The programme to policy linkage: The fulfilment of election pledges on socio–economic policy in The Netherlands, 1986–1998

To what extent are the contents of party election programmes congruent with subsequent government policy actions? Existing research on the fulfilment of pre–election pledges focuses on systems of government in which executives formed by a single parties are the norm. This study extends this research to coalition systems of government. Specific policy proposals made by the main Dutch parties in their recent election programmes are identified and compared with subsequent government policy actions. Hypotheses about the conditions under which pledges are more likely to be acted upon are formulated and tested. Although clear linkages between election programmes and subsequent policies are found, pledges made by prospective coalition parties in the Netherlands are less likely to be acted upon than those made by prospective governing parties in the United Kingdom. Prominent features of cabinet government, such as the allocation of ministerial portfolios and the coalition policy agreement, are found to influence the likelihood of pledges being fulfilled. In addition, consensus between parties is also found to increase the likelihood of government actions responding to election pledges.     

Video election note: The UK General Election of 2010

This video election note is a very brief introduction to some of the main points of interest regarding the 2010 UK general election. It touches on events since the 2005 election, the course of the campaign, the salient issues, policy differences between the main parties, key features of the outcome for the major and minor parties, turnout, government formation and the implications for British politics. There are also preliminary observations on what the pattern of constituency results tell us about how the recession and the expenses crisis affected outcomes.     

The rise of Pasok: The Greek election of 1981

Presidents and Prime Ministers. Edited by Richard Rose and Ezra N. Suleiman. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980. Pp. 347. £4.75.

Western European Party Systems. Edited by Peter H. Merkl. New York: Collier Macmillan, 1980. Pp. 676. £25.95.

Government and Administration in Western Europe. Edited by F. F. Ridley. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979. Pp. 244. £15 (hardback), £4.95 (paperback).

The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy. By Philip G. Cerny Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980 Pp. 319. £1250.

Contemporary France. Politics and Society Since 1945. By D. L. Hanley, A. P. Kerr and N. H. Waites. London: Routledge &; Kegan Paul, 1979. Pp. ix + 325. £8.50.

Social Change in France. By M. Vaughan, M. Kolinsky and P. Sheriff. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980. Pp. vii + 216. £9.95.

French Politics and Public Policy. Edited by Philip G. Cerny and Martin A. Schain. London: Frances Pinter, 1980. Pp. xxii + 300. £12.50.

The Unexpected Rebellion: Ethnic Activism in Contemporary France. By William B. Beer. Foreword by Nicolas Wahl. New York and London: New York University Press, 1980. Pp. 150.

La Décadence: 1932–1939. By J.‐B. Duroselle. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, ‘Politique Etrangère de la France’ Collection, 1979. Pp. 568.

French Conservatism in Crisis. The Republican Federation of France in 1930s. By William D. Irvine. Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1979. Pp. xx + 256. Bibliography. Index. $17.50.

Vichy et La Corporation Paysanne. By Isabel Boussard. Paris: Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1980. Pp. 415.

L'aventure algérienne, 1940–1944: Pétain, Giraud, de Gaulle. By Lucien Adès. Paris: Pierre Belfond, 1979. Pp. 258.

France and the United States. By Jean‐Baptiste Duroselle. The University of Chicago Press, 1978. Translation. Pp. 276. £12.60.

Dualism and Discontinuity in Industrial Societies. By Suzanne Berger and Michael J. Piore. Cambridge: CUP, 1980. Pp. xi + 159. £10.50.

Mobilità senza movimento: Le elezioni del 3 giugno 1979. Edited by Arturo Parisi. Bologna: II Mulino, 1980. Pp. 160. 29 tables. L.8,000.

Eminenza Rossa. By Giancarlo Galli. Milan: Sugar Co Edizioni, 1976. Pp. 232. L.3,200

Maurizio Valenzi—Sindaco a Napoli. Interview by Massimo Ghiara. Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1978. Pp. 190. L. 2,000.

