Cause Lawyers,Political Violence,and Professionalism in Conflict

This article examines how cause lawyers in conflicted and authoritarian societies balance their professional responsibilities as lawyers with their commitment to a political cause. It is drawn from extensive interviews with both lawyers and political activists in a range of societies. It focuses on the challenges for lawyers in managing relations with violent politically‐motivated clients and their movements. Using the notion of ‘legitimation work', it seeks to examine the complex, fluid, and contingent understandings of legal professionalism that is developed in such contexts, offering three overlapping ‘ideal types’ of cause lawyers in order to better understand the meaning of legal professionalism in such sites: (a) struggle lawyers (b) human rights activists and (c) a ‘pragmatic moral community'. The article concludes by re‐examining how law is imagined in the legitimation work of cause lawyers in such settings and how that work is remembered in the transition from violence.     

Defending coase against false charges: A comment on block

This note suggests that Coase's The Problem of Social Cost has been read and interpreted too broadly to apply to all aspects of law. Drawing from Coase's own work, I show that Coase was narrowly focused on the economic analysis of negative externalities. This understanding of the paper precludes it from being used as a justification for the broad redistribution of property rights for the purpose of wealth maximization. This understanding of Coase's paper also defends his work against charges from those who object to making the determination of property rights secondary to the maximization of wealth.     

Psychology,law, and the black community

Summary The present paper presented key applications of psychology and the law to the black community, embracing both civil and criminal law and legislation. The breadth of its focus preluded a more in-depth treatment of other areas relevant to black people which include issues related to psychiatric emergencies and involuntary hospitalization, child custody, and right-to-treatment litigation in prison and mental health facilities. In focusing attention on these applications and areas for activity, hopefully, I have not presented an unrealistic depiction of a responsive, socially sensitive, legal system capable and willing to exercise its powerful tools in the interest of the black community. To the contrary, there is considerable literature that identifies the historic role of the legal system in the enactments of laws to institutionalize and cement slavery, its failure to aggressively protect constitutional and civil rights of blacks, in imposing penalties differentially to blacks and whites in the criminal justice system, and more recently, conspiracies of law enforcement officials to deprive blacks of basic civil rights (Bell, 1975; Burns, 1973; Higgenbotham, 1973). The legal system, rather than being an effective instrument for justice and positive social changes, has often been a major source of racism. Thus, any meaningful attempts by lawyers or behavioral scientists in the interest of black people cannot ignore the racism that is embedded in the fabric of the legal profession and the behavioral sciences. Particular aspects of the law with significant social-psychological dimensions are: the cultural inertia, the archaicness of the law due to its roots in English common-law, historic and contemporary racism, conservatism associated with the principle of stare decisis, judicial elitism, and the substitution of administrative and judicial discretion for overt racism. Thus, in order for the legal system, or the field of psychology, to be reponsive to the needs of blacks and other oppressed groups, they must eradicate racism and injustice in their own ranks.Traditionally law has functioned as the hand maiden of the propertied class in our society. So it was to be expected that lawyers in the legislative halls, lawyers on the bench and lawyers in the executive branch of government would combine their talents to perpetuate by law this peculiarly American doctrine of racism predicated upon a claimed color inferiority.     

Interviewing Preschoolers: Comparisons Of Yes/No and Wh- Questions

This study investigated the influence of question format on preschool-aged children's errors, their response accuracy, and their tendency to say I don't know when given non-misleading questions in a neutral, unbiased context. Children (3 to 5 years old) participated in a craft-making session that included a staged accident with two experimenters differing in gender and appearance; the environment also had several distinctive features. One week later children were interviewed about actions, participants, and environment; questions were yes/no format with the veridical response yes (yes questions), yes/no format with the veridical response no (no questions), and specific wh- format questions. Question format substantially influenced children's responses: they were most likely to make errors if asked no questions, and were unlikely to answer either yes/no question with I don't know. In contrast, children spontaneously and frequently said I don't know to wh- questions about content they did not recall (environment), but not about content that was well recalled (actions). Implications of question format for reliability of eyewitness testimony by preschoolers are discussed.     

