Popular Constitutionalism's Hard When You're Not Very Popular: Why the ACLU Turned to Courts

Through a case study of the early American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), this article examines the empirical ramifications of constitutional scholars' recent exhortations to "take the Constitution away from the courts" in order to promote democratic deliberation about constitutional meaning. While it is now one of the most prominent examples of a litigation-based interest group, the ACLU began its existence demonstrating a commitment to constitutionalism outside the courts. Through coding a decade's worth of meeting minutes and examining archival sources, I demonstrate that the ACLU's mounting unpopularity rendered extrajudicial politics impossible, precipitating the ACLU's shift toward litigation. The ACLU's move toward litigation, despite its early devotion to political activism outside the courts, suggests that it is not always possible for political actors to make constitutional arguments without courts. Furthermore, the ACLU's use of courts to publicize and dramatize its constitutional arguments demonstrates that litigation may actually promote popular deliberation about constitutional meaning. These political realities both highlight and contradict two empirical assumptions underlying arguments about the normative desirability of restricting courts' involvement in constitutional politics. First, the state is not a neutral arena in which all political actors are equally free to pursue their constitutional visions through majoritarian processes. Second, courts may facilitate (rather than hinder) popular deliberation about constitutional questions.     

The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism

Constitutional discourse has perhaps never been more popular, nor more comprehensively challenged than it is today. The development of new constitutional settlements and languages at state and post-state level has to be balanced against the deepening of a formidable range of sceptical attitudes. These include the claim that constitutionalism remains too state-centered, overstates its capacity to shape political community, exhibits an inherent normative bias against social developments associated with the politics of difference, provides a language easily susceptible to ideological manipulation and, that, consequent upon these challenges, it increasingly represents a fractured and debased conceptual currency. A rehabilitated language of constitutionalism would meet these challenges through a version of constitutional pluralism. Constitutional pluralism recognises that in the post-Westphalian world there exists a range of different constitutional sites and processes configured in a heterarchical rather than a hierarchical pattern, and seeks to develop a number of empirical indices and normative criteria which allow us to understand this emerging configuration and assess the legitimacy of its development.     

The Perils of ‘As If’ European Constitutionalism

This review article offers thoughts on Kaarlo Tuori's recent book, European Constitutionalism, and more particularly on what he calls the ‘disciplinary contest over the legal characterisation of the EU and its law’. As the book's title suggests, Tuori privileges the constitutional perspective in that contest, so much so—he freely admits—that his analysis ‘predetermine[s] how the EU and its law will be portrayed’. And therein also lies the book's main weakness. Tuori's predetermined ‘constitutional’ interpretation, like so much of the dominant legal discourse in the EU today, ultimately obscures the core contradiction in EU public law. National institutions are increasingly constrained in the exercise of their own constitutional authority but supranational institutions are unable to fill the void because Europeans refuse to endow them with the sine qua non of genuine constitutionalism: the autonomous capacity to mobilise fiscal and human resources in a compulsory fashion. The EU's lack of constitutional power in this robust sense derives from the absence of the necessary socio‐political underpinnings for genuine constitutional legitimacy—what we can call the power‐legitimacy nexus in EU public law. To borrow Tuori's own evocative phrase, the EU possesses at best a ‘parasitic legitimacy’ derived from the more robust constitutionalism of the Member States as well as from the positive connotations that using ‘constitutional’ terminology evokes regardless of its ultimate aptness. The result is an ‘as if’ constitutionalism, the core feature of which is an increasingly untenable principal‐agent inversion between the EU and the Member States, one with profound consequences for the democratic life of Europeans. The sustainability of integration over the long term depends on confronting these adverse features of ‘European constitutionalism’ directly, something that legal elites—whether EU judges, lawyers, or legal scholars—ignore at their peril.     

