The Investment Theory of Wars: Belligerent Dictators in the McGuire/North-Model of Autocracy

In the early 90s Martin C.McGuire and Mancur Olson Jr. developed aneconomic explanation of autocracy. Thedifferentiation between roving andstationary bandits is the core of theirtheory. The authors claim that an``invisible hand'' leads to a conversion ofroving bandits into stationary bandits. Inthis respect, stationary bandits are``public goods providing kings'' who reignpeacefully. Thus, war is hardly a rationalpolitical option. However, this resultstands in contradiction to the overwhelmingevidence for wars in human history.Therefore, war as a political option isintroduced. It is shown that theMcGuire/Olson argument challenging the ideathat the welfare of people ruled bystationary bandits is always higher thanwelfare of people ruled by roving banditsproves to be valid only under certaincircumstances.     

The Logic of Private and Collective Action

Since Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action (1965), it is impossible for political scientists to conceive of political participation without reference to his powerful argument linking numbers of participants, public goods, and participatory outcomes. What is puzzling is the poor empirical support for this argument in the domain where it should work best, namely explaining business political activity. Olson thought his arguments principally applicable to economic groups, and for the empirical development of his arguments Olson drew heavily on business interests, the most active segment of the interest group community. We explore these arguments with business political activities data by examining the statistical performance of various measures of market structure in determining business political activity, and find little empirical support. We do offer an alternative basis for business behavior lodged in both private and collective goods that preserves business rationality and also helps explain not only the amount of business political participation but the modes of business participation .     

Competition among officials and the abuse of power

Traditional economic theory suggests that competition among officials providing government goods tends to reduce corruption. However, empirical evidence does not yet support this view. In this paper, I show that a corrupt and powerful central authority can use competition among officials to amass resources for itself. While competition reduces corruption at the lower level of government, corruption at the higher level of government is increased. To avoid widespread theft from the central authority, competing officials are monitored more intensively than a monopolist. Hence, even though competition among officials generates more consumer surplus, it may reduce welfare.     

