政府横向权力配置新论——从结构功能主义角度的分析

在＂结构功能主义＂权力分立观看来,政府的立法权、司法权和行政权分别是一种政治性、法律技术性和兼具政治性与行政技术性的权力;为了实现相应的政府职能,这些权力应当由相应的政治性的机关（立法机关）、法律技术性机关（司法机关）和兼具政治性与行政技术性的机关（行政机关）来行使;为了保证各政府机关能够＂称职＂地行使相应的权力,各政府机关的组成人员、运作规则应当具备不同于其他机关和人员的制度设计。尽管当今世界各国存在国家性质和政权体制的不同,但是三种权力的性质却是永恒不变、超越国家界限和超越意识形态的。我国当前权力机关（民意机关）和司法机关（法院）的行政化倾向不利于国家职能的有效实现。     

Gubernatorial Veto Powers and the Size of Legislative Coalitions

Few political institutions are as central to theories of lawmaking as the executive veto. Despite its importance, institutional continuity at the national level has precluded identification of empirical effects of the veto on legislative behavior. We address this limitation and present evidence from the states demonstrating how the veto affects the formation of legislative coalitions and, indirectly, executive influence over policymaking. We find consistent evidence that the presence and strength of gubernatorial veto powers affect the lawmaking behavior of state legislatures. Our analysis shows how institutional provisions condition executives' ability to affect policy outcomes in separation‐of‐powers systems.     

论美国经济制裁中的总统权力边界

美国具有较为完善的经济制裁体系,主要依据《敌国贸易法》和《国际经济紧急权力法》对外实施单边经济制裁。虽然《国际经济紧急权力法》是国会限制总统权力的法律,但是在内容上却给予总统以广泛的行政权力。总统既享有固有的外交权力,又获得国会赋予的对外贸易管制权,而司法部门在涉外问题中基于政治问题和国际礼让原则,并不做司法审查,总统经济制裁的行政权力扩张得到了立法与司法的支撑。在美国经济制裁中,立法权、行政权与司法权受商业利益、个人追求与党派之争的影响,逐渐脱离法治轨道。从宪法授权以及美国经济制裁的发展历程上看,经济制裁措施存在不完全符合宪法等要求的问题,我们在应对美国经济制裁时可从这些问题着手加以研究。     

民法变通规定制定权的法源冲突及解决路径——以《民法典》相关规定阙如为切入点

为在民事法治建设中妥善处理各民族风俗习惯与国家民事法律的关系,我国《民法通则》《婚姻法》《继承法》《收养法》赋予了民族自治地方人大对民事法律规定进行变通的权力。已经正式实施的《民法典》并没有对此项权力予以明确规定,而我国《民法通则》等法律又因为我国《民法典》的实施而被废止。在此背景下,民族自治地方人大还能否对民法典的相关规定进行变通或者补充,是全面贯彻实施《民法典》必须解决的一个重要问题。由于我国《民法通则》等法律规定的变通规定制定权是授权立法而非职权立法,依据宪法及宪法相关法有关立法权限划分的规定,已无法解决我国《民法典》与《民法通则》等法律之间存在的新的一般规定与旧的特别规定的冲突问题。在民法典时代,民族自治地方人大能否对《民法典》的规定进行变通或补充,尚有待全国人大常委会作出裁决。     

梁启超司法理念中的国家本位观

对梁启超司法观念的分析不能脱离于梁氏对西方宪政思想改造的理论框架,寻此脉络可以明晰梁氏宪政理念中对待司法的态度,带有国家本位意识突显于三权分立中的司法限权功能的特征。对外而言,司法独立首先体现为国家主权的独立,也即对领事裁判权的收回。对内而言表现为三方面,第一国家权力的收敛与集中优位于对政府权力的限制;第二倚重行政权与立法权之间权力制衡,司法权功能被旁置;第三,民权让位于司法权力的统一与司法治理。     

