The Danzig Question in British Foreign Policy, 1918–1920

Among the many and often bitter territorial disputes following the collapse of Germany and Russia in Central and Eastern Europe — to mention only the questions of Vilna, Memel, Teschen, or Lemberg — the problem of the Polish sea access was particularly explosive and became the most vexing territorial problem of the whole conference. This paper examines the question of Danzig and the lower Vistula within the context of contradicting Polish, German and Western, mainly British ambitions and preferences. The author shows that the proclamation of the Free City of Danzig and the creation of the Polish Corridor, dividing Germany into two parts, was a compromise not liked in Warsaw and Berlin and one the British, always fearing fatal repercussions to future stability, only considered to be the lesser choice of evils.     

Russia as a Gravity Pole of the GCC’s New Foreign Policy Pragmatism

Abstract

Despite the obvious differences over the Syrian crisis and Iran, the GCC countries do not seem to be distancing themselves from Russia politically. To a large extent that is due to Russia’s growing military role (in Syria) and military cooperation (with Iran), as well as the diminishing role of the United States under Obama. Having accepted the situation in Syria (after the fall of Aleppo) as a fait accompli, the GCC’s elites seem to be looking at Russia as a powerful player able to reduce the scope of Iran’s expansion in the region. Their approach involves a carefully established mechanism of economic interaction exploiting Russia’s need for GCC finances and arms acquisitions.     

A. Johnstone,Dilemmas of Internationalism: The American Association for the United Nations and US Foreign Policy, 1941–1948

Middle Powers are generally understood to perform diplomatic functions of constructive engagement and consensus-building to facilitate agreement in international negotiations. Middle Powers may, however, adopt more confrontational roles, especially when their accommodative functions become deficient. Whilst theoretical perspectives on Middle Powers account for such roles, limited empirical evidence has been provided to explore the conditions under which they revert to combative diplomacy. This article contributes to this area by examining the role of South Africa in the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation. During this period, South Africa shifted to a more confrontational approach epitomised by the heightening of its public diplomacy against developed countries and its co-leadership of the G-20 coalition of developing countries. The Cancun Ministerial collapse reflected both the possibilities and limitations of combative diplomacy as South Africa enhanced its international prestige but failed to extract any meaningful concessions, whilst triggering the threat of diplomatic retaliation by the major trading powers.     

The Rhetoric of Appeasement: Hitler's Legitimation and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39

Few grand strategies have been more scrutinized than Britain's decision to appease Nazi Germany. From 1933 to 1938, Britain eschewed confrontation and attempted to settle German demands. However in the five months following the negotiations at Munich, the British abandoned appeasement and embraced a policy of confronting the German state. The roots of both appeasement and confrontation can be found in Germany's legitimation strategies. Until the Munich crisis, Adolf Hitler justified Germany's aims with appeals to collective security, equality, and self-determination—norms central to the European system established by the Treaty of Versailles. After Munich, in contrast, German politicians abandoned these legitimation strategies, arguing instead that expansion was justified as a matter of German might, and not international rights. As Britain came to see German demands as illegitimate, so too did they decide this revisionist state was insatiable, impervious to negotiation, and responsive only to the language of force.     

The Relevance of Détente to American Foreign Policy: The Case of Greece, 1967–1979

This article contributes to the historiography of détente from an original viewpoint, namely the relationship between the United States and Greece. It substantiates the argument that the supposed spirit of détente did not help lessen American realpolitik considerations concerning Greece and its surrounding geostrategic region; in fact, the more Cold War antagonisms intensified in the region, the more Greece was locked in the morass of superpower rivalries. This tendency was also, ironically, re-invigorated following Greece’s adoption of its own Ostpolitik largely thanks to the spirit of détente. This paradigm was reflected in the policy of the four successive American administrations between 1967 and 1979 during which détente had become the most popular notion in the Cold War lexicon.     

British Foreign Policy,the Financial Elite,and the Nationalisation of the Constantinople Quays Company, 1934–1945

The analysis examines the role of British financial institutions, namely the Bank of England and the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders [CFB], in the making of British policy towards Turkey. The nationalisation of the Constantinople Quays Company, a port operator purchased in 1907 by the British and French governments, serves as a case study through which business–state relations, the role of finance in the conduct of international relations, and the impact of perceptions on policy decisions are explored. In this case, the financial elite’s role was minimal during most of the period considered, becoming more important in the final war years in a framework of the Anglo–Turkish debt restructuring negotiations of 1944. Significantly, the CFB, rather than the Bank, represented the British government in the negotiations. There exists an abundance of evidence of the divergent views between Whitehall and the financial elite about Turkey’s trustworthiness as a debtor and a signatory to treaties. The British government’s perceptions were much more positive than those of the financial elite. This difference stemmed from the different interests involved: Whitehall sought to secure Turkey’s collaboration in the increasingly unstable global security environment while the Bank and the CFB were more concerned with investor and bondholder interests and attempted to avoid further financial losses.     

