Devolution and Development: Territorial Justice and the North-South Divide

One of the unintended consequences of devolution under New Labouris that it might make it more difficult to secure territorialjustice between the nations and regions of the United Kingdom.Centralized regional policy, the aim of which was to promoteeconomic equity between the regions, has been replaced by adevolved regional policy that aims to promote an economic dividendwithin each region. In the unlikely event that devolution yieldsa uniform economic dividend in each region, the result doesnothing to redress the territorial inequalities at the heartof the North-South divide. Treating unequal regions equallyis not a recipe for territorial justice.     

Preferences for International Redistribution: The Divide over the Eurozone Bailouts

Why do voters agree to bear the costs of bailing out other countries? Despite the prominence of public opinion in the ongoing debate over the eurozone bailouts, voters' preferences on the topic are poorly understood. We conduct the first systematic analysis of this issue using observational and experimental survey data from Germany, the country shouldering the largest share of the EU's financial rescue fund. Testing a range of theoretical explanations, we find that individuals' own economic standing has limited explanatory power in accounting for their position on the bailouts. In contrast, social dispositions such as altruism and cosmopolitanism robustly correlate with support for the bailouts. The results indicate that the divide in public opinion over the bailouts does not reflect distributive lines separating domestic winners and losers. Instead, the bailout debate is better understood as a foreign policy issue that pits economic nationalist sentiments versus greater cosmopolitan affinity and other‐regarding concerns.     

The Majority‐Minority Divide in Attitudes toward Internal Migration: Evidence from Mumbai

Rapid urbanization is among the major processes affecting the developing world. The influx of migrants to cities frequently provokes antagonism on the part of long‐term residents, manifested in labor market discrimination, political nativism, and violence. We implemented a novel, face‐to‐face survey experiment on a representative sample of Mumbai's population to elucidate the causes of anti‐migrant hostility. Our findings point to the centrality of material self‐interest in the formation of native attitudes. Dominant group members fail to heed migrants' ethnic attributes, yet for minority group respondents, considerations of ethnicity and economic threat crosscut. We introduce a new political mechanism to explain this divergence. Minority communities facing persistent discrimination view in‐migration by coethnics as a means of enlarging their demographic and electoral base, thereby achieving “safety in numbers.” Our article sheds light on the drivers of preferences over internal migration. It also contributes insights to the international immigration literature and to policy debates over urban expansion.     

Bridging the Ideological Divide: Trust and Support for Social Security Privatization

Using a pair of national surveys, this article analyzes the individual-level sources of public support for Social Security privatization. Given the inherent risks associated with privatization, we argue that the political trust heuristic affords untapped theoretical leverage in explaining public attitudes toward privatization. We find that, among certain individuals, political trust plays an instrumental role in structuring privatization preferences. Political trust increases support for privatization, but only among liberals. This heterogeneity in trust’s impact is best explained, we argue, by the unbalanced ideological costs imposed by the potential privatization of Social Security. Among liberals, embracing privatization requires the sacrifice of core values, thereby making political trust a potent consideration. Political trust is inconsequential among conservatives because supporting privatization requires no comparable sacrifice for them.

Comparative Perspectives on Childcare Expansion in Germany: Explaining the Persistent East‒West Divide

Abstract

Germany’s family policy responded to the European Union’s Barcelona targets by expanding publicly funded childcare, especially for children under the age of three, throughout the country. While overall nearly 33 per cent of all children in that age group had access to public childcare by 2015, there is still a large difference between the situation in the eastern and the western part of the country. This paper documents and explains this development of two persistently different childcare regimes in the two parts of the country. It shows that supply factors such as local administrative capacity and resources interact with demand factors such as parental need and demands for public childcare to produce the divergent development. It then discusses the conceptual challenges involved in engaging in this type of subnationally comparative analysis.     

