US Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan: From Carter to Clinton

The US has maintained a keen interest in Taiwan's military security for decades, and US arms transfer to Taiwan has become an especially important issue for both China and Taiwan since the normalization of US-China relations. This study attempts to examine US arms transfer policy toward Taiwan since the late 1970s. What factors have been involved in the formulation and implementation of US arms transfer policy? How have structural changes in the international system, such as the end of the Cold War, affected the policy? Since the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 allowed continued sales for Taiwan's security and the US-PRC Joint Communique on 17 August 1982 agreed to decrease arms sales to Taiwan, how has the US resolved the contradiction between the two sets of policies? Finally, what is the effect of US arms transfer on Taiwan's national security and defense industry?     

US 'Dual Track' Policy: Arms sales and technology transfer to China mainland and Taiwan

This article analyzes the United States 'dual track' policy on arms sales and technology transfers to the China mainland and Taiwan. Despite its 'one China' policy, the US has continued to sell arms to Taiwan and provide Taiwan with military technology. At the same time, Washington is unwilling to transfer certain technology to the China mainland. The US 'dual track' policy of arms sales and technology transfer to both sides of the Taiwan Strait has maintained a strategic balance by developing closer relations with Beijing while maintaining the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Washington's objectives are to enhance Sino‐American relations and to maintain Taiwan's security while not unsettling the generally positive Sino‐American relationship. While this policy has caused tensions in US‐PRC relations, this 'unbalanced balance' has served US interests in maintaining Taiwan's security and has not strained Washington‐Beijing relations to the breaking point.     

The Taiwan Problem in the Second George W. Bush Administration—US officials' views and their implications for US policy

The behavior of Taiwan leaders and people in 2003–2004 raised the salience of Taiwan's assertive movement toward permanent independence for US policy makers. No longer did US officials responsible for assessing cross-Strait relations and their implications for US policy take it for granted that such assertiveness and moves toward independence would be held in check by the mainstream opinion in Taiwan, previously but no longer viewed as pragmatic by US decision makers. In response to the new situation, US policy makers intervened in Taiwan politics, trying to channel Taiwan assertiveness along lines less likely to lead to war with China. US interventions were widely seen to have had a moderating effect on the Taiwan elite and public opinion in the lead-up to the December 2004 legislative election that resulted in a significant setback for President Chen Shui-bian's push toward greater independence. Taiwan's political opposition leaders pursued high-level contacts with China. Chinese leaders warmly welcomed the Taiwan opposition leaders who renounced Taiwan independence. However, Taiwan politics remained sharply divided over cross-Strait issues, with President Chen unwilling to renounce Taiwan independence or accept a version of the so-called one China principle seen by China as a prerequisite for improved relations with the Taiwan government. President Bush and other US officials encouraged both governments to show greater flexibility in order to promote dialogue that would reduce misunderstanding and ease tensions. The uncertain outlook for cross-Strait relations included the possibility of talks, improved relations, and agreements on managing cross-Strait tensions between the Taiwan and Chinese governments. On the other hand, the impasse between China and Taiwan could deepen. The Bush administration appeared to have settled on a policy that endeavored to deter China from using force against Taiwan and deter Taiwan from taking provocative steps toward independence. The main alternatives to this approach seemed less acceptable to US policy makers under prevailing conditions, suggesting that US policy is likely to persist with a dual deterrence policy for the rest of President Bush's term in office.     

China's good neighbor policy and its implications for Taiwan

Chinese leaders in recent years have been following a coherent policy toward Asia that emphasizes moderation and accommodation while preserving core PRC interests. China's prevailing ‘good neighbor’ policy approach—backed by improvement in US–China relations—provides important opportunities and challenges for Taiwan. It clearly inclines the PRC leaders to avoid more aggressive or harder‐line tactics in the mix of carrots and sticks that makes up China's recent approach toward Taiwan. To follow a more disruptive course would undermine the influence and advantage Beijing has been seeking with its ongoing moderate approach toward the United States and other Asian powers. The main challenge for Taiwan is how to deal with the current balance of carrots and sticks in China's policy. Much depends on the ability of Taiwan's leaders and populace to turn the prevailing balance in PRC policy to Taiwan's advantage. This presumably will involve reviving their economy, promoting effective governance and prudent defense, while consolidating relations with the United States and managing tensions in cross‐Strait relations to the advantage of Taiwan's future security and development. Unfortunately, there is no political consensus on Taiwan to mobilize domestic resources and opinion in a concerted effort to protect Taiwan's future as an entity independent of PRC control. Those outsiders who have followed with positive interest Taiwan's remarkable development over the past decades hope that Taiwan makes good use of the opportunities posed by China's good neighbor policy to adopt prudent and concrete measures beneficial to Taiwan's long range prospects.     

