Hegemonic Authority and Domestic Legitimation: Japan and Korea under Chinese Hegemonic Order in Early Modern East Asia

Some argue a powerful China will likely reestablish a Sinocentric tribute system in pursuit of hegemony in Asia. This line of argument, however, rests on misleading images of the Chinese empire while assuming hegemony is a product of a single agent and its activities. But, why do actors comply with, defy, or challenge hegemonic authority? I argue hegemony is not just an outcome of the material power of the preponderant state, but is constructed in interaction with other actors’ pursuit of domestic legitimation. The tribute system and Chinese hegemony in early modern East Asia were built on symbolic domination—Chinese views of how international politics should work determined what was socially acceptable and legitimate while regulating the range of choices other actors could make due to domestic consequences. It shows that crafty political leaders engaged in a form of symbolic politics that manipulated external recognition from the hegemon, but in ways that strengthened their positions against domestic opponents.     

Threats,opportunity, and force: Repression and diversion of domestic pressure, 1948–1982

This paper explores empirically how domestic political and economic challenges affect political leaders’ propensity to respond with the use of force at home and abroad. The foreign policy and world politics literatures are replete with references to leaders’ alleged use of external conflict when confronted with domestic challenges, but rarely consider domestic responses to dissent or the role of interstate threats. Comparative research on repression primarily focuses on linkages between domestic challenges and leaders’ resort to repressive policies, but ignores international alternatives. Neither literature considers the influence of external threats and opportunity structures on resort to use of force and coercion at home and abroad. Alternatively, we contend that foreign conflict and repression are complementary and potentially interchangeable policies that leaders may use to maintain political power in the face of domestic pressure. We hypothesize that the level of domestic political constraints conditions the opportunity and likelihood of selecting either repression or foreign conflict in response to domestic challenges. Since the ability to capitalize on external conflict involvement in all likelihood is not independent of international opportunity structures, we explicitly address differences in the availability of historical interstate animosity. We test our hypotheses on resort to repression and external dispute involvement on a global sample of political leaders for the period 1948–82. Our results indicate that repression and external conflict involvement appear to be largely independent and driven by different challenges: While there is some evidence that domestic conflict increases the likelihood of disputes and that external threat may promote repression, there is little support for the idea of direct substitution in kind since leaders frequently combine both dispute involvement and repression.     

Human rights treaties and mobilized dissent against the state

How does state obligation to international human rights treaties (HRTs) affect mobilized dissent? We argue that obligations to protect human rights affect not only state behavior but also the behavior of dissidents. We present a theory in which the effect of HRTs on dissent is conditional on expectations of when it will constrain government behavior. We assume that HRT obligation increases the likelihood that government agents face litigation costs for repression but argue that leaders are only constrained when they would be most likely to repress. The expectation of constraint creates opportunity: citizens are more likely to dissent in HRT-obligated states with secure leaders and weak domestic courts. We find empirical support for the implications of our theory using country-month data on HRT obligation and dissent events from 1990 to 2004.     

Revolutionary Pathways: Leaders and the International Impacts of Domestic Revolutions

How much and in what ways do individual leaders matter for international politics? This article sheds new light on these questions by considering the consequences of domestic revolutions in international relations. We argue that revolutions have international effects due to two separate pathways, one associated with the event and one associated with the new leader’s administration. In the first pathway, a revolutionary event disrupts established relationships and perceptions, creating uncertainty both within the state and abroad. In the second pathway, revolutions put individuals into office who are more willing to challenge the status quo and who have publicly committed to a sustained shift in policies during their administration. These two distinct pathways suggest that the important question about revolutions is not whether leaders or events matter most but rather the conditions under which they matter. Consequently, we studied these pathways on three phenomena: international economic sanctions, domestic economic growth, and interstate alliances. We find that revolutionary events have a short-term negative effect on domestic economic growth, while revolutionary leaders have a long-term effect on the probability that a revolutionary state is targeted for sanctions. Both the revolutionary leader and the revolution’s immediate events alter the state’s international alliances. Our findings suggest that no single level of analysis completely dominates, and the answer depends on the outcome of interest.     

