Decentralized education spending and regional disparities: Evidence from Chinese counties 1997–2001

Chinese fiscal reforms in the past decade have recentralized government revenues, making lower governments more dependent on central and provincial funds. At the same time, decentralization in spending has obliged the county governments to take primary responsibility for financing compulsory education. That vertical imbalance can lead to widening regional gap in education if the central government does not carry out effective redistributive fiscal transfers. This paper examines a data set that includes all the counties of mainland China from 1997 through 2001 and finds that regional economic and budgetary disparities did carry over to education spending. The author would like to thank Professor Alice Cooper and the anonymous reviewers for invaluable suggestions.     

Creating Public Value with Tax and Spending Policies: The View from Public Economics

According to the framework rooted in public economics, governments can create public value by focusing tax and spending policies on remedying market failures and addressing concerns about fairness embodied in a social welfare function. By pursuing optimal tax and spending policies, governments navigate the omnipresent trade‐offs between equity and efficiency. Of course, in practice, the process by which policies are adopted does not resemble the planner's problem in social choice theory. In addition, real fiscal policies do not look much like the recommendations that arise from the optimal tax literature. Governments operate in public choice environments that are not conducive to focused remedying of market failure, and they suffer from their own tendencies to fail to achieve their objectives. Nevertheless, many of the tools are in place to help the federal and state governments focus tax and spending in ways that can maximize public value.     

State Actions Affecting Cities and Counties, 1990–1993: De Facto Federalism

States experienced considrable fiscal stress during the first four years of the 1990s. This has led to changes in five policy areas: (1) state financial aid; (2) local revenue diversification; (3) "sorting out" of responsibilities between the state and local governments; (4) tax and spending limitations; (5) and mandate relief. Some of the most significant changes occurred in California, Colorado, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, and Wisconsin.     

Political characteristics, institutional procedures and fiscal performance: Panel data analyses of Norwegian local governments, 1991–1998

Abstract.  Budgeting can be understood as a common resource pool problem where spending agencies have incentives to encourage excessive levels of current spending and reduce budget surplus or create budget deficits. The political leadership is assumed to have an important role in keeping fiscal control and resisting the high-demanders' pressure for increased spending. Three factors of relevance for their success are investigated: political characteristics (political colour and political strength, the strength of relevant interest groups) and two institutional characteristics – committee structure and budgeting procedures. The analyses are based on panel data from up to 434 Norwegian municipalities in the period from 1991 to 1998. The results support the hypothesis that strong political leadership improves fiscal performance. The effect of interest groups is to a high degree community-specific. However, an increased share of elderly reduces fiscal surplus. Differences in budgetary procedures do not seem to affect fiscal performance. A strong committee structure seems, on the other hand, to result in better fiscal performance than a weaker one.     

Do citizens care about government debt? Evidence from survey experiments on budgetary priorities

Ever since the Great Recession, public debt has become politicised. Some research suggests that citizens are fiscally conservative, while other research shows that they punish governments for implementing fiscal consolidation. This begs the question of whether and how much citizens care about debt. We argue that debt is not a priority for citizens because reducing it involves spending and tax trade-offs. Using a split-sample experiment and a conjoint experiment in four European countries, we show that fiscal consolidation at the cost of spending cuts or taxes hikes is less popular than commonly assumed. Revenue-based consolidation is especially unpopular, but expenditure-based consolidation is also contested. Moreover, the public has clear fiscal policy priorities: People do not favour lower debt and taxes, but they support higher progressive taxes to pay for more government spending. The article furthers our understanding of public opinion on fiscal policies and the likely political consequences of austerity.     

Oil,elections and fiscal transparency

How does governments’ ability to gain financing from oil income affect their behaviour? Numerous studies have explored the effects of oil wealth on countries’ political characteristics, especially the level of democracy. Oil has also been associated with a significant electoral incumbency advantage across different political regimes. However, the relationship between oil wealth and incumbent governments’ behaviour, including election-year fiscal manipulation, has been studied to a lesser extent. This article argues that higher oil rents increase election-year public spending as they provide national governments both with direct revenue and increased financing opportunities. However, fiscal transparency mitigates this effect. Consequently, oil-induced electoral budget cycles decrease as fiscal transparency increases. Using a high-quality measure of fiscal transparency in a panel of countries, robust evidence in favour of this argument is found. The findings suggest that many of the previous results on the political effects of oil, including incumbency advantage, might run through an election-year spending channel, and that fiscal institutions might matter substantially for the political effects of oil.     

Do fiscal rules dampen the political business cycle?

