“保护的责任”：国际法院相关司法实践研究

“保护的责任”自提出以来,迄今已在政治层面获得了广泛的国际共识。在法律层面特别是可操作性层面,国际法院通过对《灭种罪公约》及《消除一切形式种族歧视国际公约》的解释和适用,提出了“作为一种义务存在的干涉”这样一种新观念,强调了所有公约当事国所应承担的“预防责任”,间接地回应了《国家对国际不法行为的责任》条款草案第48条,也从法律实践的角度回应了“保护的责任”,特别是其中的“预防责任”。通过这种回应,就使国家基于“保护的责任”而采取的某些干涉行动具有合法性。这种回应,将会深刻地影响到国家的行为模式。面对这种新发展所带来的挑战,中国有必要调整自身外交策略。     

Evidentiary Issues in the ICJ's Genocide Judgment

Despite the commitment by the International Court of Justice(ICJ or the Court) in clarifying underlying methods and guidelinesof its approach to fact-finding and evidence, it can be doubtedwhether the judgment delivered in the Bosnia and Herzegovinav. Serbia case genuinely marked a decisive step towards a moretransparent and reliable methodology for evidentiary matters.Behind the formula of ‘fully conclusive evidence’,when dealing with Articles II and III of the Genocide Conventionthe Court adopted for all practical purposes a typical criminallaw ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’ standard of proof.By this choice the Court upheld in substance the argument putforward by Serbia that even if the questions of state responsibilityfor acts of genocide are not excluded by the scope of the Convention,they must nevertheless be judged by the same parameters of individualcriminal responsibility. In reaching its conclusions the Courtrelied heavily on the jurisprudence of the ICTY, both as regardsthe ascertainment of facts and their legal qualification. Itremains to be seen whether in future cases the Court will beable to adopt a similar criminal court posture, and whetherit will be similarly prepared to rely on the findings of otherinternational tribunals such as the International Criminal Court,which is not established by the Security Council.     

The Crime of Genocide in the ICTR Jurisprudence

The jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal forRwanda (ICTR) has properly focused on the special intent (dolusspecialis) to destroy a group as the distinguishing characteristicof genocide and differentiated it from result-oriented crimes.Although the ICTR has crowned genocide as ‘the crime ofcrimes’, it has simultaneously dethroned it by holdingthat it attracts the same sentence as other humanitarian lawviolations. Nonetheless, ICTR jurisprudence attaches considerableimportance to characterizing the destruction of the Tutsi asgenocide as distinct from crimes against humanity. Because theTutsi cannot be readily distinguished as one of the protectedgroups under the Genocide Convention, Trial Chambers have goneto great lengths to characterize them as an ‘ethnic’group in order to justify the label of genocide.     

The Implications of the ASLEF Case

The decision of the European Court of Human Rights in ASLEFv United Kingdom (27 February 2007) will require the governmentto re-visit the law relating to the right of trade unions toexclude and expel individuals because of their membership ofpolitical organisations perceived by trade unions to be hostileto their interests. It is now clear—as was pointed outat the time—that the changes made by the Employment RelationsAct 2004 do not go far enough to meet obligations under theEuropean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). However, the casealso raises much wider questions about the compatibility ofother statutory restraints on trade union autonomy with Article11 of the ECHR, notably ss 64–67 (on unjustifiable discipline)and 174–177 (on exclusion and expulsion as a whole, andnot only the measures relating to membership of hostile politicalparties). This article considers both the immediate and thewider implications of the ASLEF decision for British trade unionlaw, in the context of what appears to be a greater willingnessof the Strasbourg Court to listen more carefully to trade uniongrievances than in the past. The article also draws attentionto the role of litigation as a trade union strategy to recoverlost rights, and again emphasises the importance of InternationalLabour Organisation Convention 87 and the Council of Europe'sSocial Charter of 1961 (as well as the jurisprudence thereunder)as important sources in the construction of the ECHR, Article11.     

