论新时期大学生网络道德的培育

网络社会的迅猛发展，给当代大学生的思想道德形成了强烈的冲击，面对网络社会的挑战，如何培育大学生的网络道德。成为我们亟待解决的问题。我们从大学生网络道德培育的原则、内容、方法和途径方面进行了一定程度的探讨，希望对大学生网络道德的培育起到一定的促进作用。     

Dworkin on external skepticism and moral permissions

This article discusses Ronald Dworkin’s first objection against what he calls external moral skepticism, the view that denies truth-value to moral judgments. According to that objection, an external skeptic denies that substantive moral judgments can be true. But, at the same time, the objection goes, what follows from the skeptical view is that all actions are morally permissible, which is in itself a substantive moral judgment. We call this ‘the self-defeating argument.’ We argue that the objection’s success depends on how we interpret the idea of moral permission, an issue Dworkin does not clearly resolve. Against his objection, we advance two different arguments. First, once we learn what role the idea of moral permission plays in morality, we can see that any plausible view of some agent’s moral permission must acknowledge its complex character, and that the existence of a moral permission must have some impact on the balance of moral reasons for other agents. On this understanding, it is false that it follows solely from external skepticism that everything is permissible. Second, we argue that even if permissions have a simple character, not a complex one, they are plausible only when framed within a moral constellation of rights and obligations. So understood, it is, again, false that it follows from external skepticism that everything is permissible.     

“If it doesn't make sense it's not true”: how Judge Judy creates coherent stories through “common-sense” reasoning according to the neoliberal agenda

This study examines the American court show Judge Judy. Drawing on both conversation analysis and critical discourse analysis, this paper aims to show how ideological assumptions about how to be a “good citizen” manifest themselves at a turn-by-turn level in the interactions on Judge Judy and how they contribute to the co-construction of a new version of events. The microanalyses reveal how Sheindlin's strategic use of “common-sense reasoning” sets up a context and characterization of the opposing litigants. Sheindlin reframes complex issues as simple black-and-white stories. These new stories have a plain narrative line without the contingencies of everyday life and with clearly moral and immoral characters allowing her to pass a judgment that only seems fair.     

The Moral Efficacy of Aesthetic Experience: Figures of Meaning in the Moral Field

Abstract

This paper proposes to analyse the process that makes paths of action meaningful. It argues that this process is one of "figuration". The term "figuration" intends to outline how the experience of moral meaning is one that already positively marks out a field and to identify and analyse the mechanisms used for such marking and selection. It is my contention that these mechanisms predate the persuasion to a moral path; they are the process through which this path is constructed as meaningful. This thesis is elucidated through an analysis of the tactics of meaning in Kant's moral theory. Kant turns to aesthetics as a means of corroboration for his moral theory, but he also attempts to limit the scope of the interactions between his aesthetic and moral theory. For instance, when he writes on the topic of form in aesthetic taste or outlines the technical specifications of aesthetic judgment, it is arguably the arcane peculiarities of his system that are met. For this reason, Kant insists on the merely analogical relations between beauty and morality. However, it is also possible to see how certain aspects of Kant's aesthetic theory execute wider, and potentially more important, functions for his practical philosophy, such as providing meaningful orientation for the ascetic moral attitude of his duty-ethics. In this respect, certain figures of Kant's aesthetic theory may well be viewed as complementing the dependence in his moral philosophy, in the important sections on moral pedagogy and methodology, on appeals to heroic models and stories as ways of shaping and inculcating the moral disposition. This paper considers these aspects of interaction between Kant's aesthetic and moral philosophies as both (1) a problem for the consistency of his philosophy given his avowed exclusion of aesthetic and religious elements of meaning in his duty-ethics; and (2) as a case study for the new, schematic analysis of "moral figuration" outlined in the paper.     

Injustice Abroad,Authority at Home? Democracy,Systemic Effects,and Global Wrongs

Multiple normative theorists currently link political authority to democratic political procedures. I explore how proponents of this influential view can address a fundamental, but overlooked, puzzle. The puzzle begins from the firm judgment that even a government that keeps democratic procedures intact loses its general authority if it enacts abhorrent major laws. This judgment means that the moral failure of some laws can dissolve the moral authority of other laws—even ones that are quite distinct in their content. But how can we explain these systemic effects of specific laws? I confront this challenge by introducing a global perspective into the discussion of political authority. First, I suggest that we should only adopt an account of systemic effects that can explain how the worst global conduct dissolves a government's general authority. Second, after developing such an account, I use it to reflect on thornier global cases.     

