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1.
Reviews     
Recently, various authors have examined the relationship between growth in government size and total economic growth. In each case, the authors permitted only a monotonic relationship. This paper examines the issue of a non-linear relationship between growth in government and overall growth in the economy.Government contributes to total economic output in various ways. The provision of Pigovian public goods enhances the productivity of the private sector inputs increasing total output. However, the public decision-making process can result in an inefficient quantity of public goods. The likelihood of this outcome increases with the size of government. Further negative effects are created by the revenue raising and spending mechanisms of government, and the increasing diversion of resources into unproductive rent-seeking activities. The magnitude of these effects is likely to increase with the relative size of government.  相似文献   

2.
This essay reasses the assumptions of the Brams-Fishburn theory of approval voting, and proposes modifications to make the theory correspond better with likely voting choices. With a small number of candidates, voters who use the inadmissible strategy of voting for all candidates can help to produce a result that better reflects the voters' wishes than is possible with admissible strategies, so we propose a widening of the definition of admissibility to encompass this case. With more than three candidates, we define first-order admissible strategies, which are the most likely strategies to be used in practice, and are also strongly sincere, in that a vote for any candidate is always accompanied by votes for all more or equally-preferred candidates. Their number is less under approval voting than under plurality voting. Both proposed modifications strengthen the technical arguments favoring approval voting over plurality voting.  相似文献   

3.
This essay extends the theory of simple collective decision problems to spatial games in which (contrary to the traditional assumption) each agent's preferences are concave, in the sense that the alternatives that the agent does not prefer to any particular reference alternative together constitute a convex set. Such concave preferences might characterize decision problems in which, say, a site must be selected for some obnoxious facility, such as a prison, garbage dump, or facility for managing hazardous materials. The results indicate that, under these conditions, the (weak -)core can be structurally unstable, changing discontinuously with apparently minor perturbations of the decision problem. The main theorem identifies a curious property of the core when the set of feasible alternatives is compact and convex and each agent's preferences are strictly concave. Namely, a point in the feasible set's interior can belong to the core only if there is no feasible alternative that makes every member of any winning coalition strictly worse off. In this sense, an interior point belongs to the core only if it lies in the pits.A preliminary version of this essay was presented at the West Coast Conference on Small Groups Research, Stanford University, 17 April 1985, and the Experimental Social Choice Workshop, Utah State University, Logan, Utah, 20–21 June 1985. This material is based on work supported by grants from the National Science Foundation (Grants SES 83-12123 and SES 84-10094), the Real Estate Center and Department of Decision Sciences of The Wharton School, and the Research Fund of the University of Pennsylvania.  相似文献   