What the ICJ did not say about the Duty to Punish Genocide: The Missing Pieces in a Puzzle

The article focuses on the legal implications of the constructionof the International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court) ofthe duty to punish genocide under Article VI of the Conventionon the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide inthe Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro judgment.It posits that the Court's discussion of the duty to punishis satisfying in terms of what it says and less satisfying interms of what it is silent about. It is satisfying in the sensethat the Court's construction of the duty to cooperate withinternational tribunals prosecuting genocide as including aduty of extradition, seems to extend beyond the plain languageof the Convention and indeed beyond the parties’ originalintent. It is not fully satisfying because the duty to prosecuteremains quite limited. It is further argued that the obligationto punish genocide as established in Article I and the obligationto prosecute genocide as established in Article VI should beunderstood as two distinct obligations. Article VI merely setsthe institutional arrangements for prosecution. Other normativesources support the conclusion that a general duty to prosecuteperpetrators of genocide or extradite them for prosecution elsewhereapplies even in those cases where the offence was not committedin the territory of a contracting state or when the offenderis prosecuted by an international court that has jurisdictionover the state where the alleged perpetrator is found.     

The Enjoyment of Rights and Freedoms: A New Conception of the 'Ambit' under Article 14 ECHR

Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as applied by the UK judiciary under the Human Rights Act 1998, is in danger of becoming as 'parasitic' as it is often described. Judges have inappropriately narrowed the scope of the 'ambit' of other Convention articles, and thus limited the number of claims to which Article 14 can apply, by defining it according to considerations more properly weighed in a justification analysis incorporating proportionality. The emerging approach departs from Strasbourg jurisprudence, and fails to give full effect to the language and intent of Article 14. This trend need not continue. This article begins the process of fashioning a new conception of the ambit of Convention articles: one that could change the fortunes of Article 14 cases in the UK, but that flows naturally from the precedents of the European Court of Human Rights, and gives effect to the spirit of the HRA.     

O'Keeffe v Ireland: The Liability of States for Failure to Provide an Effective System for the Detection and Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse in Education

In O'Keeffe v Ireland, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found that Ireland failed to protect the applicant from sexual abuse suffered as a child in an Irish National School in 1973 and violated her rights under Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention on Human Rights. This note argues that the decision is important in expanding the Court's jurisprudence regarding positive obligations under Article 3 to child sexual abuse in a non‐state setting where there was no knowledge of a ‘real and immediate’ risk to the applicant. It also argues that the case raises concerns about the Court's methodology for the historical application of the Convention and about the interaction of Article 3 positive obligations with vicarious liability in common law tort regimes.     

A Foetal Right to Life? The Case of Vo v France

This article examines the scope of application of Article 2of the European Convention on Human Rights, to the unborn foetus.The focus of the articles is on the case of Vo v France, and,in particular, on the jurisprudence of the European Court ofHuman Rights on a state's obligation to protect life in respectof both voluntary and involuntary, negligent terminations ofpregnancies. The last part of the article reviews abortion lawsin Europe and the US and suggests that a gradualist moral perspectiveon the status of the embryo could justify the imposition ofcriminal penalties for foetal death caused by violent conductagainst a pregnant woman without prejudice to the rights ofthe woman.     

我国刑事赔偿制度之改革

In reference to the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter referred to “the Covenants”), the state compensation system of China in criminal justice shall be reformed as such: Compensation for a miscarriage of justice should not be determined by the results of first instance or second instance, but no guilty through retrial in the final trial upon finding of new evidences. If policemen, prosecutors and judiciaries take lawful measures, causing loss to the suspected due to arrest, detention or other enforcement in the criminal proceedings, the suspected should not get the state compensation for that even if he is decided no guilty in the final trial. If the suspected is cooped up illegally, he should get the state compensation even if being decided guilty finally. The measures of search and seizure should be included in coercive measures, hence differentiating the lawful search and seizure and the unlawful infringement of the property rights. Yang Yuguan, Professor of the Procedure Law Institute in China University of Political Science and Law, whose research mainly covers procedure law and human rights law. He wrote many books and essays, for instance, “Computer and Crime” (1986), “On Plea Bargaining” (1986), “Basic Education in Prisons in China” (1995), “The United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Policy” (1996), “On the Ratification and Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” (2000), “On Hearsay” (2001), “On Exclusionary Rule” (2002), “Human Rights Law: Study On International Covenant on Civil and Political Right” (2003), “The International Criminal Court: Idea, reality and Prospective” (2007), “Death Penalty Control with Procedural Law” (2006), “On Due Process of Law and Human Rights Protection” (2005). He was once a researcher fellow of Ministry of Justice of China, a member of the Crime Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office at Vienna, and an editor-in-chief in some books, such as “The United Nations Criminal Justice Norms and Standards”, “The United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies and their Comments”, “A Study On UN Convention of Anti-corruption”.     