L'Albero in Piazza: storia, cronaca e leggenda delle feste dell ‘Unità. By Claudio Bernieri. Milan: Gabrielle Mazzotta editore, 1977. Pp. 167. L. 2,000.

Le origini dello stalinismo nel PCI: storia della ‘svolta’ comunista degli anni trenta. By Ferdinando ORMEA. Milan: Feltrinelli Editore, 1978. Pp. 344. L.9,000.

Berlinguer. By Vittorio Gorresio. Milan: Feltrinelli Editore, 1976. Pp. 200. L.2,500.

Capital Markets and Industrial Investment in Germany and France. By B. T. Bayliss and A. A. S. Butt Philip. London: Saxon House, 1980. Pp. xiii + 198. £10.50.

Britain in Europe. Edited, by William Wallace. London: Heinemann, 1980. Pp. x + 213. £4.95 (paperback) £10.50 (hardback).

British Foreign Policy and the Atlantic Area. By ARTHUR Cyr. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1979. Pp. 172. £10.00.

The Reluctant Party: Labour and the EEC, 1961–1975. By L.J. Robins. Ormskirk: G. W. and A. Hesketh, 1979. Pp. 155.

Budgetary Politics: The Finances of the European Communities. By Helen Wallace. London: George Allen &; Unwin, 1980. Pp. 120. £6.95 (hardback), £2.95 (paperback).

The Economics of International Integration. By Peter Robson. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1980. Pp. ix + 197. £12.50. £4.95 (paperback).

Agriculture and the European Community. By John S. Marsh and Pamela J. Swanney. London: George Allen &; Unwin, 1980. Pp. 98. £6.95 (hardback), £2.95 (paperback).

The European Community and the Third World: The Lome Convention and its Impact. By Ellen Frey‐Wouters. Eastbourne: Hall‐Saunders Ltd., Praeger Special Studies, 1980. Pp. xii+290. £15.50.

The International Division of Labour and Multinational Companies. A study by P. K. M. Tharakan and a symposium at ECSIM. Farnborough: Saxon House, 1979. Pp. 152.

Regional Policy: Past Experience and New Directions. Edited by Duncan Macklennan and John B. Parr. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979. Pp. xviii + 334. £17.50 (hardback), £6.95 (paperback).

Regional Policy in the European Community. Edited by D. Yuill, K. Allen and C. Hull. London: Croom Helm, 1980. Pp. 251. £12.95.

A Political and Electoral Handbook for Wales. By Denis Balsom and Martin Burch. Farnborough: Gower, 1980. Pp. x + 195. £12.50.

Western European Cities in Crisis. Edited by Michael C. Romanos. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1979. Pp. xviii + 243.

A Tale of Five Cities: Life in Provincial Europe Today. By John Ardagh, London: Secker and Warburg, 1979. Pp. 457. £8.95.     

Muffling the swing: STV and the Irish general election of 1981

This article explores alternative hypotheses for variation in the political salience of unemployment. The differences between the political opinions of employed and unemployed people are used as a proxy for the qualitative importance of unemployment. Unemployment is not found to be more politically salient when government support of the unemployed is more generous or when jobless spells are shorter. Far more important is the character of employment. Unemployment is more politically salient in countries where employment guarantees a basic livelihood. The data also suggest that unemployment has greater salience in countries where the unemployed are more likely to use state employment exchanges in searching for work. Two conclusions are suggested. First, public toleration of high unemployment in recent decades may be partly the result of the rise of atypical work arrangements. Second, while it is debatable whether social‐democratic protections of employment standards increase unemployment rates, such efforts may inadvertently increase the political costs of high unemployment.     

