Strasbourg,the House of Lords or Elected Politicians: Who decides about rights after Re P?

In Re P , the House of Lords decided that art 14 of the Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 which prohibited unmarried couples from being eligible to adopt, violated articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Apart from its significance for adoption law and anti-discrimination law, Re P is also important in understanding the constitutional role of the courts under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). Re P recognizes that if Strasbourg has determined that an issue falls within states' margin of appreciation, this does not prevent municipal courts from enforcing those rights. This comment will discuss the meaning and scope of the courts' obligation under section 2 of the HRA, the status of the rights protected by the HRA and the appropriate role of the courts in a rights dispute which is subject to moral, social, religious or political controversy.     

Denying Foreign State Immunity on the Grounds of the Unavailability of Alternative Means

Granting immunity from suit to a foreign state or an international organisation, deprives the plaintiff of access to court and appears incompatible with the rule of law. Since the European Court of Human Rights judgment in Waite v Germany (1999), the availability of alternative means for dispute settlement has been emphasised in the context of international organisation immunity. However in the case of foreign state immunity, this approach was not taken by the European Court of Human Rights in Al-Adsani v United Kingdom (2001) nor by the House of Lords in Jones v Ministry of the Interior of Saudi Arabia (2006). Likewise, foreign state immunity would be granted under the UN State Immunity Convention of 2004, regardless of whether there are alternative means. This Convention, rather than enhancing the rule of law, could lead to its attenuation. That several of these cases involve immunity in cases of torture sharpens their sensitivity.     

Indeterminacy,Disagreement and the Human Rights Act: An Empirical Study of Litigation in the UK House of Lords and Supreme Court 1997–2017

This article explores the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on the decision making of the House of Lords (UKHL) and the UK Supreme Court (UKSC). How does Convention rights content vary across areas of law in the UKHL/UKSC? Are some judges more likely than others to engage in Convention rights discourse? Is judicial disagreement more common in cases with higher levels of Convention rights discourse? A robust method of answering questions of this nature is developed and applied to decisions of the UKHL/UKSC, showing that the Convention rights content of decisions has varied over time and over substantive areas of law. Higher levels of human rights discourse are associated with greater levels of disagreement. A benchmarked measure of human rights content is developed to show the effect of the particular judge on the human rights content, illustrating the indeterminacy in human rights discourse and how its deployment can be contingent on judicial attitudes.     

Incompatibility of the Digital Economy Act 2010 subscriber appeal process provisions with Article 6 of the ECHR

Through case-law research, this paper critically assesses the compatibility of the Digital Economy Act 2010 (DEA) subscriber appeal process provisions (Section 13 of the DEA) with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Drawing on the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case-law, Ofcom's Initial Obligations Code (the Code), and the DEA judicial review decision, namely, BT PLC and Talk Talk PLC v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills and others, this paper focuses on the three Strasbourg Court principles of equality of arms, admissibility of evidence, and presumption of innocence, in an effort to determine whether Section 13 of the DEA infringes them, and whether this constitutes a breach of a subscriber's right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR. The paper examines these three ECtHR principles. It contrasts such principles with the Code's provisions, and considers the compatibility of Section 13 of the DEA with Article 6 of the ECHR. It concludes that the DEA subscriber appeal process provisions do indeed infringe these principles, thus constituting a violation of subscribers' right to a fair trial. It also recommends that the UK government start taking seriously human rights in general, and Article 6 of the ECHR in particular.     

The Law Lords and Human Rights

This article presents an empirical analysis of the impact of the Human Rights Act on the House of Lords. Drawing on a database of judgments from 1994 to 2007, changes in judgment‐giving behaviour are identified by charting patterns of agreement and dissent across different categories of case. Voting records are also examined in order to identify whether significant differences exist between individual Law Lords in their approach to human rights cases.     

The Role of Parliamentary Intention in Adjudication under the Human Rights Act 1998

This essay gives more detailed content to the widespread viewthat the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) has changed the traditionalrole of parliamentary intention in statutory interpretation.It begins by outlining the various ways in which legislativeintent has featured in traditional (pre-HRA) statutory interpretation.This is followed by an examination of the interpretive principlesdeveloped by the senior judiciary under the HRA case-law, focusingon the extent to which they seem to depart from traditionalprinciples. It is argued that although the traditional roleof parliamentary intention is partly preserved post-HRA, theinterpretive obligation under s 3(1) HRA nonetheless shiftsthe interpretive focus away from what Parliament originallyintended in enacting the legislation under HRA scrutiny, towardsfulfilling the overriding goal of achieving compatibility withConvention rights. The final sections of the essay attempt toprovide an account of what is involved in this shift.     

