Japan’s Pivotal Role in the Emerging Indo-Pacific Order

The imperative in the Indo-Pacific region is to build a new strategic equilibrium pivoted on a stable balance of power. A constellation of likeminded states linked by interlocking strategic cooperation has become critical to help build such equilibrium. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is the author of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept that the US is now pushing. But Japan faces important strategic challenges. To secure itself against dangers that did not exist when its current national-security policies and laws were framed, Japan must bolster its security or risk coming under siege. US security interests will be better served by a more confident and secure Japan that assumes greater responsibility for its own defense and for regional security. The US must encourage Japan, which has not fired a single shot against an outside party since World War II, to undertake greater national-security reforms. Peace in Asia demands a proactive Japan.     

Ballistic missile security risks facing Japan

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan's strategic value to the United States has undergone a qualitative shift, leaving uncertainty about how much the US can be depended upon to complement Japan's defense capacity. North Korean, Chinese, and Russian arsenals contain TBMs that could destroy major Japanese cities, yet Japan virtually lacks any independent means to counter them. Lieutenant Colonel Atsumasa Yamamoto was seconded to IIPS by the Japan Defense Agency. In this study, he analyzes Japan's current ability to deal with TBM risks. He also assesses the US TMD program and the extent of US support that Japan can expect.     

美国“印太”战略对南海问题的影响——以“印太”战略支点国家为重点

随着印度洋战略价值的上升,美国在"重返亚太"战略基础上推出了"印太"战略,其战略实质是美国在印太地区缔造战略支点,并将其塑造成美国霸权下的多极格局。印度、澳大利亚、日本作为美国在印太地区的战略支点国家,它们自身在南海地区具有重要的战略利益。在美国"印太"战略的引导下,战略支点国家将对南海问题产生深刻的影响,尤其是将加剧中国周边安全环境的复杂化。在中美战略博弈的背景下,考察美国"印太"战略特别是其支点国家对南海问题的影响,有助于我们把握美国"印太"战略的实质,也有益于我们全面地分析南海地区的安全形势,提出应对策略。     

对谈:日本哲学的成立、意义与展望

前近代日本究竟有无哲学,日本哲学的合法性依据究竟何在?关于日本有无哲学的讨论意义何在?这是中日哲学研究者近年来热议的课题。本文作者认为,关于日本是否有哲学的判断基准在于如何理解"何谓哲学"的问题。无论从狭义的哲学,还是广义的哲学理解来看,日本都有哲学。概而言之,它大体包含以下3个层面的内容:其一,自古以来日本人的价值观、自然观、宇宙观、人生观等,即日本人关于自然与人的深层性思考;其二,引进西方哲学后关于西方哲学的研究成果;其三,在与西方哲学对决(对话)的过程中,日本学者独自的哲学创造。但是,在思考日本哲学问题时要注意"思想"与"哲学"的区别,以免泛哲学化。思想只是"臆见"、主观的、想当然的,但不是哲学思维;哲学必须是建立在"逻格斯(Logos)"基础之上,努力追求抵达客观性依据的学说。     

Maritime Security in the Region: SCS and ECS as Key Arenas for Converging Political Interests

This article examines the situations in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS) and the reasons for recent political and strategic attention. As background it reviews the history of maritime activities in Asia where there was no real maritime Great Power with continuity. It then discusses the latest situations in the ECS around the Senkaku Islands, where China's Coast Guard vessels and fishing boats have made occasional incursions into Japanese waters, and the relatively-less understood Scarborough Shoal and the Pratas Islands in the SCS that have strategic significance in a future powerbalance in the SCS. The article then notes the US rebalance to Asia and the interpretation of the principle of Freedom of Navigation. It continues with the strategic and diplomatic measures and operational and tactical measures that Japan should take. It concludes noting that Japan and the US must prepare a wide range of measures in advance to regain and maintain maritime security and stability.     

The future of the Japan‐US alliance

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in light of emerging multilateral security dialogues, there are those on both sides of the Pacific beginning to question the raison d'être of the US‐Japan alliance. Is this alliance still viable? What kind of bilateral alliance would be most desirable in the future? Can it interact effectively with a multilateral security framework? Patrick M. Cronin, a senior fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., asks these and other questions. In answering them, he maintains that the US‐Japan security alliance is the indispensable foundation for security in the Asia‐Pacific region.     

Why we need the US‐Japan security treaty

There are a number of arguments that opponents of the US‐Japan security treaty have used over the years to explain why the security treaty is either unnecessary, unfair, or both, and should be scrapped. These arguments are unreasonable at best and dangerous at worst, says Daizo Sakurada, associate professor of international relations at the University of Tokushima. He examines and responds to each argument, showing why the security treaty is necessary for peace in the Asia‐Pacific region. An earlier version of this paper was published by the Centre for Strategic Studies in New Zealand as CSS Working Paper 7/97, entitled “For Mutual Benefit: The Japan‐US Security Treaty from a Japanese Perspective.”     