The private stake in public goods: overcoming the illogic of collective action

Conclusion According to the Logic of Collective Action, most actions in the service of common interests are either not logical or not collective. In a large group, the argument goes, individual action counts for so little in the realization of common interests that it makes no sense for a person to consider group interests when choosing a course of personal conduct. Only private interests are decisive. Their fulfillment, at least, depends in a substantial way on one's own behavior. Individual actions designed to achieve private advantage are therefore rational. Actions aimed at collective goods are a waste of time and effort. Occasionally, of course, a person acting on the basis of private interests may inadvertently provide some collective good from which many other people derive benefit. This is what happens in the case of the Greek shipping tycoon. But it occurs only because one person's private good fortuitously coincides with the collective good of a larger group. From the tycoon's perspective, there are no collective interests at stake in the sponsorship of an opera broadcast, only his own private interests. Nor does his decision to underwrite a broadcast take account of the other people who will listen to it. His action is a solitary one designed to serve a private interest, and it is perfectly consistent with Olson's argument concerning the illogic of collective action, because it is not grounded in collective interest and is not a case of collective behavior. Olson's theory permits people to share collective interests but not to act upon them voluntarily. The only acknowledged exception occurs in the case of very small groups, where each member's contribution to the common good represents such a large share of the total that any person's default becomes noticeable to others and may lead them to reduce or cancel their own contributions. In this instance, at least, one person's actions can make a perceptible difference for the chance of realizing collective interests, and it is therefore sensible for each person to consider these collective interests (and one another's conduct) when deciding whether or not to support group efforts. Outside of small groups, however, Olson finds no circumstances in which voluntary collective action is rational. But in fact the conditions that make collective action rational are broader than this and perhaps more fundamental to Olson's theory. They are inherent in the very ‘collectiveness’ of collective goods - their status as social or group artifacts. In the absence of a group, there can be no such thing as a collective good. But in the absence of mutual awareness and interdependence, it becomes extremely difficult to conceive of a social group. The assumption that group members are uninfluenced by one another's contributions to a collective good is no mere theoretical simplification. It may be a logical impossibility. Being a member of a group, even a very large one, implies at the very least that one's own conduct takes place against a background of group behavior. Olson's assumptions do not acknowledge this minimal connection between individual and group behavior, and they inhibit recognition of the elementary social processes that explain why slovenly conduct attracts special attention on clean streets, or why the initial violations of group norms are more momentous than later violations. It may be argued, of course, that the groups of Olson's theory are not functioning social groups with a collective existence, but only categories or classes of people who happen to share a collective interest. The logic of collective action is intended precisely to show why these ‘potential’ groups are prevented from converting themselves into organized social groups whose members act in a coordinated way. In such latent groups, perhaps, members are unaware of one another, and Olson's assumption that they are uninfluenced by one another's conduct becomes a reasonable one. Another implication, however, is that Olson's theory is subject to unacknowledged restrictions. The logic of the free ride is for potential groups. It may not hold for actual ones. The distinction is exemplified, in the case of public sanitation, by the difference between what is rational on a clean street and what is rational on a dirty one. The logic of the free ride does not make sense for the members of an ongoing group that is already operating to produce collective goods such as public order or public sanitation. While this represents a notable limitation upon the scope of Olson's theory, it apparently leaves the logic of collective action undisturbed where potential or latent groups are concerned. But suppose that a member of an unmobilized group wants her colleagues to contribute to the support of a collective good that she particularly values. Her problem is to create a situation in which such contributions make sense to her fellow members. As we have already seen in the case of the neighborhood street-sweeper, one possible solution is to provide the collective good herself. If it has the appropriate characteristics, its very existence may induce other members of the latent group to contribute to its maintenance. This is not one of those cases in which one person's private interest fortuitously coincides with the collective interest of a larger group. The neighborhood street-sweeper is acting on behalf of an interest that she is conscious of sharing with her neighbors. Her aim is to arouse collective action in support of that interest. She does not expect to pay for public cleanliness all by herself, or to enjoy its benefits all by herself. Her role bears a general resemblance to the one that some analysts have defined for the political entrepreneur who seeks to profit personally by supplying a collective good to the members of a large group (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young 1971). Like the neighborhood street-sweeper, the entrepreneur finds it advantageous to confer a collective benefit on others. But the similarity does not extend to the nature of the advantage or the manner in which it is secured. The entrepreneur induces people to contribute toward the cost of a collective good by creating an organizational apparatus through which group members can pool their resources. The existence of this collection mechanism can also strengthen individual members' confidence that their colleagues' contributions are forthcoming. What the entrepreneur gains is private profit - the difference between the actual cost of a collective good and the total amount that group members are prepared to pay for it. By contrast, the neighborhood street-sweeper induces support for a collective good, not by facilitating contributions, but by increasing the costs that come from the failure to contribute. As a result of her efforts, she gains a clean street whose benefits (and costs) she shares with her fellow residents. She takes her profit in the form of collective betterment rather than private gain, and her conduct, along with the behavior of her neighbors, demonstrates that effective selfinterest can extend beyond private interest. Self-interest can also give rise to continuing cooperative relationships. The street-sweeper, acting in her own interest, brings into being a cooperative enterprise in which she and her fellow residents jointly contribute to the production of a collective good. Cooperation in this case does not come about through negotiation or exchange among equal parties. It can be the work of a single actor who contributes the lion's share of the resources needed to establish a collective good, in the expectation that its existence will induce others to join in maintaining it. The tactic is commonplace as a means of eliciting voluntary collective action, and it operates on a scale far larger than the street or the neighborhood. Government, paradoxically, probably relies on it more than most institutions With its superior power and resources, it may be society's most frequent originator of voluntary collective action. Its policies, imposed through coercion and financed by compulsory taxation, generate a penumbra of cooperation without which coercion might become ineffectual. By providing certain collective goods, government authorities can move citizens to make voluntary contributions to the maintenance of these goods. The stark dichotomy between private voluntary action and public coercion - one of the mainstays of American political rhetoric - may be as misleading as the identification of self-interest with selfishness. There is more at stake here than the voluntary production of collective goods. Continuing cooperative behavior can have other results as well. Once group members begin to expect cooperation from one another, norms of cooperation and fairness are likely to develop. Axelrod (1986) has suggested that modes of conduct which have favorable outcomes for the people who pursue them tend to evolve into group norms. Public-spirited action that serves self-interest could therefore engender a principled attachment to the common good, undermining the assumption of self-interestedness that gives the logic of collective action its bite. Laboratory studies of cooperative behavior have already demonstrated that experimental subjects have far less regard for narrow self-interest than rational choice theory requires (Dawes 1980). In one extended series of collective action experiments, however, Marwell and Ames (1981) found a single group of subjects who approximated the self-interested free-riders of Olson's theory. They were graduate students in economics.     

