Non-Majoritarian Democracy: A Comparison of Federal and Consociational Theories

In an earlier attempt to compare federalism and consociationalism,I found that, both conceptually and empirically, they do notcoincide but that they do overlap to a significant extent. Inthis second comparison, my point of departure is that both conceptsentail a rejection of majoritarian democracy. Eight characteristicsof non-majoritarian democracy—or consensus democracy—canbe identified: (1) executive power sharing, (2) balanced executive-legislativerelations, (3) strong bicameralism, (4) multiparty system, (5)multi-dimensional party system, (6) proportional representation,(7) federalism and decentralization, and (8) a written constitutionand minority veto. Consociational theorists tend to emphasizethe non-majoritarian attributes of power sharing, proportionalrepresentation, and multi-partyism, whereas federal theoristsstress the non-majoritarian characteristics of strong bicameralismand rigid constitutions, in addition to federalism itself. Asimilar pattern is revealed by a factor analysis of these variablesin twenty-two democratic regimes. Although consociationalismand federalism are non-majoritarian in nature, they representclearly different dimensions of non-majoritarianism.     

Democracy by Competition: Referenda and Federalism in Switzerland

Competition is not only a prerequisite for the successful workingof economics but also of political coordination systems. Weargue that popular referenda and federalism are the key factorsin maintaining competition in the political arena. Competitiveeconomic or political markets require free entry and exit andthe absence of regulations that prevent suppliers from beingsuccessful with the best product-be it goods or services inthe form of policies-and prevent citizens from choosing freely.     

Federalism and Consociational Regimes

Federalism and consociationalism are useful means of understandingpolitical systems. Federalism and consociationalism are bothbased on compound majoritarianism rather than simple majoritarianism,and both represent modern attempts to accommodate democraticcomplexity and pluralism, but the two systems are not quitesymmetrical, and territorial organization is not the only characteristicthat differentiates them. Instead, it can be said that federalismrelates to the form of a polity, while consociationalism relatesto the character of a regime. To the extent that federalismmay also function as the character of a regime, then federalismand consociationalism may be more symmetrical. One of the ambiguitiesof federalism is that it is often both form and regime. Consociationalism,however, relates only to regime.     

Consociational Cradle of Federalism

Except for the time of its painful—consociational—birth,federalism in its theory and practice does not entail a rejectionof a majoritarian mode of decisionmaking. Differently at differenttimes on different issues decisional modes will most probablyvary along a continuum from consociationalism to majority rule.When the governing elites adopt consociational practices, withregard to some issues, such practices result from factors otherthan the federal nature of the system. Most of these factorswould lead to consociationalism in a unitary system as well.In contrast, consociationalism is bound to be the dominant decisionalmode in loose confederations, including those whose componentunits do not practice consociational or majoritarian democracyeither within their own confines or at the confederal summit.     

Corporatism, Pluralism, and Democracy: Toward a Deliberative Theory of Bureaucratic Accountability

This essay proposes a deliberative model of bureaucratic accountability and assesses its feasibility. Conventional wisdom suggests that a deliberative theory of bureaucratic accountability has little utility outside corporatist contexts. I reject this view because recent changes in patterns of interest representation have transformed both corporatist and pluralist bureaucracies into more hospitable environments for public deliberation. Contrary to the claims of democratic corporatists, recent pluralist practices of interest representation also seem to be compatible with public deliberation. Hence, movement toward greater openness in administrative decision-making is possible from both liberal pluralist and corporatist starting points. Corporatism clearly has no monopoly on democratic deliberation.     

Corporatism and the Microeconomic Foundations of Swedish Social Democracy: The Swedish Model Revisited*

The aim of this paper is to advance the research into the workings of ‘corporatist’ societies by adding a microeconomic dimension and outlining how such a revised model is applicable to recent Swedish experience. Sweden is often regarded as a corporatist society., that is, one in which policy is the outcome of a ‘social partnership’ between encompassing groups coordinated by government. This corporatist approach, resting on the existence of a macro-economic social contract between peak organizations, is complemented here by an analysis of the micro-level incentives and mechanisms conducive to operating within the corporatist cooperative framework. These characteristics are seen as together constituting what I term the solidaristic market economy, a system of economic relations different in fundamental respects from the two with which we are familiar. While Swedish reality docs not correspond exactly to the economic model set out, the case is made that it is as reasonable to extrapolate from Swedish experience to the solidaristic market economy (and vice versa) as to learn from U.S. experience about the competitive market economy and from the Soviet Union about the command economy. Complemented by these micro-characteristics, corporatist analysis of economic relations under social-democratic regimes is thus seen as explaining the resilience of the ‘Swedish model’. Rather than in constant peril as critics suggest, the encompassing interest organizations and the patterns of relations among them are characterized by continued solidity in keeping with the operating principles of the solidaristic market economy.     

