The Taiwan Problem in the Second George W. Bush Administration—US officials' views and their implications for US policy

The behavior of Taiwan leaders and people in 2003–2004 raised the salience of Taiwan's assertive movement toward permanent independence for US policy makers. No longer did US officials responsible for assessing cross-Strait relations and their implications for US policy take it for granted that such assertiveness and moves toward independence would be held in check by the mainstream opinion in Taiwan, previously but no longer viewed as pragmatic by US decision makers. In response to the new situation, US policy makers intervened in Taiwan politics, trying to channel Taiwan assertiveness along lines less likely to lead to war with China. US interventions were widely seen to have had a moderating effect on the Taiwan elite and public opinion in the lead-up to the December 2004 legislative election that resulted in a significant setback for President Chen Shui-bian's push toward greater independence. Taiwan's political opposition leaders pursued high-level contacts with China. Chinese leaders warmly welcomed the Taiwan opposition leaders who renounced Taiwan independence. However, Taiwan politics remained sharply divided over cross-Strait issues, with President Chen unwilling to renounce Taiwan independence or accept a version of the so-called one China principle seen by China as a prerequisite for improved relations with the Taiwan government. President Bush and other US officials encouraged both governments to show greater flexibility in order to promote dialogue that would reduce misunderstanding and ease tensions. The uncertain outlook for cross-Strait relations included the possibility of talks, improved relations, and agreements on managing cross-Strait tensions between the Taiwan and Chinese governments. On the other hand, the impasse between China and Taiwan could deepen. The Bush administration appeared to have settled on a policy that endeavored to deter China from using force against Taiwan and deter Taiwan from taking provocative steps toward independence. The main alternatives to this approach seemed less acceptable to US policy makers under prevailing conditions, suggesting that US policy is likely to persist with a dual deterrence policy for the rest of President Bush's term in office.     

Hong Kong's policy possibilities and directions toward the mainland‐Taiwan conflict

On 1 July 1997, Hong Kong was returned from British colonial rule to Chinese rule under the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The change in political status of Hong Kong has great impacts on the triangular relationship between Hong Kong, the mainland and Taiwan, in which the mainland and Taiwan are still in a state of intense political conflict and competition. This paper examines the policy possibilities and directions for Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region of the PRC in handling its relations with Taiwan. It argues that both Beijing and Taipei want to preserve the existing Hong Kong‐Taiwan relations for political and practical purposes but at the same time will try to avoid being forced into a suspected political trap—for Beijing the recognition of Taiwan as an independent political entity and for Taipei the subordination of Taiwan to PRC sovereignty. Between these two baselines, the paper points out that Hong Kong should pursues its own Taiwan policy built upon the interests of Hong Kong and depoliticization of Hong Kong‐Taiwan relations.     

试析"一个中国"原则的来源和内涵

台湾问题起源于国共两党的斗争 ,是一个客观存在的中国历史遗留问题 ,这构成“一个中国”原则的历史来源 ;台湾问题在本质上属于中国的内部事务 ,这构成“一个中国”原则的逻辑来源。因此 ,台湾问题是中国的内政 ,两岸之间无论存在多大的分歧都要在“一个中国”原则下协商解决 ;从促成国家统一的角度出发 ,“一个中国”原则的真正内涵是 :世界上只有一个中国 ,台湾是中国的一部分 ,中国的主权和领土完整不能分割。只有坚持真正的“一个中国”原则 ,才能和平解决台湾问题     

Taiwan's Expansion of International Space: opportunities and challenges

While much is to be celebrated since Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration in 2008, cross-Strait relations are not without challenges. One such crucial test is Ma's call for Chinese leaders to stop isolating Taipei in the world community and give Taiwan adequate ‘international space’. Because the issue strikes at the heart of the fundamental differences between Taipei's and Beijing's positions regarding the island's sovereignty, it needs to be handled carefully by both governments for better cross-Strait relations. This study analyzes the approaches adopted by both Beijing and Taipei regarding Taiwan's status in the international community. Utilizing discussion with Chinese scholars and government officials and the analysis of several waves of survey data conducted in Taiwan, it argues that Beijing's flexibility in its application of the ‘one China’ principle and the Ma administration's practicality in making its requests are critical to the realization of Taipei's demand for international space and hence cross-Strait stability.     