Beyond reason: the philosophy and politics of immigration

In this paper, I critically address the role of arbitrary and contingent features in philosophical debates about migration. These features play a central role, and display the importance of ‘unreason’ in the debate and the limits of rational criticism. Certain elements of political thought have to be taken as given, as essential starting points or indispensable building blocks. As such, they cannot be exposed to rational criticism. Political arrangements such as national borders, nation-states and national identities constitute these building blocks, and justify coercive borders in order to sustain them. If we are to subject these arrangements to critical examination, then we move beyond the limits of liberal political philosophy. I examine theorists who take this kind of approach to the ethics of immigration: Michael Blake, Samuel Scheffler and David Miller. I argue that such approaches ask us to balance arbitrary and contingent features of the political world against the non-contingent moral equality of the migrant. If we are to recognize the migrant as an equal reason-giver in the moral contestation of borders, then we are compelled to theorize beyond these limits, and to theorize instead about a global community of equals, a post-national world made up of transnational belonging.     

Guilty Subjects and Political Responsibility: Arendt, Jaspers and the Resonance of the 'German Question' in Politics of Reconciliation

The post-war question of German guilt resonates in contemporary world politics, framing the way actors and observers conceptualize collective responsibility for past wrongs in diverse polities. This article examines the responses of Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers to the 'German question': in what sense are ordinary citizens collectively accountable for state crimes and how should they respond to the legacy of past wrongs? Arendt and Jaspers agree on conceiving collective responsibility in terms of a liability predicated on political association that does not impute blame. However, they disagree on the value of the sentiment of guilt in politics. For Jaspers, a spreading consciousness of guilt through public communication leads to purification of the polity. But Arendt rejects guilt in politics, where publicity distorts it into a sentimentality that dulls citizens' responsiveness to the world. These contrasting responses are employed to consider how members of a 'perpetrating community' might be drawn into a politics of reconciliation. I suggest that Arendt's conception of political responsibility, conceived in terms of an ethic of worldliness, opens the way for understanding how 'ordinary citizens' might assume political responsibility for past wrongs while resisting their identification as guilty subjects by a discourse of restorative reconciliation.     

Merleau-Ponty's Conception of Dialectics in Phenomenology of Perception

Although the fact that Merleau-Ponty has a dialectical approach in Phenomenology of Perception has been discussed in recent Anglophone readings, there has not been an explicit clarification as to how his varying usages of the term hang together. Given his repeated references to Hegel and to dialectics, coupled with the fact that dialectics are not part of the Husserlian phenomenology or Heideggerean existentialism from which Merleau-Ponty draws so much, the question of just what he does with the idea of dialectics presents itself. In this paper I argue that, in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty saw Hegel as providing a model for the conception of rationality and meaning that must underpin the existentialist response to the problems bequeathed him by Husserlian phenomenology: namely, the problems of embodiment, perception and the constitution of the world. In connection with this, I suggest an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's “existential dialectics” that focuses on his three principal uses of the term: 1) a “dialectic of objective thought,” 2) a set of existential-dialectical categories intended to capture the ontological structure of the “body-subject” as “being-in-the-world,” and 3) a dialectic at the cultural level concerning others and history.     

Courage,regulatory responsibility,and the challenge of higher‐order reflexivity

Contemporary regulators must respond to ever‐increasing societal demands in various domains. Regulators must cope with these demands under conditions of extreme epistemic scarcity and ideological divide. This leaves regulators perplexed about what action they should take. Regulatory praxis offers two primary responses to this moral and epistemic dilemma: technical canonization and reflexive regulation. While these two approaches represent contrary regulatory philosophies, they suffer from two common blind spots: (a) disregard of the critical role of discretionary judgment in regulatory action; and (b) disregard of the dilemma of higher‐order reflexivity. The article explores the idea of higher‐order reflexivity in the regulatory context. This exploration renders visible the abysses that are faced by regulators as they attempt to resolve regulatory dilemmas through a cognizant and introspective process. The article argues that the Socratic concept of courage and the idea of forward‐looking responsibility provide a plausible framework for thinking about the challenge of regulatory judgment. It concludes with a discussion of the legal and institutional mechanisms that could both facilitate and put to scrutiny the realization of this ideal (but noting also several features of the contemporary regulatory system which constitute potential barriers).     