Structure and Process in Federal and Consociational Arrangements

Daniel J. Elazar uses the concepts of structure and processto distinguish between federal and consociational arrangements.While the distinction is appropriate and useful, it does havelimitations, and in some respects may be slightly misleading.It is argued here that under certain circumstances, politicalstructures can play an important role in defining or promotingcon-sociational arrangements, even if such structures were originallythe result of social forces. An additional point made is thatin both federations and consociations, the relationship betweenstructure and process is essentially reciprocal. It is suggestedthat more attention be paid to the differences in the kindsof structures found in the two forms of governance and, in turn,how they might be linked to differences in process. At thisstage, it appears that consociations are much more confederalin form, which has certain consequences for the manner in whichconflict is both structured and resolved.     

Local Corporatism in Norway*

In several countries changing market conditions and legislation regulating economic activity have led to the emergence of corporalist structures at the local as well as the national level. In Norway these have generated local institutional innovations which have had several important actual and potential consequences, ranging from a growth of neo-mercantilist policies to increased inter-community competition for industrial establishment and aid.     

Corporatism and Planning in London in the 1980s

This study confirms the existence of corporatist forms of interest intermediation at the micro level of four local planning authorities in London. In all four boroughs distinctions could be drawn between local business associations and metic, non-local firms. The former displayed most of the institutional characteristics outlined by Schmitter in his original definition of corporatism. In contrast the non-local or metic firms did not exhibit all these institutional characteristics at the level of local government. The conditions under which they bargained with local planning authorities (LPAs) were often influenced by statutory and other requirements handed down from central government. These requirements were themselves often the result of corporatist interest intermediation at the level of the central state. Both local business associations (LBAs) and metic production organizations (MPOs) were required by (LPAs) to implement planning policies. This process has increased in importance during the Thatcher era. Economic decline has made the local planning authorities even more dependent on private organizations for implementation than before. Local LBAs and MPOs were granted privileged access to the planning system. Only the LBAs were granted representational monopolies for their very local areas in this process. MPOs developed representational oligopolies but because they were so few in number they could be in conflict with one another over the rights to develop a particular site. In return for these representational privileges both the LBAs and MPOs were expected to moderate their demands for major departures from the approved local plans. The methods used to intermediate interests to the local planning systems were primarily informal. Although a small number of formal meetings were held each year between external organizations and the LPAs they represented a minority of the contacts between them and representatives of both LBAs and MPOs. Informal bargaining took place in two ways. First, there were issue specific negotiations over particular developments. The second type of contact was long-term, non-issue specific and primarily concerned with network building. Both types of bargaining were relatively secret and involved only the top echelons of the organizations concerned.     

Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies: Meaning and measurement

Abstract The ongoing use of the concept of 'corporatism' in industrial democracies has been stretched to include overlapping but still distinctive realities, which in turn often produce different 'lists'of corporatist economies. Consequently, this analysis sets out to disentangle the concept of corporatism and to suggest a replacement. It includes a comparative classification of 24 long–term industrial democracies in terms of the corporatism scores given by 23 different scholarly analyses. The divisions in scoring certain important but problematic cases (such as Japan) can be explained by noting differing emphases in the term. I then propose an alternative, more focused summary measure of economic integration which is clearly linear and which has no 'problem cases'. Precise scores on economic integration are given for four time periods from the late 1960s through the mid–1990s. It will be seen that the industrial democracies have always been dichotomised between integrated and non–integrated (or 'pluralist') economies.     

Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies: Meaning and measurement

The ongoing use of the concept of 'corporatism' in industrial democracies has been stretched to include overlapping but still distinctive realities, which in turn often produce different 'lists'of corporatist economies. Consequently, this analysis sets out to disentangle the concept of corporatism and to suggest a replacement. It includes a comparative classification of 24 long–term industrial democracies in terms of the corporatism scores given by 23 different scholarly analyses. The divisions in scoring certain important but problematic cases (such as Japan) can be explained by noting differing emphases in the term. I then propose an alternative, more focused summary measure of economic integration which is clearly linear and which has no 'problem cases'. Precise scores on economic integration are given for four time periods from the late 1960s through the mid–1990s. It will be seen that the industrial democracies have always been dichotomised between integrated and non–integrated (or 'pluralist') economies.     

公共事务治理与社团主义模式

解决公共事务的治理危机需要一种合作机制的创新,社团主义理论强调建构一种有合作特征的社会结构,因而对于公共事务治理模式的创新具有借鉴意义。对于中国的现实情况而言,一种可供选择的有效途径是在社团主义所型构的社会结构中合作性地处理公共事务。