20世纪90年代以来南海争端中的美国因素

20世纪90年代中期以来,美国以保护自由通航为由逐步介入南海的争端,并将此作为实现其亚太战略的一种手段。美国的介入对中国南海主权权益的维护产生的负面影响是：危及中国战略安全利益,增加中国收回南海主权的难度,加剧了地区紧张局势。中国政府坚定地表达了维护国家领土主权的决心和意志,并采取了切实措施维护中国的领海主权;坚持“以邻为善,以邻为伴”的周边外交政策,加强与东盟的战略沟通和战略互信：有针对性地应对美国在南海地区的利益需求。     

关于中日间台湾地位问题的“1972年承诺”与中美日“三角关系”

本文聚焦中日间关于台湾问题的“1972年承诺”,对中日两国围绕台湾问题存在分歧的症结及解决前景进行了分析,认为日本一直不肯直接承认中国对台湾的主权,并经常在这个问题上制造摩擦（如邀请台湾政治敏感人物访日）,除了因为他们有些人无意认真遵守《开罗宣言》的规定之外,还因为他们不得不受美国台湾政策的影响以及他们固有的对台湾的战略思考所致。中日间关于台湾地位问题的“1972年承诺”就是鉴于日方这种法律、政治和战略考量,在中美日三国合作的背景下妥协的产物。笔者认为,随着中美日“三角关系”的趋于形成和中日“战略互惠关系”的建立,必将为中日间关于台湾问题的合理解决创造条件。     

Competing conceptions of Taiwan's identity: The irresolvable conflict in cross‐strait relations

Supporters of unification and Taiwan independence advocates view Taiwan's status through radically different logical frameworks. Unification supporters are guided by historical determinism. They believe that because Taiwan was part of China in the past, and because the island's residents have ancestral ties to mainland China, Taiwan is therefore an unalienable part of Chinese territory that must be brought under the control of the mainland Chinese state. In contrast, advocates of Taiwan independence are guided by the logic of pragmatism. In their view, cultural identity does not dictate political identity, and decisions about Taiwan's status should be guided by the will of the island's people, rather than by an abstract notion of historic destiny. Both of these approaches are rooted in long‐standing concepts of Chinese identity. Chinese ethnicity has long included both a hereditary and a cultural component. In the past, the cultural component allowed China to absorb populations on its periphery. Today, it serves as an outlet for Taiwan independence supporters seeking to redefine Taiwan as a political entity separate from the mainland Chinese state.     

Sino–Vatican Negotiations: problems in sovereign right and national security

This article, in the context of sovereignty, discusses problems put to China and the Vatican in their long course of negotiations (1987–) which aim at a reconciliation. China’s past experience in negotiating with major powers (US and Great Britain) are reviewed while the Vatican’s aim of negotiating a concordat is also explained. The societal factors from the current Chinese political landscape, including social unrest as well as the Taiwan factor, are reviewed to identify problems in the ‘Sino–Vatican negotiations’.     

我国《反分裂国家法》第8条的国际法依据——以国家主权为视角

本文通过对国际法中有关国家主权的规则的列举,结合为维护国家主权独立与领土完整而制定的《中华人民共和国反分裂国家法》第8条的实践进行阐释,详细论证了《反分裂国家法》第8条在国家主权方面的国际法依据;通过对国家主权与反分裂的关系的剖析,说明了规定《反分裂国家法》第8条对维护国家主权与领土完整的显明意义,是中国政府面对“台独”分裂势力挑衅时的必然选择。     

两岸政治定位的瓶颈

面对破解＂两岸政治定位＂这一难题,两岸学者都做出了努力。本文探讨双方已有的共识与分歧,并重点分析两个最受关注的方案———台湾学者张亚中的＂一中三宪论＂与大陆学者刘国深的＂球体理论＂。研究发现台湾学者始终坚持＂中华民国是主权国家＂的底线,而大陆学者则在如何面对＂中华民国＂问题上前进了一步。本文认为＂是否敢于突破底线＂与＂是否存在解决难题的意愿＂是两岸政治定位问题的两个瓶颈,希望两岸学者在现有基础上继续前进,不要后退,坦诚交流,共同建构两岸和平发展的理论框架,寻求更多更好的解决方案。     