Continuity and change: the administration of George W. Bush and US policy toward Taiwan

This paper examines recent modifications in American policy toward the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan). It contends that, while the George W. Bush Administration may have carried out a significant readjustment of US policy, available evidence suggests that it will not endorse any major upgrades in ties with Taipei during the foreseeable future. Like previous administrations, the Bush Administration now recognizes the value of engaging the People's Republic of China (PRC). This development holds important implications for the future trajectory of America's relations with Taiwan and the PRC and for peace and stability in the Western Pacific.     

Rapprochement between Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland: implications for American foreign policy

This article examines US policy toward the improving relations between the Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. It also analyzes several policy options that the Barack Obama administration may wish to consider. In conclusion, the author suggests that, despite some arguments to the contrary, continuing the current policy supporting the growing rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei is in the best interest of the US.     

From functional integration to structural readjustment: Taipei–Beijing relations and the role of the United States

Regardless of the continued stalemate in the political arena, trade and economic interactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have increased steadily. Both aggregate data and the results of survey research have testified to the existence of functional integration of the two societies across the Taiwan Strait. In addition to functional integration, structural readjustments have also been made by political authorities both in Taipei and Beijing so as to facilitate continuity of trade and economic relations. These types of mutual accommodations include: establishing proper ‘unofficial’ agencies on both sides to serve as instruments of practical contacts and negotiation; the more flexible definition of ‘One China’ by Beijing; and the opening of ‘small links’ between Quemoy and Amoy by Taipei. Beijing's refusal to grant Taipei any official diplomatic status and Taipei's reluctance to accept the ‘One China’ principle remain major obstacles to cross‐Taiwan Strait relations. The United States will continue playing a key role in future cross‐Strait relations. Beijing seems to be content, at least temporarily, to maintain cordial relations with the United States in exchange for the latter's adherence to the ‘One China’ principle and rejection of the option of Taiwan independence. Whether Taipei will use enhanced US commitment to Taiwan's security to strike a better deal with Beijing for gradual cross‐Strait integration or to utilize increased American protection to move onto the separatist road will be affected by domestic politics in Taiwan, future US policy toward to the island, and Beijing's response to Taipei's demand for security and international recognition.     

美国民众对军售台湾支持率的影响因素研究——基于美国人对华态度实证调研

美国对外政策的制定通常需要有民意基础,然而现有研究鲜有从美国民众的视角探究美国对台军售。本文基于美国人对华态度实证调研的数据,利用单因子试验法测试美国民众在“中美关系”和“对台军售”间的权衡,并采用logistic模型来检查影响美国民众对台军售支持率的主要因素。结果表明即使对台军售会严重恶化或危害中美关系,58％的美国民众依然支持美国对台军售。政治倾向（温和派）、媒体和信息渠道（收听广播和浏览网络频率）、个人因素（性别、年龄）等是影响美国民众对台军售支持率的主要因素。终止美国对台军售,我国一方面需要有更加强有力的反制措施,另一方面可以尝试通过长期规划的网络传播手段来扭转美国民众对对台军售的支持。     

The Role of the Military in the PRC Taiwan Policymaking: A case study of the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996

This article examines the role of the military in the structure and process of PRC policy formulation on Taiwan through a case study of the military's involvement in, and influence on, Beijing's policymaking in the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996. The military has its own vital interests in Taiwan policy, which are embodied in three aspects: preservation of the military's political privilege, military build-up for modernisation drives, and more budgetary resources for defence. This article proposes that the PRC leadership succession problem together with the military's leverage accounted for the outbreak of the crisis. Under pressure, Jiang Zemin had to accept the plan of physically intimidating Taiwan to gain the military's support in consolidating his position as Deng Xiaoping's successor.     

A postcolonial reading of the state question in China

The notion of sovereignty in China carries a postcolonial legacy. Earlier Chinese leaders adopted the notion of sovereignty to protect themselves from Western imperialist intrusion. However, not only was their performance as a sovereign state judged against a set of criteria already determined externally, but their sovereign sphere was also constructed too late to avoid the imperialist remnants within China which were established before Chinese could nominally strengthen their sovereign defense. As a result, with every Chinese assertion of their soverign status, there comes the internal reminder that it is subverted. The sense of anxiety and frustration thus created explains China's harsh policy toward Taiwan, a piece of land considered to be Chinese but now searching for independent statehood. Taiwan, once a Japanese colony and then an American Cold War base, has become a permanent reminder to the Chinese leaders of their unwanted historical shame.     