Election observer effects: A field experiment in the Russian Duma election of 2011

The literature on elections and election monitoring is divided between those who take a skeptical view, suggesting that monitors are often political rather than objective in their judgments, and those who see monitors as a real force for cleaner, more honest elections. Studies that use field experiments to look for the effect of monitors generally support the optimists, indicating that the mere presence of election observers can have powerful effects. This is surprising given the extent of the resources available to incumbents who wish to conduct electoral fraud. We present the results of an experiment in which 768 observers were randomly assigned to polling stations in 21 cities in Russia in the 2011 parliamentary elections. Unlike most previous studies of election observers, our results suggest that observer effects on turnout and vote for the ruling party are small. The results suggest the need to study more carefully the circumstances that shape the impact of observation missions.     

Partisan politics and stock market performance: The effect of expected government partisanship on stock returns in the 2002 German federal election

Rational partisan theory suggests that firms perform better under right- than left-leaning governments. In the pre-election time, investors should anticipate these effects of government partisanship. This is the first study to investigate such anticipated partisan effects in Germany. Applying conditional volatility models we analyze the impact of expected government partisanship on stock market performance in the 2002 German federal election. Our results show that small-firm stock returns were positively (negatively) linked to the probability of a right- (left-) leaning coalition winning the election. Moreover, we find that volatility increased as the electoral prospects of right-leaning parties improved, while greater electoral uncertainty had a volatility-reducing effect.     

Political change and stability of the popularity function: The French general election of 1981

France experienced in May, 1981, a drastic political change, the influence of which on stability of the popularity function, from V. Giscard d'Estaing to F. Mitterrand, is examined here. First, a survey of existing estimates of French popularity functions is presented, and the main problems they raise are briefly discussed. The theoretical effects of government change are then analyzed, with a distinction between global effects (honeymoon and others) and distribution effects; these effects are then linked to the moves of ideologically motivated voters. Finally, new estimates are presented on French data for two periods, the first corresponding to Giscard's tenure only and the second including Mitterrand's tenure. The main conclusion is that the popularity function remained fairly stable, except for a move in the intercept when the Socialists came to power. This move is, in large part, the result of attitudinal changes in the more ideologically oriented electors, as results on disaggregated data indirectly confirm.     

Macroeconomic performance and government popularity in Britain: the short run dynamics

Abstract. Despite an extensive body of research on popularity function modelling there is little agreement about the magnitude and stability of effects. This is particularly true in the literature relating to Britain. The purpose of this paper is to specify and test a popularity function for Britain using the Box-Jenkins transfer function model building strategy. The model is estimated for the thirty-three year period between 1947 and 1980. This approach provides a particularly stringent test of causal links between the economy and political support. It demonstrates statistically significant links between unemployment, inflation and the devaluation of the currency, and the level of support for the incumbent party over the opposition party in the polls. However the links are not strong enough to provide an efficient forecasting model, and the effects are unstable over time. Generally the economic effects are related to the magnitude of unemployment and inflation.     

Perceptions of economic performance and voting behavior in the 1983 general election in Britain

The evaluation of voters' perceptions of economic performance and their relationships to voting behavior has been a relatively neglected topic in British politics. A model of these relationships is specified and estimated using data from a survey of the electorate carried out at the time of the general election of 1983. The model demonstrates strong underlying links between partisanship, perceptions of economic performance, and salient noneconomic issues during the election. The latent construct underlying these variables is a highly significant predictor of the probability of voting Conservative in that election. By contrast, perceptions of personal economic conditions are not a significant predictor of voting behavior at all. Overall, these results show that perceptions of national economic performance played a highly significant role in determining the outcome of the election in 1983.     

Clarity of responsibility: How government cohesion conditions performance voting

Recent literature has shown that the long established link between economic performance and electoral outcomes is conditioned by a country's institutions and government, what is often termed ‘clarity of responsibility’. In this article two distinct dimensions of the clarity of the political context are identified: institutional and government clarity. The first captures the formal dispersion of government power, both horizontally and vertically. The second captures the cohesion of the incumbent government. Analysing survey data from 27 European countries, it is shown that voters' ability to hold governments to account, for both the economy and management of public services, is primarily influenced by the extent to which there is an identifiable and cohesive incumbent, whereas formal institutional rules have no direct impact on performance voting.     