挑战与回应--跨国公司与国家主权

跨国公司是“利害双面体” ,在给世界各国带来利益的同时 ,也对主权国家的政治、经济、文化和科技主权构成了威胁和挑战。主权国家为了维护国家主权和国家利益 ,应积极地应对 ,进行技术创新 ,巩固信息主权 ;主动地“限制”政府管理权限 ,转变政府职能 ,增强本国企业和国家的竞争力 ;建构文化的主体意识 ,实现民族文化的现代化 ,从而编扎起一道防护跨国公司消解国家主权的“防火墙”。     

毛泽东国家文化安全思想提出的背景与得失

毛泽东虽然没有直接提出"文化安全"的概念,但是他提出了一系列蕴含着丰富的国家文化安全思想理念的观点。本文认为,近代以来帝国主义侵华给中国人民带来的屈辱历史和文化伤害,是毛泽东思考新中国文化安全的历史起点;捍卫共产党安身立命的信仰系统和价值追求,是毛泽东对国家文化安全的现实考虑;维护民族利益,捍卫国家文化主权,是毛泽东提出文化安全思想的深层涵义。由于毛泽东对文化安全形势的估计过于严重,反而导致了新的文化不安全。     

China's Socialization in the International Human Rights Regime: why did China reject the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court?

This article uses a hard law—the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court—to examine the depth of China's socialization in the international human rights regime and the relative weights of sovereignty and human rights norms in determining China's policy choices. It shows that the reasons for China's rejection of the Rome Statute are twofold. On the one hand, Chinese leaders have not fully internalized human rights norms, and they prioritize state sovereignty over human rights when making decisions. On the other hand, the legalized Rome Statute sets up an independent court with mandatory jurisdiction and grants the Prosecutor the ex officio right to investigate a crime. Such treaty provisions may have negative impacts on China's core sovereignty of territorial integration and regime security, thus imposing high sovereignty costs on China. Therefore, China resolutely voted against the Rome Statute, even if such an action made it a small minority outside the international mainstream. These findings indicate that China is still in a weak socialization stage and is not able to take on binding human rights and humanitarian obligations with high sovereignty costs.     

Identity,Sovereignty, and Economic Penetration: Beijing's responses to offshore Chinese democracies

Investigating how the PRC responds to democratization in Taiwan and Hong Kong, this paper argues that the Chinese Communist leadership has mainly developed three strategies in managing the complicated crises, including Beijing's own legitimacy crisis and the integration crisis of the Chinese nation, caused by the rise of offshore Chinese democracies. These strategies are: identity politics, sovereignty politics, and economic penetration. With ‘identity politics’, Beijing identifies ‘identification with the Communist leadership’ as the sole Chinese national identification, and utilizes the nationalistic passions of mainland and even overseas Chinese people against democrats in Taiwan and Hong Kong, by labeling the latter as ‘separatists’ or ‘national traitors’. Further, Beijing defines ‘sovereignty’ in a way in which the ‘central’ government monopolizes all possessions of the nation, and excludes ‘people's sovereignty’ from the politics of national reunification or the ‘one country, two systems’ model actualization. While appealing to both ‘soft power’ based in ‘patriotic nationalism’ and ‘hard power’ embedded in national sovereignty, however, the Chinese regime also mobilizes business resources and opportunities provided by China's growing economic power and China's dominance in Greater Chian economic integration for its political purposes of curbing offshore Chinese democracies.     

华人精英对“中国梦”的态度与成因初探

中国高层对"中国梦"的倡导及其内涵阐述引起了海外华人精英的高度关注。这些主要由侨领、留学生、学者等群体构成的海外华人精英对此表达出几种观点看法:一是期待与共鸣;二是担忧中国内部出现的如食品安全、道德滑坡等社会问题羁绊"中国梦"的实现;三是强调人本理念的植入,呼吁中国借鉴西方普世价值文明。这些观点反映出具有家国情怀的侨领和"跨国认同"的华人精英对中国形象和民族复兴的期待,同时他们正视中国内部目前现存问题与挑战,华人精英倾向于从政治文明和文化角度来设计中国圆梦的路径方法。华人精英俨然是海外华人社会的"意见领袖"。于是,通过发挥其在侨务公共外交中的桥梁作用,有利于聚合海外华侨华人的资源力量,为实现"中国梦"而共同奋斗。     

