Religion and the Scottish Independence Referendum

The Scottish independence referendum debate, like the Act of Union of 1707, has significant religious dimensions. The Act gave special recognition through the monarch to the Presbyterian Church of Scotland. The Church, a national church, has not yet declared a position on independence, but is seeking to protect its existing privileges whatever the result. The Roman Catholic Church, recognised by the Scottish Parliament, unlike its formal rejection by the UK Parliament and monarchy, symbolically associates itself with the case for independence. Paradoxically, Catholics supporting independence subject themselves, in their religious lives, to an authoritarian foreign power. The SNP Scottish Government attempts to draw Roman Catholic support for independence from its traditional support base in the Labour Party by cultivating a sense of religious grievance that is not justified by the evidence. Old religious divisions are still relevant but non‐religion is growing fast and resulting in new perspectives on the independence debate.     

The Monarchy,the State and Religion: Modernising the Relationships

Aspects of contemporary monarchy and government in relation to religion are out of step with contemporary society and require systematic reform. The removal of religious and gender discrimination in the arrangements for succession to the monarchy would be in conformity with modern anti‐discrimination attitudes. The monarchy should also consider stepping back from its religious role. The monarch has an official role as Supreme Governor of the Church of England but less than a quarter of the population identify as Anglican and in its current attempts to be inclusive the monarchy seeks to respect and support other religions whose beliefs and practices are at variance with those of the C of E and the general population. In Scotland a new settlement could be promoted by the disestablishment of the Church of Scotland (comparable to the situation in Wales and Northern Ireland) and the ending of separate Roman Catholic state education.     

Political, Religious and Cultural Identities: The Undercurrents of Scottish Football

Despite recognition that religion plays an important role in Scottish and that Scotland has long been different from England in matters involving religion, there remains a dearth of relevant research on this subject. For example, only in recent years, with the works of Mitchell (1992) and Curtice and Seawright (1995), has there been a qualified look at least at one aspect of this relationship, the association between religion and politics. This paper will bring both of these subjects together by considering the religious and political undercurrents that for many people have come to characterise Scottish football. A characterisation that is particularly evident in the case of the two major clubs in Scotland: Glasgow Rangers and Celtic.     

Scotland's independence vote looms over UK

‘Should Scotland be an independent country?’ If Scottish residents vote ‘yes’ in September the UK will undergo a break-up that will raise fundamental questions on both sides of the Scottish border, as well as for other European nations with separatist movements.     

Valence Politics in Scotland: Towards an Explanation of the 2007 Election

In this article we use evidence from the Scottish Election Study 2007 to build an explanation for the narrow SNP victory in the Holyrood election. The theoretical focus is on valence models of voting, which are increasingly important in Scotland following dealignment and ideological convergence in the party system, and as Scottish governments flex their executive muscle. Exploring the valence battleground reveals mixed but overall negative evaluations of Labour's performance in government, and suggests advantages for the SNP on issue competence, leadership and party image. Modelling party choice at the individual level shows that key valence variables – performance evaluations, economic competence and party image – have strong and significant effects, unlike hitherto prominent factors like religion, class and national identity. Constitutional preferences are important too, but their effects suggest a further valence link: the SNP's strong showing among voters seeking further devolution but opposed to independence is due in large part to its credentials as a battler for Scottish interests. In contrast, Labour's stand against 'more powers' may have tarnished its own reputation on that score. We conclude that the SNP edged home by persuading enough voters that it had a positive agenda for governing Scotland within the current constitutional arrangements, and that it could deliver on that agenda.     

Scotland's Sectarianism Problem: Irish Answers?

A series of developments during the 2010–11 football season has led to an intense public debate over the question of the nature and extent of religious sectarianism in Scotland. The Scottish National Party (SNP) government has responded with a new piece of legislation which has been widely criticised and has prompted some commentators to speculate about a political ‘own goal’. This article provides a guide to the debate around sectarianism and its historical and political dimensions. It also suggests that the Irish roots of the problem in Scotland should be properly acknowledged, and that a possible way forward could involve cooperation between Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland within the structures and procedures of the British–Irish Council (BIC).     

Politics in a Cold Climate: The Conservative Decline in Scotland

An important feature over the last 30 years has been the increasing shortfall in the Conservative vote in Scotland compared with England. The Conservative Party, despite social structural disadvantages in terms of housing tenure and social class, did unusually well until the mid-1950s, particularly among Unionists and Protestants. After considering the historical and religious factors explaining earlier Conservative political strength, it is argued that two factors help to explain the changing politics of the state in Scotland: the establishment of Scotland as a separate unit of economic management in popular perception and the greater dependence on direct state involvement. The Scottish economic dimension has made Scotland an ideological category largely incompatible with Conservative English/British national rhetoric as employed by Mrs Thatcher.     