The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional Democracy

The paper is a critical survey of the last ten years of research on the principles of legitimacy of constitutional democracy and their application in practice in Europe and North America. A constitutional democracy is legitimate if it meets the test of two principles: the principles of democracy or popular sovereignty and of constitutionalism or the rule of law. There are three contemporary trends which tend to conflict with the principle of democracy and thus diminish democratic freedom. There are three responses to the lack of legitimacy of these three trends. The first is to downplay the principle of democracy in order to endorse the three trends. The second is to uphold the principle of democracy, in the form of deliberative constitutional democracy, in order to criticise aspects of the three trends and to call for further democratisation. The third trend deepens this critical response by tying the test of democratic legitimacy more closely to case studies of attempts by citizens to exercise their democratic freedom.     

Reconciling Constitutionalism with Power: Towards a Constitutional Nomos of Political Ordering

Drawing upon Hannah Arendt's and Carl Schmitt's theories on the relationship between nomos and boundary, this paper revisits how constitutionalism and political power are reconciled as constitutional ordering. It first analyzes constitutionalism in the light of political modernity. Indicating that political power grounded by constitutions is omnipotent, complementing and completing constitutionalism, the paper contends that an omnipotent constitutional ordering is anything but an unleashed Leviathan. It is argued that constitutional omnipotence is framed and thus constrained by a constitutional nomos, the matrix of which is a dual delimitation of boundaries, generational, and jurisdictional.     

Democracy and emergency: finding the constitutional foundation of the knowledgeable state in social dynamics

This article aims to bring to light the law–society dynamic relationship in constitutional governance by engaging with the question of political constitutionalism from the perspective of institutional epistemology. It first reframes the debate surrounding legal and political constitutionalism as one concerning the state's ‘epistemic competence’ in governance shaped by the constitution, and then traces how constitutional ordering has given rise to the ‘knowledgeable state’ by setting a unique social dynamic in motion: the ‘epistemico-political constitution’. Using the example of the World Health Organization's initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic, a the article presents a two-part argument. First, constitutional ordering institutes a process of knowledge production embedded in the interaction between the state and society – a unique law–society dynamic – that responds to governance needs. Second, given the current law–society dynamic in the suprastate political landscape, the legitimacy challenge facing expertise-steered global governance is further intensified as more crisis responses are expected from outside the state.     

Constitutional Directives: Morally‐Committed Political Constitutionalism

About 37 state constitutions around the world feature non‐justiciable thick moral commitments (‘constitutional directives’). These directives typically oblige the state to redistribute income and wealth, guarantee social minimums, or forge a religious or secular identity for the state. They have largely been ignored in a constitutional scholarship defined by its obsession with the legitimacy of judicial review and hostility to constitutionalising thick moral commitments other than basic rights. This article presents constitutional directives as obligatory telic norms, addressed primarily to the political state, which constitutionalise thick moral objectives. Their full realisation—through increasingly sophisticated mechanisms designed to ensure their political enforcement—is deferred to a future date. They are weakly contrajudicative in that these duties are not directly enforced by courts. Functionally, they help shape the discourse over a state's constitutional identity, and regulate its political and judicial organs. Properly understood, they are a key tool to realise a morally‐committed conception of political constitutionalism.     

宪法判断的正当化功能

对特定国家行为的合宪性作出具有法律效力的宪法判断,有助于实现基本权利的保障和法律体系的统一。除此之外,对国家行为的正当化也是宪法判断所能实现的一个重要功能。宪法是法律体系的正当性基础,通过对法律规范作出合宪判断,可以直接强化其宪法上的正当性,而即便是违宪判断,通过法律技术的运用和处理,也可以实现对特定法律规范或国家行为的正当化功能。     

The High Court of the People: Popular Constitutionalism in Hong Kong under Chinese Sovereignty

Popular constitutionalism rarely arises in authoritarian polities. In the absence of genuine elections and referenda, aggrieved and disenfranchised citizens are more likely to resort to extraconstitutional action to defend themselves, to which the regime may respond with decisive suppression. Systemic popular constitutionalism did emerge in Hong Kong, currently under Chinese sovereignty, however. Through coordinated mass resistance based on shared constitutional understandings, large numbers of residents have succeeded in restraining the appointed Hong Kong chief executive from deploying his full range of powers, obliged China to make concessions on electoral reform it would not have made otherwise, and enabled the Basic Law, an imposed constitution, to remain relevant. This article specifies three preconditions under which the residents of Hong Kong have, in the teeth of authoritarianism, managed to adjudge the constitutionality of the acts of the ruling elite with their feet. These preconditions, nevertheless, are idiosyncratic, and may not endure the recent mounting tensions between Hong Kong and China [Correction added on 5 June 2014, after first online publication: the phrase “to authoritarian politic” has been removed from the last statement in the abstract.].     