Price discrimination in a rent-seeking economy

This paper examines the incentive and the consequences of using discriminatory pricing by a monopolist in a rent-seeking economy. It is shown that, even if all consumer groups' demands have identical elasticities at any given price, the monopolist has an incentive to charge a lower price to high pressure consumer groups so as to alleviate their rent-seeking efforts in challenging its monopolistic power. Furthermore, it is shown that by allowing the firm to price discriminate total welfare may increase, even if all rent-seeking expenditures are completely wasteful.     

Aleksandr Bogdanov and Systems Theory

The significance and potential of systems theory and complexity theory are best appreciated through an understanding of their origins. Arguably, their originator was the Russian philosopher and revolutionary, Aleksandr Bogdanov. Bogdanov anticipated later developments of systems theory and complexity theory in his efforts to lay the foundations for a new, post-capitalist culture and science. This science would overcome the division between the natural and the human sciences and enable workers to organise themselves and their productive activity. It would be central to the culture of a society in which class and gender divisions have been transcended. At the same time it would free people from the deformed thinking of class societies, enabling them to appreciate both the limitations and the significance of their environments and other forms of life. In this paper it is argued that whatever Bogdanov's limitations, such a science is still required if we are to create a society free of class divisions, and that it is in this light that developments in systems theory and complexity theory should be judged.     

Monopoly,rent-seeking,and second best theory

In the context of a simple general equilibrium model, in which there is a profit-maximizing monopolist, we show that in general the introduction of rent-seeking does not restore the first best pricing rule for the undistorted industry. This result is in direct contrast to that obtained when one assumes that the monopolist follows a full cost pricing rule with a constant markup ratio. Furthermore, it still holds even if the full cost pricing rule is profit-maximizing. We also investigate the conditions under which the first best pricing rule is reinstated for the undistorted industry.     

"相对剥夺"理论视角下的农村盗窃问题研究

当前新农村建设如火如荼,可愈演愈烈的农村盗窃问题却严重影响着新农村建设的全面协调发展。本文试运用“相对剥夺”理论对农村盗窃问题予以探讨,以揭示农村盗窃问题产生的深层根源,并据此提出解决农村盗窃问题的措施,从而有效遏制及防止农村盗窃问题的发生,最终保障社会主义新农村建设的顺利进行。     

Public Goods Theory from Eighteenth Century Political Philosophy to Twentieth Century Economics

Some scholars have studiedMancur Olson's legacy by investigating theeffects of his research on the socialsciences (McLean, 2000). Others havescrutinized the logical and empiricalimplications of his theories (Sandler,1992; Marsh, 1976; Chamberlin, 1974;Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1970). A thirdgroup have quietly claimed that hisgreatest work, The logic of collectiveaction, was little more than apopularization of earlier ideas (Dowding,1997; Chamberlain, 1966). This paperattempts to exonerate Olson of the latterclaim by reviewing the major contributionsto collective action theory before his timeand comparing them to The logic ofcollective action.     

Do data breach disclosure laws reduce identity theft?