A Dutch revolt? The salience of the nonstrategic nuclear weapons issue in Dutch politics

Transparency, international credibility, democratic accountability, a new realism in defense expenditures – these basic policy goals fit awkwardly with the current deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) on Dutch territory. Most parties in the Netherlands want the NSNW removed. Some are even willing to challenge the idea that only consensus among all 28 NATO Allies can lead to the removal of the NSNW. The new Dutch minister of foreign affairs for example, Frans Timmermans, has a long track record of calling for an end to the deployment of US nuclear weapons on Dutch territory. Without NATO consent if necessary. His appointment fits with the political shift that we have seen over the past few years in Dutch politics. This article looks at the political rationale behind that shift: who are the main political actors involved? How have domestic and international pressures influenced party positions? The article also looks at the possibilities a new Dutch Government has were it to challenge the NATO consensus on NSNW. Would the USA refuse to take the NSNW away? How would NATO react and what could mitigate Allied concerns?     

International institutions and credible commitment of non-democracies

How do non-democratic countries credibly commit to policies in front of domestic and international audiences? Unlike democracies, non-democracies do not have functioning electoral systems and free presses to make their commitments costly thus credible. Yet, the need to credibly commit to a policy arises for non-democracies as well. In particular, when non-democratic leaders push for economic reforms, they need to coordinate the beliefs of domestic groups and attract international resources. How do non-democracies solve the commitment problem and succeed in achieving their policy goals? In this study, we argue that international institutions provide an important mechanism through which non-democratic countries could credibly signal their commitment to open economic policies. We test the argument with the involvement of IMF programs by post-communist countries from 1989 to 2005. We find that while IMF status is used as a credible commitment device for all countries, the effect is more significant for non-democracies.     

Explaining Styles of Financial Market Opening in Chile, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey

This study examines financial opening in middle-income countries and identifies the variables that shape its basic features. We find that the widely noted increase in international capital mobility has not constrained financial policy-making equally across states. A country's economic conditions and need for external funds determine its government's bargaining power vis-à-vis international actors and domestic groups with respect to financial policy. Governments with low bargaining power, because domestic economic conditions are poor or need for external funds is high, must open financial markets completely to attract or retain capital. Conversely, governments with high bargaining power may be able to retain some controls on capital flows or deny foreign banks access to domestic markets and still have access to capital.
To explore these issues, this article looks at opening in Chile, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey. These countries opened their financial systems in very different ways. Turkey and Mexico liberalized their markets almost completely, whereas Korea (1980–98) kept barriers to capital entry and Chile (1991–98) retained barriers to capital exit. Although economic conditions explain the basic style of financial opening, they cannot account for the residual barriers that persist in mostly open markets or the pace and timing of reforms. Domestic political factors, particularly, the interests of leaders and key social groups as well as their relative bargaining power, help to explain these variables. The paper develops a typology of styles of financial opening to encourage systematic thinking about the origins and consequences of differences in style.     

Global Credit Markets,Political Violence,and Politically Sustainable Risk Premia

How do international financial conditions affect civil unrest? Existing studies examine the domestic economic roots of political violence but say little about the role of external financial conditions. We explore the interactions between international lending, government policy, and domestic unrest. In particular, we note that because of sovereign risk and defensive lending dynamics, credit ratings and interest rate premia are endogenous to expectations about civil violence. We test these claims using instrumental variables techniques and daily data on sovereign bond yield spreads, credit ratings, and episodes of civil violence in 59 developing countries from 1990 through 2004. After correcting for endogeneity, we find that exogenous increases in the price of foreign capital are robustly associated with increased odds of civil conflict. Primary commodity dependence, low economic growth, and poverty can also increase the odds of civil conflict by reducing access to foreign capital.     

Threats to Leaders’ Political Survival and Pro-Government Militia Formation

It is puzzling why leaders delegate authority to pro-government militias (PGMs) at the expense of professional armed forces. Several state-level explanations, ranging from low state capacity to blame evasion for human rights violations have been proposed for the establishment of PGM linkages. These explanations lack focus on the individuals making decisions to form PGMs: national leaders. It is argued that leaders create linkages with PGMs to facilitate leaders’ political survival in the event of their deposition. Threats to leaders’ survival come from the military, foreign powers, or domestic actors outside the ruling coalition. As costs of leader deposition are low for the state, leaders facing threats from one or all of these sources must invest in protection from outside of the security apparatus. The argument is tested through data on PGM linkage formation and threats to political survival. Results show that leaders under coup threat are more likely to form PGM linkages, while threats from foreign actors make leaders particularly more likely to form linkages with ethnic or religious PGMs. The findings strongly suggest that PGM linkage formation is driven by leader-level desire for political survival, rather than a host of state-level explanations.     