Who's European? Scotland and England Compared

In the Brexit referendum in 2016, Scotland voted 62 per cent Remain, and England 53 per cent Leave. This article explores whether this came about because more people in Scotland considered themselves ‘strongly European’ compared with people in England. Analysis of Scottish and British Social Attitudes survey data for 2017 shows that people in Scotland are significantly more inclined to say they are ‘strongly European’ (45 per cent) than in England (34 per cent), a finding that holds true across the spectrum of socio‐demographic and political variables. Nevertheless, the key predictors of being strongly European are similar in both countries: having liberal values, high levels of education, political party support, as well as being British, while in Scotland supporting the Scottish National Party and being in favour of independence are important. ‘Being European’ has taken on different meanings in Scotland and England as the aftermath of the Brexit referendum works its way through the political process.     

Questions of Sovereignty: Redefining Politics in Scotland?

The issue of sovereignty has never been resolved in Scotland. The 1998 Scotland Act, creating the Scottish Parliament affirmed that the Westminster Parliament is sovereign, but this is disputed. In practice, the issue was left largely in abeyance as sovereignty was seen as an outdated concept. The Scottish independence referendum of 2014 and the UK Brexit referendum of 2016 both brought back the question of sovereignty in stark terms. Analysis of data from the British Election Study of 2019 with regard to (a) the right of Scottish self‐determination, and (b) the right of a UK‐wide majority to take Scotland out of the EU, allows us to identify ‘sovereigntists’ and ‘unionists’. Sovereigntists, on both dimensions, now constitute a majority. A smaller group of unionists reject both positions. There remains a group of ‘semi‐sovereigntists’ who accept Scottish self‐determination, but also that the UK as a whole should decide on Brexit. Controlling for the social and political factors, Scots are increasingly polarised around issues of sovereignty, which have become central to contemporary Scottish politics.     

The European Dimension to Scottish Constitutional Change

Scottish self‐government and European integration are linked. Europe has become an important framework for the independence project. Evidence for Scots being more pro‐European is ambivalent, but there is a pro‐European consensus in Scottish political parties and civil society. In the referendum campaign, the No side suggested that an independent Scotland might not gain admission to the European Union. If the United Kingdom as a whole should vote to withdraw from the EU in a future referendum but Scotland to stay in, the independence question would re‐emerge. In the absence of independence, a number of issues arise as to how Scottish interests can best be represented in the EU.     

The Sacred Kingdom and the Royal Wedding of 2011

Despite secularisation and increased religious diversity the UK state and the monarchy are religiously legitimated institutions which have their origins in protestant/catholic divisions over three hundred years ago but which remain strong enough to survive in the current era. The Church of England acts not only as the established church of England but as a church for the UK with respect to events such as the coronation and the royal wedding of 2011. Ecumenical and interfaith initiatives have been attempted by the government and the monarchy and were evident in attendance at the wedding but it demonstrated the ritual supremacy of the state church and the inevitable difficulties of seeking to achieve formal representation for religious diversity in the state. Attempts at more formally inclusive religious involvement in state institutions conflict with other goals such as gender equity and suggest that secular state institutions might be fairer to all religions, denominations and those with no beliefs.     

Territorial Finance and the Future of Barnett

This article traces the changing funding relationships between Scotland and the UK government. Beginning from the Barnett Formula, it examines how the changing support within Scotland for greater political autonomy from Westminster has influenced the mechanisms that have determined Scotland's fiscal structure. Increasing support for the SNP, and then for the Yes campaign in the September 2014 independence referendum, has led to a mixture of new powers being granted to the Scottish Parliament. The Scotland Act 2012 extends the Scottish government's control over income tax and some other small taxes. Although independence was rejected by the Scottish people in September 2014, the ‘Vow’ made by the Westminster parties immediately before the vote is leading to far‐reaching changes in the UK's fiscal structure. This will cause a very substantial change in intergovernmental relations within the UK, which the Barnett Formula may not survive.     

Religion,partisanship and preferences for redistribution

This article offers a new theoretical explanation of the relationship between religion and the demand for redistribution. Previous literature shows that religious individuals are less likely to favour redistribution either because (a) religion provides a substitute for state welfare provision, or (b) it adds a salient moral dimension to an individual's calculus which induces them to act contrary to their economic interests. In this article, it is argued that the effect of religion on an individual's redistributive preferences is best explained by their partisanship, via a process of partisan motivated reasoning. In contexts where parties are able to combine religion with pro-redistribution policies, religious individuals are more likely to favour redistribution as doing so reinforces their partisan identity. In advanced democracies, religious individuals are more likely to be supporters of centre-right parties that oppose redistribution. However, in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) the historical and political context leads to the opposite expectation. The nature of party competition in CEE has seen nationalist populist parties adopt policy platforms that combine religion and leftist economic programmes. They are able to credibly combine these two positions due to the way in which religion and the welfare state became linked to conceptions of the nation during the inter-war state-building years. Using data from 2002–2014, the study shows that religiosity is associated with pro-redistribution attitudes in CEE. Furthermore, religious supporters of nationalist populist parties are more likely to favour redistribution than religious supporters of other parties. The results of this research add greater nuance to our understanding of the relationship between religiosity and economic preferences.     