Election outcomes under different ways to announce preferences: an analysis of the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria

We use preference data from the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria to analyze different voting rules. An exit poll right after the election collected data on ordinal and cardinal preferences from approximately 1000 actual voters. Our analysis is threefold. First, we determine the hypothetical social outcomes under different voting rules; second, we investigate the stability of the outcomes under those rules. Finally, we provide a categorization of different types of parties and analyze the impact of certain voting rules (Plurality Rule, Plurality Run Off, Hare System, Condorcet Method, Approval Voting, Borda Rule, Evaluative Voting, and Majority Judgment) on the performances of parties in those scenarios.     

Voters’ perceptions of government performance and attributions of responsibility: Electoral control in Poland

We test the claim that elections function as a mechanism of accountability in the case of Poland, a new democracy with a fluid party system. We ask whether individuals’ vote intentions are based on assessments of governing parties’ performance. Taking into consideration attributions of responsibility for such performance, accountability exists if assessments of poor performance decrease the probability of voting for a ruling party. We use two criteria of performance: perceived change in unemployment rate and level of corruption between two consecutive elections. Using data from the Polish POLPAN panel survey, our results confirm the existence of a heterogeneous sanctioning model.     

Consociationalism and its critics: Evidence from the historic Northern Ireland Assembly election 2007

Critics of consociational power-sharing institutional arrangements in deeply divided societies argue that such arrangements solidify the underlying conflict cleavage and render it all-important for party competition and voter behaviour. I find evidence to the contrary in the case of voter behaviour at the historic 2007 Assembly election in Northern Ireland. At least in the unionist bloc, I find the effective disappearance of the ethno-national conflict cleavage as a determinant of voter choice. This suggests that consociational arrangements have led to both inclusion and moderation, rather than polarisation and ‘ethnic outbidding’.     

The effect of school district and municipal government financial health information on local tax election outcomes: evidence from fiscal stress labels in Ohio

A key informational asymmetry in local public finance is the lack of information available to local residents regarding the financial status of the school districts and local governments in which they reside. Given that voters in many states must approve property and income tax increases for these local entities, the lack of full information on the financial status of these local entities may lead to sub-optimal voting decisions. State financial intervention systems have begun to make financial problems more salient to residents, potentially alleviating these informational asymmetries. This paper examines the effect of the Ohio fiscal stress labeling program on voting outcomes and the tax-setting behavior of local officials for school district and municipal government tax referendums. We use a difference-in-differences approach to examine data from over 3000 school district and 2300 municipality property tax elections from 2004 to 2012. While we find minimal evidence that the yes vote share changed for school district referendums following fiscal stress label receipt, we find very large increases (15 to 23 percentage points) in the likelihood of referendum passage for school districts following label receipt. We do not find much evidence of changes in the likelihood of passage or the yes vote share following label receipt for municipalities, but we do find that these voting outcomes rise following label removal. We also find that local officials do not appreciably change their tax-setting behavior in response to these labels, as the size and likelihood of property tax proposal are largely unchanged following label receipt or removal.     

Election Laws,Mobilization, and Turnout: The Unanticipated Consequences of Election Reform

State governments have experimented with a variety of election laws to make voting more convenient and increase turnout. The impacts of these reforms vary in surprising ways, providing insight into the mechanisms by which states can encourage or reduce turnout. Our theory focuses on mobilization and distinguishes between the direct and indirect effects of election laws. We conduct both aggregate and individual‐level statistical analyses of voter turnout in the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections. The results show that Election Day registration has a consistently positive effect on turnout, whereas the most popular reform—early voting—is actually associated with lower turnout when it is implemented by itself. We propose that early voting has created negative unanticipated consequences by reducing the civic significance of elections for individuals and altering the incentives for political campaigns to invest in mobilization.