Leaders,Tenure, and the Politics of Sovereign Credit

Sovereign creditworthiness is as much a function of politics as economic fundamentals. Previous research has focused on the relationship between creditworthiness and political factors such as regime type, regional effects, and international organization membership. These factors, while important, often change slowly and do not always capture the more dynamic political determinants of creditworthiness. As an alternative, this study focuses on the role of leaders. We argue that leaders’ tenure reduces uncertainty in the sovereign credit market. Time in power allows leaders to better manage expectations related to sovereign credit policy of both domestic supporters and market actors. As a result, we expect that creditworthiness improves as a leader’s tenure increases. We find supporting evidence for our argument using two distinct empirical approaches: panel data analysis and a natural experiment. Our findings provide a better understanding of the relationship between leaders, politics, and sovereign credit.     

Economic Interests and Threat Assessment in the US Congress, 1890–1914

Why do some domestic actors see the international environment as a threatening place populated by untrustworthy powers, when others find opportunities for peaceful cooperation in the same conditions? Because these actors confront the same international environment, the reasons for their divergent evaluations must rest on differences in their own beliefs and interests. In this article, we consider the impact of societal interests in trade and trade protection on elite assessments of the international environment. We examine evaluations of the international environment in speeches given in the US Congress during naval appropriations debates between 1890 and 1914. The manufacturing sector’s interest in trade protection led political leaders who represented manufacturing regions to offer more negative assessments of the international environment, while those representing export-oriented agricultural areas of the country gave more positive evaluations. These effects were roughly comparable to those associated with party, as well as individual-level characteristics, such as having served as a military officer.     

Chinazambia and Boliviafranca: A Simulation of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy

Despite a longstanding focus on the systemic distribution of power in the study of international relations, scholarship during the past 20 years increasingly emphasizes the role of domestic politics in foreign-policy-decision making. This simulation enables participants to experience negotiating an international issue—a territorial dispute between two fictitious states, Chinazambia and Boliviafranca—in the context of this "two-level game" between domestic and international environments. The simulation furnishes a vantage point from which students can assess realist, liberal, and alternative theoretical perspectives on international relations as they affect policy making. The simulation is flexible and can be executed under a variety course contexts, as well as time and participation constraints. Additionally, the simulation provides ample opportunity for a number of enriching postsimulation activities.     

A Comment on the Comments

Private diplomacy and secret agreements among adversaries are major features of international relations. Sometimes secret reassurance has resulted in cooperation and even peace between longtime adversaries. Yet rationalist theories consider private diplomatic communication as cheap talk. How do we explain this gap between theoretical expectations and the empirical record? I offer a theory that explains how, why, and when a leader may convince an enemy that his private reassurances are credible even when they are not costly to undertake. I also account for the conditions under which recipients of such reassurance infer the leader's benign intentions from these secret interactions. I claim that leaders engage in secret reassurance with the enemy when they face significant domestic opposition. The adversary can leverage the initiator's domestic vulnerability by revealing the secret reassurance, thereby imposing domestic punishment on the initiator. Further, by entering into private or secret negotiations and offering their adversary such leverage, initiators generate “autonomous risk” that exists beyond their control. I evaluate this theory against two empirical cases. The first case looks at Richard Nixon's secret assurances to the Chinese leadership in 1972. The second examines the secret negotiations between Israeli officials and the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization that ended with the signing of the Oslo I Accord in 1993.     

Analysing Voting Inconsistency in the United Nations General Assembly

In many international institutions, contested norms pass via voting. Although votes express national positions, dynamic vote shifts are a widespread phenomenon. Why do states sometimes change their voting stances concerning re-occurring international rules and norms? To explain observed variation, this analysis theorises the role of domestic and external windows of opportunity as well as the role of lobbying in the United Nations General Assembly. It shows that changes in government composition and changes in the text of re-occurring international rules and norms matter. Yet, whilst resourceful actors more likely change their voting stance after having successfully negotiated text changes, less powerful states are more likely to shift voting stances in response to third party lobbying.     