议行合一原则应当彻底抛弃

在马克思恩格斯那里,“议行合一“就是“议”和“行”组织的同一与职能合一。“议行合一”作为一个描述社会主义政权权力结构的概念与社会主义的现实不符,作为一种理想的权力结构模式更是有害。在社会主义的历史上,“议行合一”只有在不正常的时期才短暂地存在过,除了战争年代,它给人们带来的是灾难而不是福音。因此,“议行合一”的理论与原则应当彻底抛弃。     

Power,National Security and Transparency: Judicial Decision Making and Social Architecture in the Federal Courts

Even in a democratic society, the need for transparency must be balanced with an important countervailing interest: the occasional, legitimate need for government secrecy. This article, based on an examination of opinions in federal cases dealing with national security and transparency, explores how judges identified the main legal issues presented by a case and the legal factors or mode of legal interpretation used to reach or justify their conclusions. The article concludes that many of these opinions are as much about judges’ attempts to balance the judicial branch's power with the powers of the executive and legislative branches as they are about national security and transparency. Furthermore, the article contends these opinions have created an “architecture of power” that determines how national security information is controlled. The final section also suggests that judges should be mindful of the original architecture of power established by the Constitution and the First Amendment when writing their opinions.     

健全和完善股份公司机关的策略

现代股份公司机关是由股东大会、董事会、监事会分享公司权力并互相制约的一个有机体 ,如何合理安排三会的地位和权力的分配乃是研究公司内部治理结构的最高目标。本文在分析我国公司法律制度现状的基础上 ,主张借鉴外国公司立法的经验 ,建立起以董事会为中心的公司机关 ,适当弱化股东大会的权力 ,限制经理的权力 ,加强监事会的监督职能     

军事司法权能否推定

现代法治要求以权力法定为原则,以权力推定为例外。由于军事法理研究相对薄弱,以及法律与实践的内在冲突,军事司法权受军事统率权控制的制度惯性延续至今,表现在我国军事司法权配置中存在许多权力推定现象。基于现代法治的内在要求,以及依法治国方略和依法治军方针的现实需要,特别是军事司法权属于国家司法权的理论定位,在军事司法权配置实践中,应当严格限制军事司法权的推定,逐步实现从权力推定向权力法定的过渡,军事领导机关不宜再行使军事司法立法权,军事司法机关也不宜再行使军事司法解释权。     

清末改革司法职权配置考察

清末改革中按照立宪政体和三权分立模式建立起相对独立的司法权体系,但法部的司法行政权过大,处处与大理院争权,对审判权的独立行使构成阻碍。大理院内审判权与检察权初步实现了职权独立和相互制约,但对外都受到法部的制约,难以发挥各自应有的作用。清末缺少足够的新式法律人才、配套法律和财政支撑,社会也没有相应的思想准备,尤其是清政府力图强化中央集权和政策统一的指导思想都影响了新建立的司法权体系的独立运行。     

Legal Reasoning and the Separation of Powers: A State-Level Analysis of Disputes Involving Federal Funds Appropriations*

This article investigates the influence of judicial decisions on state legislative oversight of federal funds. A systematic analysis of judicial decisions is undertaken in an effort to reveal (a) the extent to which such activity on the part of legislatures is permitted or denied by courts, and (b) the nature of legal reasoning that determines differential outcomes. The analysis reveals, among other things, that there are two divergent paths of law: one upholding the legislative prerogative to exercise the power of the purse, and the other upholding the executive function of governors to act as custodians and executors of federal funds and programs. The delegation of legislative powers to interim committees is likewise investigated.     

The United States Congress and nuclear war powers: explaining legislative nonfeasance

Scholarly debate over the role of the United States Congress in approving military action has focused on the respective war powers granted the executive and legislature by the United States Constitution. Although a voluminous literature has examined the institutional and partisan politics shaping their exercise, a conspicuous lacuna concerns nuclear war powers. Despite periodic but mostly ineffective reassertions of congressional prerogatives over war, the decision to employ nuclear weapons has been left entirely to presidential discretion since 1945. Explaining this consistent refusal by Congress to rein in the ultimate presidential power and exercise co-responsibility for the most devastating form of war relies less on disputatious constitutional grounds than on three arguments about congressional dysfunctionality, legislative irresponsibility, and the relative costs of collective action by federal lawmakers on perilous national security questions.     