西方宪政危机成因分析

西方宪政危机本质上是宪政内部矛盾运动的结果。具体到不同宪政国家,其宪政危机的发生,则各有其复杂而深刻的历史背景和现实原因。从世界近现代宪政史来看,宪政制度的缺失,国家权力秩序的失衡,国家权力的腐败,政治势力的恶斗,经济基础薄弱,社会发育不成熟等是导致宪政危机产生的主要因素。从政治、经济、社会等方面深入探讨宪政危机的成因,对于寻求化解和预防宪政危机的有效对策,促进宪政文明的健康发展有着十分重要的意义。     

Unpopular Sovereignty?

Popular sovereignty was presented in modern constitutional discourse as a mode of collective action. It was supposedly manifest in the power to constitute, control and dismantle governments. Important strands of contemporary constitutional theory, notably legal constitutionalism and deliberative democracy, have taken leave of this tradition. They have severed the connection between sovereignty and action. What remains of popular sovereignty is fundamental rights and values, or dispersed networks of deliberation. This is based on the the idea that the place of power is ‘empty’ and legitimised on the principle of including ‘All-Affected-Interests’. The very concept of sovereignty thus becomes unpopular. This contribution aims to re-establish the link between popular sovereignty and action by examining sovereignty's emancipatory telos, its majoritarian mode of operation and its dependence on political citizenship.     

立宪政体中的赋税问题

以赋税问题作为看待财产权与宪政制度之关系的一个切入点 ,通过对财产权在宪政之先的论述 ,提出赋税的合法性问题。当前的财政危机导致对源自民间的赋税的依赖性增强 ,从而凸现出赋税合法性的危机。解决这一危机的方向是继续沿着财产权入宪的思路 ,确立“税收法定”的宪政主义的赋税模式。     

Examining the Aesthetic Dimensions of the Constitutional Treaty

Abstract:  One of the most important issues surrounding the new Constitutional Treaty is the extent to which it will be able to generate a greater popular identification with the European integration project. This article explores this issue in more depth by looking at the role of popular identification in securing polity legitimacy in general. An argument is then developed that although popular identification and polity legitimacy are often separated, from a practical point of view, it is preferable to think of polity legitimacy in such a way as to incorporate questions of identity and affectivity. The article then outlines a way in which such a theory can be constructed, termed an 'aesthetic' theory of political legitimacy. Such a theory is then applied to understand both the EU as a distinctive type of post-state polity and the role that the constitutional tradition might play in securing its legitimacy.     

宪法泛政治化的逻辑归谬与历史反思

马伯里诉麦迪逊案创立的“政治问题不审查”之宪法惯例及与美国宪法传统相契合的政治观,将对宪法正当性的逻辑判断转读为对于主体的道德依赖,其生成的逻辑结构未免带有强迫性,导致宪法的泛政治化。近代旧中国立宪的逻辑怪圈亦然:宪法“移植”使得“应然宪法”性状无法获得“实然宪法”有效地证明,则悖论产生;“自上而下”的立宪路径和权力本位,使得宪法缺少正当性基础;明显的“工具性”特征,造成“政治”与“宪法”的“目标冲突”,形成“体”和“用”的二律背反。事实就是:宪法的泛政治化是一个世界现象,防止宪法泛政治化,宪法司法化具有价值上的合理性,但以司法化为导向的中国宪政目标之实现尚需经历一个长期的准备阶段,要防止两种极端倾向:悲观主义和冒进主义。     

Reforming the United Kingdom Constitution: Law,Convention, Soft Law

The Governance of Britain Green Paper continues the programme of constitutional reform begun in 1997, and appears to reinforce the juridification of the UK's constitution. Nevertheless, several key reforms will be implemented not by legislation, but by creating new conventions. This article argues that such ‘declared’ conventions are best understood as a form of constitutional ‘soft law’, which attempt to influence constitutional behaviour rather than generating binding norms. Applying a regulatory analysis, it then argues that the case for a soft, rather than hard law approach to constitutional reform is weaker than its widespread use in the UK suggests. Finally, the article challenges the thesis that the political constitution is being replaced by a legal constitution, arguing that the government's attitude to constitutional reform still exhibits basic characteristics of political constitutionalism. Moreover, there is more to contemporary constitutional developments than a bipolar contest between political and legal constitutionalism.     