China's good neighbor policy and its implications for Taiwan

Chinese leaders in recent years have been following a coherent policy toward Asia that emphasizes moderation and accommodation while preserving core PRC interests. China's prevailing ‘good neighbor’ policy approach—backed by improvement in US–China relations—provides important opportunities and challenges for Taiwan. It clearly inclines the PRC leaders to avoid more aggressive or harder‐line tactics in the mix of carrots and sticks that makes up China's recent approach toward Taiwan. To follow a more disruptive course would undermine the influence and advantage Beijing has been seeking with its ongoing moderate approach toward the United States and other Asian powers. The main challenge for Taiwan is how to deal with the current balance of carrots and sticks in China's policy. Much depends on the ability of Taiwan's leaders and populace to turn the prevailing balance in PRC policy to Taiwan's advantage. This presumably will involve reviving their economy, promoting effective governance and prudent defense, while consolidating relations with the United States and managing tensions in cross‐Strait relations to the advantage of Taiwan's future security and development. Unfortunately, there is no political consensus on Taiwan to mobilize domestic resources and opinion in a concerted effort to protect Taiwan's future as an entity independent of PRC control. Those outsiders who have followed with positive interest Taiwan's remarkable development over the past decades hope that Taiwan makes good use of the opportunities posed by China's good neighbor policy to adopt prudent and concrete measures beneficial to Taiwan's long range prospects.     

论两岸在南海争端中的战略合作问题

在两岸关系和平发展进程中,南海问题是一个具有战略价值的议题.两岸是否需要和能否在当前激烈的南海争端中进行战略合作,需要进行全面的考察.马英九执政以来,台湾当局的南海政策重新回到了1994年的政策轨道,重申"中华民国"拥有南海主权,并有意推动两岸合作开发南海资源.但是,两岸的"南海合作"不得不面对内外因素的制约.两岸之间能否搁置争议、构筑互信和建立必要的沟通平台是必须考虑的内部制约因素,而制约两岸合作的外部因素则主要是美国的阻挠和南海周边国家的分化.总体看来,两岸在南海问题上谋求合作,符合两岸的根本利益,既有利于维持中国的海洋权益,也有利于推动两岸关系和平发展.     

Discussion of 'Four Contradictions Constraining China's Foreign Policy Behavior'

Chinese foreign policy behavior is constrained by different sets of contradictions, but at the same time these contradictions serve to inspire and focus Chinese foreign policy, both in negative and positive ways. As China transitions to a developed country that is fully integrated into regional and global economic, political and security regimes, these contradictions may become less salient, however. With the growth of China's comprehensive national power, the Chinese will come to view their country less as a poor nation and more as a great power and thus this dual-identity syndrome should diminish in importance as a factor constraining China's foreign policy behavior over time. The contradictory impetus behind Chinese foreign policy that derives from the desire to benefit from pursuit of 'open-door' policies and the compulsion to protect state sovereignty will similarly likely become less important as China's power grows, but only if there is mutually acceptable settlement to the Taiwan problem and Beijing's confidence in its ability to secure its territorial integrity is enhanced. A stronger, more confident China will also likely become more actively involved in regional and global issues on a pragmatic, rather than principled basis. Finally, while bilateral ties will remain important to Beijing, its participation in multilateral fora will no doubt increase, including in the security sphere, as it becomes more experienced and self-assured in multilateral interaction. Ultimately, bilateral and multilateralism may take on the role of parallel tracks in Chinese diplomacy with little tension between them.     

从“主权”与“治权”的话语透视两岸关系

1992年台湾单方面提出“主权及于整个中国”、“治权仅及于台澎金马”的话语表述以来,尽管大陆方面至今从未接受关于“治权”的表述,但“主权”与“治权”的研究确已成为两岸共同关注的领域.本文以二者关系为视角,分析了影响两岸关系的若干政治主张,并重点考察“一中框架”论对处理“主权”与“治权”话语的启示,从而透视两岸关系的发展脉络.