Fair-trade coffee in Nicaragua and Tanzania: a comparison

Fair-trade activities in the South have tended to be studied in relation to the internal aims of the fair-trade organisations themselves. This article argues that it is also critical to consider the wider fair-trade ‘arena’ or set of interactions. The authors focus on Tanzania and Nicaragua and study the role of four key actors—small-scale producers, co-operatives, development partners, and public authorities. Using comparative data from field studies conducted in 2002–2003, the article identifies key national and international issues affecting local producers. Illustrating how fair trade evolves differently according to context, the article examines how the co-operative movement in Nicaragua has been strengthened by fair-trade production, in contrast to the situation in Tanzania. It concludes by discussing some of the challenges faced by fair trade, including how to reconcile the demands of the market with building solidarity.     

试析中国-日本-东盟战略互动关系

中国、日本与东盟是目前东亚地区权力结构中的三大主导力量，它们之间的关系在很大程度上制约和决定着东亚国际关系格局的基本走向。本文主要借鉴国际政治研究中的三角关系分析方法，分析当前中国-日本-东盟三角关系的特征与发展趋势。     

The changing role of the military in Turkish politics: democratization through coup plots?

The exposure of alleged coup plots in 2007 has shaken the guardian role of the Turkish military in politics. What were the conditions that led to the exposure of the coups and what is their significance for the future of Turkish democracy? Drawing on insights from southern Europe, the article argues that failed coup plots can lead to democratic civil–military relations especially if they work simultaneously with other facilitating conditions, such as increasing acceptance of democratic attitudes among officers, consensus among civilians over the role of the military, and the influence of external actors, such as the European Union. The article focuses on such domestic and international factors to analyse the transformation of the Turkish military, the splits within the armed forces and the resulting plots. It argues that one positive outcome of the exposed conspiracies in Turkey has been the enactment of new institutional amendments that would eradicate the remaining powers of the military. Yet, a negative outcome of the coup investigations has been an increase in polarization and hostility. Turkish democracy still lacks mutual trust among significant political groups, which creates unfavourable conditions for democratic consolidation.     

Internationalized regimes: a second dimension of regime hybridity

Traditional approaches have conceptualized political regimes almost exclusively with reference to domestic-level political factors. However, many current and historical political regimes have entailed a major role for international actors, and in some cases the external influence has been so great that regimes have become internationalized. This article explores the concept of ‘internationalized regimes’ and argues that they should be seen as a distinct form of hybrid regime type that demonstrates a distinct dimension of hybridity. Until now, regime hybridity has been conceived along a single dimension of domestic politics: the level of competitiveness. Yet, some regimes are characterized by a different type of hybridity, in which domestic and international authority are found together within a single political system. The article explores the dynamics of internationalized regimes within three settings, those of international occupation, international administration and informal empire.     

The Confessional State in International Politics: Tudor England,Religion, and the Eclipse of Dynasticism

Whilst religion and collective identity have become issues of central concern to international relations scholars, dynastic concerns and national interests still dominate their analyses of early modern international politics. This analysis contributes to the constructivist emphasis on collective identity to foreign policy by examining Tudor England in light of the concept of confessionalisation. Based on the recent historiography of Tudor England, this analysis demonstrates the importance of religion in defining not only the collective identity of international actors, but also their foreign policies, choice of alliances, and, more generally, their international outlook. Through such a lens, it seeks to draw analyses of the confessional state away from their focus on domestic state formation to the “external” dimension of confessionalisation and its importance for international politics.     

Domestic elites and external actors in post-conflict democratisation: mapping interactions and their impact

Abstract

Following the end of the Cold War, post-conflict democratisation has rarely occurred without a significant international involvement. This contribution argues that an explanation of the outcomes of post-conflict democratisation requires more than an examination of external actors, their mission mandates or their capabilities and deficiencies. In addition, there is a need to study domestic elites, their preferences and motivations, as well as their perceptions of and their reactions to external interference. Moreover, the patterns of external–internal interactions may explain the trajectory of state-building and democracy promotion efforts. These issues deserve more attention from both scholars and practitioners in the fields of peace- and state-building, democracy promotion, regime transition and elite research. Analyses of external actors and domestic elites in post-conflict democratisation should therefore address three principal issues: (1) the identification of relevant domestic elites in externally induced or monitored state-building and democratisation processes, (2) the dynamics of external–domestic interactions and (3) the impact of these interactions on the outcomes of post-conflict democratisation.