China's Advances in the South China Sea: Strategies and Objectives

The sea lanes of the South China Sea are vital not only as a trade route but also for strategic security. It is self-evident that this should be so for the East Asian countries who lay claim to the area, but it is also true for those nations further afield who are affected by the activities there, such as Japan, Korea and the US. Based on his observations of the Chinese navy'sactivities in the South China Sea over the last ten years, Shigeo Hiramatsu, Professor of Social Sciences at Kyorin University, examines the history of the Chinese Navy within the context of East Asian security in the following article. He argues that in light of Chinese plans to increase the capability of its navy, a strong US-Japan relationship as well as a more active Japanese role in the region is essential to prevent a possible flare up of skirmishes around the South China Sea.     

日本智库对中国崛起的研究

日本智库在对华决策方面发挥着重要作用,目前日本智库对于中国崛起的研究较多。多数日本智库看好中国崛起的前景,认为中国崛起在经济上给日本带来了许多机遇,同时也提出了在军事和战略上的各种隐忧。他们认为应加强同中国的交流与合作,抓住中国崛起带来的各种机遇,另一方面也要针对中国崛起可能带来的威胁加强防范。     

Okinawa and the Nago heliport problem in the US-Japan relationship

The impact of the decision about when and if the United States Marine Corp Air Station will be relocated in Okinawa reverberates beyond the prefectural shores. It has the potential to upset the G-8 Summit, scheduled to be held in Nago City in July 2000, as well as to affect the strategic relationship between the US and Japan. In this article, Robert Eldridge, Post-doctoral Fellow at the Suntory Foundation, Osaka, reviews the history of this complicated problem. He argues that the US and Japan must continue to make progress addressing Okinawan requests and concerns. Ameliorating Okinawa” s burden, while at the same time more actively seeking public understanding and suppor t of the US-Japan security relationship and Japan's role in that relationship, as well as increasing Japan's ability to cooperate in times of emergency, is in the interest of both countries.     

从永久中立到依附美国——简析战后初期日本政府的国家安全构想

战后初期的日本政府从非武装化的现状出发,积极需求维护国家安全之路。概而言之,其国家安全构想经历了一个从永久中立国到依靠联合国,再到依附美国的演变过程。日本政府决策层最终选择依附美国,是在美苏对立的国际环境下,在被美国占领这一最大现实中,以"追随强者"的结盟心态做出的重大战略决择。在依附美国构想的基础上形成的战后日本国家安全政策目前正处于重要转型期,安倍内阁的国家安全政策走向特别值得关注。     

Changing Security Relationship between Japan and South Korea: Frictions and Hopes

Japan has long played the role as the main operating base for Korean contingencies. It has also provided rear-area logistic support to the US forces fighting in Korea and helped South Korea build up its defense industrial base. However, the Japan-South Korea relationship has deteriorated in recent years due to short-term political and long-term economic and strategic reasons. At this point, South Korea is bandwagoning with China and deemphasizing its relationship with Japan. China-South Korea relations are not without problems, however, and Japan regards South Korea as one of the most important potential strategic partners in maintaining stability in Asia. In the future, the most decisive factor in determining the direction of the security relationship between Japan and South Korea will be China.     

The New Cabinet Crisis Management Center and the Leadership of the Prime Minister

In May 2001, a cabinet crisis management center was set up below the prime minister's new official residence. It is from here that Japan's national crises are now to be managed. In an era of constant flux, questions over the circumstances surrounding Japan's strategic security are being raised. Clearly, the structure of crisis management and legislation are crucial for a nation'ssecurity. In this article, Lt. Gen. Toshiyuki Shikata of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (retired) and professor of Law at Teikyo University, examines 30 international and domestic crises that Japan had to deal with in which the leadership of the prime minister determined the outcome. He describes the history of Japanese crisis management, pointing out the current problems and argues that in a post-Cold War era, Japan needs to confront the discrepancies in the structure of its security if it wishes to become a credible member of the international community.     

The Japan‐US alliance and the Asia‐Pacific region

For the past fifty years the Japan‐US alliance has provided the framework for Asia‐Pacific security, says Jusuf Wanandi, Chairman of the Centre for Strategic International Studies in Indonesia and former research fellow at IIPS. The region's political and economic dynamics are changing, Wanandi says, and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) supports an increased Japanese security role, with regional organizations acting as a conduit. But before Japan will win the confidence of some Asian neighbors, he says, Japan must open its economy, reform its domestic politics, and come to terms with its militaristic past.     