对美国“弃台论”相关争论的观察及美国对台政策走向分析

2008年马英九上台以来,两岸关系步入和平发展时期.美国政府官员和政策专家对在此时期美国对台政策是否应当调整发表了不同的看法,其中“弃台论”声音的出现,引起了美国官方和学界的高度关注和激烈争论.“弃台论”在美国国内产生了重要的影响,但从现实来看,“弃台论”尚未进入决策层面.当前美国对台政策并未发生结构性变化,美国并没有放弃对台湾的影响力.未来美国对台政策呈现出总体框架维持不变、局部修正的态势.     

马英九上台后美国对台政策调整的背景分析

马英九上台执政后,美国对台政策的着力点由反对单方面改变台海现状转向正面评价台湾当局调整大陆政策和两岸关系的改善。美国的上述调整虽然有其现实的国家利益需求,但决策环境的变化也在对美国传统的对台思维和战略产生深刻的影响。未来四年,美国会继续发展美台关系,保持对台海局势的影响力,但随着两岸对话的不断深入,美国对台海局势的关注度可能会有所降低,台湾问题对中美关系的负面影响也可能趋于弱化。     

Coping with the Global Financial Crises: institutional and ideational sources of Taiwan's economic resiliency

Over the last two decades, Taiwan has weathered two global financial crises: the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 and the sub-prime loan crisis of 2008–2009. Each time the island's economy emerged from the crisis relatively unscathed. Many of the elements that constitute Taiwan's economic resilience have been fostered through entrenched institutional arrangements and established policy orientations over a long period. Taiwan managed to retain the bulk of these long-running sources of economic resilience despite the tremendous external pressures exerted by neo-liberal policy advocates to dismantle these ‘out-dated’ policy thinking and practices in the name of reform during the decade-long interval between the two crises. Taiwan was able to cope with the 2008–2009 global financial crisis thanks also to a more enabling regional environment created through stronger cooperation among Asian economies and under a new awakening among the East Asian policy makers.     

Explaining Taiwan's Revisionist Diplomacy

Taiwan is a revisionist power. Its independence movement challenges a vital status-quo interest of mainland China's opposition to a de jure Taiwan declaration of independence and maintaining, however ambiguously, Taiwan's commitment to the ‘one-China’ formulation. Why is it that a small and vulnerable island off the coast of a great power has continued to challenge the vital interest of that great power and risk war? Adopting a ‘levels of analysis’ approach to Taiwan's mainland policy, this paper addresses this question by examining four prevalent explanations for Taiwan's revisionist diplomacy: (1) the mainland deterrent is ineffective, reflecting Taiwan doubts about either mainland capabilities or mainland resolve to wage a retaliatory war; (2) in an example of the security dilemma in alliance politics, US commitment to Taiwan, although aimed at deterring PRC use of force, encourages Taiwan to challenge the status quo because the Taiwan leadership is confident of US intervention and US ability to defend Taiwan; (3) because of the development of a ‘Taiwan identity’ and of corresponding domestic political pressures, the Democratic Progressive Party has been compelled to adopt a pro-independence policy; (4) Chen Shui-bian has a personal commitment to Taiwan independence and has been willing to challenge the mainland's interest in one-China, despite risk of heightened conflict and regardless of domestic political considerations.     

新时期的美国涉台关系及其制约因素

中美关系与两岸关系的大格局,决定了美国涉台关系的变化趋势.在政治上,美国乐见国民党连续执政和两岸关系的和平发展,但对于台湾被迫走向统一,存有疑虑,希望及时把握两岸和谈的具体进程.美方对台湾在“国防”、“外交”等领域予以多方面支持的目的,从短期看是同步强化美台关系,维护美国在台海地区的既有利益;从长期看则是增加台湾在两岸谈判中的筹码,谋取美国在台湾问题最终解决方案上的主动权.     

Southeast Asia and cross‐strait relations: The policy of separation of politics and economics

During the periods of July‐August 1995 and mid‐March 1996, China initiated a series of missile tests and military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, and the mainland for many was considered responsible for the rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait. But, Southeast Asian countries held Taiwan responsible for stimulating the mainland's military actions because of the island's claim for independence. Why? There are three different theoretical arguments on this issue, i.e. those of political primacy, economic determinism, and the separation of politics and economics. This paper contends that the principle of separation of politics and economics is the policy that Southeast Asian countries pursue in developing their relations with the PRC and the ROC, i.e. maintaining official and full‐scale relations with the PRC, but keeping unofficial and economic links with Taiwan. Therefore, for Southeast Asian countries, the PRC's military exercises in the Taiwan Strait were a political and not an economic problem, and one between the mainland and Taiwan. This is the key factor in explaining attitudes in Southeast Asian nations toward the Taiwan Strait crisis.     