4.
Crews  Clyde Wayne 《Policy Sciences》1998,31(4):343-369
The size of the federal budget tells only one part of the tale of government's presence in the market economy. The enormous amounts of non-tax dollars government requires to be spent on regulation – estimated at $647 billion per year – powerfully argue for some sort of regulatory scorekeeping. Regulatory costs are equivalent to over one-third of the level of government spending. A regulatory budget can be an effective tool both for spurring reform and monitoring regulatory activity.At bottom, today's rulemaking process is plagued by the fact that agency bureaucrats are not accountable to voters. And Congress – though responsible for the underlying statutes that usually propel those unanswerable agencies – nevertheless can conveniently blame agencies for regulatory excesses. Indeed, Americans live under a regime of Regulation Without Representation.A regulatory budget could promote greater accountability by limiting the regulatory costs agencies could impose on the private sector. Congress could either specify a limit on compliance costs for each newly enacted law or reauthorization of existing law, or Congress could enact a more ambitious full-scale budget paralleling the fiscal budget, a riskier approach. A comprehensive budget would require Congress to divide to a total budget among agencies. Agencies' responsibility would be to rank hazards serially, from most to least severe, and address them within their budget constraint. In either version of a regulatory budget, any agency desiring to exceed its budget would need to seek congressional approval.Regulatory costs imposed on the private sector by federal agencies can never be precisely measured, and a budget cannot achieve absolute precision. Nonetheless, a regulatory budget is a valuable tool. The real innovation of regulatory budgeting is its potential to impose the consequences of regulatory decisionmaking on agencies rather than on the regulated parties alone. Agencies that today rarely admit a rule provides negligible benefit would be forced to compete for the right to regulate. While agencies would be free to regulate as unwisely as they do now, the consequences could be transfer of the squandered budgetary allocation to a rival agency that saves more lives.Budgeting could fundamentally change incentives. Under a budget, adopting a costly, but marginally beneficial, regulation will suddenly be irrational. Congress would weigh an agency's claimed benefits against alternative means of protecting public health and safety, giving agencies incentives to compete and expose one another's bogus benefits. Budgeting could encourage greater recognition of the fact that some risks are far more remote than those we undertake daily. In the long run, a regulatory budget would force agencies to compete with one another on the most important bottom line of all: that their least-effective rules save more lives per dollar spent (or correct some alleged market imperfection better) than those of other agencies.There are clear benefits to regulatory budgeting, but there are also pitfalls. For instance, under a budget, agencies have incentives to underestimate compliance costs while regulated parties have the opposite incentive. Self-correcting techniques that may force opposing cost calculations to converge are only at the thought- experiment stage. However, limitations on the delegation of regulatory power and enhancing congressional accountability can help.Certain principles and antecedents can help ensure that a regulatory budgeting effort succeeds. Explicitly recognizing that an agency's basic impulse is to overstate the benefits of its activities, a budget would relieve agencies of benefit calculation responsibilities altogether. Agencies would concentrate on properly assessing only the costs of their initiatives. Since an agency must try to maximize benefits within its budget constraint or risk losing its budget allocation, it would be rational for agencies to monitor benefits, but Congress need not require it.Other ways to promote the success of a budget are to: establish an incremental rather than total budget; collect and summarize annual report card data on the numbers of regulations in each agency; establish a regulatory cost freeze; implement a Regulatory Reduction Commission; employ separate budgets for economic and environmental/social regulation; and control indirect costs by limiting the regulatory methods that most often generate them.A regulatory budget is not a magic device alone capable of reducing the current $647 billion regulatory burden. Yet a cautious one deserve consideration. Having good information is an aid in grappling with the regulatory state just as compiling the federal fiscal budget is indispensable to any effort to plan and control government spending.  相似文献   

5.
We note the failure of a rational egoist model of human behavior to generate successful predictions of important economic and political behaviors including collective action. Alternative models are presented that combine rational, utility-maximizing features with concerns about collective welfare. The performance of these models in explaining contributing behavior in an experimentally-induced public goods game is compared to the performance of a rational egoist and collective welfare model. The results indicate that a model in which subjects are presumed to trade off benefits to self with benefits to others provides a better explanation of actual contributing behavior than either the rational egoist or collective welfare models, but still explains only a small amount of the individual variance in contributing behavior.The Institute for Political Economy, Utah State University provided important financial support for this study. Donald Cundy, Alan Huston, Joe Oppenheimer, John Orbell, and Randy Simmons provided valuable comments on earlier drafts.  相似文献   

6.
The development of increasingly transnationalized (globalized) financial markets raises several key issues for the analysis of politics, public policy, and the national state. This article suggests that financial globalization increasingly constrains policymakers and circumscribes the policy capacity of the state. After looking briefly at a range of approaches to the process of financial globalization itself, the author suggests that technological change is the main independent variable, by reducing transaction costs and dramatically increasing the price sensitivity of financial markets across borders, while at the same time making possible a range of economies of scale. These very developments have a knock-on effect throughout the domestic and international economies. They in turn make obsolescent the political economies of scale — the governance structures — which have characterized economic policy in modern nation-states, undermining the capacity of the state to produce public goods. At the same time, globalized financial markets interact with rapidly changing interest group structures and divided state structures, especially through regulatory arbitrage. Without the development of transnational regimes capable of regulating global financial markets, the structural basis of the national state itself is being undermined, and Polanyi's Great Transformation is over.  相似文献   