The EU and the Bosnian Civil War 1992–95: The Capabilities–Expectations Gap at the Heart of EU Foreign Policy

Abstract

Using the empirically driven case study of the European Union's response to the Bosnian civil war 1992–95 this article assesses the effectiveness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), through Christopher Hill's ‘capabilities–expectations gap framework’. In assessing effectiveness it explores both the expectations placed on the EU and the capabilities the Union was able to deploy. Moreover, this research suggests that the EU was ineffective in responding to the Bosnian crisis. The EU pursued a rigid strategy of diplomatic and economic foreign policy, failing to generate the political will to attempt alternative approaches. This research argues that the capabilities–expectations gap framework is a useful tool for conceptualising the EU's effectiveness but that it under-specifies the importance of the end result of the policy.     

Will Sexual Minority Rights Be Trumped? Assessing the Policy Sustainability of LGBTI Rights Diplomacy in American Foreign Policy

A hallmark of the Barack Obama Administration’s foreign policy was the incorporation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender and Intersex [LGBTI] rights diplomacy. With the change to the Donald Trump Administration in January 2017, this new aspect of American foreign policy has yet to be tested. This analysis investigates the methods used by advocates and government allies to imbed this policy in foreign policy institutions to increase the difficulty of a full policy reversal. It argues that whilst new leadership does not always support LGBTI equality domestically, LGBTI diplomacy will not likely face eradication from foreign policy mandates largely due to the strategic framing of LGBTI rights diplomacy.     

“Ultimate Destiny” Delayed: The Liberals,the Organization of American States,and Canadian Foreign Policy, 1963–1968

Until Canada joined in 1990, the issue of its membership in the Organisation of American States bedevilled Canadian foreign policy, which many observers saw as a decisive test of Ottawa’s interest in Latin America. Under the Liberal government of Lester Pearson, prime minister from 1963 to 1968, and the stewardship of his secretary of state for External Affairs, Paul Martin, Canada seemed poised to join OAS. But a mixture of foreign and domestic factors—including American intervention in the Dominican Republic, Cuba’s isolation within the hemisphere, and growing Canadian nationalism—ruined this initiative. Using the Pearson government’s policy toward the OAS as a lens through which to explore the direction of Canadian foreign relations in the 1960s, this analysis also examines competing views of Canada’s place in the world.     

The Resurgence of Chinese Anti-Americanism in the 1990s： State Policy or Popular Expression？

While Western observers typically attribute the population＇s nationalist anti-Americanism largely to government propaganda or manipulation, they misunderstand the roots of anti-American behavior in China. As depicted by Peter Hay Gries in China＇s New Nationalism and by Michael H. Hunt in The Genesis of China＇s Foreign Policy, a more nuanced portrayal is in order. While the two books utilize distinct socialpsychological and historical perspectives, an integrative reading of the two suggests that popular expression is in fact largely responsible for China＇s anti-Americanism. At first this conclusion in favor of popular expression may seem at odds with Hunt＇s state-centered analysis of the roots of foreign policy. Nevertheless, after a brief summary of each book and a comparative application to the issue of anti-Americanism, the authors demonstrate that applying a comparative historical reappraisal to Hunt＇s study suggests that both scholarly works support the predominant role of popular expression on contemporary China＇s nationalist anti- Americanism.     

The Political Perils of Cold War Foreign Relations: Adlai Stevenson’s Democrats and Foreign Policy in the 1956 Presidential Election

This analysis uses the case of the 1956 American presidential election between Adlai Stevenson and Dwight Eisenhower to highlight the ways that an obsession with foreign relations could prove problematic to a campaign. Focusing primarily on Stevenson’s advisors, long-standing problems in the Democrats’ strategy on foreign relations, coupled with the emotional attachments that several key advisors had to the issue, combined to ensure that the Democrats failed to develop an effective foreign policy platform—particularly when running against a president believed to be so successful in that arena. Ultimately, it argues that the Stevenson campaign’s failure to forge an effective position highlights the problematic relationship between domestic policies and foreign relations.     

Two-Level Negotiations and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Failure of the Johnson Plan for the Palestinian Refugees, 1961–1962

The Kennedy administration sought to resolve the Palestine refugee problem in 1961–62 with a plan for compensation, resettlement, or repatriation under the formal auspices of the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission and negotiated by UN special envoy Dr. Joseph Johnson. The negotiations failed and the plan was canceled by the administration in December 1962. The article utilizes a multi-level conceptual model which examines the links between interstate negotiation, domestic politics and boundary-crossing interactions between foreign states and non-state domestic actors and their impact on foreign policy. It analyzes the multi-level negotiations that were conducted between representatives of the governments of Israel and the United States regarding the Johnson proposals, discussions held between Israel representatives and American Jewish leaders and prominent Jewish individuals, and between American government representatives and these same Jewish leaders and individuals. The study analyzes the factors that contributed to the failure of the plan and illustrates the nexus between foreign policy and domestic politics and the role of non-state actors in foreign policy decision making.     

Achieve Glory against All Odds- The Development of China＇s Foreign Policy in the Past 60 Years

Since its founding 60 years ago, the People＇s Republic of China has been pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory. Braving wind and storm in diplomatic front and breaking through brambles and thorns, it has scored brilliant achievements. Through arduous diplomatic struggles, China has safeguarded its national independence, sovereignty and security, created a favorable international environment for its cause of modernization, reform and opening-up, improved its international status and influence, and made important contribution to the promotion of world peace and development as well as the cause of human progress.     