政治文明与宪政的关系

政治文明是一个从物质文明和精神文明之中抽象出来的且相对独立的概念。从内涵上说 ,政治文明的核心是政治民主 ;从外延上说 ,政治文明包括政治观念的文明、政治规范的文明和政治秩序的文明。政治文明同宪政的关系表现为 :政治文明是宪政的前提和基础 ;宪政是政治文明的支柱和灵魂 ;现代政治文明发展的主流、本质和终极趋向是政治文明的宪法化和宪政文明。文章最后还讨论了政治文明与中国宪政的建构问题 :即建构“民主”与“宪政”的协调并用模式 ,重塑“权力”与“权利”的互动关系模式及完善“国家”和“社会”的二元结构模式     

关于清末宪政运动的几个问题

清末宪政运动是中国近代宪政史的开端。本文重新讨论了清末宪政运动中的三个问题，认为：清末预备立宪不是骗局，而是清末统治者认真权衡自身利害做出的政治抉择；立宪派领导的国会请愿运动不是乞求统治者的恩赐，实际上是一场同清政府争夺立宪主导权的斗争；清末君主立宪虽然失败，清末宪政运动的方向仍然应当给以肯定。     

Political constitutionalism and populism

Criticisms of political constitutionalism's relationship to populism point in two opposed directions. Legal constitutionalists consider it too open to, and even as legitimating, populist politics, whereas radical democrats consider it too closed to popular participation, prompting an anti-system politics of a populist character. I dispute both these views. Underlying these contrasting assessments are differing conceptions of populism and constitutionalism. This article distinguishes right- from left-wing populism, and limited government from non-arbitrary rule, as constitutional ideals. Legal constitutionalism typically embraces the first ideal. However, that can be a driver of both right- and left-wing populism, and allow types of arbitrary rule that democratic backsliding and illiberal regimes can (and do) exploit. By contrast, political constitutionalism involves the second ideal and is antithetical to right-wing populism while potentially friendly to the legitimate demands of left-wing populism. Nevertheless, the practical reality of political constitutionalism in the United Kingdom (and elsewhere) often falls short of its ideal theoretical potential. Addressing these shortcomings, however, requires strengthening democracy rather than the legal constitution, not least through electoral reform.     

Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism

The new model for economic and political renovation mandates the entrenchment, beyond the reach of majoritarian control, of rules for the free movement of transnational capital. This "new constitutionalism" removes key aspects of economic life from the influence of domestic politics within nation states. A manifestation of this new orthodoxy is the network of bilateral investment treaties designed to ensure foreign investors security from "discrimination" and "expropriation," and conferring standing on investors to sue in the event that their investment interests are impaired. This paper examines the agency of the state in promoting this self-binding regime of investment rules and its potential impact on domestic constitutional regimes. Of particular concern here are constitutional arrangements that protect property, such as that recently enacted in the Republic of South Africa, that deviate from the norms expressed in the transnational investment-rules regime.     

世贸组织上诉机构与欧洲法院司法能动之比较——为什么慎谈世贸组织“司法宪法化”

关于世界贸易组织以及欧洲联盟"宪政"的关注度日见高涨,其中,不乏将"司法造法"视为世贸组织制度"宪法化"引擎"的"司法宪法化"学说。但在政府间国际组织内谈论"宪政",不得不保持审慎的态度。比较世界贸易组织上诉机构澄清规则、填补规则、引入规则的司法能动,与欧洲法院的实践有本质的不同,其能动性的发挥有显著的特殊性,不得不区别对待、具体分析。