Retributivism and Over-Punishment

Law and Philosophy - Lately it has become a commonplace to complain about the injustice of mass incarceration. I share the sentiment that this phenomenon has been an injustice. But it also has...     

Retributivism In Extremis

I defend two objections to Tadros’s views on punishment. First, I allege that his criticisms of retributivism are persuasive only against extreme versions that provide no justificatory place for instrumentalist objectives. His attack fails against a version of retributivism that recognizes a chasm between what offenders deserve and the allthings-considered permissibility of treating offenders as they deserve. Second, I critique Tadros’s duty view – his alternative theory of punishment. Inter alia, I object that he derives principles from highly unusual examples of self-defense he subsequently tries to apply to ordinary cases of punishment.     

Retributivism and Legal Moralism

This article examines whether a retributivist conception of punishment implies legal moralism and asks what liberalism implies about retributivism and moralism. It makes a case for accepting the weak retributivist thesis that culpable wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for blame and punishment and the weak moralist claim that moral wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for legal regulation. This weak moralist claim is compatible with the liberal claim that the legal enforcement of morality is rarely all‐thing‐considered desirable. Though weak moralism has some plausibility, it does not follow from weak retributivism if legitimate state functions are limited in certain ways.     

The Failure of Trust-Based Retributivism

Law and Philosophy -     

Retributivism and Fallible Systems of Punishment

Abstract

I argue for the following, which I dub the “fallibility syllogism”: (1) All systems of criminal punishment that inflict suffering on the innocent are unjust from a desert-based, retributivist point of view. (2) All past or present human systems of criminal punishment inflict suffering on the innocent. (3) Therefore, all such human systems of criminal punishment are unjust from a desert-based, retributivist point of view. My argument for the first premise is organized in the following way. I define what a human system of punishment is. I offer a distinction between retributive and utilitarian approaches to punishment. I distinguish between weak retributivism embodied in the second premise and strong retributivism, which I argue is the basis for the weak version. I argue that on retributivist grounds, each case of punishment is just when it matches the seriousness of the wrongdoing of the offender and that systems of punishment are just from a retributivist point of view when there are no exceptions to this match-up. In making my case, I will use Kant's retributivism as the version of my choice, so I will spend some time showing that recent reinterpretations of Kant (arguing that he was not a thoroughgoing retributivist), even if they are correct, are consistent with my view. Ultimately, however, I argue that the better view is that Kant was a thoroughgoing retributivist.     

Retributivism: The Right and the Good

Victor Tadros claims that punishment must be justified either instrumentally or on the grounds that deserved punishment is intrinisically good. However, if we have deontic reasons to punish wrongdoers then these reasons could justify punishment non-instrumentally. Morever, even if the punishment of wrongdoers is intrinsically good this fact cannot contribute to the justication of punishment because goodness is not a reason-giving property. It follows that retributivism is both true and important only if we have deontic reasons to punish. Tadros also claims that the constitutive aim of punishment is to inflict harm or suffering on offenders. On the contrary, the constitutive aim of retributive punishment is to inflict (justified) wrongs on offenders that are proportionate to the (unjustified) wrongs they commit. Indeed, punishment should involve the least harmful wrong that is proportionate to the wrongfulness of the offense, adequate to facilitate recognition, and (perhaps) conducive to deterrence.     

Retributivism and the inadvertent punishment of the innocent

Retributivism is generally thought to forbid the punishment of the innocent, even if such punishment would produce otherwise good results, such as deterrence. It has recently been argued that because capital punishment always entails the risk of executing an innocent person, instituting capital punishment is tantamount to intentionally taking innocent lives and therefore cannot be justified on retributive grounds. I argue that there are several versions of retributivism, only one of which might categorically forbid risking punishing innocent persons. I also argue that our moral practices reveal either that we do not hold this particular version of retributivism, or that we reject equating risking punishing the innocent with intentionally doing so. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A9102008 00005     

Revisiting Kantian Retributivism to Construct a Justification of Punishment

The standard view of Kant’s retributivism, as well as its more recent reworking in the ‘limited’ or ‘partial’ retributivist reading are, it is argued here, inadequate accounts of Kant on punishment. In the case of the former, the view is too limited and superficial, and in the latter it is simply inaccurate as an interpretation of Kant. Instead, this paper argues that a more sophisticated and accurate rendering of Kant on punishment can be obtained by looking to his construction of the concept of justice. In so doing, not only is a superior account of Kant furnished, but also one up to the task of resolving the vexed issue of justifying legal punishment.

Book Review: Social Meaning,Retributivism, and Homicide

Law and Philosophy -     

Retributivism,Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment

Retributivism is commonly taken as an alternative to a consequentialist justification of punishment. It has recently been suggested, however, that retributivism can be recast as a consequentialist theory. This suggestion is shown to be untenable. The temptation to advance it is traced to an intrinsic good claim prominent in retributive thinking. This claim is examined, and is argued to be of little help in coping with the difficulties besetting the retributive theory, as well as clashing with a desert claim equally central to that theory.     

Rehabilitating Social Conflicts in European Public Law

Subject to conditions that public law can secure, social conflicts can be normatively appealing for their dividend in terms of dynamism, identity and stability. While this notion was key to post‐World War II European public law, it no longer holds true now that social conflicts are increasingly marginalised by the expansion of supranational law and its consensus culture. However, far from disappearing social conflicts re‐emerge as challenges to the current institutional setting, even despite the policy of constitutional gesture undertaken by EU institutions. This paper tracks the role of social conflicts in European public law and argues that as long as EU politics fails to embrace a culture of social conflicts, challenges to the authority of EU law can be normatively justified.     

The Instruments of Abolition, or Why Retributivism is the Only Real Justification of Punishment

Victor Tadros’ The Ends of Harm is the most recent systematic attempt to defend the good old utilitarian justification of punishment. The attempt fails for a variety of reasons, which are here explored. First, the attempt presupposes an implausible account of human’s psychology. Second, the attempt confuses an attack on retributivism with an attack on certain criminal justice systems. Finally, Tadros admits that his justification of punishment is best seen as a mere step along the road to full-blown abolitionism – and so he unwittingly admits the extraordinarily thin sense in which he could be said to be really attempting to justify punishment.     

Rehabilitating serious violent adult offenders: an empirical and theoretical stocktake

Extensive meta-analyses of the correctional programme evaluation literature have generated developments in the technology of programme design. However, the risk, need and responsivity principles do not constitute a rehabilitation theory and cannot answer specialist offender programme design questions. After more than a decade of involvement in programmes for seriously violent offenders, we decided to reassess the empirical evidence underpinning violence rehabilitation in adult men. We focused on both mixed and violent offender samples, reviewing the outcome data from nine evaluations of cognitive–behavioural interventions. Despite a plethora of methodological difficulties, it appears that most of the programmes had small to large effects on violent and non-violent recidivism. Little could be concluded from these evaluations about the most promising theoretical framework for future programme development. Most programmes contained only scant information on their underlying theory base. None referred to multivariate aggression or crime theories. We conclude that there is a pressing need for additional evaluative research, and theory development. To date, the case for specialist violent offending programmes has not been made.     

High School Equivalency Programs: A Method of Rehabilitating Suburban School Drop-Outs

In a five-year period, 825 delinquent school drop-outs received their high school equivalency certificates from the Missouri State Department of Education. 37% of those receiving certificates enrolled in college full or part-time. 55% found jobs, enrolled in training programs, or entered the armed services. Only 3% were re-referred to the Court for additional services. These are the amazing results of a high school equivalency program staffed by volunteers and operated by the St. Louis County Juvenile Court from February, 1969, to 1974.