In the United States, identity theft resulted in corporate and consumer losses of $56 billion dollars in 2005, with up to 35 percent of known identity thefts caused by corporate data breaches. Many states have responded by adopting data breach disclosure laws that require firms to notify consumers if their personal information has been lost or stolen. Although the laws are expected to reduce identity theft, their effect has yet to be empirically measured. We use panel data from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission to estimate the impact of data breach disclosure laws on identity theft from 2002 to 2009. We find that adoption of data breach disclosure laws reduce identity theft caused by data breaches, on average, by 6.1 percent. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

The incumbency dilemma and rent extraction by legislators

An incumbent is able to shirk or otherwise obtain rents based on his tenure of office because more senior representatives are better able to advance their legislative agendas than are more junior members. The realization of incumbent rents implies that an electoral prisoners' dilemma occurs at the level of voters across electoral districts. Pivotal voters in each district would benefit if all incumbents were replaced by challengers with similar legislative programs because the cost of incumbent rents can be avoided, but each benefits if his representative has more seniority than those from other districts.     

Participant or Spectator? Victim‐Focused Political Activity since 2010

The public significance of the victim has shifted over successive governments. Each party, when in power, has utilised and politicised the victim to support its policy and legislative agenda. However, on the whole, this attention has been reserved for those who are victims of serious crime (such as murder, sexual violence and domestic abuse) and not volume offences (such as burglary, criminal damage, theft). Recent years have seen the inquiry rising in popularity, a ‘quick political fix’ to satisfy victims—and the public—that action on societal ills is being taken. However, in so doing, successive governments have, perhaps inadvertently, tended to replicate the ‘hierarchy of victimisation’ that is witnessed in frontline criminal justice activities. This has the result of affording victims only a spectator role when policy and legislative changes are being developed in their name. By contrast, the actions taken in developing expert and practitioner‐led policy around victim experience have proved to be more ‘successful’ in generating lasting change. This article suggests that there is no single ‘right’ approach to involving victims in policy development, but that each particular incident or situation needs consideration as how most ‘effectively’ to involve first‐hand victim experience.     

Rational Bandits: Plunder,Public Goods,and the Vikings

The paper applies and extendsinsights from Mancur Olson's study of statemaking to the Vikings. In a world ofroving bandits, a sub-optimal provision ofpublic goods exists, most notably ofsecurity. Roving banditry leads toover-plundering and zero profits for theplunderers, which makes stationary banditryprofitable. The most efficient banditsmonopolize violence, begin to tax andprovide some amounts of public goods inorder to stimulate economic growth. Theanalysis demonstrates how the Vikings'activities and settlements are consistentwith such an explanation, with the dynamicsof the process being reflected in thevariation in the number of raids and theamount of wealth extracted.     

Efficiency in Politics: Competing Economic Approaches

The article reviews four recent economic books on efficiency in democracy. Special emphasis is given to two ambitious competing approaches: Mancur Olson's theory of encompassing interests and Donald Wittman's Myth of Democratic Failure . It is argued that the thesis that democracy should generally be presumed to be efficient is problematic in several respects. Sweeping conclusions are reached by virtue of a superficial application of economic analogies, which abstracts away many crucial characteristics of democratic politics, such as information imperfections, weak incentive structures, and collective action failures. The basic explanation for efficient outcomes may have more to do with the size of rulers' stakes in the economy than with voluntary Coasean bargaining.     