Mavericks or misconstruction? A reply to Campbell and Allan

In a jurisdiction without a codified constitution clearly demarcating the role of the courts, and given the centrality of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty to the United Kingdom's constitutional framework, criticism of the courts for overstepping the mark – particularly in politically contentious cases – is par for the course. In their 2019 article, Professors David Campbell and James Allan offer a criticism of the Supreme Court for what they describe as its surreptitious creation of judicial supremacy at the expense of parliamentary sovereignty. In support of their claim, the authors examine two particularly significant judgments: R (Miller and another) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union and Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission's Application for Judicial Review. This reply discusses several problematic aspects of the authors’ critique of those judgments, demonstrating that, contrary to the authors’ claims, these cases do not provide evidence of a surreptitious attempt by the Supreme Court to expand its power.     

The rule of law as the lodestar of the European Convention on Human Rights: The Strasbourg Court and the independence of the judiciary

The rule of law is a constitutional principle under the European Convention on Human Rights. Throughout its history, the rule of law has been the lodestar guiding the development of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. In recent years, the normative impact of this principle has been increasing in the case-law of the Court, in particular in cases dealing with the independence of the judiciary. The article discusses the conceptual core of the rule of law under the Convention system as a fundamental component of “European public order”. Subsequently, the three-dimensional normative status of the rule of law is explored as well as the Court's statement that the principle is “inherent in all the Articles of the Convention”. On this basis, an in-depth analysis is undertaken of the application in recent Strasbourg case-law of the independence of the judiciary as a fundamental organic component of the rule of law. Finally, the author reflects on the “symbiotic” relationship in the field of judicial independence between the Strasbourg Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union.     

European Court of Human Rights accepts blood donor screening based on sexual orientation

In a series of three rulings released simultaneously on 15 October 2002, the European Court of Human Rights dismissed complaints that Italy's approach to screening blood donors infringed privacy rights and discriminated against lesbians and gay men.     

The Concept of Legislation: Jackson v Her Majesty'sAttorney General

In Jackson and Others v Her Majesty's Attorney General , the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords faced an unusual case – one in which it had to decide not only what Parliament intended, but whether it created a statute in the first place. Though the Committee was unanimous in finding that Parliament did indeed create a statute, the decision reveals deep divisions within the panel concerning the status of the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy and a profound difference in commitment to an exclusively source-based approach to law.     

Human Rights,Privacy and the Public Interest—Who Draws the Line and Where?

This lecture examines the protection of privacy in the United Kingdom (both at common law and after the incorporation of Human Rights Convention rights) as well as in other European countries and in the European Court of Human Rights. It considers the significance and extent of the margin of appreciation which that Court allows to individual states in respect of the protection of privacy and the balancing of privacy against other interests such as press freedom. It concludes that the margin allowed by the Strasbourg court may not be very large, that the balancing of interests apparently required by that Court is often delicate and difficult, that informal mechanisms of redress such as the Press Complaints Commissions have some benefits, but that further case-law development appears inevitably to be required if any certainty is to be achieved in at least some common situations.     

Regulating surrogacy--a contravention of human rights?

On the 2nd of October 2000, The Human Rights Act 1998 came into full force, signalling the incorporation of The European Convention on Human Rights into U.K. law. Areas of law believed to be inconsistent with the Convention may now be challenged in both The European Court of Human Rights and domestic courts. This article considers whether existing laws on the regulation of access to infertility services, in particular surrogacy, will be deemed incompatible with the ECHR. Human rights as enshrined within Articles 8 and 12 will be examined in light of recent suggestions that there may arise legal challenges by those who have had access to reproductive services restricted or denied. It will be shown that, although existing and potential future controls may arguably infringe these rights, it is nevertheless unlikely that they will be held to be in contravention of The Human Rights Act 1998.     

European Parliament and Executive Federalism: Approaching a Parliament in a Semi-Parliamentary Democracy

Abstract: The European Parliament has often been understood along the lines of theories of European integration—compared to regular parliaments by Federalists or belittled as merely an international assembly by intergovernmentalists. This paper proposes an understanding of the European Parliament not along theories about what the EU should become, but what it is and surely will continue to be, that is a very distinct federal structure. The European Parliament is a parliament in an executive federalism—with far‐reaching consequences for its form and functions. After outlining the characteristics of this federal structure, these consequences will be demonstrated by analysing the European Parliament in contrast with two ideal types of parliaments: the working parliament, separated from the executive branch and centred around strong committees (like the US Congress), and the debating parliament, characterised by the fusion of parliamentary majority and government as well as plenary debates (like the British House of Commons). Dwelling thus on a comparison to a legislature in a non‐parliamentary federal system, like the US Congress, this paper argues that the European Parliament might best be understood as a special case of a working parliament. Finally, it will be proposed to consider the influence of executive federalism not only as fundamentally shaping the European Parliament but also as rendering the EU generally a semi‐parliamentary democracy.     