Asylum Claims and Drug Offences: the Seriousness Threshold of Article 1F(b) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the UN Drug Conventions

Asylum claims lodged by individuals who were involved in drugactivities prior to their entry into the country of asylum raisecomplex questions as to whether they have committed a seriousnon-political crime under Article 1F(b) of the 1951 Conventionand thus shall be excluded from refugee protection. The 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugsand Psychotropic Substances (Trafficking Convention) —which is the relevant international framework for drugs in thefield of international criminal law — indiscriminatelyconsiders all forms of supply related drug offences as ‘seriouscriminal offences’, irrespective of individual criminalresponsibility. This conflicts with the complex nature of thedrug industry particularly in countries affected by armed conflictand proportionality considerations inherent to Article 1F(b). Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatiesprovide a possibility to reconcile the ambiguous wording ofthe Trafficking convention with Article 1F(b) by means of interpretation.Offences for personal consumption as the least serious drugoffences do not reach the seriousness threshold of Article 1F(b).Trafficking offences in turn attain the seriousness thresholdonly if aggravating circumstances prevail over mitigating circumstances,and if there are no grounds for rejecting individual responsibilityor defenses to criminal liability. International, large-scaleactivities carried out by transnational organized criminal groupsare factors that make drug offences most serious.     

Equal Civil Partnerships,Discrimination and the Indulgence of Time: R (on the application of Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of State for International Development

In R (on the application of Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of State for International Development the Supreme Court unanimously declared that the ban on different‐sex civil partnerships was incompatible with Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In a strikingly robust and, at times, acerbic manner, the Court systematically dismantled the Secretary of State's request for tolerance of a discriminatory and unsustainable legal position. The decision represents a clear victory for those campaigning for reform and the issuing of a declaration of incompatibility by the Court is likely to have influenced the later announcement by Prime Minister Theresa May in October 2018 that different‐sex civil partnerships will ultimately be introduced in England and Wales.     

WHAT DOES ACCESS TO JUSTICE REQUIRE? — OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO INVOKE THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

Persons with disabilities have a right to effective access to justice under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD). This article provides insights on the parameters of that right, including a close examination of the history and text of Article 13, which directly addresses access to justice and other relevant UNCRPD provisions. In addition to the UNCRPD, this article discusses implementation guidance from the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, including its guidelines for State Party reports and jurisprudence. The initial reports by eleven States Parties — Argentina, Azerbaijan, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Hungary, Mexico, Peru and Turkmenistan — are also considered. The Committee’s feedback regarding implementation of Article 13 by these eleven States parties is critiqued for being limited and inconsistent. This article then attempts to clarify what effective access to justice actually requires. It does so by focusing on the insights that can be drawn from implementation of Article 13 since the UNCRPD was adopted as well as implementation guidance from the Conference of States Parties, the International Disability Alliance, the World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry and the National Center for Access to Justice. This article concludes with recommendations on how the Committee can improve its guidance on access to justice to help ensure that equal rights will not be illusory for persons with disabilities.     

On the Use of Criminal Law Notions in Determining State Responsibility for Genocide

On the face of it the 1948 Convention on Genocide appears tobe a treaty that on the one hand obliges contracting statesto criminalize and punish genocide in their domestic legal systemsand, on the other, arranges for interstate judicial cooperationfor the repression of genocide. The International Court of Justice(ICJ), in the Bosnia v. Serbia judgment, has instead held thatthe Convention, in addition to providing for the criminal liabilityof individuals, also imposes on contracting states as internationalsubjects a set of obligations (to refrain from engaging in genocide,to prevent and punish the crime, and also to refrain for allthose categories of conduct enumerated in Article III: conspiracy,incitement, attempt, complicity). This approach raises two questions:(i) is it warranted so to broaden states' responsibility? (ii)when applying such Article III categories to state responsibility,should an international court such as the ICJ that pronounceson interstate disputes rely upon criminal law categories toestablish whether a state incurs responsibility for conspiracy,complicity, and so on? Or should it instead forge autonomouslegal categories better suited to state responsibility? Theauthor sets forth doubts about whether it is appropriate totranspose criminal law categories to the corpus of internationallaw of state responsibility. In particular, his misgivings relateto the category of ‘state complicity in genocide’as set out by the Court: once the Court decided to transplantthis criminal law category to state responsibility, arguablyit should have relied upon the rigorous concept of complicity,as derived by international criminal courts from case law andthe relevant practice of states, rather than apply a notionthat finds no basis in international criminal law, in comparativecriminal law or in state practice.     