How to Change Your Foreign Policy in 100 Days: A New Course with the Prodi Government?

Conventional wisdom has it that the new government of Romano Prodi managed to effect a significant “shift” in Italy's foreign policy away from the course of the centre-right in the proverbial first 100 days of government. A number of discontinuities with the foreign policy of the Berlusconi government have been invoked, ranging from Italy's relations with Europe and its transatlantic posture, to its engagement with areas of crisis such as the Middle East. But these claims have to be substantially qualified. In fact, it appears that the foreign policy of the Prodi government has rather pragmatically blended elements of change and continuity, and that the shift which has occurred in some areas should be understood more as a combination of domestic and international developments than a result of the change in government alone. Moreover, in order to really change Italy's foreign policy – and change it for the better – the government should focus on a different set of priorities, mainly the institutions, instruments, politics, and ideas of foreign policy.     

The Eurafrique Initiative,Ernest Bevin and Anglo–French Relations in the Foreign Office, 1945–1950

This analysis examines the prevalence of Eurafrican thinking in the British Foreign Office throughout the late 1940s. Drawing on British and French diplomatic archives, it reveals the centricity of the Foreign Office, and British Embassy at Paris to a project largely confined to the mental map of the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. The financial stains facing Britain, often misinterpreted as “decline”, seemed a temporary phenomenon that “multilateral European cooperation” could rectify. Although shelved in 1949–1950, the Eurafrique initiative has seen few historians analyse its strategies across the corridors of power. This analysis reappraises British desires for Western European “co-operation” and a renewed faith in the Entente Cordiale as a geo-political counterweight to growing East–West bipolarity. Discussions of strategies to pool African possessions to recover the European economy were short-lived. Yet they challenged prospects of long-term economic dependence upon the United States in favour of an Anglo–French led European bloc.     

Collaboration as successful strategy against right-wing populism? The case of the centre-right coalition in Austria, 2000–2007

The article represents the first systematic study of the reactions of political parties and the media as well as national and transnational civil society actors to the rise and inclusion in government in 2000 of the Austrian right-wing populist Freedom Party (FPÖ). Specifically, it investigates the effectiveness of strategies aimed at ostracizing populist actors versus “defanging” them through incorporation in public office. The article finds that turning the FPÖ into a pariah has not been effective in moderating the party or curbing its success. Incorporation in public office has been more effective, however, leading to the near collapse of the FPÖ and the split of the party. Yet, the cause for such an outcome may be found less in the strategy itself by imposing some intrinsic mechanism of moderation but rather in the incompetence and inexperience of populist party politicians unfamiliar with public office. Exclusionary strategies have also the undesirable effect of playing into the narrative of populist actors of being persecuted by the political establishment thereby offering them another means of mobilization. The article concludes that the revival of the FPÖ shows that no strategy can yield lasting success unless the demand-side causes underlying radical right-wing populism are addressed.     

Faris,H. (2013). The Failure of the Two-State Solution: The Prospects of One State in the Israel–Palestine Conflict.

M.B. Hayne, The French Foreign Office and the Origins of the First World War 1898–1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) £35. ISBN 019–820270–9.

Keith Hamilton, Bertie of Thame: Edwardian Ambassador (Woodbridge/Suffolk: Boydell Press 1990 (= Royal Historical Society Studies in History, No. 60)), ix + 436 pp. ISBN 0–86193–217X. £35.

Anita Inder Singh, The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo‐American Relationship, 1947–56 (Pinter, 1993) pp. 309. £45.

Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), Truman in the White House: The Diary of Eben A. Ayers (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1991) $37.50. ISBN 0–8262–0790–1.

Robert Pearce (ed.), Patrick Gordon Walker: Political Diaries 1932–1971 (London: The Historians Press, 1991) £20. ISBN 1–872273–05 X.

Richard J. Aldrich (ed.), British Strategy and the Cold War, 1945–51 (London: Routledge, 1992) £40. ISBN 0–415–07851–2.

Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name. Germany and the Divided Continent (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993) £25. ISBN 0–224–02054–4.     

Living in the Past or Living in the Future? Analyzing Parties’ Platform Change In Between Elections,The Netherlands 1997–2014

Do parties change their platform in anticipation of electoral losses? Or do parties respond to experienced losses at the previous election? These questions relate to two mechanisms to align public opinion with party platforms: (1) rational anticipation, and (2) electoral performance. While extant work empirically tested, and found support for, the latter mechanism, the effect of rational anticipation has not been put to an empirical test yet. We contribute to the literature on party platform change by theorizing and assessing how party performance motivates parties to change their platform in-between elections. We built a new and unique dataset of >20,000 press releases issued by 15 Dutch national political parties that were in parliament between 1997 and 2014. Utilizing automated text analysis (topic modeling) to measure parties’ platform change, we show that electoral defeat motivates party platform change in-between elections. In line with existing findings, we demonstrate that parties are backward-looking.