Putting Politics First: The Impact of Politics on American Religious and Secular Orientations

Nearly all research on the political impact of Americans’ religious and secular orientations assumes that such orientations are exogenous to politics. Using multiwave panel and experimental data, we find that religious and secular orientations are endogenous to political orientations. In other words, religion and secularism are a consequence as well as a cause of politics. In showing this, we make three major contributions. First, we conceptualize and measure secular orientations in a new way—not just as the absence of religion, but also as an affirmative secular identity and positive commitment to secular principles. Second, our panel and experimental data allow for the most definitive test to date of whether political orientations exert a causal effect on religious and secular orientations. Third, we isolate the conditions under which politics affects religious–secular perspectives, thus identifying the mechanism that underlies political orientations.     

Anatomy of a Scottish Revolution: The Potential of Postnationalist Scotland and the Future of the United Kingdom

Scottish politics isn't about some remote northern politics but go to the heart of the nature, character and power dimensions of the UK and British state. Scotland has been dramatically changed by the scale of the SNP landslide victory in the 2011 Scottish Parliament elections. Scottish society, identity and culture along with the politics of unionism and nationalism have all changed and will change further. The old fashioned politics of devolution are dead, but what comes next and what are the consequences for Scottish independence? What has to be challenged are old‐fashioned out‐of‐date views of the SNP, and the unreconstructed nationalism of the British state.     

Laborde’s religion

ABSTRACT

Cécile Laborde’s Liberalism’s Religion proposes liberal principles to address political controversies over religion. One is the public reason requirement that reasons for state policies should be accessible. Another is the civic inclusiveness requirement according to which symbolic religious establishment is wrong when it communicates that religious identity is a component of civic identity. A third is the claim that liberal states have meta-jurisdictional authority to settle the boundary between what counts as religion and what counts as non-religion. The article considers whether Laborde has managed to articulate these three principles in a way that is operationalisable and can serve to provide solutions to practical controversies over religion. It is argued that Laborde’s formulations leave important issues open, and some ways of settling these issues are considered.     

Politics of God or Politics of Man? The Role of Religion and Deprivation in Predicting Support for Political Violence in Israel

This study examines the associations between religious affiliation and religiosity and support for political violence through a nationwide sample of Israeli Jews and Muslims. Based on structural equation modeling, the findings show that by and large Muslims are more supportive of political violence than Jews and more religious persons are less supportive of political violence. Deprivation, however, was found to mediate these relations, showing that the more deprived – whether Muslims or Jews, religious or non-religious persons – are more supportive of political violence. The explanatory strength of religion and deprivation combined in this manner was found to be stronger than any of these variables on their own. The findings cast doubt on negative stereotypes both of Islam and of religiosity as promoting political violence. They suggest that governments which want peace at home, in Israel as elsewhere, would do well to ensure that ethnic and religious differences are not translated into, and compounded by, wide socio-economic gaps.     

Religion and discrimination: extending the ‘disaggregative approach’

ABSTRACT

Cécile Laborde’s disaggregation strategy, which is convincingly applied to religion, liberal neutrality, and freedom of association, should be extended to discrimination, in order to more systematically determine whether, when, and why indirect religious discrimination is unfair. Moreover, while Laborde’s distinction between the ‘Disproportionate Burden scenario’ and the ‘Majority Bias scenario’ is a powerful alternative to the discrimination-focused account of the justifiability of religious exemptions, the epistemic status of that distinction is not immediately clear. A case can be made that Disproportionate Burden and Majority Bias do not map onto different types of minority exemption claims. They are perspectives or analytical frames that may jointly and usefully be applied to most instances of such claims.     

Reading between the lines: party cues and SNP support for Scottish independence and Brexit

Scotland’s future within the European Union (EU) played a prominent role in the 2014 independence referendum. The story goes that latent supporters of independence voted to stay within the UK to maintain EU access. Defeated, Scottish leaders declared the referendum a once-in-a-life-time event only repeated if conditions substantially changed. With the UK now facing a chaotic exit from the EU, proponents of Scottish independence have suggested that a second referendum may occur after Brexit negotiations are completed. Faced with a consensus among Scottish party leaders in supporting EU membership, those hoping for a second independence referendum, we argue, looked to alternate sources of information that saw Brexit as an opportunity to create the conditions that would spur a second referendum. Using panel data from the British Election Study, we examine whether Scottish voters voted tactically to leave the EU. We argue that Scottish National Party voters were likely to interpret statements on the conditions for a second independence referendum as an implicit signal to vote “Leave.” The results have important implications for the role of referendums in representative democracy, strategic voting, and the importance of intra-party division on individual vote choices.     

Campus Religious Life in America: Revitalization and Renewal

What role does organized religion play in the life of the American campus? Among both scholarly and popular observers, the university has long been regarded as secular territory. Contrary to the .cphsecularization thesis, the history of campus religion is not a declension narrative. This essay provides an overview of the student religious landscape in America, focusing most of its attention on schools that are not affiliated with a religious tradition. It identifies six signs of religious vitality on campus: 1) the expansion of evangelicalism; 2) the revitalization of Catholic student organizations; 3) the reinvention of campus Judaism; 4) the growth of new immigrant and alternative religions; 5) the beginnings of renewal in mainline Protestant campus ministries; 6) the embrace of spirituality by student affairs professionals. Noting several recent studies on education and religiosity, it concludes that college is not especially damaging to religious commitment.