The right,the good and the jurisprude

Legal philosophy must be based on a set of substantive political values about such fundamental matters as the nature of the political community and the meaning of human freedom. This general thesis is illustrated by the analysis of moral discourse about the justification and limits of liberty-rights and equality-rights.The most effective way of arguing about the liberal conception of individual liberties (consistent with the Millian Harm Principle) is by recourse to the priority of the right over the good. But this conception is little more than a restatement of the Harm Principle itself hence, a more fundamental justification for it is required. This can be provided by a substantive conception of equality of individuals as moral agents who are capable of choosing, pursuing and changing their own conceptions of the good, within the parameters of avoiding harm to others.In turn, the basic moral problem about equality-rights concerns the test of the discriminatory character of legal classifications. The insistence that immutable personal characteristics, such as race and sex, are prima facie discriminatory, can only be explained by an appeal to a notion of positive freedom: individuals should not be adversely affected by those characteristics over which they have no control.There is a significant parallelism in the discourse about liberty-rights and equality-rights: one is a mirror image of the other. This indicates that jurisprudence is incomplete without those more fundamental conceptions, such as equality of moral agents and positive freedom, and that a proper discourse about human rights is derivative from the ideal of a just society.I am grateful to Martin Krygier, Grant Lamond and David Mason for their helpful comments.     

Abortion: Models of responsibility

My focus within the topic of abortion is on several models that are used to support the position that a woman has a responsibility to sustain the fetus she carries because she brought about its existence. I consider the following models: a creator, strict liability, fault, and a contract. Although each of these models has been used by opponents of abortion to support the position that women should accept the consequences of engaging in sexual intercourse, I argue that none of the models is adequate.This paper grew out of research begun during the 1979 Summer Seminar of the National Endowment for the Humanities led by Richard Wasserstrom. He and other participants in the Seminar contributed to my thinking then and commented later on drafts of this paper. Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the Society for Women in Philosophy and to colloquia at California State University, Los Angeles, and the University of California, Santa Cruz. I appreciate the good suggestions made during these discussions. I also want to thank Sharon Bishop, Donald Burrill, E. M. Curley, Barbara Herman, and Miles Morgan for their helpful comments.     

The relationship of the outcome and procedural fairness: How does knowing the outcome influence judgments about the procedure?

Justice theories distinguish between fair procedures and fair or favorable outcomes. However, it is not clear whether people can clearly separate judgments about procedures from knowledge of the outcomes of those procedures. Two experiments are reported which address that question. In both studies respondents evaluate the fairness of decision-making procedures. In one case those evaluations occur prior to knowing the outcome of the procedure (behind the veil), while in the other the outcome is known before the procedural evaluation (in front of the veil). Two hypotheses about outcome influence are tested: that knowing the outcome changes themeaning of procedural fairness and that knowing the outcome changes theweight given to procedural fairness. Findings of both studies suggest that prior knowledge about the outcome does not change the way people define the meaning of the fairness of a procedure. However, people place less weight on their judments about procedural fairness when evaluating the decision maker if they make those judgments already knowing the outcome of the procedure.     

Arguments in Favour of a Functional Theory of Fundamental Rights

The article suggests a relational concept of fundamental rights.This concept enhances the «functional» rôleplayed by some of the rights in the system of a state governedby the rule of law, rather than an ethical universality or asubstantial content coinciding with any list of «human»rights. Fundamental rights belong to the fundamental (ideal, substanticeand normative) criteria of recognition/selection of actions and normain the institutional/normative practice of a legal order. Given thispremise, the work analyses some relevant issues: universal-fundamentalnexus, property rights, liberty rights, social rights. Fundamentalrights refuse any rigid classification which identifies anddistinguishes among them on the basis of their fixed doctrinal structure: universal rights vs. non universal ones, property vs.liberty rights, social rights as rights to state services. Theseclassifications miss the real point about fundamental rights,which are to protect interest and values of individuals sociallydeemed worth of the best legal efforts in the most effective approach.     