Trade marks are 'possessions'--but applications are not (yet)

In its decision of 11 October 2005 the European Court of HumanRights (ECHR) ruled that a registered trade mark was a ‘possession’within the meaning of Article 1 of the First Protocol to theEuropean Convention on Human Rights. The ECHR failed, however,to extend this level of protection to the particular trade markapplication at issue, thereby leaving the protection of intellectualproperty rights as fundamental rights somewhat incomplete forthe time being.     

Case Comment: The Legality of ‘Kettling’ after Austin

This case comment considers the European Court of Human Rights decision of Austin v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 14. Austin claimed, unsuccessfully, that police kettling at a public protest in London amounted to a violation of her right to liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights. This case comment suggests that the court took an unexpected and unorthodox approach to the issue of ‘deprivation’ within Article 5. This decision may come to undermine the protections afforded by Article 5 and extend the current exceptions to Article 5 to an indefinite range of situations.     

On the Principle of Complementarity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the RomeStatute or the Statute) entered into force on 1 July 2002, withthe satisfaction of Article 126 of the Statute.¹ Up until 24 September 2004, 139 States have signed the Statuteand 97 States have become the Parties. Under such circumstances,China, as one of the permanent members of the Security Councilof the United Nations and a non-party State playing a greatrole in international affairs, needs to acquire a better understandingand also makes a detailed study on the Statute. One of the mostunique characters of the International Criminal Court (the ICCor the Court)—as reflected in the principle of complentarity—willbe discussed and analysed in the following essay.     

The Powell Hypothesis: Race and non-capital sentences for murder in Kentucky, 1976–1991

The 1987 U.S. Supreme Court decision McCleskey v. Kemp ruled, in part, that the findings of the Baldus study, offered by the petitioner to support a claim of racial bias in death penalty cases, were insufficient to demonstrate unconstitutional discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Lewis Powell offered additional justification for the ruling when he wrote, “If we accepted McCleskey’s claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty. ” This statement has become labeled as the “Powell Hypothesis. ” This paper tests the “Powell Hypothesis” to determine whether race has an impact on sentences levied in noncapital murder cases in Kentucky between 1976 and 1991. The results indicate racial factors influenced sentence length in these cases.     

Guantánamo Bay: Towards Legality?

This article outlines the US Supreme Court's approach to the habeas corpus entitlements of suspected terrorists detained in Guantánamo Bay and argues for the extension of constitutional habeas corpus rights to them. The article considers two ways in which the Supreme Court might carry out this task: first, 'the territorial approach' (based on domestic legal principles of 'unincorporated territories' and principles of leasehold), and secondly, 'the extraterritorial approach' (based on international purposive approaches to the reach of human rights treaties exemplified by the European Court of Human Rights' Article 1 jurisprudence). For reasons of effectiveness of protection, the Article expresses a clear preference for the latter. The House of Lords decision in R (Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence (2007) is proposed as a template for such a development. Finally the article refutes arguments rejecting such a development based on the 'trade-off thesis' and perceptions of judicial competence.     

Delfi AS v Estonia: The Liability of Secondary Internet Publishers for Violation of Reputational Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights

In October 2013, the European Court of Human Rights in Delfi AS v Estonia upheld a decision of the Estonian Supreme Court to impose liability on the owners of an internet news portal for defamatory comments which had been posted on their website by anonymous third parties. This note suggests that the decision is important in the context of publications with a ‘public interest’ element to them, because it appears to afford more protection to the right to reputation (deriving from the Article 8 right to privacy) and less to freedom of expression than was formerly the case. It is further argued that the Court's emphasis on the positive obligation of states to protect this right to reputation may mean that the existing English law in this area, including, potentially section 5 of the Defamation Act 2013, is inconsistent with the ECHR jurisprudence.     

Adverse Possession and Article 1 of the European Convention

In the post-human rights era the question has arisen on several occasions as to whether the automatic and arbitrary termination of the registered owner’s title through the common law and statutory principles governing adverse possession of land is contrary to the Article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention. The matter fell to be decided in J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom ([2005] 3 EGLR 1) where the European Court of Human Rights held that the automatic termination of a registered owners title after 12 years possession was indeed a violation of Article 1, Protocol 1. More recently, the decision of the European Court has been overturned by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights where the Grand Chamber has held that a squatters’ right to another persons land are not disproportionate (J. A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v United Kingdom, The Times, October 1st 2007). This short article examines the decision of the Grand Chamber.