Civic implications of restorative justice theory: Citizen participation and criminal justice policy

Restorative justice, a normative theory and reform movement emphasizing dialogue and reconciliation between victim, offender, and community, is a widespread, if experimental, part of the practice of criminal justice in the United States. This essay argues that restorative justice draws connections between civic engagement and punishment practices that distinguish it as a normative theory of criminal justice. Advocates of restorative justice expect the growth of non-punitive attitudes and the weakening of support for incarceration to emerge from a public and lay-oriented context of adjudication. The role of lay participation in achieving social change, although prominent in restorative justice critiques of mainstream criminal justice norms and practices, has not been clearly articulated in practical terms. Significant ambiguities remain regarding the degree of lay participation, scope of authority, and the focus of restorative justice forums. The essay argues that an adequate assessment of restorative justice experiments should include an analysis of their impact on public attitudes towards crime and crime control policy and not simply on their impact on the specific victims and offenders involved. The link between less incarceration and restorative justice forums is public willingness to grant them the authority to hear and sanction offenses that would ordinarily receive incarceration. Whether and how they can influence broader public attitudes, then, is a critical test of restorative justice effectiveness.     

论统治视角中的官僚制

官僚制理论是由马克斯·韦伯提出并作出了深入研究的问题。在韦伯之前 ,虽然也有人对这个问题作出研究 ,但只是在他这里 ,官僚制理论才第一次作为一个系统的理论而存在。在韦伯之后 ,官僚制的问题是 2 0世纪学术思想研究中最为引人注目的问题 ,几乎所有 2 0世纪著名的思想家们都对这个问题发表过意见。但是 ,所有谈到这个问题的人 ,无论是持肯定的态度还是采用批判的眼光 ,基本上都是对官僚制作出了统治的理解。这就是官僚制理论和实践出现全面危机的根源。当前 ,一场全球性的行政改革运动正在进行 ,要想真正有所建树 ,当务之急是走出统治的视角     

Pluralism, Corporatism and the Distributive Conflict in Developed Capitalist Countries

In the 1970s the level of the distributive conflict increased in most developed capitalist countries. But at the same time it was found that the level of the distributive conflict remained on an unchanged level or even declined in some countries. In this article the role of interest organizations is analysed in explaining both cross-national differences in the level of the distributive conflict and the resurgence of the distributive conflict in the 1970s. Using Mancur Olson's new theory of interest organizations, the author shows on a theoretical level that a pluralist mode of interest intermediation is conducive to a high level of the distributive conflict and that a corporatist mode of interest intermediation is conducive to a low level of the distributive conflict. Empirical analyses in 18 developed capitalist countries are then carried on to test this theory. Empirical analyses strongly support the theory.     

Robust satisficing voting: why are uncertain voters biased towards sincerity?

The modern theory of voting usually regards voters as expected utility maximizers. This implies that voters define subjective probabilities and utilities for different outcomes of the elections. In real life, these probabilities and utilities are often highly uncertain, so a robust choice, immune to erroneous assumptions, may be preferred. We show that a voter aiming to satisfice his expected utility, rather than maximize it, may present a bias for sincere voting, as opposed to strategic voting. This may explain previous results which show that strategic voting is not as prevalent as would be expected if all voters were expected utility maximizers.     

Preserving the low‐income housing stock: What nonprofit organizations can do today and tomorrow

Abstract

In recent years, nonprofit organizations involved in housing have multiplied in number and expanded the size and scope of their activities in low‐income housing preservation. Newly available data show that nonprofits now constitute a significant sector in the upgrading, maintenance, and management of affordable housing and continue to focus their efforts on serving those most in need. Analysis also indicates that the potential exists for significant further expansion of their activities in the short and medium term. While nonprofits cannot by themselves meet the enormous needs for preserving low‐income housing, they can be major contributors, particularly if carefully designed expansion of federal support for projects and operations comes to complement their current resources.     

Control,consent and political legitimacy

In this essay, I evaluate Philip Pettit’s theory of republican political legitimacy and maintain that it fails to provide a more satisfactory account of legitimacy than consent-based theories. I advance two interrelated theses. First, I argue that in so far as Pettit successfully narrows the scope that his theory of political legitimacy has to address, his arguments could be adapted to support consent-based theories. Second, I argue that Pettit’s theory fails to satisfy the high standards it sets for itself and is thus unsuccessful. My critique focuses on Pettit’s notions of historical, political and normative necessity, before evaluating whether his requirement of equally individualised popular control of government should be endorsed.