7.
John Gibson 《Public Choice》1993,77(2):323-332
A number of empirical models have found protection to be greatest for industries employing poorly skilled, low paid workers. This has caused some economists, notably Robert Baldwin, to suggest that equity concern by politicians in an alternative to the interest group hypothesis. This paper reports the result of a test on New Zealand data that shows that this equity concern is absent for industries with few employees or firms. Equity concern variables were only important for industries with many employees and firms. This suggests that equity concern is selective and may be reconcilable with self-interest motivations.I am grateful to John Tressler, Richard Harris and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments.  相似文献   

8.
Further tests and thoughts on the OECD data lead me to conclude that, if anything, my 1986 paper underestimated the magnitude of the inverse relation between economic growth and government size. If one takes the nominal-based measure of government scale, as advised by Saunders, the significance levels, coefficient magnitudes and goodness of fits improve over what I found with my initial investigation. I would suggest that Saunders reconsider his reluctance to believe that the size of the public sector is unrelated to economic growth in OECD countries over this time period.One additional thought appears relevant to the current policy debate concerning budget deficits and economic performance within the major industrialized economies. The empirical work displayed here and in my 1986 paper suggests serious problems associated with the various proposals urging governments to raise taxes and/or ease fiscal policy. Elsewhere, I have suggested that available empirical evidence implies that plans to increase taxes as a way out of budget deficits are plans that carry the potential for raising government spending and possibly future deficits as well. Coupled with the evidence presented here, we should also recognize the potential of tax increases to raise the level of government participation in a country and, accordingly, exert inverse influences on its future economic performance as well. As suggested in my 1986 paper, the empirical evidence may suggest the following irony: While political participants may crave larger and larger non-market resource allocations, their future ability to satisfy that craving may very well be severely constrained by the satisfaction of that same appetite.  相似文献   

9.
The political feasibility of protectionist policies that regulate international industry derives from the absence of overt collusion among domestic import-competing producers. The regulation of international industry cannot be explicit since governments would thereby be perceived to be approving (or instigating) international collusion. Hence, voluntary export restraints have been popularly presented with a focus on the difficulties confronted by domestic import-competing producers and a de-emphasis on the mutual gains to domestic and foreign producers from monitoring by a foreign government of a restrictive export cartel arrangement. Similarly, trigger-price mechanisms have popularly been explained in terms of the need for anti-dumping measures to preserve fair competition. Likewise, the involuntary export tax derived in the first instance from an administratively validated (but, as demonstrated by Kalt's econometric analysis, contentious) complaint of unfair foreign competition. Voluntary export restraints, trigger-price mechanisms, and involuntary export taxes are however protectionist devices, the beneficiaries of which can transcend national jurisdictions, and which have in common the characteristic that the gains to domestic industry interests derive from the regulation of foreign competitors.A previous version of this paper was presented at a conference on Economics and Power organized by the FWS Institute of Zug and held at Interlaken, Switzerland in July 1988.  相似文献   

10.
Postmodern inquiry into the discursive construction of identity has the potential to make a distinctive, democratizing contribution to public policy analysis. More so than conventional approaches, a postmodern policy analysis offers the opportunity to interrogate assumptions about identity embedded in the analysis and making of public policy, thereby enabling us to rethink and resist questionable distinctions that privilege some identities at the expense of others. Public policy analysis can benefit from postmodernism's emphasis on how discourse constructs identity. A review of postmodernism and postmodern approaches to interrogating identity is followed by an exercise in postmodern policy analysis. Social welfare policy in contemporary postindustrial America is shown to participate in the construction and maintenance of identity in ways that affect not just the allocation of public benefits, but also economic opportunities outside of the state. Mired in old, invidious distinctions (e.g., independent/dependent, contract/charity, family/promiscuity), welfare policy discourse today helps to recreate the problems of yesterday, particularly as a critical factor in reproducing women's poverty.  相似文献   