从合宪性推定到权力谦抑主义——香港“郑家纯等诉立法会”案中的解释方法与司法哲学

香港"郑家纯等诉立法会"案的判决涉及"香港立法会的调查委员会是否有权传召当事人"这一颇具争议的问题。针对当事人提出的"立法会调查委员会越权"的主张,在进入司法审查后,法院面对的是如何选择具体的方法来进行审查。虽然从文本来看,香港《基本法》并没有明确赋予立法会的调查委员会以传召当事人的权力,但法院采取合宪性推定方法,认为《基本法》没有禁止立法会通过调查委员会来行使证人传召权,并判决立法会的调查委员会不存在越权情形。这种对立法机关持谦抑姿态的方法论在一定程度上超越了形式文本,在本质上建基于《基本法》架构下国家不同权力间的关系维度,具有宪法上的正当性,并且对当下中国宪法方法的建构具有启示意义。当然,香港立法会调查权的行使必须以《基本法》为依据,以香港特殊的行政主导制为基础,这又从另一面体现了立法权对行政权的谦抑。     

The Influence of Congressional Preferences on Legislative Overrides of Supreme Court Decisions

Studies of Court–Congress relations assume that Congress overrides Court decisions based on legislative preferences, but no empirical evidence supports this claim. Our first goal is to show that Congress is more likely to pass override legislation the further ideologically removed a decision is from pivotal legislative actors. Second, we seek to determine whether Congress rationally anticipates Court rejection of override legislation, avoiding legislation when the current Court is likely to strike it down. Third, most studies argue that Congress only overrides statutory decisions. We contend that Congress has an incentive to override all Court decisions with which it disagrees, regardless of their legal basis. Using data on congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions between 1946 and 1990, we show that Congress overrides Court decisions with which it ideologically disagrees, is not less likely to override when it anticipates that the Court will reject override legislation, and acts on preferences regardless of the legal basis of a decision. We therefore empirically substantiate a core part of separation‐of‐powers models of Court–Congress relations, as well as speak to the relative power of Congress and the Court on the ultimate content of policy.     

立法与行政的权限分配

所谓立法与行政的权限分配即是理顺法的制定与执行之间的上下游关系,本质是权力等级序列问题,它与权力分立语境下机关之间的监督与制约关系并非一回事。所有的立法与行政权限分配方式都可以总结为分离型与下降型两种模型,其中分离型又可以细分为双重分离型、立法与行政分离型和立法分离型。"分离"意味着要么是限制下游,要么是限制上游。对学说、实务、规范三者进行彻底分析可以得知,我国立法与行政的权限分配应当是一种立法分离型结构。立法权自身分离给立法机关与行政机关,但这种分离是限制下游式,受到制约的是行政立法而不是法律;相反,行政权则是立法权的下降,既不应当存在自主行政行为,也不应当限制立法作具体措施。     

The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court,the Primacy of EU Law and the Problem of Kompetenz‐Kompetenz: A Conflict between Right and Right in Which There is No Praetor1

The ECJ has long asserted its Kompetenz‐Kompetenz (the question of who has the authority to decide where the borders of EU authority end) based on the Union treaties which have always defined its role as the final interpreter of EU law. Yet, no national constitutional court has accepted this position, and in its Lisbon Judgment of 2009 the German Constitutional Court (FCC) has asserted its own jurisdiction of the final resort' to review future EU treaty changes and transfers of powers to the EU on two grounds: (i) ultra vires review, and (ii) identity review. The FCC justifies its claim to constitutional review with reference to its role as guardian of the national constitution whose requirements will constrain the integration process as a standing proviso and limitation on all transfers of national power to the EU for as long as the EU has not acquired the indispensable core of sovereignty, i.e. autochthonous law‐making under its own sovereign powers and constitution, and instead continues to derive its own power from the Member States under the principle of conferral. Formally therefore, at least until such time, the problem of Kompetenz‐Kompetenz affords of no solution. It can only be ‘managed’, which requires the mutual forbearance of both the ECJ and FCC which both claim the ultimate jurisdiction to decide the limits of the EU's powers—a prerogative which, if asserted by both parties without political sensitivity, would inevitably result in a constitutional crisis. The fact that no such crisis has occurred, illustrates the astute political acumen of both the FCC and the ECJ.     