This paper develops and tests the theory that fiscal rules limit politicians' ability to manipulate the budget for electoral gain. Using panel data from the American states, I find evidence suggesting that stringent balanced budget rules dampen the political business cycle. That is, while spending rises before and falls after elections in states that can carry deficits into the next fiscal year, this pattern does not exist in states with strict “no-carry” rules. Neither binding gubernatorial term limits nor the partisan composition of government appear to significantly affect the magnitude of the political business cycle.     

School Spending Profiles: A Framework to Enlighten Resource Allocation Decisions*

Despite improved fiscal accounting systems, many district leaders continue to struggle with how to report and use fiscal data for the purpose of strategic resource decisions. This paper proposes the creation and use of school spending profiles as a way to communicate more complete and comparable school spending information. The proposed school spending profile provides not only a complete picture of school expenditures reflecting real costs, but it also indicates spending relative to each school's mix of student needs. Data from Denver Public Schools (DPS) illustrate how profiles can provide dashboard indicators useful for district leadership. Key assumptions and implications are considered.     

Fiscal Adjustments and Their Effects During the Transition to the EMU

The transition phase to EMU hasbeen accompanied by considerable monetaryand fiscal consolidation efforts in the EU.This paper analyses this consolidationprocess and its effects on economicactivity in the EU. It is tested to what extent fiscal retrenchment efforts havedepressed or stimulated private spending. Inthe case of the latter non-Keynesian effectsdominate the traditional Keynesianexpenditure effects of government spending,taxation and transfer payments.     

A better budget rule

Debt limits, interest coverage ratios, one‐off balanced budget requirements, pay‐as‐you‐go rules, and tax and expenditure limits are among the most important fiscal rules for constraining intertemporal transfers. There is considerable evidence that the least costly and most effective of such rules are those that focus directly on the rate of spending growth, even with their seemingly ad hoc nature and possibilities for circumvention. In this paper, we use optimal control theory and martingale methods to justify a transparent, nonarbitrary rule governing maximum sustainable rate of spending growth, treating the revenue structure of a jurisdiction as a given continuous‐time stochastic process. Our results can be used to determine whether a proposed rate of spending growth is sustainable or not. © 2009 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

The Role of Slack in Local Government Finances

The research presented here adopts an organizational approach to develop three regression models that examine why local governments accumulate slack in the form of unreserved fund balances, and what is the impact of slack resources on local governments' short‐term fiscal conditions and decisions about spending and revenues. Using data on Chicago suburban municipalities and their governments, the first model estimates the effects of long‐term and short‐term conditions (fiscal and governing) on unreserved fund balances. The second and third models examine the impact of slack resources and other factors on year‐end deficits or surpluses and changes in spending and own‐source revenues. The results show that ending balances, expenditures (size), and long‐term fiscal conditions have the greatest effect on fund balances, and that slack and current fiscal conditions have the greatest effect on ending balances and changes in revenues and spending.     

The Federal Antideficiency Act at 150—Where Do We Stand?

The Antideficiency Act of 1870 codified Congress's power of the purse to curb unauthorized agency spending. Is it still working? This paper analyzes all violations of the Act over 12 years by agency and type, causes and consequences, and how violations were detected. The number of violations has trended down slightly. While agency preventive controls have failed, detective controls are working. Employees and agencies are comfortable self‐reporting violations, which are neither pervasive nor material. The risk of violations increases during fiscal year transitions and periods of change. The Act remains effective at stopping unauthorized and overspending, but does not address wasteful spending.     

The Impact of Parties and Elections on Municipal Debt Policy in Mexico

Opportunistic electoral fiscal policy cycle theory suggests that all subnational officials will raise fiscal spending during elections. Ideological partisan fiscal policy cycle theory suggests that only left‐leaning governments will raise election year fiscal spending, with right‐leaning parties choosing the reverse. This article assesses which of these competing logics applies to debt policy choices. Cross‐sectional time‐series analysis of yearly loan acquisition across Mexican municipalities—on statistically matched municipal subsamples to balance creditworthiness across left‐ and right‐leaning governments—shows that all parties engage in electoral policy cycles but not in the way originally thought. It also shows that different parties favored different types of loans, although not always according to partisan predictions. Both electoral and partisan logics thus shape debt policy decisions—in contrast to fiscal policy where these logics are mutually exclusive—because debt policy involves decisions on multiple dimensions, about the total and type of loans.     

(Non)equivalence in a federalism: Dual tax shares, flypaper effects and Leviathan

Among the best-known theorems of fiscal federalism is the presumed allocative and distributive equivalence between a lump-sum grant to a collectivity and a set of lump sum grants to the members of a collectivity. Interestingly, the simple elegance of the theorem is at odds with observed behavior. Grants to governments produce greater public spending than does tax reduction. Explanations of this "flypaper effect" range from misspecified econometric modeling to presumed behavior based on fiscal illusion. In this paper we show that theoretical equivalence exists in a model that recognizes only one tax share, the citizen voter's local tax share. When the model is expanded to include voters' federal tax shares as well as local taxes, non-equivalence and the flypaper effect become the rule, not the exception.     