11.
The median and the competitive equilibrium in one dimension   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Two alternative models of legislative outcomes are the minimum winning coalition and the competitive equilibrium (Koford, 1982). In a unidimensional setting, the outcome under the former is the median, while the outcome under the latter is the highest net demand location.This paper describes the competitive equilibrium in a unidimensional model, and shows that under some common conditions it coincides with the median, in particular for pure redistributive issues. However, for distributive issues, the two equilibria will differ. Finally, the comparative statics of the two models are examined; while the winning coalition is sensitive only to changes in the location of the median, for distributive issues the competitive equilibrium has the standard economic comparative statics that the outcome adjusts in the direction of the change in preferences.  相似文献   

12.
Positivist beliefs among policy professionals: An empirical investigation   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
MORÇÖL  GÖKTUĞ 《Policy Sciences》2001,34(3-4):381-401
A group of scholars argue that mainstream policy analysis ispositivistic in its theory and practice. This paper reports the resultsof an e-mail survey that was conducted to investigate the extent,dimensions, and determinants of positivist beliefs among policyprofessionals. The survey results show that policy professionals aremore positivistic in their abstract beliefs and less so in their beliefsabout the role of politics and analysis in the policy process.Educational background is the most important factor determining beliefs:The economists and mathematicians/scientists are most positivistic intheir beliefs, while political scientists are least positivistic. Also,practitioners take more positivistic positions than academics. Overall,the largest percentage of the respondents see the postpositivistfacilitator role as the proper role for policy analysts,but there is also a significant percentage of those who prefer thepositivist problem solver role.  相似文献   

13.
There have been several attempts to compare different approaches to modelling public expenditure decision-making. This paper is an extended comment on one such attempt: Fred Thompson and Richard Williams, A Horse Race Around a Möbius Strip: A Review and a Test of Utility Maximizing and Organizational-Process Models of Public Expenditure Decisions. In a commentary mode, we: (a) examine why tests of the sort that Thompson and Williams offer are neither definitive in choosing between models nor very useful in improving models; (b) outline a more meaningful test procedure; and (c) offer a somewhat more critical view than Thompson and Williams of the utility-maximizing approach to modelling public expenditure decisions.A comment on Fred Thompson and Richard Williams, A Horse Race Around a Möbius Strip: A Review and A Test of Utility-Maximizing and Organizational-Process Models of Public Expenditure Decisions, in this issue of Policy Sciences.  相似文献   

14.
Public preferences about the availability of abortion under various circumstances have remained fairly stable over time. Yet a standard CBS/New York Times abortion question indicates that a significant shift in opinion occurred during the 1980s, whereby the public became increasingly supportive of legalized abortion as it is now. These very different patterns of public opinion about abortion suggest that the public perceived a shift in the abortion status quo, toward more restricted access, over time, and became more supportive of current abortion policy.A model of support for legalized abortion as it is now is developed that incorporates the influences of court activities and interest-group behavior. The analysis indicates that the public reacted directly to the activities of the courts, becoming more supportive of current abortion policy in response to media coverage of court cases that challenged the abortion status quo and Supreme Court nominations and confirmations. Although absolute preferences remained largely unchanged, it appears the public perceived an increasing threat to the status quo and became correspondingly less enamored with further restrictions on the availability of abortion.  相似文献   