日本参加TPP的“内忧”与“外患”

文章分析了日本参加TPP谈判问题所面临的困境及其对未来内政外交走向的影响。首先,在经济方面,日本因参加TPP谈判将面临是继续保护农业还是扩展制造业出口以振兴经济的矛盾;其次,在政治方面,由于参加TPP谈判日本将面临由于各利益集团冲突引起的国内政治矛盾;第三,在外交方面,因为参加TPP谈判,日本将与美国围绕以农业为主的市场开放的程度问题进行博弈,同时也陷入如何协调美国市场与中国市场的关系的矛盾。文章认为日本将不会在短期内解决这些矛盾,而只能在国内政界重新整合与国际格局进一步发展变化的过程中逐步得到解决。     

New Japan–China Relations and the Corresponding Positioning of the United States—History,Values, Realism in a Changing World

After more than a decade of deterioration in the relations between Japan and China symbolized by the visit of then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to Yasukuni Shrine, the relationship finally turned around in 2006–2007 into a qualitatively different one preparing for a new regional order. This was made possible mainly by the realistic perceptional change of the Japanese public on the regional security environment and the corresponding policy change of the Chinese Government on Japan-related histoty. The USA, as an essential stakeholder in Japan–China relations, also has to change itself in order to maintain its presence and interests in Asia and grasp a golden opportunity to build a more stable regional and international order given the drastic change in Japan–China relations which are still fragile due to structural problems. To this end, the USA needs to reevaluate and understand well the changing Japanese perception of history and of the severe security situation around Japan. Also, a Japan–USA–China trilateral partnership framework is now necessary to create a more stable Asian order by a USA initiative.     

The Okinawa “Effect” in US–Japan Alliance Politics

Abstract

Discontent over US military bases in Japan’s Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominent “thorn in the side” of US–Japan relations. But what exactly has been the effect of Okinawa’s base politics on the management of the alliance? We examine Okinawa’s significance on the US–Japan alliance—the “Okinawa effect”—in terms of the alliance’s strategic coherence. Through an examination of the post–Cold War history of the base issue, we argue that, while there little to suggest that the Okinawa issue has undermined the alliance’s strategic effectiveness, alliance efficiency in dealing with burden sharing problems has been diminished, at times substantially. While reduced efficiency may often be inevitable in alliances between democracies, this persistent inability to resolve burden sharing disputes in the Okinawan case means that there is still potential for deteriorating efficiency to eventually undermine the alliance’s solidarity and effectiveness.     

International relations theory and Japanese pacifism: Why didn’t Tokyo go ballistic over North Korean nukes?

Seen from the perspectives of the various Western theories of international relations, Japan’s peculiar armed pacifism can appear very different. Prominent neorealists have predicted that Japan will inevitably develop nuclear weapons; prominent liberals have cited Japan as the model pacifist nation of the future. Over the last five years, it became clear to Japan that North Korea either possessed, or was on the brink of acquiring, nuclear weapons. How would the Japanese government respond to such a critical threat to its security? The case of North Korean nukes suggests that policymakers should be wary of the grim expectations of Western neorealists, at least in regard to Japan.     

Japan's security strategy: Meeting the needs of a new era

A new era has dawned, but the US and Japan remain in a security relationship of parent to child, says Toshiyuki Shikata, professor of inter‐cultural studies at Teikyo University and retired lieutenant general in Japan's Ground Self‐Defense Force. He draws on his familiarity with security issues to examine Japan's strategic challenges in the new era, Japan's role in the alliance, and Japan's defense modernization. He denounces avoiding international security responsibilities due to alleged constitutional constraints, and says that a seat on the UN Security Council would allow Japan to share the full risks and responsibilities in discharging international obligations.     

Dulles’s second visit to Japan: The Tokyo talks of 1951

In January–February 1951, intensive negotiations were conducted in Tokyo between the Japanese and American governments about Japan’s roles in American strategy in Asia. The United States expected Japan to play two vital roles in the cold war. The first was that Japan could act as a potential offensive base from which to mount warfare against Soviet Russia and communist. China. the second was that Japan would serve as a supplementary balancer in the maintenance of the balance of power in Northeast Asia through the reactivation of her defense forces. This article, examining the Japanese government’s preparations for the Tokyo talks, discusses Japanese-American negotiations on a bilateral base arrangement and rearmament. It is argued that, although the United States succeeded in securing Japan as a major strategic base in the cold war by obtaining Japanese agreement to the U.S. proposal for stationing requirements for post-treaty American bases and troops, it failed in having Japan accept a U.S. plan for the revitalization of Japanese power because of the Japanese government’s reservation about rearmament.