“救亡”与“修身”的双重探寻——李大钊对马克思主义唯物史观与史学的探析、阐释与运用

李大钊虽然在“五四时期”对儒家文化进行了批判，但他依然肯定通过“修身”来提高道德修养的思想。同时，在对救亡的探寻之中，他的修身意识发展成了对个体存在意义和价值追求的反省，演进成了对唤起国民觉醒的思想。“十月革命之后”，马克思主义唯物史观和史学受到李大钊重视。他对唯物史观的探析、阐释与运用和对马克思主义史学的研究，使他有效地引发出了群众自觉救亡的动力，同时，又将他的修身意识贯彻到其中，对唤醒群众自觉树立正确的人生观产生了积极的影响。     

The Theory of Universal Human Rights: A Comment on Talbott

In this analysis of William Talbott’s important book, I note with appreciation his defense of universal moral principles and of moral justification as a “social project,” his focus on the critique of oppression, and his emphasis on empathic understanding in the account of human rights. I go on to develop some criticisms regarding: 1) Talbott’s traditional understanding of human rights as holding against governments and not also applying to nonstate actors; 2) his account of the interrelations among well-being, autonomy, claims for first person authority in moral judgment, and human rights; 3) his strongly rationalist and liberal individualist interpretation of moral judgment and autonomy; and 4) the lack of a role for intercultural dialogue about human rights, which nonetheless are held to apply to all human beings across cultures. In each case, I briefly consider what an alternative approach would look like.     

Justice and Culture: Rawls, Sen, Nussbaum and O'Neill

Is it possible, in a multicultural world, to hold all societies to a common standard of decency that is both high enough to protect basic human interests, and yet not biased in the direction of particular cultural values? We examine the recent work of four liberals – John Rawls, Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum and Onora O'Neill – to see whether any of them has given a successful answer to this question. For Rawls, the decency standard is set by reference to an idea of basic human rights that we argue offers too little protection to members of non-liberal societies. Sen and Nussbaum both employ the idea of human capabilities, but in interestingly different ways: for Sen the problems are how to weight different capabilities, and how to decide which are basic, whereas for Nussbaum the difficulty is that her favoured list of capabilities depends on an appeal to autonomy that is unlikely to be acceptable to non-liberal cultures. O'Neill rejects a rights-based approach in favour of a neo-Kantian position that asks which principles of action people everywhere could consent to, but this also may be too weak in the face of cultural diversity. We conclude that liberals need to argue both for a minimum decency standard and for the full set of liberal rights as the best guarantors of that standard over time.     

Metaphor, Intertextuality, and the Post–War Consensus

The idea of a once 'postwar consensus', between the Labour and Conservative parties, has become a commonplace in the academic literature of British political science. Here, I intend to briefly consider two aspects of this. I want to look at how the phrase 'postwar consensus' is used in a rather loose and indeterminate metaphorical fashion; and how the idea remains something of an intertextual construct rather than being a more fully developed social scientific argument. The simple moral or lesson being that social scientists require to be highly circumspect with regard to the subsumption of broad extents of time and/or space under some all-embracing catch-all label or designation.     

Reconciling legal positivism and human rights: Hans Kelsen's argument from relativism

This article examines the conceptual relationship between legal positivism and human rights, challenging the common idea that the two are in tension or that there exists, at most, a contingent relationship between them, whereby legal positivists can only recognize the normative validity of human rights if they happen to be inscribed in positive law. To do this, I focus on the thought and writings of one of the “founding fathers” of modern legal positivism: the Austrian legal theorist and political philosopher Hans Kelsen. In the first part, I show that Kelsen's conception of legal positivism is inextricably tied to — and, indeed, logically stems from — his moral relativism. In the second, I show that this form of relativism is also the philosophical foundation for Kelsen's commitment to democracy and human rights. Finally, in the third part, I examine the specific conception of human rights that results from this relativistic foundation, contrasting it with the “natural law” version that legal positivism excludes.     