Measuring the Convergence/Divergence of “Serious Crime” Arrest Rates for Males and Females: 1960–1995

It is now almost a quarter of a century since Adler (1975) and Simon (1975)stimulated a debate about the convergence of crime rates for men andwomen. The ensuing debate generated literally dozens of papers. Given theexistence of a series that now extends from 1960 to 1995, this papersuggests an appropriate way to examine the convergence hypothesis usingtime series techniques. These techniques take into consideration the effectsof the following factors: (a) random shocks orinnovations, (b) the potentially lasting effects of suchinnovations, and (c) the autocorrelation that time series oftenexhibit. Using time series techniques on annual data, we examine trends inthe arrest rates for males and females for six Part I crimes (homicide,robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft)for the years 1960 through 1995. We test for convergence, divergence, notrend, and a special condition of equilibrium between series calledcointegration.     

Adam Liberman

Adam Liberman, one of Australia's leading IP lawyers, is nowGeneral Counsel of CSIRO, Australia's national science agency.Also an established IP author, here he found time to answerquestions put to him by JIPLP. How did you first become interested in IP? Various unrelated strands formed my IP interest. The first waswhen I read Charles     

The Place of Legal Positivism in Contemporary Constitutional States

The aim of the paper is that of discussing some recent antipositivist theses, with specific reference to the arguments that focus on the alleged incapability of legal positivism to understand and explain the complex normative structure of constitutional states. One of the central tenets of legal positivism (in its guise of methodological or conceptual positivism) is the theory of the separation between law and morality. On the assumption that in contemporary legal systems, constitutional law represents a point of intersection between law and basic moral values, antipositivists contrast legal positivism with two main arguments. First, on a more general level, the positivist theory of the separation between law and morality is questioned; then, and consequently, the neutrality thesis in the juristic study of law is rejected. The author discusses both these antipositivist arguments, and offers a brief defence of methodological positivism.     

The structure of basic human rights

This paper offers a theory of the structure of basic human rights which is both compatible with and clarificatory of the traditional conception of such rights. A central contention of the theory is that basic rights are structurally different from other kinds of moral rights, such as special rights, because of differences both in the way in which basic rights have content and the model on which basic rights are correlative with duties. This contention is exploited to develop and defend the central thesis of the theory, namely that basic human rights are bundles of mutually held active rights enjoyed by persons in virtue of the specifiable moral relationships they bear to each other.     

When Are People Persuaded By DNA Match Statistics?

The way in which statistical DNA evidence is presented to legal decision makers can have a profound impact on the persuasiveness of that evidence. Evidence that is presented one way may convince most people that the suspect is almost certainly the source of DNA evidence recovered from a crime scene. However, when the evidence is presented another way, a sizable minority of people equally convinced that the suspect is almost certainly not the source of the evidence. Three experiments are presented within the context of a theory (exemplar cueing theory) for when people will find statistical match evidence to be more and less persuasive. The theory holds that the perceived probative value of statistical match evidence depends on the cognitive availability of coincidental match exemplars. When legal decision makers find it hard to imagine others who might match by chance, the evidence will seem compelling. When match exemplars are readily available, the evidence will seem less compelling. Experiments 1 and 2 show that DNA match statistics that target the individual suspect and that are framed as probabilities (i.e., The probability that the suspect would match the blood drops if he were not their source is 0.1%) are more persuasive than mathematically equivalent presentations that target a broader reference group and that are framed as frequencies (One in 1,000 people in Houston would also match the blood drops). Experiment 3 shows that the observed effects are less likely to occur at extremely small incidence rates. Implications for the strategic use of presentation effects at trial are considered.     