A study of section 3 of the Maltese Official Secrets Act,its Canadian and British counterparts and its effects on freedom of expression

This article answers the question whether s 3(1) of the Maltese Official Secrets Act breaches freedom of expression as contained in art 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and s 41 of the Constitution of Malta. Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights is briefly analysed in the light of obtaining case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Section 3(1) of the Maltese Official Secrets Act – which finds counterparts in several Commonwealth criminal law statutes – is subsequently studied by reference to United Kingdom and Canadian case law. A freedom of expression impact assessment of s 3(1) of the Official Secrets Act is carried out with the ensuing conclusion being that only s 3(1)(c) of the Maltese Official Secrets Act might, in certain circumstances, constitute a breach of art 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and s 41 of the Constitution of Malta.     

Interview with Judge Luzius Wildhaber,President of the New European Court of Human Rights

On Tuesday, November 3, in Strasbourg, the new, full-time European Court of Human Rights will be inaugurated. Judges will be sworn in, including the new president of the court, Mr. Luzius Wildhaber of Switzerland.     

Relatively Absolute? The Undermining of Article 3 ECHR in Ahmad v UK

The recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Ahmad v UK dangerously undermines the well‐established case law of the Court on counter‐terrorism and non‐refoulement towards torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. Although ostensibly rejecting the ‘relativist’ approach to Article 3 ECHR adopted by the House of Lords in Wellington v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Court appeared to accept that what is a breach of Article 3 in a domestic context may not be a breach in an extradition or expulsion context. This statement is difficult to reconcile with the jurisprudence constante of the Court in the last fifteen years, according to which Article 3 ECHR is an absolute right in all its applications, including non‐refoulement, regardless of who the potential victim of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment is, what she may have done, or where the treatment at issue would occur.     

The house of lords and the labour government 1974–79

An analysis of the legislative activity of the House of Lords during the period of Labour government between 1974 and 1979. At the time much of their activity was depicted as a clash between Lords and Commons, between the two chambers of the British legislature – one a ‘one‐sided, hereditary, unprized, unrepresentative, irresponsible absentee’ and other made up of the directly elected representatives of the people.

The author shows that the events during the period were in fact rather more complex than this, being more accurately portrayed as a clash between Government and Parliament facilitated by the House of Lords. In addition, the author points not only to the importance of the peers perceptions of the parliamentary situation at the time, what it was generally as well as at specific times and with regard to specific issues, and to the impact that this had, but also highlights the fact that the political complexion of the House of Lords is far more complex than a simple Conservative‐Labour dichotomy.

By way of conclusion it is argued not only that the activity of the House of Lords during this period provides ample evidence of the extent and nature of the work of the House, but also that the members were doing no more than their constitutional position provides for, namely to scrutinise and revise legislation – it was, as Bagehot observed, a Chamber of ‘temporary rejectors and palpable alterers’.     

Procedural Innovation and the Surreptitious Creation of Judicial Supremacy in the United Kingdom

In Re an Application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission for Judicial Review, the Supreme Court made unfavourable comments about Northern Irish abortion legislation in a way which showed complete disregard for elements of civil procedure which are a foundation of proper adjudication within the context of respect for democracy. This was but the latest of a number of cases in which the senior judiciary has made unaccountable procedural innovations furthering judicial supremacy in defiance of the sovereignty of Parliament. In addition to Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, two other of these cases, Simmons v. Castle and R (Miller and another) v. The Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, will be discussed. These cases reveal an effort to create judicial supremacy by means which we are obliged to call surreptitious.     

The Enjoyment of Rights and Freedoms: A New Conception of the 'Ambit' under Article 14 ECHR

Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as applied by the UK judiciary under the Human Rights Act 1998, is in danger of becoming as 'parasitic' as it is often described. Judges have inappropriately narrowed the scope of the 'ambit' of other Convention articles, and thus limited the number of claims to which Article 14 can apply, by defining it according to considerations more properly weighed in a justification analysis incorporating proportionality. The emerging approach departs from Strasbourg jurisprudence, and fails to give full effect to the language and intent of Article 14. This trend need not continue. This article begins the process of fashioning a new conception of the ambit of Convention articles: one that could change the fortunes of Article 14 cases in the UK, but that flows naturally from the precedents of the European Court of Human Rights, and gives effect to the spirit of the HRA.     

Possession of cannabis legal for now

In two recent rulings the Ontario Court of Justice threw out charges of possession of cannabis contrary to section 4(I) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA). The courts found that the accused in each case had been charged with an offence not known to law. Parliament never re-enacted the CDSA section prohibiting simple possession of cannabis (marijuana) after it was struck down by the Ontario Court of Appeal in the Parker case.