中国财政政策对居民消费需求的非对称效应——基于流动性约束视角下一个新的分析框架

政府运用财政政策扩大居民消费需求,除了需要科学抉择政策取向之外,政策力度和节奏的把握也非常关键。本文在Tagkalakis研究的基础上,首先提出了中国财政政策对居民消费非对称性效应研究的理论框架,然后建立财政政策冲击对居民消费影响的经济计量分析模型,利用1999—2009年中国省际面板数据估计了政府消费冲击、税收冲击以及预期可支配收入对居民消费的影响,并在此基础上进一步考察流动性约束在财政政策冲击对居民消费产生非对称性影响中的作用。实证结果表明财政政策冲击在好与坏两个时期之间对居民消费产生了显著的非对称性凯恩斯效应。其中在坏的时期,政府消费冲击与税收冲击对居民消费影响效应的绝对幅度相对较大。虽然国外理论界认为非对称性效应产生的原因复杂,本文认为在我国财政政策冲击对居民消费产生非对称性效应的原因中,流动性约束起到了非常重要的作用。另外,预期可支配收入因是否面临流动性约束而对不同类型消费者的消费需求影响发生方向性改变。     

The Federal Role in State Fiscal Stress

This article examines the extent to which the federal government'spolicies were responsible for the fiscal stress experiencedby most state governments in the early 1990s. Federal policieshave contributed considerably to recent state fiscal stress,particularly through the Medicaid program—the fastestgrowing part of state budgets—and the recession, whichdepressed revenue and increased welfare and Medicaid spending.Federal aid reductions have not been an important source ofrecent state fiscal stress. The real value of per capita federalaid other than for welfare programs fell considerably in the1980s, but the reductions were much greater for local governmentsthan for states. The largest reductions were in the early 1980s.Federal policies have affected state finances in several otherways—through tax policy, unfunded mandates, and the federalfailure to cope effectively with problems like health and poverty.Federal court rulings have also caused budget problems (as havestate court decisions). In some respects, state fiscal problemsare not a federal responsibility. Rising school enrollments,new corrections policies, and inelastic tax systems have createdfiscal stress for many states. Excessive state spending in the1980s has contributed to recent fiscal problems in some states,but not generally.     

Spending Stabilization Rules: A Solution to Recurring State Budget Crises?

Recurring state fiscal crises raise a fundamental question: Is it possible to stabilize budgets over the business cycle? This paper examines spending stabilization rules, an alternative to the inaccurate process of budget forecasting. Under two spending rules, we assess how state budget situations would compare with actual experience. Our analysis reconstructs recent aggregate state budget patterns assuming states had adopted a rule and then takes a closer look at California and South Carolina. With surpluses partially invested in a rainy‐day fund, a spending rule resulted in stable growth of state budgets throughout the recession and sluggish recovery of the early 2000s.     

Political markets, property tax referenda, and local school spending

For better or worse, fiscal decisions made through property tax referenda allow local political markets to work. Demand, supply, and voting process components of such markets are estimated for those Oregon K-12 school districts that held referenda between 1981 and 1986. Various attributes of the median voter were related to school spending, but supply decisions by school boards and administrators were also important. Large districts used state aid to substitute for local property tax revenues on nearly a one-for-one basis, while relying on reversion budgets (inadequate property tax bases and implicit threats of school closures) to extract greater-than-desired spending levels from the median voter.     

Fiscal policy responsiveness, persistence, and discretion

This paper analyzes the different characteristics of fiscal policy using a two-step estimation procedure. First, we decompose both government spending and government revenue into three components: responsiveness, persistence and discretion. Second, we assess the determinants of these characteristics. Using data from 132 countries, our results show that fiscal policy is more persistent than responsive to economic conditions, which implies that the authorities may have less leeway in the short-run notably to curb spending behavior. In addition, countries characterized by greater fiscal persistence have less discretion and responsiveness. Finally, macroeconomic, institutional and geographic variables explain cross-country variation in fiscal characteristics.     

The political economy of the peace dividend

We develop a model of the peace dividend and use it to predict the fiscal consequences of a reduction in the demand for military spending. The model is based on the assumption that the political process responds to political demands and costs in a way that maximizes net political benefits. The predictions of our model on how a peace dividend will be allocated over nonmilitary spending, tax relief, and deficit reduction is tested against the experience of eight major wars in United States history.