From Afro-Sweden with Defiance: The Clenched Fist as Coalitional Gesture?

Anti-racist activist Maria Teresa “Tess” Asplund, who is Afro-Swedish, became known around the world in 2016 when a photograph of her stepping out in front of three hundred marching neo-Nazis from the Nordic Resistance Movement went viral on social media. Tess raised her clenched fist in protest, as part of a counter-demonstration. The recognizability of her clenched fist as an act of protest struck a chord with anti-racist activists and movements around the world as the photograph of her lit up the Internet. In this article, we examine Asplund’s action as an expression of the current racial climate in Sweden, while at the same time tracing the viral and transnational circulation of her image across multiple-publics and mediaspheres to investigate how her solitary presence and her clenched fist function relationally and rhetorically.     

Why should we care about competition?

Abstract

Most people believe that competitive institutions are morally acceptable, but that there are limits: a friendly competition is one thing; a life or death struggle is another. How should we think about the moral limits on competition? I argue that the limits stem from the value of human sociability, and in particular from the noninstrumental value of a form of social connectedness that I call ‘mutual affirmation.’ I contrast this idea with Rawls’s account of social union and stability. Finally, I show how these ideas provide the basis for a powerful argument in favour of social provisions for public goods: for example, a strong public health care system moderates the stakes in labour market competition, preventing the competition from descending into a life or death struggle.     

Examining the French Hijab and Burqa Bans through Reflexive Cultural Judgment

How can we judge unfamiliar cultures while avoiding ethnocentrism and universals? It requires what I call reflexive cultural judgment. After considering the socially and politically situated knowledge and commitments that guide the judgment of others, those engaged in reflexive cultural judgment meditate on what they have learned in the intercultural engagement and cast a critical eye on their own supposedly universal principles to reveal cultural particulars that typically would not be as visible to insiders. To demonstrate this, the article examines French political judgment of Muslim women who wear the hijab (a head covering) and burqa (a face covering). Through content analysis of previously unanalyzed data on the National Assembly's 2009–2010 discussion of the burqa, the article identifies particular French assumptions about gender and freedom that informed the ban. The author then casts a critical eye on her own political situatedness, highlighting the limitations of American liberal thought on freedom and religion.     

Human Rights and Modern Liberalism: a Critique

The idea of human rights has become one of the central moral notions of both the theory and practice of international politics. While its foundation and future in the practice of politics looks bright, it is an idea that still causes great trouble at the theoretical level. What are human rights? Why do we have them? To what should we attribute the authority of their moral claims? The theorist Michael Freeman has suggested one theory that by addressing such questions may serve as a foundation for human rights. His theory, however, ends by begging the questions it set out to answer.     

STRUCTURE AND ACTION AS CONSTRUCTS IN THE PRACTICE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION*

Abstract: In this paper we first examine the dominant instrumental paradigm of organization, and the critique to which it has been subjected from both social action theory and a more structural analysis of organizational life. Secondly, we draw on critical theory to construct an alternative paradigm. This addresses some of the problems left by critiques of the dominant paradigm, focuses on the relationship between structure and action, and the way in which each of these constitutes, and is constituted by, the other. In the final section we outline the implications of this analytical approach for analysis and practice in public administration. Public administration is about what people do, but also about how this activity is perceived and talked about. This distinction between thought and practice is not the same as the distinction between the academic and the practitioner. Although the academic operates largely in the world of thought — through teaching, research and writing — the work of the practitioner also rests on foundations in the world of thought, namely, the perception of the organization as an instrument for the accomplishment of some purpose, and of the administrator as the controller of that instrument for the better achievement of the end. We contend that these approaches to analysis and practice mask significant aspects of the ways that relationships within and between organizational contexts come to be structured and conducted, and do not provide a basis for understanding or evaluating either organizational processes or the activities of managers within these.     

关于科学发展观时代内涵和现实定位述要

发展观是一个国家在发展进程中对发展及怎样发展的总的和系统的看法,是一定时期经济与社会发展的需求在思想观念层面的聚焦和反映。科学发展观是三个代表重要思想在发展领域的深化和具体化,是全面建设小康社会和实现现代化的根本指针,是我们党执政理念的重要升华。