Gillian Davies

How did you first become interested in IP? After being called to the Bar and completing my pupillage inCommon Law Chambers, I decided I wanted to work in an internationallaw context to make use of my language skills in French andSpanish. Completely by chance, I applied for a job as legalassistant at the United International Bureaux for the Protectionof Intellectual Property (the organization which subsequentlybecame WIPO), in     

Plan and counterplan: Notes on moving beyond the crisis in planning theory

Conclusions In developing a working class perspective of planning theory, I have suggested that neither bourgeois nor Marxist planning theories can incorporate the dissensus tactics that are at the heart of working-class movements. Neither can they deal with the class nature of planning nor the class composition of planners. As the current social, political and economic crisis was forced on capital by the struggles (plans) of the working class, it follows that working-class counter-plans should deepen the crisis so that benefits will accrue to our side. The development of our successful counter-plans will throw their planning theory deeper into crisis. Ultimately, crisis resolution must be on the terms of the (ex-)working class.     

What makes an international institution work for labor activists? Shaping international law through strategic litigation

Studies on international legal mobilization often analyze the mobilization efforts of activists at a single international court. Yet we know little about how activists choose among multiple international institutions to advance social justice claims. Drawing on comparative case studies of Turkish and British trade union activists' legal mobilization efforts and case law analysis, I show that activists, guided by their lawyers, probe multiple avenues to identify the legal institution with the highest judicial authority and is most responsive to activists' claims. Once they identify their target institution, the iterative process between a responsive court and activists' strategic litigation can build a court's jurisprudence in a new issue area, even if the court provides limited de jure rights protections. Activists primarily use international litigation strategy to leverage structural reforms at the domestic level and to set new international norms through precedents.     

Interpreting the Political Theory in the Practice of Human Rights

In this discussion of The Heart of Human Rights, I support Allen Buchanan’s pursuit of a theory-in-practice methodology for interpreting the foundations and meaning of international legal human rights from within the practice. Following my use of that methodology, I recharacterize the theory of rights revealed by this methodology as political not moral. I clarify the import of this interpretation of international legal human rights for two problems that trouble Buchanan: (1) whether the scope of ‘basic equal status’ is a global or an ‘intrasocial’ standard and (2) whether there is a ‘proliferation’ of rights that risks undermining the legitimacy of international legal human rights. I argue that the scope of basic equal status is global and that the practice of making what he calls ‘new’ rights claims is part of the practice of human rights.     

Vico and Imagination: An Ingenious Approach to Educating Lawyers with Semiotic Sensibility

Law is a specialized semiotic realm, but lawyers generally are ignorant of this fact. Lawyers may manage meaning, but they also are managed by meaning. Seemingly trapped by the weight of pre-existing signs, their attempts to manage these meanings generally are limited to technical interventions and instrumentalist strategies. Signs have power over lawyers because they are embedded in narratives, a semiotic economy that confronts the lawyer as “given” even though it is dynamic and constantly under construction. Most lawyers do not make meaning through legal narratives; rather, they parrot bits of the controlling narratives in response to certain problems. Because clients often can achieve their objectives when their lawyers crudely manipulate the symbols of law, these endeavors pay very well. Well-paid lawyers tend not to ask too many questions. Consequently, semiotics is, at best, misunderstood by lawyers; more likely it is wholly unknown. A lawyer’s avowed instrumentalism is the very problem to be addressed in this regard. For the scope of discussion, I refer to Vico’s famous On the Study Methods of Our Time and draw my conclusion for the lawyer of our time.     

Political corruption and the role of public prosecutors in Italy

This paper analyzes the problem of political corruption in Italy and the role public prosecutors have played in unraveling such a phenomenon. The factors that have contributed to fostering systemic corruption as well as those that have contributed to uncovering such a system are given careful consideration. The most relevant conclusion is that whereas endogenous forces in the judiciary (prosecutors and judges) — in particular, its low level of institutional autonomy — have prevented it from containing corruption, exogenous forces — which have broken the conditions that had favoured the stability of the so-called first Republic — have led prosecutors to engage in massive investigations.This article is a revised version of the paper prepared for delivery at the 1994 Workshop on Corruption and Politics held at the Instituto Internacional de Sociologia Juridica, Onati (Spain), July 13–14, 1994. I am appreciative to Prof. Giuseppe Di Federico (University of Bologna) for his deep insights of this complex matter and for his very useful comments.