there any Arab democracies today, nor is there any tangible democratization in this region. Adherents of the democratization hypothesis in the Arab world invoke mainly two arguments: that of a strengthened civil society and that of economic transformation, which are supposed to trigger democratization. Both arguments are discussed with the finding that they do not provide convincing evidence to support such hypotheses. Rather, systemic transitions from non‐democracies to other non‐democratic systems are likely developments in the Arab Middle East. Comparative research should therefore focus not only on the ‘breakdown of democratic regimes’ or ‘democratic transitions’, but develop models better to grasp non‐democratic transitions.