15.
The responses of municipal governments to declining real revenue are used to conduct a critical test of three theories of budgetary decisionmaking. Contrary to the expectations generated by the bureaucratic process theory, there is little evidence of the application of any budget cutting algorithm based on stable account priorities. Contrary to the expectations generated by the interest group politics model, there is equally little evidence of across-the-board cuts. The results are, however, broadly consistent with what we have termed the managerial theory which emphasizes the relative controllability of expenditure categories, transient decisionmaker preferences, and the stochastic impact of short-term expenditure solutions. The difficulties associated with the conduct of critical tests in this area are also discussed.Supported by NSF grant DAR 80-11208.  相似文献   

16.
The welfare state is often accused of being counterproductive: as the scope of public responsibility expands, private morality (especially altruism and benevolence) atrophies. This essay surveys psychological findings for evidence, which turns out to be broadly consistent with either of two models of moral development, each bearing distinct policy implications. The model of morally keeping in practice that is implicit in the term moral atrophy suggests the need for frequent opportunities to exercise moral skills, which would seem inconsistent with the welfare state. Alternatively, the model of moral character-building favoured by both philosophers and ordinary discourse would require only occasional reminders of one's moral principles. On this model, benevolence could usefully supplement the welfare state.  相似文献   

17.
The Delaney anticancer amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 is a prominent example of zero risk legislation. The relevant clauses prohibit a finding of safety for any relevant substance found to induce cancer in humans or animals. It is argued that the Delaney approach to safety regulation is not only misguided, but that relaxation of the law - for example, to permit substances that pose insignificant cancer risks - would produce only marginal improvement in regulation. A major shift in regulation that permits some form of cost-benefit analysis is the only way to move toward rational policy choices.Professor of Economics, Rutgers University. I am grateful to William Ascher, Richard A. Merrill, and two referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts.  相似文献   

18.
The issue of adverse health effects from electric and magnetic fields (EMFs) has been brewing for the last decade or so. While the epidemiological evidence persists in linking proximity-to-powerlines to a few forms of cancer, exposure and dose remain undefined, and no clear mechanism of action has been identified. Despite this scientific ambiguity, there are frequent calls for governmental action; and yet, there is no unanimity on what action is appropriate, even among those asserting that something ought to be done. This article analyzes the various ways that the EMF problem has been socially constructed through distinctive forms of public discourse and the sources of contention among these different forms. It should appeal to interpretive policy analysts and to those interested in the valuative assumptions behind policy claims. Those oriented exclusively to the technical side of EMF may find the interpretation offered here somewhat unsettling, however, since it relativizes many of the factual claims surrounding the issue. Attention is also given to the ways that multiple EMF discourses are accommodated in the absence of scientifically conclusive evidence.  相似文献   

19.
The defense budget poses many problems to the student of budgetary behavior and its ever-changing structure makes it difficult to identify patterns and trends in allocation. This study examines defense budget requests from the Eisenhower through the Reagan administrations. An analysis of changes in allocation to the 54 appropriation categories suggests that the defense budget responds to new doctrines and management introduced by each administration. Shifts in allocation among the services are greatest in the first two budgets of an administration and reversals of previous program priorities also occur early in each administration. After three or four budget requests, year-to-year continuity in allocation to winners and losers finally begins to emerge. Two other findings also shed light on the politics of defense budgeting. First, the degree of variation in allocation is least when the defense budget increase is large. Second, low presidential popularity leads to less variation. The identification of such trends should permit future budget requests to be evaluated in the context of the long-term evolution of defense politics.  相似文献   

20.
Given rapidly increasing losses from extreme climate events, the world community already has a common interest in action to mitigate and adapt to climate change. However, this common interest is not well served through continued promotion of either mandatory (legally-binding) policies or do nothing policies by various participants in the regime established by the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change. The common interest would be better served by a third way, comprised of voluntary no regrets policies that are commensurate with the limited political power of the regime and already have succeeded on small scales in reducing vulnerabilities to extreme climate events and in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Both mandatory and do nothing policies, as well as the regime itself, have depended upon scientists for political support in the past. But scientists might better serve the common interest of the world community through support of a third way in the future.  相似文献   

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