Pitfalls in Strategic Planning: Lessons for Legitimacy

The paper considers how planning as a political activity is underpinned by concepts of justice and how professional practitioners are consistently faced with making ethical choices in the public interest. The key objective is therefore to identify the centrality of ethics in praxis. In this context, political liberal theory is empirically useful in exploring both the role of participants and the processes employed in strategic planning. A case study analysis generates key issues which are relevant to planning in the wider arena and an extensive series of interviews provides interesting insights into the dynamic between those involved and the effectiveness of procedures followed.     

Bridging the Divide between Evidence and Policy in Public Sector Decision Making: A Practitioner's Perspective

While policy advocates can help bridge the divide between evidence and policy in decision making by focusing on ambiguity and uncertainty, policy makers must also play a role by promoting and preserving deliberative processes that value evidence as a core element in leveling raw constituent opinion, ultimately resulting in a better‐informed electorate. Building on existing research and analytic capability, state legislatures can increase the demand for and delivery of relevant information, giving the institution the capacity to keep abreast of research in critical public policy areas. By implementing data and time‐conscious evaluative frameworks that emphasize evidence‐based decision making and longitudinal cost–benefit analytics at critical policy‐making junctures, the institutional culture can become less unpredictable and the “rules of the game” can be more transparent. In 2015, Mississippi's legislative leaders created a system to review requests for new programs and funding using such an evidence screen.     

Strategic Nuclear Forces: Unrealistic Planning

The Department of Defense has embarked on a program of strategic modernization that will demand substantial budgetary growth for strategic forces—roughly 29 percent after inflation—during the 1990s. However, defense funding overall is unlikely to grow during the next several years. This article projects the funding that the Bush Administration's strategic modernization plans would demand, assesses the feasibility of these plans given budgetary limits, and describes some options which would reduce this funding.     

Thinking Ahead: Strategic Foresight and Government

The technique of strategic foresight — developing policy based on long-run scenario planning — has much to offer Australian governments. By paying greater attention to identifying emerging issues, and drawing on a broad range of information sources, policies are more likely to prove durable and effective. Drawing on examples from the private sector, and from governments in the UK, USA and Australia, I outline what strategic planning entails, and how it might be implemented.     

Strategic coalition voting: Evidence from Austria

Strategic coalition voting assumes that voters cast their vote in a way that maximizes the probability that a preferred coalition will be formed after the election. We identify three decision contexts that provide incentives for strategic coalition voting: (1) a rental vote of a major party supporter in favor of a preferred junior coalition partner perceived as uncertain to pass a minimum vote threshold, (2) avoiding a wasted vote for the preferred small party that is not expected to pass the minimum vote threshold, and (3) explicit strategic coalition voting to influence the composition and/or portfolio of the next coalition government. The results based on a nationally representative survey conducted before the 2006 Austrian general election generally support these hypotheses.     

To Bridge the Divide between Evidence and Policy: Reduce Ambiguity as Much as Uncertainty

Policy makers cannot consider all evidence relevant to policy. They use two shortcuts—emotions and beliefs to understand problems and “rational” ways of establishing the best evidence on solutions—to act quickly in complex, multilevel policy‐making environments. Many studies only address one part of this problem. Improving the supply of evidence helps reduce scientific and policy maker uncertainty. However, policy makers also combine their beliefs with limited evidence to reduce ambiguity by choosing one of several possible ways to understand and solve a problem. We use this insight to consider solutions designed to “close the evidence–policy gap.”     

Favorites and underdogs: Strategic behavior in an experimental contest

Conflicts between favorites and underdogs are everyday phenomena. We examine their strategic behavior in an experimental contest, and find behavior partially consistent with predictions. Favorites given a first-mover advantage do overcommit effort relative to Nash. Underdogs often select the best response effort level given the favorite's move. Overall dissipation of the prize was significantly higher with the strategic commitment relative to Nash. qu]Life is not so mathematically idiotic that it allows only the big to eat the small, for it happens just as often that the bee kills the lion, or at least drives it mad.