Comparing Jiang Zemin's Impatience with Hu Jintao's Patience Regarding the Taiwan Issue, 1989–2012

Although the essence of China's Taiwan policy has not changed from the era of Jiang Zemin to the present, the era of Hu Jintao, Jiang's and Hu's attitudes are different. Jiang was impatient with the delay in the unification of China and Taiwan, talking about timetables for unification; however, Hu has so far been patient, saying that he is not afraid of delaying unification. The purpose of this paper is to explain why their attitudes are different. I argue that two factors combine to result in Jiang's impatience and Hu's patience: conflicting ‘perceptions of Taiwan's domestic politics and Taiwan's China policy’ and differing ‘perceptions of the US behavior and attitude regarding Taiwan’.     

Accounting for Taiwan's economic policy toward China

This article explores the ideas, institutions, and interests in which Taiwan's economic policy toward China is embedded. The authors indicate that the ideas behind Taiwan's economic policy toward China are as vibrant as ever, the political foundation for a coherent and feasible policy is eroding, and commercial interests are digressing from the Taiwan government's policy goals. Political forces around ideas have strong hearing on the formation of Taiwan's economic policy toward China. The truthfulness or falseness of the security argument is of intrinsic value to Taiwan's decision makers. The authors also point out that in order to have a complete picture of cross‐Strait economic relations, we need to specify how trade and investment with China influence Taiwan's distribution of political interests.     

US‐China relations and the Taiwan factor

With the diplomatic warming of US‐China relations, the recent resumption of the Koo — Wang meeting and Taiwan's elections for legislators, mayors, and city councilors, cross‐Taiwan Strait relations are at another historical turning point. While the improvement of US‐China relations tends to relieve both sides from rhetoric exchanges of ‘China threat’ and ‘US‐Taiwan conspiracy’, Clinton's oral declaration of the ‘Three No's’ has raised serious concerns in Taiwan. With such a background, a group of experts and policy‐making participants from the US, Taiwan and Mainland China gathered again at a conference on ‘US‐China Relations and the Taiwan Factor’ in Washington, DC in mid‐October 1998. This was the second episode in a series of symposia on US‐China relations sponsored by the Association of Chinese Political Studies (ACPS). The symposium attempts to provide a free, intimate, and long‐term forum for a group of influential experts with different perspectives from the US, Taiwan and Mainland China. As a result, a deep understanding of common interests has been reached and clear differences have also been recognized through direct dialogue and frank exchange of ideas.     

Goodwill and Proactive Exchange Policy: How Taipei manages the cross-strait relations

Dynamic developments within both Mainland China and Taiwan have compounded the uncertainties looming across the Taiwan Strait. Since mid-2000, the cross-strait relationship has evolved into a mixture of four elements: lingering, though less confrontational, political stalemate; growing and even accelerating economic exchanges; rapidly expanding social interactions; and heightened military competition. Since July 1999, four distinct periods have marked Beijing's tactical operations toward Taiwan: military intimidations and verbal threats (9 July‐21 September 1999); verbal threats (21 September 1999‐18 March 2000); passive observation (18 March‐20 June 2000); and the two-pronged campaign (20 June‐present). Beijing's two-pronged campaign is well-coordinated and full-scaled. One soft prong aims at winning 'the hearts of Taiwanese people'. The soft prong includes the following elements: softening of rhetoric without concrete change of behavior; escalated efforts to invite opinion leaders in Taiwan; mentioning preferential treatments for Taiwanese investors on the Mainland; and allowing a dramatically increased number of Mainland visitors to Taiwan since July 2000. On the other hand, the hard prong seeks to put 'appropriate pressure' on Taipei to accept Beijing's precondition of resumption of cross-strait talks, and eventually Beijing's terms on unification. The hard prong includes the following elements: continuing to conduct military exercises with no reduction in frequency and scale; continuing strangulation of Taipei's international living-space with a new twist of diplomatic war in Africa; mobilizing Chinese overseas globally to oppose Taiwanese independence; escalating Beijing's pressure on Washington not to include Taiwan in the theater missile defense program, and not to transfer arms to Taiwan. The new Taiwan government has adopted much continuity in its cross-strait policy from the previous one. The new administration seeks a structured and constructive cross-strait relationship, holds no precondition for the resumption of cross-strait talks, continues to express maximum goodwill, exercises absolute restraint to avoid being seen as provocative, and takes a proactive approach on promoting socio-economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait.