Republican China: Chaos,Process, and Revolution*

A pivotal figure in the birth of Chinese cinema, Zheng Zhengqiu (鄭正秋 1889–1935) established an art of dramatic film integral to the creation of early Chinese motion pictures. His style incorporated unique cross-media perspectives, producing theatrical works fundamentally grounded in his experiences in graphic arts (illustrated news) and theater. This article focuses on crucial links between Zheng's films and his work for various illustrated newspapers, as well as between his stage plays and his own experience of family life. The author offers new approaches to and interpretations of Zheng's art, analyzing his emotional modes of narrative and provocative forms of engagement. These artistic traits are rarely discussed in contemporary scholarship on his contributions to Chinese cinema. Emerging during the 1911 Revolution, Zheng's sensational style of drama aimed to foster broad social and cultural reforms. For Zheng, art was never for art's sake alone; instead, art was always in the service of society.     

The Modernization in Irish Republican Thinking Toward the Utility of Violence

For the last thirty years the Irish republican movementcomposed of the IRA and Sinn Feinhas resorted to armed struggle as part of its strategy against British power in Northern Ireland. The cease-fire announced by the terrorist group in 1994 and the peace process that followed has signaled a historic shift in the strategic thinking of republicans. The emergence of dissident groups that reject the politicization of the movement and advocate the maintenance of the military campaign has highlighted the challenges the republican leadership faces after their acceptance of the 1998 Belfast Agreement. This article explores all of these issues and the importance of the armed struggle in the shifting republican mentality.     

Incompetence, Noise, and Fear in Central-Local Relations in China

In this article, I analyze how the structure of the Chinese state affects the probability that local cadres will comply with the directives of the center. Because the Chinese state consists of a five-level hierarchy of dyadic principal-agent relationships, the existence of even moderate levels of routine incompetence and noise ensures that compliance will be less than perfect due to simple error. Moreover, because the center cannot perfectly differentiate between simple incompetence and willful disobedience, the structure of the state enables cadres to engage in strategic disobedience. I thus conclude that the complexity of the linkages between center and locality are a major factor in the observed persistence of corruption and institutional malfeasance. Andrew Wedeman is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln. His research focuses on the political economy of reform in China and specifically on the effects of corruption on development, both in China and elsewhere in the developing world. Recent publications include: “Budgets, Extra-Budgets, and Small Treasuries: The Utility of Illegal Monies”,Journal of Contemporary China; “Agency and Fiscal Dependence in Central-Provincial Relations in China”,Journal of Contemporay China; “Stealing from the Farmers: Institutional Corruption and the 1992 IOU Crisis”.China Quarterly and “Looters, Rent-Scrappers, and Dividend-Collectors: Corruption and Growth in Zaire, South Korea, and the Philippines”,The Journal of Developing Areas.     

From Borderland to Heartland: The Discourse of the North-West in Early Republican China

Abstract

The issue of the North-West, its developmental potential and significance as a national place, gained great attention in early and mid-1930s China. Early twentieth-century Chinese understandings of the North-West as a geographical region derived from Qing imperial order in the Inner Asian frontier lands of the empire but the term became more complex semantically in the Republic and by the 1930s it had gained a range of different meanings. Such complexity bespoke some of the tensions involved in conceptualizing the relationship between former Qing Inner Asian frontier lands and the Chinese heartland within the new territorial form of the Chinese Republic. This article traces changing meanings and uses of the term from the late Qing into the 1930s. It identifies and examines key areas of its discursive content and reveals the growing centrality of ideas of the frontier and North-West in Chinese nationalist discourse. This research highlights the importance of the frontier in post-imperial Chinese visions of the nation.     

The Legislative Process in Republican China: The 1930 Nationalist Family Law and the Controversy over Surnames for Married Women

Abstract

This article investigates the legislative process that produced the 1930 Nationalist Family Law Book of the Republican Civil Code, focusing in particular on the debate over married women's surnames. In the accompanying discussion, Guomindang (GMD) lawmakers, legal experts, educators, women's rights advocates, and others grappled in a remarkably open manner over how best to address the surname question in light of their concerns with Party consolidation, legal modernisation, gender equality, social stability, and individual identity. Although the outcome of the legislative process affirmed customary surname practices (albeit with progressive overtones), the process itself was uniquely radical, with participants thoroughly reevaluating one of the oldest and most fundamental patriarchal institutions in Chinese society. The legislative and post-legislative debate over surnames illuminates the Nanjing Decade as a singular transitional period in the history of Chinese law and gender during which law was subject to revision and amendment rather than orthodoxy, and GMD policy toward women was subject to deliberation rather than dictated by ideology.     

The Politics of Fear

The future of the European Union has never been more in doubt than at the very moment it has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its historical accomplishments. When the heads of Europe's weakest institutions—the Commission, the Council and the Parliament—collected the prize in Oslo on December 10, 2012 they spotlighted the nub of the problem. Unless these institutions can garner the legitimacy of European citizens and transform into a real federal union with common fiscal and economic policies to complement the single currency, Europe will remain at the mercy of global financial markets and the fiscally authoritarian dictates of its strongest state, Germany. Moving beyond this state of affairs was the focus of a recent “town hall” gathering in Berlin sponsored by the Berggruen Institute on Governance. The meeting brought together current power brokers—such as the contending voices of German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble and French Finance Minister Pierre Moscovici, who rarely appear in public together—as well as Europe's top former leaders, key thinkers and young people who will govern in the future. The peace‐building project of the European Union was born out of the ashes of World War II and the anguish of the Cold War. Yet, as George Soros points out, its current inability to resolve the eurocrisis by forging greater union is dividing Europe once again, this time between creditors and debtors. Former Greek premier George Papandreou has warned that this division is fomenting a new politics of fear that is giving rise to the same kind of xenophobic movements that fueled the extreme politics of the Nazi era. To avoid a repeat of the last calamitous century, Europe first of all needs a growth strategy both to escape the “debt trap” it is in—and which austerity alone will only deepen—and to create breathing space for the tough structural reforms that can make Europe as a whole competitive again in a globalized world. To sustain reform, it needs a clear path to legitimacy for the institutions that must govern a federal Europe. The proof that Europe can escape its crisis through a combination of growth, fiscal discipline and structural reform comes from the one country so many want to keep out of the union: Turkey. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan rightfully boasts of Turkey's accomplishments that resulted from the difficult changes carried out after its crisis in 2001—ranging from quickly cleaning up the banks to liberalizing markets to trimming social benefits to make them more affordable in the long run. As a result, Turkey today is the fastest growing economy in the world alongside China with diminished deficit and debt levels that meet the eurozone criteria that many members states themselves cannot today meet. Turkey has even offered a 5 billion euro credit through the IMF for financial aid to Europe. Germany itself also provides some lessons for the rest of Europe. The obvious reason Germany rules today is because it is the most globally competitive country in the European Union. That is the result of a series of reforms that were implemented starting in 2003 under the leadership of then‐chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Aimed a bolstering Germany's industrial base and its collateral small and medium enterprises which are the foundation of its middle class society, those reforms introduced more labor flexibility and trimmed benefits to make them sustainably affordable while investing in training, maintaining skills and research and development. Even if Europe's individual nation states can shrink imbalances by following Turkey and Germany in getting their act together, the only ultimate way to save the euro, and thus Europe itself, is to build the complementary governing institutions at the European level. For those institutions to become effective, they must be empowered and legitimated by European citizens themselves. To this end, Tony Blair has suggested a bold move: the direct election of a European president. Symbolically, the Oslo ceremonies were a historical turning point for Europe. By recognizing the European Union's peace‐making past, the Nobel Prize challenged Europe to escape once and for all the destructive pull of narrow national interests and passions.