集中与分权的历史逻辑——“共同纲领”时期我国宪制的建构、运行与更张

1949年《共同纲领》与《政府组织法》共同确立了堪称"四九宪制"的国家权力配置基本格局。与以苏联为代表的社会主义宪法传统不同,四九宪制虽然同奉议行合一原理为圭臬,却有自己的独特创造,表现为通过中央人民政府主席这一职位实现议、行两端的权力集中。然而决策权与执行权在规范层面的分工模糊与权能交叠,使四九宪制在实际运行中无法确保中央人民政府主席对国家事务直接和经常的领导。随着机构改革与权力重组的受挫,这一时期宪制的制度弹性逐渐耗尽,新政权的缔造者们最终通过在1954年《宪法》中对最高国务会议制度的设计实现了对议行合一体制的重设。     

论中央与地方立法权限的划分标准——基于公共服务理论的研究

实定法所确立的中央与地方立法权限的划分标准尚有缺陷,不能适应各地方因地制宜的治理需求。已有学理研究成果过于"重技术"而"轻理论",缺乏深层次的价值指引,难以回应以上现实困境。公共服务理论为解决央地立法权限的划分问题提供了全新视角。在公共服务理论下,国家长久执政的正当性前提在于向人民提供良好的公共服务,国家行使立法权的目的在于组织公共服务,央地立法权限的划分同样应以公共服务为中心。中央立法的定位系制定为提供公共服务所设置国家机构、组织、制度等内容的框架性法律和部分直接规范公共服务的组织、运行的细则性法律,地方立法则系制定细则性法律。央地之间细则性立法事项的权限划分应当以"便利服务"为标准。     

Becoming a Threat: The Burqa and the Contestation Over Public Morality Law in France

Through an examination of legislative debate and court opinions, this article illustrates that the French understanding of public order policing as a bulwark of freedom and national sovereignty deeply informed the development of (and contestation surrounding) the 2010 ban on all facial coverings in public. This ban notably includes the burqa or niqab, garments worn by a small minority of Muslim women in France. This article has two aims. The first is to expand on the sociolegal argument about the contested nature of rights protections and constitutional constraints on legislative authority by highlighting how a nation's legal culture can profoundly shape that contestation. The second aim of this article is to show, through a technique called legal archaeology, how longstanding French views on rights confront current European‐inspired alternative views that would give more weight to individualistic protections against state action than has traditionally been the case in France.     

Developing an index of EX-POST parliamentary oversight of public finance

For the past decade, scholars and practitioners have developed indexes to measure both legislative powers in general, and of the legislative power of the purse, in particular. Initial focus was on the development of a comprehensive index of legislative powers, and on assessing the ex-ante role of the legislature in the budget process.

This article substantially deepens extends previous research on ex-post oversight, by developing a more comprehensive index to measure ex-post oversight, by using more up-to-date data bases and by including more countries. We can partially confirm the emerging consensus that ex-post budget oversight is stronger in parliamentary – and especially Westminster – systems than in countries with other forms of government, thereby somewhat offsetting the previously identified weaknesses of Westminster parliaments in budget formulation.

When used in combination Wehner’s [2006. Assessing the power of the purse: An index of legislative budget institutions. Political Studies, 54, 767–785] index of ex-ante legislative oversight, this index provides a comprehensive picture of legislative power of the purse regarding the budget process.